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To Mom and Dad

For my part, I used to consider that nothing happens by chance or by accident …. So I
was not far from the view of those who think that all things are absolutely necessary; who
think that security from compulsion is enough for freedom, even though it is under the
rule of necessity, and who do not distinguish the infallible … from the necessary. But I
was dragged back from this precipice by a consideration of those possibles which neither
do exist, nor will exist, nor have existed.
—Leibniz, “On Freedom”
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ABSTRACT
G. W. Leibniz professes a commitment to historical Christian theism, but the depth and
orthodoxy of his commitment has been questioned throughout the past three centuries. In
this project I defend both the cogency and the orthodoxy of Leibniz’s philosophical
theology and, by extension, its application to the Christian task of theodicy. At the heart
of this defense is the central claim of this project, namely, that Leibniz’s philosophical
theology represents a traditional brand of Augustinianism. In short, I argue that Leibniz’s
theodicy is not his own, but is the tacit claim of a longstanding theological tradition made
explicit and brought to bear on the problem of evil as articulated in Leibniz’s day.
Accompanying this central claim are a number of subordinate claims, the most significant
of which center on how we read Leibniz on providence and on free choice. Regarding the
former, I argue that Leibniz’s understanding of providence has precedence in and is a
recapitulation of older Augustinian views of the God-world relationship. As for free
choice, I maintain that the Augustinian tradition is not only incompatiblist, or libertarian,
but was recognized as such in Leibniz’s day. Hence in adhering to this tradition, Leibniz
is knowingly adhering to a libertarian theology. I show that his adherence to this tradition
and its views of freedom has significant textual support. My method of defense is both
historical and constructive. On the historical side I focus primarily on contextual and
textual analysis. However, insofar as this defense includes the viability of Leibniz’s
theodicy for Christian theology and theodicy today, constructive engagement with
Leibniz’s contemporary objectors and the current literature on the problem of evil is also
required. Therefore, I devote the latter part of this defense to lingering objections and
interlocution with current approaches to the problem of evil. In the end I conclude that
xii

Leibniz’s theodicy, when read in the light of the Augustinian tradition, is not only
orthodox, cogent, and defensible, but is perhaps the most viable response to the problem
of evil for traditional Christian theology, if not the inevitable response for a traditional
Augustinian.

xiii

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the past three centuries, Gottfried Leibniz has been accused of
determinism,1 deism,2 and various degrees of Spinozism.3 Yet, Leibniz places himself

1

E.g., Leonhard Euler, Lettres a une princesse d'allemagne sur divers sujets de physique et de
philosophie (London: la Société Typographique, 1775), 17-20; J. Th. C. of Wirtembergh, “Philosophiæ
Leibnitianæ & Wolphianæ Usus in Theologia, per præcipua Fidei capita: Præmittitur Disseratio de Ratione
& Revelatione, de Natura & Gratia,” in Historia Litteraria: Or, An Exact and Early Account of the Most
Valuable Books Published in the Several Parts of Europe, ed. Archibald Bower (London: N. Prevost,
1732), vol. 4, no. 20, 195-96; François Aubert, Entretiens sur la nature de l'ame des bêtes (A Basle, 1760),
294; Marquis d’Argens, New memoirs establishing a true knowledge of mankind, by discovering the
affections of the heart, and the operations of the understanding, [...] By the Marquis d'Argens, [...] with
letters from the Baron de Spon, ... two novels, Spanish and French; and [...] Thoughts on the art of
beautifying the face. By Mademoiselle Cochois, [...], 2 vols. (London: D. Browne, et al., 1747), vol. 2, 20812; Anthony Collins, A philosophical inquiry concerning human liberty (London: R. Robinson, 1735),
30ff.; Voltaire, Philosophical, Literary, and Historical Pieces, 2nd ed., trans. W. S. Kenrick (London:
Fielding and Walker, 1780), 411-2; Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John
Bell, et al., 1788), 334-5; Richard Falckenberg, History of Modern Philosophy, 3rd English ed. from 2nd
German ed., trans. A. C. Armstrong, Jr. (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1897), 274 (First edition: 1888;
second edition: 1892); Alfred Weber, History of Philosophy, trans. Frank Thilly (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1896), 359-60; Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, History of Modern Philosophy in France (Chicago:
The Open Court Publishing Company, 1899), 118; Wilhelm Max Wundt, Ethics: An Investigation of the
Facts and Laws of the Moral Life, trans. Margaret Floy Washburn (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.,
1897), 97-9; Friedrich Ueberweg, History of Philosophy from Thales to the Present Time (New York:
Scribner, Armstrong, & Co., 1876), vol. 2, 116; S. H. Mellone, The Dawn of Modern Thought: Descartes,
Spinoza, Leibniz (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), 97-115; B. A. G. Fuller, A History of Modern
Philosophy, 3rd ed. (New York: Holt, et al., 1960), 118 (first published in 1938); R. P. Sertillanges, Le
Problème du Mal l’Histoire (Paris, 1948), 234-35; Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Socrates to Sartre: A History of
Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), 273; C. D. Broad, Leibniz: An Introduction
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975); D. W. Hamlyn, A History of Western Philosophy (London:
Viking, 1987), 160-64; R. C. Sleigh, Jr., Leibniz & Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); R. C. Sleigh, Jr., “Leibniz on Freedom and Necessity: Critical Notice of
Robert Adams, Lebniz: Determinist, Theist, and Idealist,” The Philosophical Review 108:2 (April, 1999), 24577; Robert Sleigh, Jr., Vere Chappell, and Michael Della Rocca, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” in The
Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, 2 vols., eds. Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), vol. 2, 1195-1278; and Robert Merrihew Adams, Leibniz:
Determinist, Theist, Idealist (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
2

E.g., Sir Isaac Newton, “An Account of the Book Entitled ‘Commercium Epistolicum Collinii
Aliorum, De Analysipromota; Published by order of the Royal-Society, in relation to the Dispute between
Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Keill, about the Right of Invention of the Method of Fluxions, by some call'd the
Differential Method’,” The Royal Society of London, Philosophical Transactions (1683-1775) 29:342
(1715): 178-216; Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, 338-39; Thomas Reid, Essays on the
Intellectual and Active Powers of Man, 3 vols. (Dublin: P. Byrne and J. Milliken, 1790), vol. 1, 263-64;
Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Œuvres philosophiques (Berlin: Jean Nourse, 1751), 222-26; and Falckenberg,
History of Modern Philosophy, 270-80.

1

2
within historical Christian orthodoxy throughout his mature writings (e.g., A 6.4:2355455). Though some would dismiss such posturing as a public façade,4 such a dismissal
has much to account for. Leibniz’s writings display unusual mastery of and attention to
historical theology and scholastic minutia (e.g., G 6:49-101); his corpus is littered with
detailed notes on theological figures and disputes (e.g., C 25-7; Grua 1:76-80, 150-55,
338-46, 347-59, 380-88; 2:560-1; A 6.1:508-13; 6.4:1680-90);5 and he himself penned
several theological treatises, including Examen religionis Christianae and De
praedestinatione et gratia dissertatio. Moreover, the former work professes to be
Leibniz’s own theological system (A 6.4:2355), a system that is itself thoroughly
traditional. In addition, unlike some philosophers in his day, such as Pierre Bayle,

3

E.g., F. W. J. Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, trans. Andrew Bowie
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 77-83; Falckenberg, History of Modern Philosophy,
277f.; Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Oxford, 2001),
vol. 1, 6-8 (first published in 1851); Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, vol. 2, 111; and 116.Note also the
exchange between Louis Racine, Le Chevalier De Ramsey, and Alexander Pope which nowhere references
Leibniz, only fatalism, Spinozism, and deism (Louis Racine, La religion, poëme; par Monsieur Racine, De
l’Académie Royale des Inscriptions & Belles-Lettres, 2 vols. [London, 1785], 299; 301; 303; and 306); yet,
Pope gathers the exchange under the heading, “As some passages in the Essay on Man have been suspected
of favouring the schemes of Leibnitz and Spinoza, or of a tendency towards Fate and Naturalism, it is
thought proper here to insert the two following Letters, to show how ill-grounded such a suspicion is,” thus
treating Leibniz as synonymous with fatalism, Spinozism, or (weak disjunctive) deism. Pope, The Poetical
Works of Alexander Pope, with His Last Corrections, Additions, and Improvements. From the Text of Dr.
Warburton. With the Life of the Author., 2 vols. (London: C. Cooke and Paternoster-Row, 1795), vol. 1,
243; Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz with an Appendix of Leading
Passages (London: Routledge, 1997), xi.
4

E.g., Russell, Critical Exposition, x; and Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 581-96. This narrative also appears in Russell’s “Recent Work on
the Philosophy of Leibniz,” Mind 12, no. 2 (1903): 177-201. This review is reprinted in The Collected
Papers of Bertrand Russell, eds. Alasdair Urquhart and Albert C. Lewis (New York: Routledge, 1994).
5

For an extended treatment of Leibniz’s various writings on Trinity and Incarnation, see Maria
Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation, trans. Gerald Parks (New Haven: Yale,
2007).

3
Leibniz does not isolate his theology from his philosophy.6 As Essais de theodicée
shows, Leibniz sides with the historical Christian stance on faith and reason (G 6:49101); he casts the problem of evil on a Christian backdrop of God’s eternal decrees and
the Christian creation-fall-redemption-consummation narrative (G 6:102-5); and he gives
special attention to problems that emerge out of sacred Scripture (G 6:143ff.).
Though one could try to dismiss these numerous theological forays as the mere
byproduct of Leibniz’s prolific genius, theology was no mere curiosity for him. Leibniz
devoted a great deal of effort to reconciling protestant and Catholic divisions, both in his
writings and in his person. Leibniz dedicated numerous works, brief and lengthy, to the
effort; he met with Cristóbal de Rojas y Spinola, Bishop of Tina, who had received papal
permission to negotiate reunion with the Princes of Germany; Leibniz was privy to the
plan for Catholic-protestant reunion, drafted by Lutheran theologian Gerhard Molanus—a
plan about which Leibniz himself corresponded with French bishop, Jacques Bossuet;
and Leibniz continued to play a role in protestant-Catholic negotiations at the behest of
Georg Ludwig after the apparent failure of these negotiations in 1691. Perhaps most
noteworthy, however, is that in such dialogs, while Leibniz conceded that ecclesiastical
reunion could be had via civil union and tolerance, he was committed to theological
reunion—a strange ideal for one who does not advocate the type of theology at issue.
This ideal is embodied in Leibniz’s De praedestinatione et gratia dissertatio (1706),
wherein he navigates the fine points of predestination among protestants by commenting

6

On the relationship between philosophy and theology in the works of Pierre Bayle, see Hubert
Bost, “Pierre Bayle, un «protestant compliqué»,” in Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), le philosophe de Rotterdam:
Philosophy, Religion and Reception, Selected Papers of the Tercentenary Conference held at Rotterdam,
7–8 December 2006, eds. Wiep van Bunge and Hans Bots (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), 83-101. An
English translation of this essay appears in The Persistence of the Sacred in Modern Thought, eds. Chris L.
Firestone and Nathan A. Jacobs (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), ch. 7.

4
on bishop Gilbert Burnet’s exposition of article 17 of The Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion
in an effort to show how theological divisions might be mended.7 The resulting treatise,
much like his other writings, demonstrates not only Leibniz’s thorough grasp of
theological minutia, but his own rather traditional theological commitments within the
discussion.
Leibniz’s intellectual biography also gives reason to think that confessional
Christian theology was of great importance in his intellectual formation. Leibniz’s father,
Friedrich, a professor of moral philosophy at University of Leipzig, provided Leibniz
with a living example of intellect mingled with Christian piety (see P 165).8 Following
his father’s death, Leibniz gained access to his father’s library, and gave himself over to
Latin classics, Hellenistic philosophy, patristic works, and scholastic theology (both
medieval and then-contemporary) from age eight onward.9 As E. J. Aiton notes,
“Alongside the logical exercises performed in school, Leibniz pursued at home, in his
father’s library, the study of metaphysics, both scholastic and more recent, as well as
theology, concentrating especially on the works of the famous Catholic and protestant
controversialists” (see P 168).10 The significance of the scholastic facet of Leibniz’s
studies is testified to by which works Leibniz chose to keep from his father’s library. As
Maria Rosa Antognazza notes, when Leibniz reluctantly agreed to sell off the library to
settle his schooling debts, he requested to keep only a handful of books:
7

For a complete synopsis of Leibniz’s role in the above protestant-Catholic dialogs, see G. W.
Leibniz, Dissertation on Predestination and Grace, ed. / trans. Michael J. Murray (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2011), §1.
8

See also E. J. Aiton, Leibniz: A Biography (Bristol, England: Adam Hilger Ltd., 1985), 9.

9

Aiton, Leibniz, 10-2.

10

Aiton, Leibniz, 13.

5
These included works by five figures closely related to the post-Ramist tradition
and the Herborn school—most notably Keckermann’s voluminous Opera omnia,
the juridical encylopaedia of the famous Herborn political theorist, Johannes
Althusius (1557-1638), and the brilliant logical and encyclopaedic works of
Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld, several of which the young Leibniz had annotated
apparently between 1663 and 1666. Miscellaneous sources also document
Leibniz’s familiarity with other key writers in this tradition around the same time.
By 1664 he was acquainted with some of Alsted’s writings; in 1667 he quoted
several works by Comenius; and by the latter date he had read works by Johannes
Piscator (1546-1625), the longstanding rector of the Herborn academy and
pioneer of its Ramist approach to philosophy and theology. Later still, his private
library included works of Alsted, Althusius, Keckermann, Johann Rudolph
Lavater, and Anton Matthaeus, as well as Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624),
Alsted’s philosophical tutor in Herborn.11
Such influences are additionally noteworthy when we consider that in 1961,
Leroy E. Loemker made the case that one of the main influences on Leibniz was the
Herborn encyclopedists. As Loemker points out, “From its foundation in 1584 the old
university at Herborn flourished as a center of Reformed theology and philosophy, in
close relationship with schools with like convictions in England (particularly Cambridge)
and the protestant Netherlands.”12 Yet, Loemker observed then that Leibniz studies has
yet to fully account for this influence. Regrettably, not much has changed since Loemker
first made this observation. Though Leibniz scholarship has made great strides
throughout the 20th century and beyond on various features of Leibniz’s philosophical
theology,13 there remains surprisingly little by way of theological readings of Leibniz.14

11

Maria Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge University Press,
2009), 41-2.
12

Leroy E Loemker, “Leibniz and the Herborn Encyclopedists,” Journal of the History of Ideas
22:3 (1961): 323.
13

See Donald Rutherford and J. A. Cover, “Introduction,” in Leibniz: Nature and Freedom, eds.
Donald Rutherford and J. A. Cover (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
14

Recent exceptions include Paul R. Hinlicky, Paths Not Taken (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
2009); Antognazza, Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation; Michael J. Murray, “Introduction,” in
Dissertation on Predestination and Grace, ed. / trans. Michael J. Murray (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2011); Michael J. Murray, “Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human

6
Yet, it is this very type of reading that, in my assessment, casts suspicion on the all-toocommon determinist, deist, and Spinozist portraits of Leibniz that continue to decorate
the halls of contemporary scholarship.
The goal of this project is to help fill the theological lacuna in Leibniz studies by
offering a theological reading of Leibniz on free choice, providence, and evil. This
reading argues that, at least on matters of free choice and providence, Leibniz is a
traditional Augustinian, and that his subsequent theodicy is a natural extension of this
tradition’s theological claims. I have labeled this reading a “defense” of Leibniz’s
theodicy because the results (a) cast suspicion on the respective determinist, deist, and
Spinozist portraits of Leibniz, and (b) argue for not only the orthodoxy but the cogency of
Leibniz’s response to the problem of evil.

1. Outline of Chapters
This project consists of three parts and six chapters. In Part 1, we will look at the
current state of the question concerning Leibniz on free choice and providence, and
examine some challenges that these trends face when considered in the light of the
Augustinian tradition. I first offer a survey of theologically suspect portraits of Leibniz
from his death in 1716 to the present (chapter 1). My aim throughout is threefold: (1) to
bring to light the spectrum of interpretations found throughout the past three centuries
and how the necessitarian reading compounds over time; (2) to demonstrate the
dominance of the necessitarian reading in the literature; and (3) to highlight the
presuppositions that undergird the determinist, deist, and Spinozist interpretations of the
Freedom,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55, no. 1 (Mar., 1995); Michael J. Murray,
“Spontaneity and Freedom in Leibniz,” in Leibniz, eds. Rutherford and Cover.

7
past three centuries. Concerning the third of these goals, I bring to light eight
interpretative assumptions that play a pivotal role in the necessitarian portrait of Leibniz,
the majority of which assume either that libertarian choice requires freedom of equipoise
or that moral necessity is incompatible with libertarian choice.
The centrality of these interpretive assumptions proves significant as we set this
interpretive history in contrast with the Augustinian tradition (chapter 2). My goal here is
to establish (1) that the Augustinian tradition displays an incompatibilist commitment in
its ancient, medieval, and post-Reformation incarnations; (2) that the Augustinian
tradition was recognized as incompatibilist in Leibniz’s day; (3) that despite its
incompatibilist commitments, this tradition rejects equipoise and advocates moral
necessity; and (4) that the Augustinian tradition stands at odds with at least five core
interpretive assumptions identified in chapter 1. Taken together, these points open the
door to an interpretive possibility untried in the history of Leibniz interpretation, namely,
that Leibniz is a libertarian, not because he accepts the then-new assumptions of many
libertarian proponents in his day, but because he is in agreement with an older
Augustinian philosophy that both advocates incompatibilism and likewise rejects the
then-new assumptions regarding what libertarian choice requires.
Part 2 marks my turn to Leibniz himself. Leibniz scholars disagree over whether
Leibniz’s pre-1700 views on free choice match his post-1700 views on free choice;15
hence my exposition of Leibniz consists of a pre-1700 treatment of Leibniz’s
philosophical theology, followed by an examination of his philosophical theology in
Essais de theodicée (1711). My exposition of Leibniz aims at demonstrating that his
15

See, e.g., Sleigh, et al., “Determinism and Human Freedom,” vol. 2, 1195-1278, esp. 1265-7.
These same arguments also appear in Sleigh, “Leibniz on Freedom and Necessity,” 245-277.
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mature understanding of free choice, providence, and evil sits comfortably within the
Augustinian tradition, as does his application of these insights to the problem of evil in
Theodicée. My pre-1700 exposition of Leibniz (chapter 3) focuses on his 1686 essay,
“Vérités necessaries et contingents,” which (a) is one of the more systematic pre-1700
treatments of Leibniz’s philosophical theology, (b) pulls together into one place claims
scattered throughout his other 1680s writings, and (c) has been recognized in Leibniz
studies as a seminal representative of Leibniz’s early views on free choice.16 The findings
of chapter 3 give good reason to think Leibniz’s early thought on free choice and
providence is both libertarian and Augustinian. Following this initial exposition, I move
directly into Leibniz’s application of his philosophical theology in Theodicée (chapter 4).
In the end, we will see (1) that Leibniz remains consistent in his understanding on free
choice and providence, (2) that his understanding of these matters is deeply rooted in the
Augustinian tradition, and (3) that Leibniz’s application of this understanding to the
problem of evil is a natural extension of his Augustinian commitments.17
Having established in part 2 Leibniz’s Augustinian commitments, I turn in Part 3
to a lingering challenge to the rereading of part 2 and the contemporary task of theodicy.
Regarding the former, I examine a difficulty surrounding Leibniz’s talk of possible
worlds, namely, the problem of superessentialism (chapter 5). This problem states that
16

In 1902, Louis Couturat used the essay to argue for the Spinozist reading and successfully
persuaded Bertrand Russell of his case. Russell went on record, admitting the falsehood of his published
compatibilist-theist interpretation (see note 4 above). In 1992, R. Cranston Paull used “Vérités” to argue for
a rare, if not singularly unique, incompatibilist reading of Leibniz (see Paull, “Leibniz and the Miracle of
Freedom”). In 1998, Jack Davidson argued, contra Paull, that “Vérités” demonstrates Leibniz’s affirmation
of compatibilism, not incompatibilism (see Davidson, “Imitators of God”).
17. When using the term “Reformed scholastics” or “Reformed scholasticism” in this work, I am
affirming the conclusion of Richard Muller (et al.) that a specific method of medieval theology was
employed by Reformed theologians of the 16th and 17th centuries. See Richard Muller, Post-Reformation
Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, 4 vols.
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2003), vol. 1, “Introduction.”
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Leibniz’s view of identity makes every act an essential property of the given individual;
hence, no individual can be conceived in any possible world other than his own possible
world, nor can he be conceived as doing in that world other than he in fact does. After
considering the failings of a number of contemporary solutions, I highlight the ways in
which both the charge of superessentialism and these solutions build on the sensibilities
of contemporary modal logic. Yet I argue that there are significant differences between
the older, metaphysical approach to possible worlds and the approach in contemporary
modal logic, and that Leibniz is best read in the light of the former. By appeal to this
more metaphysically robust view of possible worlds, I show how Leibniz could answer
the problem of superessentialism raised by his critics.
After answering the problem of superessentialism, I look at objections to
Leibniz’s theodicy in the current literature, and consider the ramifications of this
reinterpretation of Leibniz for the contemporary task of theodicy (chapter 6). My
assessment has two stages. The first stage revisits four objections leveled against
Leibniz’s notion of “the best” that remain unaddressed by the reading of part 2. I show
how these challenges presume a picture of Leibniz very unlike the one painted here, and
how these challenges can be overcome under the rereading here offered. The second
stage looks at the constructive task of theodicy as it exists today and Leibniz’s potential
contribution once revised along lines suggested here. I survey some of the dominant
approaches to theodicy today and scrutinize how these positions compare with Leibniz’s
own. While some approaches to theodicy are incompatible with Leibniz, I will show (1)
that Leibniz’s approach to theodicy is strongly accommodating of and compatible with
most affirmative theodicies, and (2) that while Leibniz is often dismissed in
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contemporary literature as a rationalist who is too optimistic, his approach is far more
humble than those of his critics.
In the end, I conclude that the determinist, deist, and Spinozist portraits of Leibniz
remain at some distance from Leibniz’s true visage. While Leibniz is not entirely without
philosophical innovation (in his monadology, for example), a theological rereading of
Leibniz makes clear that he sits squarely within the Augustinian tradition on matters of
free choice and providence. Though one may object to aspects of this tradition, Leibniz’s
approach to theodicy is arguably the inevitable reply to the problem of evil available to
its adherents.

2. Terminological Issues and Clarifications
Before moving into the arguments to follow, several terminological issues should
be addressed. The first set of terminological issues surrounds the meaning and limits of a
trio of terms already used above, namely, “deism,” “Spinozism,” and “Augustinian.”
Deism, in its modern incarnations, has two primary traits. The first is that that the
God-world relationship is such that the possibility of divine interruption is impossible,
unnecessary, or simply unworthy of God.18 The second, to quote Allen Wood, is that
“there is such a thing as rational or natural religion, religion based on natural reason and
not on supernatural revelation.”19 This latter conviction is often accompanied, among the
modern rationalists, by either a dismissal of the necessity of divine revelation or an
18

This trait is the point of concern in 18th century charges of deism leveled against Leibniz. See
Anonymous, “An Account of ‘Commercium Epistolicum Collinii Aliorum, De Analysipromota […]’”;
Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, 338-39; de La Mettrie, Œuvres philosophiques, 222-26; and
Falckenberg, History of Modern Philosophy, 270-80.
19

Allen W. Wood, “Kant’s Deism,” in Kant’s Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered, eds. Philip J.
Rossi and Michael W. Wreen (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 7.

11
account of how revelation, if it were to occur, could serve a catalytic role in awakening
reason to a priori truths.20 In what follows, my references to Leibniz’s suspected “deism”
center on the impossibility of God-world interaction, per the first of these traits, and will
more often than not hover around Leibniz’s doctrine of pre-established harmony.
Spinozism, as I will use the term, has less to do with whether Leibniz was a
follower of Spinoza per se and more to do with the type of necessitarianism Spinoza
represents. Unlike charges of determinism generally, suspicions of “Spinozism” question
whether the difference between Spinoza and Leibniz on the necessity of things is as
substantial as Leibniz claims. In other words, though Leibniz speaks of possibles that are
nowhere actual (e.g., Grua 1:236), his claims cast suspicion on whether these “possibles”
are anything more than semantic possibilities. In short, Leibniz is suspected of
“Spinozism” when he is read as saying all things are necessary. Yet, this is only a “virtual
Spinozism,” since even those who press Leibniz in this direction admit that Leibniz
retains the very slight distinction that there are logical possibles (i.e., contradiction-free,
subject-predicate combinations) that lack being, even if he denies that there are
metaphysical conditions sufficient to bring about these possibles.21
Augustinian can be taken in the strict sense of the theology of St. Augustine of
Hippo and of only St. Augustine. Alternatively, this term could be used in reference to
20

For two different rationalist approaches to supernatural revelation, see G. E. Lessing, The
Education of the Human Race, §§4 and 7 (in German) in Lessings sämtliche Werke, 6 vols., ed. Robert
Petsch (Berlin, 1907); or (in English) in Lessing’s Theological Writings, trans. Henry Chadwick (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1957). These positions are also discussed in I. A. Dorner, History of
protestant Theology, Particularly in Germany, Viewed According to Its Fundamental Movement and
Connection with the Religious, Moral, and Intellectual Life (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1871), vol. 2, bk. 2,
div. 2, pt. 3, ch. 1ff.; and Emanuel Hirsch, Geschichte der Neuern Evangelischen Theologie. Im
Zusammenhang mit den allgemeinen Bewegungen des europãischen Denkens (C. Bertelsmann Verlag
Gutersloh, 1949), vol. 1, pt. 1, chs. 47-8.
21

E.g., Louis Couturat, “Sur la Métaphysique de Leibniz,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale,
10 (1902): 1-25; and Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, x-xi.
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the Augustinian tradition more broadly—that is, in reference to Augustine and the
reception of his thought in Western theology. On such usage, the term would certainly
refer to the theology of Augustine but would include ancient and medieval receptions of
Augustine’s thought in Boethius, Anselm, Aquinas, et al., and would extend into
Reformation and post-Reformation receptions, both Roman Catholic and protestant. My
use of the term Augustinian, Augustinianism, and other cognates, will be in keeping with
the latter usage. In suggesting that Leibniz is “Augustinian,” I am not suggesting that
Leibniz limits his theological and philosophical resources to Augustine’s corpus. Leibniz
draws heavily on medieval Augustinianism, as well as on Reformation and postReformation Augustinianism. Therefore, my use of the term Augustinian in reference to
Leibniz acknowledges that he is a protestant-Augustinian.
Given this characterization, a word should be said regarding the protestant
reception of pre-Reformation Augustinian theology and what we should expect to find in
Leibniz if this characterization is correct. No doubt confessional protestants (especially
Lutheran and Reformed) maintain that they sit within the Augustinian tradition as faithful
recipients of Augustine’s theology and of much of medieval scholasticism. Hence, among
the “high-orthodox” Reformed scholastics of the 16th and 17th centuries, for example, we
find regular appeal to Augustine and employment of various aspects of medieval
scholasticism, both in terms of method and content.22 For this reason, in establishing
Leibniz’s continuity with the Augustinian tradition, I will look for the same type of
reception. That is to say, if Leibniz is in fact a protestant-Augustinian, what we should
22

By “high orthodox” Reformed thought, I mean that theology developed ca. 1640-1725 in which
Reformed thought reaches its most refined, scholastic development. In employing such a heading, I am
presuming the threefold breakdown of the development of Reformed theology by Muller in PostReformation Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, “Introduction.” Muller’s entire Post-Reformation Reformed
Dogmatics is useful in drawing out the Augustinian and scholastic nature of protestant theology.
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expect to find in his texts is appeal to and use of the pre-Reformation Augustinian
tradition generally—both ancient and medieval—alongside uniquely protestant
commitments, especially regarding soteriology. As we will see, this is precisely what we
find throughout Leibniz’s writings.
One last caveat should be added here. While Leibniz’s soteriological
commitments place him within the Augustinian tradition, and indeed the protestant wing
of this tradition, this does not mean that Leibniz feels bound to ignore or marginalize the
Eastern (or Greek) Church fathers. We will see that Leibniz, like those in Western
medieval and protestant theology, draws on the writings of Easterners, such as John
Chrysostom and John of Damascus, even though Leibniz takes his soteriological cues
from the Augustinian camp. In short, what we find in Leibniz on this point is much what
we find elsewhere in the Augustinian tradition: Leibniz invokes Eastern fathers wherever
useful and to whatever extent their views are consonant with Augustinian theology, but in
matters of soteriology, he tends in a more Western direction and thus gravitates more
often than not toward distinctly Augustinian sources.
A number of additional terms are in need of clarification before we proceed,
namely, those that are invoked in contemporary discussions regarding free choice. A
historically minded reader will notice that I have already begun employing contemporary
labels such as “determinist,” “libertarian,” “compatibilist,” “necessitarian,” and so forth.
Given that these labels correspond to contemporary positions on free choice, applying
them to Leibniz and others of previous eras runs the risk of anachronism. That said, the
positions on free choice that these labels identify are not entirely foreign to the historical
discussion. Thus, while the labels themselves may be anachronistic, the broader positions
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to which they refer are not. We may therefore legitimately ask to which of these
contemporary positions, if any, is Leibniz’s position (and the respective positions of
others) most similar. But to do so properly, we must first flesh out the content of these
labels and the discussions in which they appear. In the space remaining, I will lay bare
my understanding of the contemporary positions on free choice and the terms used
therein, as well as how I will be using them throughout this project.
Determinism has a relatively uniform definition in contemporary literature:
“determinism is the general philosophical thesis which states that for everything that ever
happens there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could happen.”23 In this
basic sense, determinism does not refer to a position on free choice per se. Instead,
determinism is a position on the happenings of our world generally—all that occurs in
our world is such that, for whatever reason, it could not be otherwise. Human acts are
merely one of many occurrences included among these happenings. I say “for whatever
reason” because there are various types of determinism, each of which gives different
reasons for why things could not be otherwise. We can identify five contemporary brands
of determinism. They are physical, psychological, ethical, theological, and logical
determinism.24
Physical determinism is rooted in a reductionistic materialist worldview. The
guiding assumption is that all is reducible to matter in motion. Therefore, all happenings,
including human choice, are determined solely by the laws of physics. Choice, while
23

Richard Taylor, “Determinism,” 359, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 8 vols., ed. Paul
Edwards (New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1967), vol. 2. Cf. Ted Honderich,
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seemingly above the material realm, is in fact determined by material movements and the
laws that bind them, and thus could not be otherwise.
Psychological determinism, while distinguishing mind from matter, presumes
that the mind functions in such a way as to be determined by its own psychology. On this
view, the will is bound by prior causes, but these causes are inner psychological events
rather than purely physical events. According to psychological determinism, an agent
may “freely” choose in accord with his desires (no one coerces the agent), but what he
desires is predetermined by factors outside his control, namely, his own psychological
makeup and mental events.
Ethical determinism is a species of psychological determinism. On this view, the
will necessarily follows the final judgment of the practical intellect, and since the intellect
seeks the good, the will is bound to choose whatever the intellect judges to be good.
When combined with the assumption that psychological events invariably lead to a
specific judgment, the case is made that both the judgment and the action to follow are
determined by the psychological and moral makeup of the agent. If, as in the case of God,
the intellect knows the good, then the inevitable judgment is the infallibly known good
from which action necessary follows. If, however, the agent is ignorant of the good, the
will is still determined by the perceived good, the judgment of which is based on the
psychological limitations and ethical disposition of the individual. Therefore, whether
one knows the good or fallibly aims at the good, the agent operates according to moral
necessity. Hence, no contrary choice is possible.
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Theological determinism is rooted in the assumptions of divine foreknowledge,
providence, and predestination. The foreknowledge problem is well known, running
roughly as follows:
1. If God foreknows at T1 that Joe will choose p at T2, then it is impossible that
Joe choose ~p at T2.
2. If it is impossible that Joe choose ~p at T2, then Joe is not free regarding p.
3. Therefore, if God foreknows at T1 that Joe will choose p at T2, then Joe is not
free regarding p. (1 & 2)
Since, granting the traditional understanding of divine foreknowledge, the above
syllogism can be applied to all future contingents, the argument is quite simply that
divine foreknowledge and free choice are incompatible. This issue is compounded by the
belief that all things depend ontologically on God for existence and movement; that
history is meticulously ordered by divine decree; and that the salvation and damnation of
souls is predetermined by God. Theological determinism could go the extra step of
asserting that God himself operates out of necessity, thus espousing that everything (i.e.,
God and all he decrees) is absolutely necessary, or it could defend divine freedom and
assert that determinism applies to the world only. Regardless of which route is chosen,
both positions fall under the theological determinism heading so long as they concede
that divine foreknowledge, decree, or providence negate the contrary choice of creatures.
Logical determinism unfolds in a manner similar to the foreknowledge problem
with the important exception that logical determinism does not require God to make its
case. The problem concerns the law of excluded middle, which states that propositions
are either true or false. So the argument goes, if future contingents have an affirmative
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truth value—regardless of whether a deity knows that truth value—then alternative
outcomes are impossible, and if alternative outcomes are impossible, so is contrary
choice.
With the various forms of determinism defined, we reach the complimentary
terms “compatibilism” and “incompatibilism.”25 These terms concern the follow-up
question: If determinism is true, then is this state of affairs compatible or incompatible
with free choice? As their respective titles indicate, the compatibilist asserts that
determinism describes a state of affairs that is compatible with free choice, while an
incompatibilist maintains that the state of affairs described by determinism is
incompatible with free choice.
Incompatibilism can be associated with one of two positions on free choice,
namely, libertarianism or hard determinism.26 Since incompatibilism embraces a strong
disjunctive, either free choice or determinism (q ⊻ r), one end of the disjunctive must be
accepted and the other rejected. Which position is taken indicates which end of the
disjunctive the person accepts and which he rejects.
Hard determinism accepts the incompatibility of determinism and free choice,
and rather than rejecting determinism, the hard determinist rejects freedom as an
irrational concept that should not be applied to humans or any other beings. In short, the
fact of determinism shows freedom and all it implies to be chimerical.
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My treatment of the contemporary incompatibilist/compatibilist divide draws on Robert Kane,
“The Contours of the Contemporary Free Will Debate,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, ed. Robert
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“Determinism.”
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Libertarianism, by contrast, sees the incompatibility of freedom and determinism
as indication that determinism is false. Since we have a clear sense that we do possess
contrary choice, and our concepts of morality and justice hang on the accuracy of this
sense, determinism must be rejected and freedom defended.
Given the rarity with which one finds hard determinists, I will use the term
“incompatibilist” solely in reference to the libertarian position, though recognizing that
an incompatibilist need not be a libertarian.
Compatibilism is straightforward and, unlike incompatibilism, is without subspecies, except perhaps in the form(s) of determinism it assumes. Regardless of why the
compatibilist thinks choice is determined, the claim is the same: If freedom is properly
defined, we see that freedom can co-exist with determinism.
The Principle of Alternative Possibility (henceforth PAP) is integral to the
compatibilist-incompatibilist dispute and has been implicit in much of the foregoing. This
principle identifies the central libertarian assumption that a free act is one that entails
“alternative possibilities” or “could have been otherwise” or “was avoidable” or “could
have been done otherwise.” Robert Kane sets up the libertarian position thusly:
1. The existence of alternative possibilities (or the agent’s power to do otherwise)
is a necessary condition for acting freely, or acting “of one’s own free will.”
2. Determinism is not compatible with alternative possibilities (it precludes the
power to do otherwise).27
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The contemporary debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism centers on these
two propositions. The incompatibilist is bound to defend both propositions, while the
compatibilist is bound to dispute either one or both.
A typical libertarian defense uses the “consequence argument”: If my choices are
determined by prior causes, and those causes are traceable to prior causes, and so on, then
the chain of causes that determine all of my choices can be traced to causes that are prior
to any exercise of my will. If my choices are determined by causes that are prior to my
will, then I have no control over my choices. Therefore, if I do have control over my
choices, then those choices cannot be determined by prior causes but must be chosen in a
way that satisfies PAP.
Compatibilism denies PAP, arguing that it suffices that we choose in accord with
our desires. Take the hypothetical decision: Joe chooses p. The compatibilist points out
that Joe chooses p because he desires p. When one asks whether Joe had the ability to
choose ~p, the reply should be conditional: Yes, if Joe had desired ~p. Since Joe did not
desire ~p, however, he did not choose ~p. The implication is that Joe is free to do as he
pleases. He is free from constraint and coercion, and he has the raw capacity (say, the
physical strength necessary) to perform either p or ~p. But what Joe desires is determined
by factors outside his control. This fact, however, is irrelevant, according to the
compatibilist. For even though Joe is determined to choose p, Joe’s choosing meets the
requirements of freedom properly defined: he has the capacity to do ~p if he so desires,
and he is free from coercion and constraint regarding p. His willing is thus his own.
There is a third position on these matters that has emerged in recent years,
namely, semi-compatibilism. This position is rooted in recent efforts to undermine PAP.
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The two types of argument used are “character examples” and “Frankfurt-style
examples” (the latter being named for Harry Frankfurt).28 Because Frankfurt-style
examples tend to be more persuasive, I will focus there.
Frankfurt-style examples attempt to demonstrate that moral responsibility does
not require PAP. Let us imagine that a young man, Chas, sits among his peers in a
classroom while his teacher rattles off questions to the class. And let us suppose that
Raleigh, who sits next to Chas, has hooked electrodes up to Chas’ brain. Using a remote
control, Raleigh can hit a button and make Chas raise his hand. Raleigh, taking great
delight in his ability to determine Chas’ future, has determined that Chas will raise his
hand to answer the next question posed by the teacher. However, Raleigh has also
decided that he will refrain from hitting the button should Chas choose to raise his hand
on his own. The next question comes and Chas chooses to raise his hand, so Raleigh
leaves the remote untouched. What this scenario is intended to show is that the raising of
Chas’ hand does not satisfy PAP (Chas’ hand would rise in either scenario); yet Chas is
responsible for his action.
Semi-compatibilism is a position that has arisen in reaction to Frankfurt-style
examples. The position holds that Frankfurt-style examples demonstrate the compatibility
of determinism and moral responsibility, but they do not demonstrate the compatibility of
determinism and freedom. The semi-compatibilist, being unconvinced that freedom and
determinism are compatible, accepts hard determinism and rejects freedom as chimerical,
but the semi-compatibilist presumes nonetheless that humans are responsible for their
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actions. This position is semi-compatibilist, rather than compatibilist, because it holds
that only moral responsibility (not freedom) is compatible with determinism.
Semi-compatibilism is perhaps the one point at which contemporary discussion is
completely novel; and thus semi-compatibilism will likely play no role in the chapters to
follow. However, the Frankfurt-style examples on which it is built do have historical
precedent worth mentioning.
Stoic fate, while often treated as a form of determinism, should be distinguished
from contemporary denials of libertarian freedom, and when considering the difference
between fate and determinism, Frankfurt-style examples are helpful. To draw out the
distinction, I will highlight the great weakness in Frankfurt-style examples.
Using the scenario involving Chas and Raleigh, a careful examination shows that
the example does not in fact undermine PAP. The example purports to show that because
Chas’ hand will rise regardless of what he chooses, PAP goes unsatisfied. However, this
conclusion stands only if we limit “outcome” to Chas’ hand. Taking into account the
whole of the scenario, however, the two outcomes are very different. In the first outcome,
four possibles obtain:
(1) Chas chooses to raise his hand.
(2) Chas’ hand rises.
(3) Raleigh does not touch the remote.
(4) Chas is culpable for his action.
In the second outcome, only (2) fails to satisfy PAP, while (1), (3), and (4) all yield
alternative possibilities:
(5) Chas choose not to raise his hand.
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(6) Raleigh presses the button on his remote.
(7) Chas’ hand rises.
(8) Chas is not culpable for his actions.
Such differences are significant, to say the least. In fact, when considering these
differences, it becomes apparent that Frankfurt-style examples involve a sleight of hand.
The above example assumes that Chas satisfies PAP internally—he can choose to raise
his hand or not raise his hand—and this assumption is why his culpability is granted. The
example then turns to Chas’ inability to satisfy PAP externally in order to demonstrate
that responsibility does not require PAP. Yet, it is only because PAP is satisfied internally
that responsibility remains. Thus, the example fails to demonstrate the compatibility of
responsibility and the absence of PAP as it claims. Quite the contrary, its employment of
an internal satisfaction of PAP proves the opposite, namely, that even Frankfurt-style
examples assume that PAP is required for moral culpability.
What Frankfurt-style examples are useful in illustrating, however, is the logic of
Stoic fate and, by extension, Stoic ethics. Stoic ethics, in a nutshell, argue that all that
happens around us and to us is fated, being woven by Zeus and the fates before our
birth.29 However, according to the Stoics, our internal, emotive response is a matter of
libertarian freedom. Epictetus, for example, is quite clear that man is bound by fate, but
he is equally clear that the will is free and cannot be not-free. Fate does not and cannot
touch the free powers of choice, for free is the very nature of will: “like a good prince and
a true father, [God] has placed [the] exercise [of our free faculties] above restraint,
compulsion, or hindrance, and wholly within our own control; nor has he reserved a
29
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power even to himself, of hindering or restraining them.”30 As in Frankfurt-style
examples, the circumstances in which we find ourselves are fated—external scrutiny of
them does not satisfy PAP. But inwardly our response does satisfy PAP, and that is
precisely why we are culpable for our reaction to what befalls us.
While semi-compatibilism may be far afield from the historical discussion of free
choice and providence, the distinction between fate and determinism, brought into sharp
relief by Frankfurt-style examples, is not. The former concerns the external satisfaction of
PAP, while the latter concerns the internal satisfaction of PAP. This distinction will prove
important when discussing Augustine’s view of free choice and providence, which he
places in juxtaposition with Stoic fate, and which I will argue is the theological
antecedent to Leibniz’s own view.
Two lingering terminological issues remain that merit brief attention. The first
concerns the term discussed at the opening of this section, namely, “determinism.” While
throughout this introduction I have used this term, I do so reluctantly. As any etymologist
can testify, the meanings of words change with time. “Determined,” and by extension
“determinism,” is one such word. The necessitarian connotations of this terminology are
foreign to medieval and early modern thought, arguably originating in the 18th century.31
Determinatio was once tied to final causality and the rational choices made in reference
to a given end—hence its literal rendering “concerning an end” (de termino). It was thus
linked with free choices, or self-determination, made in reference to specified ends—the
hallmark of the medieval view of freedom—not with the denial of free choice. Whether
30
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this matches Leibniz’s usage remains to be seen. But for other purposes here, I will more
often than not shy away from the word “determinism” in the chapters to follow,
substituting instead “necessitarianism” as often as possible. Though, by the latter, I mean
what contemporary literature labels determinism.
The final terminological issue I will address here concerns the words “free will.”
A careful reader may have noticed that I consistently substituted the words “free choice.”
This is based on the terminology of the literature from which Leibniz draws. While
contemporary dialogue uses “free will” almost without exception, scholastic and later
Reformed discussions use “will” (voluntas) in reference to the choosing faculty, while the
question of freedom concerned the operation of choice, or in contemporary jargon,
whether our choosing satisfies PAP. Hence the more classical literature uses liberum
arbitrium, or “free choice.” Given that Leibniz retains this phraseology, so will I.
With these terms before us, we can now turn to the meat of this project. I will
begin with those interpretative assumptions at play in Leibniz studies that become
questionable on a theological rereading of Leibniz. It is to these we now turn.

PART 1
CHALLENGING THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

CHAPTER 1
Interpreting Leibniz on Free Choice and Providence

German idealist F. W. J. Schelling once quipped that, “according to an ancient but
by no means forgotten tradition, the idea of freedom is said to be entirely consistent with
the idea of system, and every philosophy which makes claim to unity and completeness is
said to end in denying freedom.”1 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz is, to many, the proverbial
example of this tradition. The name Leibniz conjures thoughts of a rationalist who
constructed a fanciful metaphysic filled with an infinity of souls—some sleeping, others
wakeful—and which, in its final assessment, is the best of all possible worlds. As for the
price Leibniz paid for such a world, some would argue it was the abandonment of free
choice for both God and creatures in favor of a thoroughgoing necessitarian system,
subject to charges of deism and Spinozism.
Leibniz supplies ample materials for those who would paint him as a
necessitarian. One rather serious difficulty facing Leibnizian freedom is his claim, found
at least as early as 1686, that all affirmative truth is analytic (C., 16-8; 518-23). That is to
say, whether a truth is necessary or contingent, Leibniz maintains that the given predicate
is contained within its subject. Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 B.C. is therefore an
analytic truth in which the predicate, crossing the Rubicon in 49 B.C., is in the subject,
Caesar. To be clear, Leibniz understands the subject-predicate relationship to be such
that the predicate crossing the Rubicon in 49 B.C. does not attach to Caesar at the

1

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling Sämmtliche Werke, 14 vols., ed. K. F. A. Schelling
(Stuttgart and Augsburg: J. G. Cotta, 1856-61), vol. 7, 336. Translation taken from: F. W. J. Schelling, Of
Human Freedom, trans. James Gutmann (Chicago: Open Court, 1936).
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crossing of the Rubicon or after the crossing of the Rubicon; instead, this predicate, says
Leibniz, is eternally within the very concept of the subject, Caesar (C., 19)—a position
sometimes referred to as superessentialism.2 One cannot help but ask: How can Caesar
possibly be free with regard to crossing the Rubicon if Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon
is a predicate eternally within the very notion of Caesar?
One could attempt to soften Leibniz’s claim by suggesting that, by predicate, he
simply means something true of the subject—which certainly fits the terminology,
prædico.3 Yet, Leibniz’s phraseology works against this reading. The predicate is not true
of the subject (genitive); it is in the subject (ablative) (cujus prædicatum inest subjecto)
(C., 16). When looked at through the lens of the monadology, we see at least one very
clear explanation for why Leibniz held this position. According to Leibniz, all substances
are windowless and self-moving (E., 705). Just as pain is not secreted by one substance
and absorbed by another but is internal to the subject, so it is with force. Substances do
not transfer force to one another; force is innate in substance. Monads move themselves
in accord with their perception of surrounding monads. Thus, the subject-predicate
relationship of which Leibniz speaks is overtly ontological. The predicate is in the subject
as part of its yet-to-be-manifest properties, just as a child’s future height is in her while
not yet fully actualized (cf. C., 19). If such is the case, how can Leibniz’s understanding
of choice be anything less than necessitarian?
2

See, e.g., David Blumenfeld, “Superessentialism, Counterparts, and Freedom,” in Leibniz
Critical and Interpretive Essays, ed. Michael Hooker (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press,
1982).
3

See “prædico” in Matthias Martinez, Novum dictionarium tetraglotton: in quo voces Latinae
omnes, & Graecae his respondentes, cum Gallica & Teutonica singularum interpretatione, ordine
alphabetico proponuntur (Amsterdam: Henricum Wetstenium & Rodolfum & Gerhardum Wetstenios,
HFF., 1714); see also A Latin Dicionary; founded on E. A. Andrew’s edition of Freund’s Latin-German
Dictionary, rev. Charlton T. Lewis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980; first edition: 1879), 1416.
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Such difficulties only amplify the problems that emerge as readers explore
Leibniz’s view of the will. Leibniz is often understood to affirm an intellectualist
model—the will necessarily follows the final judgment of the practical intellect (cf. E.,
711; G., 4, 362; 7, 309-10; C., 20). His application of this model is typically understood
to yield such a strong connection between reason and choice as to require psychological
determinism in God, angels, and the blessed (i.e., the Saints in heaven). Unlike fallen
humanity, these beings know the good, and their intellect, judging it as such, necessitates
that they necessarily choose in accord with that judgment (as per psychological and
ethical determinism). Hence, Leibniz is unabashed in affirming that such beings operate
out of moral necessity (C., 21; G., 7, 309-10). Though one might take this conclusion to
mean that, for Leibniz, fallen humanity is free because we may err in our judgment of the
good, Leibniz argues the opposite. Our imperfect grasp of the good and our susceptibility
to the pull of our passions makes us less free than those bound by moral necessity. For we
are still moved by our dominant inclination, but, as fallen, that inclination may emerge
from moral obligations, our passions, or some other inward movement (G., 6, 115-16). In
the end, it seems that, for Leibniz, whether blessed or fallen, the will is always
determined by the inward makeup of the acting agent (cf. G., 6, 129-32); the only
question is whether it determines toward virtue or vice.
The necessitarian reading of this evidence finds extra footing in three additional
features of Leibniz’s writing on choice. First, Leibniz consistently rejects indifference as
an impossible chimera (e.g., C., 25; G., 6, 127-30). Many readers, taking indifference to
be integral to libertarian choice, see this rejection as an overt denial of libertarian
freedom. Second, Leibniz uses mechanical analogies when arguing for the
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predetermination of the will. When showing the chimerical nature of determination
arising out of indetermination, Leibniz employs Archimedes’ definition of equilibrium as
equal weights at equal distances from a common centre (e.g., C., 518-23; cf. C., 26).4
Such polemics give the impression that will, like a scale, must be mechanically
determined in one direction or the other or not at all. Likewise, when explaining a
determined will, Leibniz uses the analogy of a magnetic needle that takes pleasure in
moving northward (G., 6, 130). The mechanical reading of these analogies is reinforced
by the fact that Leibniz concludes by labeling humans “spiritual automatons”
(d’automate spirituel) (G., 6, 131). Third, all of these anti-indifferentist inklings are
undergirded by Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. According to this principle,
nothing happens without a reason. Though contingent truths may not be necessary in the
sense that they are part of the definition of the subject—the way unmarried is predicated
of bachelor—the principle of sufficient reason states that nothing happens in such a way
that it is impossible to give a reason for why it occur thusly rather than otherwise (C., 256; G., 7, 301; E., 716). When combined, the foregoing appears to indicate that Leibniz
understands choice to be the mechanical sum total of a concatenation of causes—be they
physical, psychological, or some combination of both—which is precisely what Leibniz
seems to state in portions of his text (cf. G., 6, 115-16). On such a reading, the agent may
be self-moving and free from external coercion (C., 19; 25), but what the agent chooses is
predetermined by factors outside his control.
The deterministic implications of Leibniz’s philosophy are taken by many to
worsen—if that were possible—when coupled with his accompanying theology.
4

Cf. The Works of Archimedes, trans. T. L. Heath (London: C. J. Clay and Sons; Cambridge
University Press, 1897), 189.
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Leibniz’s apparent psychological determinism is understood to be not only applicable to
God but in many ways more flagrant in reference to the deity. Leibniz, as mentioned,
states explicitly that God operates according to moral necessity. In fact, Leibniz goes so
far as to say that it is a matter of physical necessity that God should do everything in the
best possible way (C., 21; cf. G., 7, 309-10). Unlike creatures, God knows the good—
indeed, knows the best—and cannot fail to accomplish all things in the best possible
manner (G., 6, 127-8). Therefore, divine decision-making requires no deliberation (G., 6,
345-7, esp. 346). For the veracity of all affirmative truths, whether contingent or
necessary, is apprehended a priori by the deity (C., 17; 19; 25-6); hence, the divine
intellect apprehends the best, and the divine will cannot fail to do it (C., 21; G., 6, 127-8;
7, 309-10). While these assumptions are intended to assure readers that our world must be
the best possible world, they have in point of fact assured readers that Leibniz is a
necessitarian. If God decrees out of necessity, and what God decrees comes to pass, then
all is determined. And Leibniz himself declares as much: Tout l’avenir est determiné,
sans doute (G., 6, 134).5 The conclusion appears inevitable. For Leibniz, our world is not
simply the best possible world; it is the only possible world if, by possible, we mean a
world God might bring to pass. We can here draw on the formulation of the problem as
laid bare by David Blumenfeld:
(1) N(God exists).
(2) N(If God exists, God wills what is best).
(3) N(If God wills what is best, God actualizes BPW).
(4) N(If God actualizes BPW, BPW actually exists).

5

“Without doubt, all the future is determined.”
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(5) Hence, N(BPW actually exists). (From (1)-(4)).
(6) If (5) is true, then everything that occurs, occurs necessarily.
(7) Thus, everything that occurs, occurs necessarily. (From (5)-(6)).
(8) If everything that occurs, occurs necessarily, then no one ever acts freely.
(9) Therefore, no one ever acts freely. (From (7) and (8)).6
In light of such considerations, it is difficult to read Leibniz’s talk of possible
worlds as anything more than formal. Leibniz cannot be referring to real possibilities—
things that might have come to pass but did not—for God is bound by moral and indeed
physical necessity to create the best. Possible worlds can signify only logical or
conceptually consistent worlds—that is, semantic universes that are free of subjectpredicate conflict. Yet, from the standpoint of ontology, Leibniz’s theology prevents
these alternative “worlds” from ever coming into being (cf. G., 6, 128). From the
perspective of ontic grounding in the First Cause, they are in fact impossible worlds.
Were Leibniz’s view of divine “choice” not troublesome enough in its own right,
his understanding of how divine decrees are executed appears to level a death blow to
any hope of genuine freedom. As mentioned above, Leibniz understands monads to be
“windowless”; they are not moved by force received from causal collision, but are selfmoving, in accord with their perception of surrounding monads (E., 705). Were this all
Leibniz said on the matter, the monadology would not pose too serious a problem. But
Leibniz adds to this claim his doctrine of pre-established harmony. Monadic “interaction”
requires neither causal collision (per mechanical philosophy), nor an infinite number of
moment-to-moment divine miracles (per occasionalism). Instead, monadic interaction is a
6

Blumenfeld, “Superessentialism, Counterparts, and Freedom,” 104. In the above argument, BPW
= Best Possible World and N = Necessarily.
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mere appearance, displaying the eternal decrees of God. Like two clocks moving in
perfect synch, the corresponding movements of monads are a relative harmony of wholly
independent self-movements (G., 4, 498-500), and this harmony displays the wisdom and
precision of the monads’ common craftsman. This world, this best of all possible worlds,
is therefore a series of infinite, harmonious movements, each of which gives the
impression of causal interaction. But this appearance is just that, an appearance produced
by the perfect harmony of the windowless monads that dance in accord with the eternal
decrees of God. All that was and is and will be resides within the monads, manifesting
itself in its proper time. It is as if monads were an orchestra, deaf to one another, but
following perfectly nonetheless their respective parts in a grand symphony, penned by a
common composer. While picturesque, this metaphysic leaves the reader to wonder how
Leibniz could possibly affirm free choice amid such a system.
Throughout this chapter, we will see the various ways in which the above
difficulties are painted into the necessitarian portrait of Leibniz. As we will see, the above
considerations slowly come to light over the course of three centuries of Leibniz
interpretation, compounding into an increasingly persuasive case for Leibnizian
necessitarianism. While there are dissenting voices in the history of Leibniz
interpretation, voices that counter the broad trends I will outline in this chapter,7 the
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Eighteenth century exceptions include Johann Jakob Brucker, The History of Philosophy, from
the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the Present Century; Drawn up from Brucker’s Historia Critica
Philosophiæ. By William Enfield, LL.D., 2 vols. (London: printed for J. Johnson, 1791), vol. 2, 563-65; and
William Jones, who, while not giving an extensive treatment of Leibniz on free choice, recognizes
Leibniz’s affirmation of divine concourse, and leaves the charge of necessitarianism in the conditional: see
William Jones, An Essay on the First Principles of Natural Philosophy: Wherein the Use of Natural means,
or Second Causes, in the Oeconomy of the material world, is demonstrated from Reason, Experiments of
Various Kinds, and the Testimony of Antiquity (Oxford: printed at Clarendon Printing House and sold by S.
Parker, D. Prince, et al., 1762), 21-22. Nineteenth century exceptions include Charles Porterfield Krauth,
The Conservative Reformation and Its Theology: As Represented in the Augsburg Confession, and in the
History and Literature of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1871),
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history of Leibniz interpretation can be outlined roughly as follows. In the 1700s Leibniz
is most frequently read as a necessitarian deist. In the 1800s the inklings that led to the
charge of necessitarianism are codified, giving way to an interpretive push to reduce
Leibniz’s metaphysic to a veiled form of Spinozistic necessitarianism. In the early 1900s
this Spinozistic interpretation gains more sophisticated scholarly traction, but fails to
eliminate the influence of earlier readings. Following the explosion of Leibniz research in
the mid-twentieth century, current literature offers at least four interpretive headings
under which Leibniz can be placed, ranging from libertarian to necessitarian.

1. Leibniz Interpretation in the 1700s
Much of eighteenth century talk of Leibniz focuses on his mathematical
contributions, his views on science, or his contribution to burgeoning discussions
concerning space and time.8 When focused on Leibniz’s metaphysic proper, the
340; 511; and 770; but most notably Jean Félix Nourrisson, who clearly grasps Leibniz’s distinction
between necessity and contingency, his distinction between the certain and the necessary, his talk of
hypothetical necessity, his doctrine of divine concourse, and so forth: see Jean Félix Nourrisson, La
philosophie de Leibniz (Paris: L. Hachette, 1860), 268-86. Early twentieth century exceptions include
Clement C. J. Webb, A History of Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1915), 169-70; and
Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 9 vols. (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne LTD., 1958),
vol. 4, 264-82, who seeks to temper the deterministic implications of Leibniz’s views (see esp. 280-82).
More contemporary exceptions include R. Cranston Paull, “Leibniz and the Miracle of Freedom,” Noûs 26,
no. 2 (1992): 218-35, who defends a libertarian reading of Leibniz; David Ray Griffin, God, Power, and Evil:
A Process Theodicy (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2004), 131-49; and Michael J. Murray,
“Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 55, no. 1 (1995): 75-108; “Spontaneity and Freedom in Leibniz,” in Leibniz:
Nature and Freedom, eds. Donald Rutherford and J.A. Cover (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 194216, who defends a tempered compatibilist reading via the Thomist tradition.
8

See, e.g., John Collins, Commercium epistolicum D. Johannis Collins, et aliorum, de analysi
promota, jussu Societatis Regiae in lucem editum (London: J. Tonson, & J. Watts, 1722), 241-44;
Scriptores logarithmic; or, A Collection of Several Curious Tracts on the Nature and Construction of
logarithms, Mentioned in Dr. Hutton’s Historical Introduction to his New Edition of Sherwin’s
Mathematical Tablets: Together with Some Tracts on the Binomial Theorem and Other Subjects Connected
with the Doctrine of Logarithms, 6 vols. (London: J. Davis, 1791-1807), vol. 2, 438; A New and General
Biographical Dictionary; Containing an Historical and Critical Account of the Lives and Writings of the
Most Eminent Persons in Every Nation; Particularly the British and Irish; from the Earliest Accounts of
Time to the Present Period [etc.], 15 vols., rev. William Tooke, et al. (London: printed for G. G. and J.
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discussion is often cursory in its assessment, or, if sustained, polemical in tone.
Nonetheless, we have sufficient material to compile a clear interpretive trend from this
period.
Passing commentary on Leibniz in the 1700s typically carries deistic suspicions.
As early as 1714, two years before Leibniz’s death, Leibniz was accused of deism by the
Royal Society. More specifically, he was accused of having a purely transcendent deity,
who creates a world with which he is incapable of interacting. The contrast is between
Newton’s theology and Leibniz’s. So it was argued, the contrast between “these two
Gentlemen” is this: “The one [Newton] teaches that God (the God in whom we live and
move and have our Being) is Omnipresent; but not as a Soul of the World: the other
[Leibniz] that he is not the Soul of the World, but INTELLIGENTIA SUPRAMUNDANA,
an Intelligence above the Bounds of the World; whence it seems to follow that he cannot

Robinson, et al., 1798), vol. 11, 207-9; Adam Alexander, A summary of geography and history, both
ancient and modern; containing, an account of the political state, and principal revolutions of the most
illustrious nations in ancient and modern times; [etc.] (Edinburgh: printed for A. Strahan, et al., 1794), 61;
Benjamin Martin, Biographia Philosophica. Being an Account of the Lives, Writings, and Inventions, of the
Most Eminent Philosophers and Mathematicians Who have flourished from the Earliest Ages of the World
to the Present Time (London: W. Owen, 1764), 385-90; Fontenelle (Bernard Le Bovier), Oeuvres diverses
de m. de Fontenelle, De l’Academie Françoise (Antoine van Dole, 1736), vol. 5, 26; 30-7; 119-20; and
296-7; J. T. Desaguliers, A course of experimental philosophy (London: printed for A. Millar, et al., 1763),
280; Literary memoirs of Germany and the north, being a choice collection of essays on the following
interesting subjects, viz. alchemy, ... [etc.]. Done from the Latin and High-Dutch by a Society of
Gentlemen, 2 vols. (London: printed for J. Warcus; and J. Ross, 1759), vol. 1, 384; Histoire de l'Académie
royale des sciences et des belles lettres de Berlin (Berlin: Haude et Spener, Libraires de la Cour & de
l’Académie Royale, 1749), 139-79; Lord James Burnet Monboddo, Antient Metaphysics: or, the Science of
Universals. With an Appendix, Containing an Examination of the Principles of Sir Isaac Newton's
Philosophy (Edinburgh: printed for T. Caadell, London; and J. Balfour and Co. Edinburgh, 1779), 367ff.;
Dennis De Coetlogon, An universal history of arts and sciences: … The whole extracted from the best
authors in all languages, … By … Dennis De Coetlogon, … (London: printed by John Hart, 1745), 34; The
philosophical transactions (from the year 1732, to the year 1744) abridged, and disposed under general
heads, the Latin papers being translated into English. By John Martyn, ..., 2 vols. (London: printed for W.
Innys, et al., 1747), vol. 1, 236.
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do any thing within the Bounds of the World, unless by an incredible Miracle.”9 No
explanation is offered for the reading, but the likely source of suspicion, given similar
charges in the period, is Leibniz’s doctrine of pre-established harmony, specifically his
analogical defense of the doctrine using synchronized clocks. Taken at face value as a
description, not of substance “interaction,” but of God-world relations, the deistic
implications are clear.10
Similar inklings can be seen toward the close of the 1700s, coming out of
Alexander Pope. In 1742, a series of letters passed between Louis Racine, Le Chevalier
De Ramsey, and Pope. Racine, in his well-known poem, La religion, suggests that Pope
aligns himself with the fatalism of Spinoza and the errors of the deists. No doubt what
Racine has in mind are the classic lines from Pope’s essay:
All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee;
All Chance, Direction, which thou canst not see;
All Discord, Harmony not understood;
All partial evil, universal good:
And Spite of Pride, in erring Reason’s Spite,
One truth is clear, WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT.11
These lines typify how many, especially those in the 1700s, understood Leibniz’s
theodicy, and such an understanding is plainly the object of François-Marie Voltaire’s
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Sir Isaac Newston, “An Account of the Book Entitled Commercium Epistolicum Collinii
Aliorum, De Analysipromota; Published by order of the Royal-Society, in relation to the Dispute between
Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Keill, about the Right of Invention of the Method of Fluxions, by some call'd the
Differential Method,” The Royal Society of London, Philosophical Transactions (1683-1775) 29, no. 342
(1714): 224.
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One additional explanation may be found in Laurence Sterne’s, Yorick’s Meditations upon
Various Interesting and Important Subjects (London: printed for R. Stevens, 1760). Sterne uses the
monadology as an explanation of divinization, which, if not unique to Sterne, may have linked Leibniz’s
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attack in Candide, ou l'optimisme.12 Thus, many inferred from these lines that Pope was a
Leibnizian, and Racine was no exception. Ramsey wrote to Racine in Pope’s defense,
arguing that Pope was a confessional Anglican,13 and Racine soon called Pope to account
for whether the charges were valid. Pope denied the charges outright; and in the 1785
edition of La religion, Racine included the exchange of letters.14 What is particularly
interesting about these letters is that none mention Leibniz directly; they reference only
fatalism and the errors of the Spinozists and the deists.15 Yet, Pope, in his The Poetical
Works of Alexander Pope, with His Last Corrections, Additions, and Improvements
(1795)16 includes his correspondence with Racine under the heading, “As some passages
in the Essay on Man have been suspecting of favouring the schemes of Leibniz and
Spinoza, [etc.].”17 Evidently, Pope understood fate and deism to be synonymous with
Leibniz, so much so that “the schemes of Leibniz” constitutes sufficient shorthand.
Tying Leibniz together with determinism and deism was not peculiar for the
eighteenth century. And, in more lengthy and openly polemical treatments of Leibniz’s
thought, we find the explanation for the deism charge and why this charge presumes
determinism as well. Leonhard Euler is an excellent example. In a series of letters
12

Voltaire, Candide, ou L'optimisme (London, 1759).
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discussing Leibniz’s pre-established harmony and later philosophical developments by
Christian Wolff, it becomes evident that the doctrine of pre-established harmony was
understood to be overtly deistic and necessitarian in nature. Alluding to Leibniz’s
analogy of synchronized clocks which sparked the deistic reading, Euler argues that, if
the movements of the machine which is our body are as necessary as the swinging of
pendulum, then, when a thief engages in thievery, the movements of his body are also
wholly necessary. Thus, to be upset with the thief for his thievery makes as much sense
as being upset with a clock for showing it is 9 o’clock.18 Despite the best efforts of
Leibniz and Wolff, whom Euler treats with little distinction, Euler is convinced that this
difficulty remains: without free choice, one cannot judge another’s actions by which they
are just or criminal, for all actions are necessary.19
These same sentiments are echoed by one J. Th. C. of Wirtembergh, in his “The
Uses of the Leibnitian and Wolfian Philosophy in Divinity”:
Thus it appears that the Power of acting, so much talked of by Leibniz and his
Followers, resolves at last into a mere spiritual Mechanism, if I may use that
Expression, the Soul being really necessitated to have successively the Chain of
Ideas allotted to it, without being able to alter them; just as a Clock is necessitated
to shew and to strike successively all the Hours of the Day; since, according to
Leibniz, the Will has no share in the Ideas we have.20
The author admits that, “Notwithstanding all this [Leibniz] endeavours to shew that the
Soul is really free”;21 but the author’s own assessment is clear: “How this is consistent
18
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philosophie (London: La Société Typographique, 1775), 17.
19

Euler, Lettres de physique et de philosophie, 19-20.
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with Liberty and Free-will, and with the Power of acting which Leibniz and his Followers
suppose the Soul enjoys, I don’t understand.”22
Such readers home in on Leibniz’s talk of man as d’automate spiritual (e.g., G., 6,
131), seeing this language as an overtly mechanical description of humanity, and
confirmation that Leibniz’s clockwork analogy for pre-established harmony applies to the
human machine. The inevitable conclusion, as articulated by François Aubert, is that,
while Leibniz retains the word liberté, in light of the doctrine of pre-established harmony,
there can be no doubt as to the implications for the content of this word: Il me semble que
l’annéantissement de la liberté est une conséquence naturelle du systême Leibnitien.23
Such interpretive trends make evident two very closely related features of early
Leibnizian interpretation. First, Leibniz’s description of pre-established harmony as a
clockwork was taken quite literally. Rather than seeing Leibniz’s analogy of
synchronized clocks as an explanation of body-soul “interaction,”24 Leibniz’s opponents
took him to be asserting a more global description of the world and God’s relationship
thereto. And this was ultimately taken as indicative of a deistic clockwork universe,
which operates without divine interaction or interruption. In fact, the mechanical
precision of our world undermines the very possibility, and indeed reasonability, of God
intervening in it. This led to the second feature, namely, that humans, as part of this
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clockwork, and indeed as clockworks themselves, are bound by mechanical necessity. In
short, we are spiritual machines.25
Outside of the deist-determinist reading of pre-established harmony, an additional
factor at work in eighteenth century interpretation was the burgeoning tendency of the
period to think of libertarian choice as requiring freedom of indifference. As mentioned
in the opening of this chapter, Leibniz rejects indifference as an impossible chimera.
Such a stance came to be seen as requiring some form of determinism—be it
psychological, physical, or otherwise. The eighteenth century tendency to read
intellective preference as determinism can be found both negatively among supporters of
indifferentism, such as the aforementioned J. TH. C. of Wirtembergh,26 as well as
positively among figures, such as Anthony Collins, who himself embraces compatibilistic
determinism, and thus applauds Leibniz for his apparent compatibilism.27 I will focus on
negative interpreters here, as these are more prominent in the period. Two good examples
of this tendency are Voltaire and Thomas Reid.
While Voltaire is best known for his attack on Leibniz’s theodicy in Candide, he
offers more direct and analytic engagement with Leibniz’s thought in other works. In his
late work, Voltaire’s confidence in libertarian freedom would be shaken, specifically by
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the work of Collins,28 but prior to this, he displays a wariness of Leibnizian freedom,
common in the period. In Voltaire’s The Metaphysics of Sir Isaac Newton,29 we find his
discussion of “the extreme Difficulty of reconciling Liberty with this pre-established
Harmony.”30 The text displays clear evidence of an indifferentist’s distrust of intellective
preference. Voltaire places at juxtaposition Newton’s free God and Leibniz’s God who
acts according to sufficient reason. Though aware of Leibniz’s complaint that, for
indifferentists such as Newton and Clarke, God’s will is capricious and irrational,
Voltaire’s sympathies lie unwaveringly with the Newtonians, who see Leibniz’s God as
bound by the principle of sufficient reason, determined by that reason, and constrained in
choice.31
In “Dialogue XVII: On Curious Subjects,” Voltaire makes plain that he does not
see Leibnizian freedom as the ability to choose between two possibles, but as freedom to
act in accord with one’s essence.32 It is clear that Voltaire arrives at this conclusion
because, for Leibniz, “liberty of indifference is a term void of meaning.”33 Without
indifference, Voltaire can conceive of no other definition of freedom than the
unrestrained liberty to actualize what lies within. In other words, the agent is free to act as
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she pleases, but what she pleases is determined by factors outside her control, most
notably her own nature. In both his direct treatment of Leibniz and elsewhere, Voltaire
makes plain that, to his mind, libertarian freedom requires indifference, and without
indifference one is forced down the road of determinism.34
Thomas Reid displays similar leanings to those of Voltaire. Reid recognizes
Leibniz’s favoring of the “schoolmen” in his opposition to indifference, as well as the
importance of the principle of sufficient reason to this opposition.35 Yet, Reid takes this
principle to carry overtly necessitarian implications: “The determination of the will is an
event for which there must be a sufficient reason, that is, something previous, which was
necessarily followed by that determination, and could not be followed by any other
determination; therefore it was necessary.”36 This, says Reid, is the logical fruit of the
principle, as is its accompanying denial of indifference. Of this fruit any who embrace the
principle must eat. Reid goes on to complain that Leibniz offers no proof for the principle
of sufficient reason by which he undermines indifference—no proof, that is, other than
Archimedes’s definition of equilibrium. And, like others of his day, Reid takes this proof
at its mechanical face-value: “[T]o apply this reasoning to a man, is to take for granted
that the man is a machine, which is the very point in question.”37
To be fair, Reid admits that the principle of sufficient reason—a principle he finds
vague—could be interpreted three different ways, only two of which require
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necessitarianism.38 Nonetheless, Reid takes Leibniz’s rejection of indifference to be a
clear indication that he favors a necessitarian version of the principle; and so as to leave
no doubt, Reid goes on to echo the charge of clockwork deism, leveled by the Royal
Society, et al.39 Reid, like others in his day, was convinced that Leibniz’s rejection of
indifference implied a mechanical view of choice, which was part of a much larger
mechanical worldview. The implication, as articulated in Essays on the Intellectual and
Active Powers of Man, was clear: in Leibniz’s system there is an “irresistible necessity of
all human actions.”40
Figures such as Voltaire and Reid demonstrate the tendency of the eighteenth
century to move decisively away from the older views of the scholastics, which presume
that humans have intellective preference, and embrace instead the later innovation of
freedom as indifference. Hence, to the minds of such interpreters, if Leibniz sides with
the schoolmen, as he certainly does, the implication is none other than determinism. The
newer models of freedom embraced by such interpreters leaves no hermeneutic room for
both intellective preference and libertarian choice. Libertarian choice is either
indifference or not at all. Leibniz’s overt attacks on indifference coupled with his
mechanical polemics made the implications undeniable to the minds of such readers. For
Leibniz, choice is a set of mechanical, psychological inevitabilities.
One last feature of eighteenth century interpretation worth mentioning is that
indifferentist readers saw quite clearly that their determinist charges could not be limited
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to human choice. If intellective preference equals necessitarianism, then Leibniz’s God is
just as determined as humans. Defenders of indifference recognized this full well.
Therefore, one accusation that emerges in passing in the eighteenth century in Voltaire,
Reid, et al. is that there is a real sense in which, for Leibniz, our world is the only
possible world. Leibniz may speak of God choosing from among many possible worlds,
but, in the end, if God is bound by moral necessity and determined by his psychological
makeup, the implication follows: the only truly possible world is our own. All others are
incompatible with divine reason and will, and are thus ontologically groundless and
impossible.41

2. Leibniz Interpretation in the 1800s
Moving into the 1800s, we find that the underlying assumptions of the 1700s
continue, and thus a certain continuity of interpretation can be found between the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Examples of this interpretive continuity include
Richard Falckenberg, Francis Bowen, and Alfred Weber. All three of these readers share
with one another and the 1700s the assumptions that (a) Leibniz’s pre-established
harmony implies a deistic God-world relationship, (b) Leibniz’s related view of free
choice, contra indifference, is deterministic, and (c) God’s choice to create our world and
all that it contains falls to the realm of necessity and is more properly understood as the
only truly possible world.
Bowen, Falckenberg, and Weber each take Leibniz’s understanding of the Godworld relationship to be overtly deistic. Bowen, for example, calls Leibniz’s world a
41
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“machine”;42 and, drawing on Leibniz’s clockwork analogy, offers unblushingly deistic
interpretation of the implications: “In the view of Leibnitz, ours is a mechanical universe,
wound up, once for all, at the creation, and manifesting the perfections of its author by
never afterwards needing his intervention or aid, in order to do perfectly its destined
work.”43 Echoing interpreters of the 1700s, there is no possibility or need for divine
interaction with the world. Falckenberg and Weber, in like manner, offer this same
interpretation of Leibniz’s worldview, both homing in on the same clock analogy.44
Interestingly, Weber ignores Leibniz’s affirmation of divine concourse, setting preestablished harmony in juxtaposition with this scholastic doctrine,45 while Falckenberg
recognizes Leibniz’s intent to preserve divine concourse. For Falckenberg, however,
Leibniz’s affirmation of concourse is simply an inexplicable anomaly. Concourse
presumes an intimate God-world relationship in which God upholds the world, supplying
perpetual being to it, while pre-established harmony excludes God-world interaction
entirely.46
As for the implications for free choice, Bowen, Falckenberg, and Weber affirm
the necessitarian reading of the 1700s. All three take the mechanical analogy of the
world, with its necessitarian connotations, to apply just as mechanically to human
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choice.47 And Falckenberg and Weber are clear that they take true choice to require
indifference; thus, Leibniz’s defense of intellective preference over against freedom of
equipoise requires a form of determinism.48 The implications for Leibniz’s view of
creation, at least for Bowen and Weber, move explicitly in the direction suggested in the
1700s by Voltaire, Reid, et al., namely, that ours is the only possible world. Weber
begrudgingly admits that Leibniz has a doctrine of creation, but he thinks it clear that
both God’s willing and what occurs in our world as a result are bound by necessity;49 and
Bowen goes so far as to suggest that, despite Leibniz’s distinction between necessary and
existential truths, God’s act of creation and what he chooses to create falls under the
category of necessary truths among the ranks of mathematics.50
Numerous other interpreters appear in the 1800s, each of whom, while not
rehearsing all the staples of the eighteenth century necessitarian reading, are nonetheless
unambiguous as to their deterministic understanding of Leibniz. And their understanding
is more or less reflective of the deterministic reading of the previous era.51 Yet, within
this next generation of interpreters, there appear three new features of Leibniz
interpretation, which deserve attention.
47
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The first can be seen in Henry Lewes, for example, who homes in on Leibniz’s
claim that all truths are analytic. This feature of Leibniz’s thought received far less
attention in the eighteenth century than pre-established harmony and Leibniz’s rejection
of indifference. Yet, Lewes highlights Leibniz’s analytic view of truth in order to argue
that Leibniz ultimately destroys the distinction between necessary and contingent truths.
According to Lewes, it follows from this claim that, for Leibniz, all is necessary.52
The second addition to Leibniz interpretation in the 1800s is the expansion of
freedom of indifference to include moral indifference. In the seventeenth and eighteenth
century, there had been a resurgence in semi-Pelagianism—or at least what was
perceived to be semi-Pelagianism—among the latitudinarians;53 and, according to
Immanuel Kant, one of the positions taken by latitudinarians concerning humanity’s
moral nature was that we are morally neutral, able to determine ourselves toward either
good or evil.54 This view was upheld by Pelagius, and was thought by him to be a
necessary requisite of free choice.55 In the eighteenth century, this Pelagian assumption
was added to the more general leaning toward indifferentism, and was brought to bear on
Leibniz interpretation by readers such as Schelling. Schelling would go beyond former
indifferentists, arguing that not only is indifference required for free choice but moral
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indifference is required.56 The inkling that moral necessity is contrary to true freedom
was a tacit assumption of some authors in the eighteenth century who, as evidence of
Leibniz’s determinism, cite passages in which Leibniz speaks of moral necessity; but the
assumption was far less pronounced. In the nineteenth century, however, the charge
became explicit: moral necessity is incompatible with libertarian free choice. Given
Leibniz’s affinities with Augustine’s claim that choice between good and evil is a
defective form of freedom, inferior to that of God and the blessed,57 necessitarian readers
of Leibniz took his affirmation of moral necessity to confirm his denial of free choice.
The third and final addition to nineteenth century Leibniz interpretation worth
noting is also the most unique feature of the period, namely, the emergence of a
Spinozistic rendering of Leibniz’s metaphysic. As mentioned above, many within the
1700s took the logical implication of Leibniz’s system to be that God himself operates by
necessity and thus our world is the only possible world. Voltaire gives hints that, if a
being’s acts are the manifestation of essence, then the supreme deity must make actual all
that is possible and whatever is not actual is impossible.58 Some readers in both the 1700s
and 1800s hint in the direction that Leibniz’s view of creation is panentheistic.59 Weber
and Falckenberg, playing on these inklings, come remarkably close to accusing Leibniz
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of Spinozism,60 and Weber goes so far as to suggest that Spinozism was likely Leibniz’s
hidden or esoteric meaning.61 But in all such cases, interpreters stop short of accusing
Leibniz of Spinozism, recognizing that this may be a logical trajectory and perhaps a
hidden intent, but it is ultimately not on the surface of Leibniz’s writings. Beginning in
the nineteenth century, however, these inklings congeal into unveiled charges of
Spinozism, as readers argue that Leibniz’s view of choice makes “creation” more akin to
a necessitarian, panentheistic emanation.62
One of the first figures to expound this reading of Leibniz in unambiguous terms
is Schelling. In On the History of Modern Philosophy,63 Schelling makes plain that, to his
mind, Leibniz’s divergence from Spinoza is no divergence at all. Hence Schelling’s
suspicion emerges: “[O]ne would do the clever man an injustice if one considered his
doctrine of monads to be more than a hypothesis which he thought up, perhaps only to
oppose something different for a time to Spinozism, in order, so to speak, to divert the
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world with it.”64 This quote sets the tone for the direction Schelling would push Leibniz’s
metaphysic at every turn.
Schelling emphasizes Leibniz’s talk of God as substantia originaria, of monads
as productiones and derivatae, and his imagery of “monads aris[ing] by continual flashes
of lightning, or storms of the divinity.”65 Such terms and imagery, argues Schelling, point
decisively toward emanationism. Leibniz’s emanationism, however, follows from God
while remaining in God; “his doctrine can be called an immanent doctrine of
emanation.”66 To Schelling’s mind, this explains the coupling of the immanence of
concourse with the pre-established harmony of the monads. And, according to Schelling,
when considering the pre-established harmony of these monads in the human person,
Leibniz’s veiled Spinozism comes to light: “[C]an everyone see here Spinoza’s
proposition in a stunted form? ... Spinoza says: the soul is nothing more than the
immediate concept of the body, in the place of ‘concept’ Leibniz put the far less
meaningful: power of thought (Vorstellkraft).”67 For Schelling, the implication is clear,
“[W]e can primarily regard Leibnizianism only as a stunted Spinozism.”68
This Spinozism, in Schelling’s estimate, is key to a proper reading of Leibniz’s
theodicy as well. For “if the Theodicy is properly understood it still cannot appear as
really contradicting the Spinozist system, but only as a moderating and accommodating
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interpretation of it.”69 Schelling’s Spinozistic reading of the theodicy is two-tiered. First,
he sees Leibniz’s treatment of evil as reducible to the inevitable metaphysical evil of
finitude.70 Second, Schelling turns to God’s “willing” of this world. Schelling, though
recognizing that Leibniz distinguishes intellect and will in God and does so to preserve
free relationality, thinks it is clear that Leibnizian choice is the actualizing of one’s
essence, per Voltaire’s reading. Thus, while Leibniz may speak of God “deciding” to
create this world, “does not this decision as well belong finally to the nature of God,
could He deny Himself it? Obviously not. The decision was, then, a necessary one in
view of God Himself.”71 Picking up on Leibniz’s talk of moral necessity, Schelling
argues, “[I]f the moral necessity of choosing the good, and, in certain conditions, the best,
belongs to the nature, to the essence (Wesen) of God, as Leibniz maintains, then this is
only an attempt to mediate and make comprehensible the necessity with which, as
Spinoza says, everything flows from the divine essence, not, though, an attempt to
remove that necessity.”72
Leibniz interpretation in the 1800s thus moves well beyond the mere charge of a
mechanical view of man and world that carry deterministic-deistic implications.
Interpreters add to the catalog of Leibnizian ills Leibniz’s talk of moral necessity and his
analytic view of truth; and, in figures such as Schelling, inklings of Spinozistic
necessitarianism develop into full fledged charges of Spinozism. With these
69
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developments in the nineteenth century, Leibniz is moved from a mere deterministic deist
to an advocate of Spinozistic necessitarianism and panentheism. This is perhaps the peak
of the necessitarian rendering of Leibniz’s thought within this interpretive history.
Although the twentieth century would soften this rendering to a point, it would not do so
immediately.

3. Early-20th-Century Leibniz Interpretation
In the early 1900s, the Spinozistic reading would advance even further in
scholarly support than it had in the previous century. This embellished version would
employ Leibniz’s analytic view of truth, and use his claim that all possibles strain toward
existence (G., 7, 303) as a wedge, arguing against a voluntaristic view of God’s act of
creation. In this form it would gain even more respectable scholarly traction, specifically
in the well-known exchange between Bertrand Russell and Louis Couturat.73
In Russell’s early appraisals of Leibniz, he defends a relatively charitable
compatibilist reading.74 In standard fashion, Russell identifies Leibniz’s two principles,
contradiction and sufficient reason, and distinguishes their respective relationships to
necessary and contingent truths. Rather than labeling both as analytic, however, Russell
identifies the former as analytic and the latter as synthetic: “As regards the range of
analytic judgments, Leibniz held that all the propositions of Logic, Arithmetic and
73
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Geometry are of this nature, while all existential propositions, except the existence of
God are synthetic.”75 E. M. Curly characterizes Russell’s early position thusly: “[I]t
seems clear that necessary truths carry no commitment to the existence of anything,
whereas contingent propositions are related in some special way to existence and time.”76
Russell was convinced that, unless all of history is demonstrable in a way akin to the
ontological argument, we must hold that existential truths (save “God exists”) are
synthetic, even though Russell was unable to offer direct evidence from Leibniz’s texts in
support of this conviction. As for how synthetic truths come to pass, Russell recognizes
Leibniz’s claim that not all possibles are compossible,77 and attributes to divine
“freedom” which compossibles are actualized.78 Of course, Russell was convinced that,
by “freedom,” Leibniz assumes a type of psychological determinism in both God and
creatures: “The actions of free spirits hold a peculiar place in relation to necessity. Not
only do their states, in so far as they are the results of previous states, have only
hypothetical necessity, but the consequence itself has only hypothetical necessity, as
involving a psychological law which the spirits are not compelled to obey, though they
always do obey it.”79
In response to the work of Couturat, who brought to light numerous texts that
were previously unavailable, Russell would retract his early contention that necessary
truths are analytic while contingent truths are synthetic as well as his compatibilistic take
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on Leibniz’s talk of God creating.80 Couturat corrects Russell’s division between analytic
truths and existential truths, noting that, for Leibniz, “The principle of identity states:
every identity (analytic) proposition is true. The principle of reason affirms, on the
contrary: every true proposition is an identity (analytic).”81 This, Couturat argues, is the
basis of the entire monadology. With even contingent predicates residing in the notion of
the subject, the very notion of a monad includes its past, present, and future; in its own
way it reflects all successive states of the universe, and this yields the pre-established
harmony: “In a word, it is the entire Monadology which Leibniz thus progressively
derives from the principle of reason and which he presents in rational order and in proper
perspective.”82 Couturat corrects Russell by name, noting that it is undeniable in light of
(then) newly published texts that, in Leibniz’s view, contingent truths are not synthetic
but just as analytic as necessary truths.83 Couturat argues that Leibniz thinks he escapes
necessitarianism by affirming that, despite their analytic character, contingent truths are
not reducible to identity claims. And thus, while contingent truths are analytic, they are
not finitely analytic the way necessary truths are—that is, they cannot be broken down to
more basic truths. In a contingent truth, then, the predicate is in the subject in such a way
that an opposing predicate could be in the subject without yielding contradiction.84
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Looking to Leibniz’s De libertate (Careil, 178), Couturat argues that, by Leibniz’s
own account, what rescued him from Spinozism was the consideration of non-existent
possibles. Since, according to Leibniz, nothing is necessary of which the opposite is
possible (G., 4, 438), it follows that if contingent predicates are in their subject in such a
way that the opposite predicate could be in the subject without contradiction, then the
opposite is possible—that is to say, the opposite is free from formal contradiction.85 If
there are unrealized possibles, to wit, the obtaining of predicates opposite of those that
obtain, then those possibles that are realized are contingent. Couturat believes this insight
is traceable to Leibniz’s meeting with Spinoza:
By 2 December 1676 (the day after his meeting with Spinoza), Leibniz was
denying the Spinozistic thesis—“everything possible exists”—and he was already
opposing to it his own theory that only those compossibles containing the greatest
reality exist. The point is that not all possibles are compossibles (otherwise there
would be no reason why all possibles should not exist).86
On Couturat’s reading, the insight that not all possibles are compossible—as per
contingent subject-predicate relationships discussed above—is thus the sole mark
distinguishing Leibniz from Spinoza.
As for the actualization of the maximal set of compossibles (Leibniz’s ontological
definition of the best of all possible worlds), Couturat casts suspicion on the notion of a
volitional act of creation on the part of God. While Couturat affirms Russell’s conclusion
that Leibniz has a type of psychological determinism at work,87 he argues that, for
Leibniz, the movement toward existence is implicit in the possibles themselves. Possibles
are in some sense within God, straining for existence. Couturat writes: “All possibles
85

Couturat, “On Leibniz’s Metaphysics,” 26-7.

86

Couturat, “On Leibniz’s Metaphysics,” 27.

87

See Couturat, “On Leibniz’s Metaphysics,” 32-3.

55

struggle among themselves for existence in the Mind of God, which is ‘the land of the
possible realities,’ and the outcome of this struggle is the infallible and automatic (not to
say necessary) triumph of the system of compossibles which contains the most essence or
‘perfection’.”88 This, argues Couturat, was the true basis for Leibnizian optimism. We
can be assured that only those compossibles that maximize the ontic perfections in the
world burst through the divine doorway into actuality; hence, our world is of necessity
the best possible world (cf. G., 6, 115-16).
Russell, after being persuaded by Couturat’s arguments, characterized the
implications of Couturat’s insights as follows:
[T]here was no act of Creation: the relations of essences are among eternal truths,
and it is a problem in pure logic to construct that world which contains the
greatest number of coexisting essences. This world, it would follow, exists by
definition, without the need of any Divine Decree; moreover, it is a part of God,
since essences exist in God’s mind. Here, as elsewhere, Leibniz fell into
Spinozism whenever he allowed himself to be logical; in his published works,
accordingly, he took care to be illogical.89
The last remark embodies what came to be Russell’s standard mode of explaining the
apparent distinction between these Spinozistic implications and Leibniz’s assertions
elsewhere of divine choice and decree: Leibniz kept to himself his good philosophy,
while publishing his bad philosophy in pursuit of public acclaim.90
With Couturat’s work and Russell’s concession, the Spinozistic necessitarian
reading was given legitimacy in the early twentieth century by two of its most wellrespected Leibniz scholars. Despite the importance of the Russell-Couturat exchange, not
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all embraced the Spinozist read. Some, such as Ludwig Noiré, retain the deistic
understanding of Leibniz’s clockwork universe, along with its necessitarian
connotations.91 Others, such as S. H. Mellone and Samuel Enoch Stumpf, emphasize
Leibniz’s necessitarianism, and even root this in Leibniz’s “spiritual” clockwork; but they
resist heading down the road of either deism or Spinozism.92 And still others, such as B.
A. G. Fuller and A. G. Sertillanges, are more ambiguous with regard to the implication of
Leibniz’s system for God-world relations, but are wholly unambiguous as to their
affirmation of freedom as indifference and the deterministic implications they see in
Leibniz’s rejection thereof.93 Thus, while the Spinozistic interpretation found
endorsement from two preeminent Leibniz scholars in the early 1900s, no uniformity of
interpretation was forthcoming.

4. Four Contemporary Interpretations of Leibniz on Free Choice
Amid this diversity of twentieth century interpretations more charitable portraits
also arose,94 and since the flood of literature on Leibniz in the mid-1900s, there has
appeared a variety of interpretations of his thought on free choice. By and large deistic

91

See Ludwig Noiré, A Sketch of the Development of Philosophic Thought from Thales to Kant
(London: MacMillan and Co., 1900), 278.
92

See S. H. Mellone, The Dawn of Modern Thought: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz (London:
Oxford University Press, 1930), 94-8; 102; 109; and 113-4; and Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Socrates to Sartre:
A History of Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966), 273.
93

See B. A. G. Fuller, A History of Modern Philosophy, 3rd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1960), 118; (first published 1938); and Sertillanges, Le Problème du mal l’histoire, 234-5.
94

See, e.g., Clement C. J. Webb, A History of Philosophy, 170, who takes at face-value Leibniz’s
assumption of free choice in Theodicy; Paul Hazard, European Thought in the Eighteenth Century: From
Montesquieu to Lessing (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), 312, who understands Leibniz to retain
a Creator-creature divide and sees creation as a volitional act; and Frederick Copleston, A History of
Philosophy, vol. 4, 264-82, who seeks to temper the deterministic implications of Leibniz’s views (see esp.
280-82).

57

readings of Leibniz have faded, as recognition of Leibniz’s doctrine of divine concourse
has taken hold. And even if Leibnizian choice is not understood in a libertarian manner,
readers seem hesitant to walk the Spinozistic trail blazed by Couturat, and thus largely
accept the fact that Leibniz affirms a volitional understanding of God’s act of creation.
Nonetheless, determinist readings still abound.95
In the remainder of this section, I will look at four contemporary interpretative
options. These four interpretive headings are (a) necessitarianism, (b) compatibilism, (c)
libertarianism, and (d) indeterminism. As representative of the necessitarian reading, I
have chosen Robert Sleigh, Jr. My chosen exemplar of the compatibilist read is Jack
Davidson. And, though in the clear minority, we do find one libertarian reader, namely,
R. Cranston Paull. Indeterminism represents the reading of Michael J. Murray.

4.1.The Necessitarian Reading of Robert Sleigh, Jr.
Robert Sleigh, Jr. identifies three components that Leibniz thinks essential to
freedom: (1) spontaneity, (2) freedom from intersubstantial causality, and (3) freedom
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from metaphysical necessity.96 Distinguishing between metaphysical and physical
necessity, Sleigh points out that the metaphysical emphasis of (3) is to the exclusion of
physical necessity. Therefore, Sleigh argues, “[I]t is natural to suppose that [Leibniz] was
a compatibilist in the sense that he thought that a choice might be causally necessitated
and yet free. At any rate, it appears that Leibniz was a compatibilist in this sense, at least
in his mature period, dating from 1700.”97 While Sleigh acknowledges that Leibniz
rejects physical necessity in his early work, suggesting that freedom is a type of private
miracle that interrupts the series of efficient causes that act on the will (e.g., C., 20),
Sleigh suggests that a shift took place in Leibniz’s views after 1700. Sleigh notes that, in
Theodicée, Leibniz states, “[A]bsolute necessity, which is called also logical and
metaphysical, and sometimes geometric, and which alone is to be feared, does not exist in
free actions” (G., 6, 37). The claim that such metaphysical necessity alone is to be feared
is clear indication, to Sleigh’s mind, that physical necessity is not to be feared; and thus,
we can take Leibniz as affirming the compatibility of physical necessity and freedom.
Building on this contention, Sleigh points to Leibniz’s letter of 1707 to Coste as a
key piece of evidence for this claim. The passage of interest reads as follows:
When we propose a choice to ourselves ... whether to leave or not, it is a question
whether, with all the circumstances, internal or external, motives, perceptions,
dispositions, impressions, passions, inclinations taken together, I am still in a state
of contingency, or whether I am necessitated to take the choice to leave, for
example, i.e., whether in fact this true and determined proposition—in all these
circumstances taken together, I will choose to leave is contingent or necessary. I
reply that it is contingent, because neither I nor any other more enlightened mind
could demonstrate that the opposite of this truth implies a contradiction. And
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assuming that by freedom of indifference we understand a freedom opposed to
necessity . . . I agree with that freedom. (G., 3, 401)
Sleigh sees this letter as evidence of Leibniz’s new found affirmation of compatibility of
physical necessity and free choice. Sleigh comments, “There is no requirement that it
lack physical necessity. And the clear suggestion of the passage . . . is that that is all the
indifference Leibniz was then prepared to admit.”98
In addition to this bit of evidence, Sleigh notes Leibniz’s claim that our freedom
consists not only in positive choices, but in the suspension of choice; and therefore the
predictability of free actions remains elusive because choice does not merely consist in
what the intellect identifies as preferable or good. Sleigh acknowledges that Leibniz
retains this idea after 1700, but Sleigh points out that, “the thesis that this power is such
that exercises of it are in principle unpredictable by creatures is not to be found,” and he
goes on to argue that some relevant texts “suggest that Leibniz then regarded suspension
of deliberation as causally ordered in much the same fashion as any other choice is.”99 In
short, while finite minds may not know the causal complexities that determine creaturely
choice, this is due to the finitude of the creaturely mind and the infinite complexity of the
causal order; it is not because there is no determining order of causes to be known.
By raising the question of whether key aspects of Leibniz’s compatibilism
disappear after 1700, Sleigh employs Leibniz’s doctrine of pre-established harmony and
Leibniz’s notion that all truth is analytic to exacerbate the problem. Sleigh takes these
two points of Leibnizian metaphysics to point decisively toward necessitarianism. He
makes no effort to solve this problem on Leibniz’s behalf, except to suggest that Leibniz
98
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developed an alternative model of freedom. This alternative model, according Sleigh,
replaces the third requirement of freedom mentioned above, namely, contingency.
Contingency is replaced with “possibility in its own nature.”100 Using God as the supreme
example, we can say that God wills the best of all possible worlds because it is contrary
to the very idea of God that he make any other world. Yet, the creation of an alternative
world can be said to be possible if the idea of that world is internally consistent, or
logically possible. Similarly, Caesar’s decision to cross the Rubicon may be necessary
but still said to be “free,” “provided that there were alternatives, each of which was
internally consistent.”101 In the end, Sleigh does not think Leibniz’s talk of possible
worlds provides any real relief to the necessitarian problem. Sleigh therefore sees Leibniz
facing a rather serious brand of necessitarianism, one bordering on, if not of one accord
with, that of Couturat.

4.2. The Libertarian Reading of R. Cranston Paull
R. Cranston Paull, in contrast to Sleigh, offers a spirited and creative defense of
Leibniz’s incompatibilism—a position virtually without precedent in the history of
Leibniz interpretation. In his 1992 essay, “Leibniz and the Miracle of Freedom,” Paull
emphasizes “the theory of miraculous freedom”102 found in Leibniz’s 1686 essay “Vérités
necessaries et contingents” (C., 16-24).103 There Leibniz states, “But free or intelligent
substances . . . in a kind of imitation of God . . . are not bound by any certain subordinate
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laws of the universe, but act as it were by private miracle, on the sole initiative of their
own power, and by looking towards a final cause they interrupt the connection and the
course of the efficient causes that act on their will” (C., 20-1). Picking up on Leibniz’s
talk of intelligent creatures being “a kind of imitation of God” and acting “by private
miracle,” Paull suggests that Leibniz sees intelligent (free) agents as having the capacity
to interrupt the nexus of efficient causes, rather than being determined by it.
In the realm of efficient cause, such as found among stocks and blocks, the future
of a thing is entirely predictable. Therefore, “Truths about the future of non-intelligent
things like stones,” Paull notes, “are said to be knowable by created minds on the basis of
their knowledge of laws of nature, provided these laws are not suspended by God.”104
The closing provision is the most important to Paull’s thesis. Given that miracles
represent a unilateral, free (and therefore unpredictable) act contrary to the series of
efficient causes, miracles constitute the one hindrance to the predictability of physically
determined subjects. Running with this premise, Paull argues that what makes human
willing an imitation of God is that human freedom is not subject to its preceding efficient
causes, but, as with divine miracles, may interrupt the series of efficient causes that
precede it. A human agent, when functioning in accord with prior causes, is predictable
on a level akin to stocks and blocks; but, given that humans, as intelligent agents, have
the capacity for “private miracle[s],” their future acts stand above the realm of efficient
causality and remain hidden to creaturely intellects.
Paull seeks to demonstrate that this notion of miraculous freedom is completely
consistent with Leibniz’s philosophy. He considers three potential problem spots. First,
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Paull looks at Leibniz’s claim in Discourse on Metaphysics that “all things that happen to
[substances, including miracles] are only consequences of their nature” (A., 6.4, 1554).
Paull argues that, insofar as freedom is part of the intelligent nature, “even miracles are in
accord with a substance’s nature.”105 In other words, if it is the nature of humans to be
imitators of God and to choose freely, then we need not take Leibniz to be suggesting that
all which happens happens as a consequence of efficient causes pressing in on us. Rather,
we may take “consequences of their nature” to include the nature of acting agents, which,
in the case of intelligent substances, encompasses the imitation of God by the private
miracle of freedom.
Second, Paull argues that miraculous freedom does not contradict Leibniz’s
notion of pre-established harmony—that is, the principle that, “Each of these substances
contains in its nature a law of the continuation of the series of its own operations and
everything that has happened and will happen to it” (E., 107). Paull argues that, while
freedom may not submit to the series of efficient causes that precede it and in this sense
is above natural law, an intelligent substance’s willing does not contradict its own nature.
Rather, it is the nature of an intelligent subject to choose freely. Hence, “[T]his preestablished harmony between monadic perceptions is perfectly compatible with the
(Leibnizian) fact that some intelligent monads sometimes have miraculous thoughts.”106
Succinctly put, “when I act miraculously, I do not contradict my nature.”107
Third and finally, Paull addresses Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason—if p
obtains, there must be sufficient reasons for p obtaining as opposed to ~p. Paull points
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out that Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason does not prevent free decisions from
constituting sufficient reasons. Therefore, “[T]he fact that the chooser has the specific
[nature] that he does provides a sufficient reason for the miraculous choice.”108
In the end, Paull’s case is meant to demonstrate two points. The first is that “the
theory of miraculous freedom ... is not an unreasonable (or, really, an uncharacteristic)
one for the mature Leibniz to have held.” The second is that “it is consistent with a
plausible version of some basic Leibnizian doctrines.”109

4.3. The Compatibilist Reading of Jack Davidson
I have chosen Jack Davidson to represent the compatibilist reading of Leibniz.
The reason is because Davidson published a compatibilist response to Paull’s essay,
which helps highlight the dissonance between the two readings. Davidson recognizes the
development in Leibnizian scholarship that Paull’s stance represented;110 moreover,
Davidson concedes that these developments raise the question of whether there is a
legitimate lacuna in current understandings of Leibniz on freedom. He even argues that
the imitation of God theme, as expressed in “Vérités necessaries et contingents,” “does
indeed contain a central and overlooked element in Leibniz’s thinking about freedom,
according to which human freedom is grounded in a kind of imitation of God’s
nature.”111 The difference between Paull and Davidson, however, is that Davidson argues
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that this talk of an imitation of God does not open the door to a libertarian reading; rather,
“Leibniz’s theory, far from undermining compatibilism, requires it.”112
The reading Davidson espouses echoes in many ways the pre-Couturat reading of
Russell. According to Davidson, Leibniz’s view of freedom is theo-centric, not
anthropocentric. That is to say, for Leibniz, “God is the paradigm of freedom, and we are
only free in so far as we are like him.... In so far as we approximate and imitate God ...
we are free.”113 When Davidson says this, he does not mean that Leibniz considers
goodness to be freedom and evil to be bondage—although this may be a consequence of
Leibniz’s view. Instead, Davidson argues that the aspect of God we must mirror is his
supremely rational nature. Drawing on the principle of sufficient reason, Davidson argues
that, for Leibniz, “free actions must be nonrandomly grounded,” which implies freedom
must be grounded “in an agent’s mind and character.”114
Davidson understands this rational ideal of freedom to be rooted in Leibniz’s
theo-centric starting point: “[Leibniz] does not shirk the claim that God too is subject to
the laws of teleological causality.”115 To the contrary, Leibniz views God as free because
“his intellect perfectly perceives the value of the alternatives available to him, and
because his will is determined by the judgment of his intellect.”116 Davidson’s
understanding of Leibniz boils down to this: “[W]hat matters most for freedom is
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rationality.”117 On this reading, compatibilism is not a necessary evil which must be
defended as “free” despite itself; instead, the idea of a will wholly determined by reason
is Leibniz’s ideal freedom, in contrast with which all other models pale.
In this reading of Leibnizian freedom, fallen humans are not free. Our lack of
freedom is not due simply to intellectual finitude. Instead, “[W]e, unlike God, have
passions that disrupt our cognitive processes.”118 Davidson understands our “sin and
weakness of will” to be the reason why our practical intellect offers only a “perception of
the best,” as contrasted with God whose intellect knows the best a priori.119 Because
creaturely willing is a mixed bag of passions, inclinations, and intellectual judgments,
there exists a sharp distinction between God, who acts on pure intellect, and creatures:
In the light of sin and weakness of will, Leibniz’s considered view is that our will
is determined by the intellect’s perception of the best .... All free creatures, then,
act in accordance with their greatest inclination, but in God this means acting in
accordance with the practical judgment of the intellect. Thus God always acts in
accordance with the actual best. 120
On Davidson’s reading, Leibniz’s ideal of freedom is a type of extreme intellectualism,
wherein the will always follows the final judgment of the intellect, and the intellect’s
practical judgment perceives the good as it is. Such impassible intellectual willing is
modeled in God, and therefore, to the extent we imitate God, so we are free.
Davidson’s reading of Leibniz is compatibilistic because, on this reading, the
most ideal form of freedom (viz., God’s freedom) is determined, thus indicating the
compatibility of freedom and determinism. God does not act randomly but rationally and
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always in accord with the actual good—the judgment of the divine intellect determines
the acting of the divine will. Creatures likewise will in accord with their practical
judgments, and do so in a determinist manner, but given the non-rational influences of the
passions on creaturely willing, creaturely freedom is not true freedom, for it is not
determined solely by reason. On Davidson’s reading, Leibniz sees the final state of
blessedness as that which brings about the type of freedom displayed in God. In the
eschaton, the blessed always act well, for they perceive and always choose the true good.
The reason, says Davidson, is that, “after seeing God face to face, the irresistible
summum bonum and thus the proper object of the will, their passions and perceptions are
determined by the true good.”121 In such a state, humans are imitators of God.

4.4. The Indeterminist Reading of Michael J. Murray
Michael J. Murray provides the fourth and final reading of Leibniz we will
consider here. Murray’s position draws on the Thomist intellectualist view of freedom
(i.e., the will necessarily follows the final judgment of the practical intellect), a model
which can be read as similar to the one employed by Davidson. In Murray’s early work, it
is unclear whether he understands Leibniz’s intellectualism to yield compatibilism.
Robert Kane, for example, lumps Paull and Murray together as defenders of Leibnizian
“indeterminism,” and yet, Murray appears to believe that the practical intellect provides
an inclining motive sufficient for action.122 Whether (and if so, how) Murray’s
“indeterminist” reading is intended to avoid psychological determinism is unclear to me.
121
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Yet, in his more recent writings, it is clear that Murray understands intellectualism to be a
form of compatibilism and equipoise (which Leibniz rejects) to be a requisite condition
for libertarian freedom.123 Hence, it is clear that Murray’s “indeterminism” is indeed a
compatibilist reading of Leibniz. While a compatibilist reading of Leibniz is far from
novel, Murray’s unique contribution to Leibniz studies centers on the relationship
between free choice and providence as the crux of Leibniz’s position.124
Murray establishes a dichotomy between the Dominicans and the Jesuits as the
background against which Leibniz’s view of providence and free choice is best
understood. Murray characterizes Dominican theology as carrying strong ties to the
doctrine of divine concourse; and Murray sees the relationship between human freedom
and concourse as follows:
For the Dominicans, every causal event in nature requires divine causal
involvement of at least two sorts. First, God acts on the agent and “reduces its
power from potency to act” so that the creature can in fact exercise the powers
with which it has been created. Second, God acts on the patient by giving it being
or esse, a requisite condition for any effect’s obtaining. These two modes of
divine involvement in every causal event in nature permit God to know the
specific outcome of any such event, i.e., the effect.125
Such a view of creaturely freedom contrasts with that of the Jesuits, who,
following Molina and Suarez, felt that human willing “must be determined independently
of any divine volition.”126 As Murray understands it, the Dominicans felt divine
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foreknowledge rests on “[God’s] own causal contribution to the act,” a foundation of
foreknowledge the Jesuits felt “compromise[d] the freedom of the creature’s action.”127
As an alternative, the Jesuits forwarded what is known as “middle knowledge” (scientia
media), which, as Murray explains it, “permits [God] to know, prevolitionally, what a
free creature would freely choose under any circumstance in which it might be
created.”128 The creation of the circumstance is therefore the basis on which God works
out his own providential ends without violating the creature’s freedom.
According to Murray, Leibniz took issue with both of these positions. On the side
of the Dominicans, Leibniz felt “invoking efficacious concurrence is just superfluous,”
and “the Dominican scheme, incorporating as it does the determining divine concurrence,
amounted to hard determinism.”129 Since Murray reads divine concourse in contrast to
what a free creature would freely choose, Murray sees Leibniz’s affirmation of
spontaneity and his rejection of physical necessity as a rejection of divine concourse:
Although I know of no passage where Leibniz makes the point quite this way, it
seems likely that his argument for the above claim [that concurrence amounts to
hard determinism] amounts to the fact that divine predetermination, as it is
understood by the Dominicans, violates the creature’s spontaneity .... When a free
act was in view, Leibniz characterized spontaneity as the absence of any external,
determining, proximate, “phenomenal” cause.130
This reading of concourse and its incompatibility with spontaneity leads Murray to
understand Leibniz as affirming the possible worlds of Molina, over against the
scholastic notion of concourse.
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Having said this, Murray does not treat Leibniz as a pure Molinist. He recognizes
Leibniz’s objection to Molinistic freedom, which he understands to require indifference
of equipoise. Such a picture of freedom Leibniz thought inconsistent since a free agent
would then be incapable of choosing among options, and even if a choice were
(somehow) made, the choice itself would violate the principle of sufficient reason.131
In this light, Murray suggests that Leibniz’s view is an admixture of Dominican
and Molinistic premises. Murray names three premises that he takes to comprise the
Leibnizian view: (a) creaturely freedom must be foreknown in the prevolitional sense of
the Molinists, apart from any divine causal activity; (b) the prevolitional choosing of the
creature in various circumstances of various possible worlds must be the product, not of
indifference, but of “sufficient reason”—that is, with the Dominicans, there must exist
“some sufficient reason in the antecedent circumstances” for the choice made; and (c) the
sort of sufficient reasons involved must be “of a sort that do not violate the spontaneity,
and thus the freedom, of the creature as the Dominican account does.”132
According to Murray, these three conditions, The Prevolitional Condition, The
Sufficient Reason Condition, and The Spontaneity Condition, constitute the basic form of
Leibniz’s system of freedom.133 Murray therefore reads Leibniz’s possible worlds as
decisively Molinistic, but he understands Leibniz to affirm the Dominican rejection of
absolute indifference in favor of Dominican intellectualism. Murray is aware that he
cannot avoid the fact that Leibniz upholds the notion of divine concurrence (see, e.g., C.,

131

Murray, “Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge,” 82.

132

Murray, “Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge,” 83.

133

See Murray, “Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge,” 84.

70

22; cf. G., 6, 347-50);134 but, given that Murray understands Dominican concourse to be a
type of physical or causal imposition on the creature that violates freedom, Murray sees
Leibniz’s notion of concurrence as a type of after-the-fact concurrence, as if it were a
mere instantiating of a possible world known via middle knowledge. Therefore, “God
first foresees how it is that the creature inclines, and from this knows how he will concur
with the act of the creature.”135 As for the basis for inclination, this is found in the
intellectualist model, wherein the intellect inclines the creature toward a given option,
and this inclination is sufficient for willing the subsequent act.136
In the end, Murray’s understanding of Leibnizian freedom comes to this:
[T]he actions of free creatures under specified circumstances are not under the
control of the divine will. Thus, transitions between states within freely willing
rational substances are not under immediate divine control. Rather, the transition
from state to state in such substances is fixed by moral necessitated final
causality. Since this sort of relation between intellect and will, and
correspondingly, between successive states of the substance, is sufficient to secure
spontaneity ... and since it is on such grounds that God governs his own
concurrence with the actions of substance, divine causal involvement in creaturely
free acts neither destroys freedom nor implicates God in sin.137
This last clause captures the heart of Murray’s reading. In the end, Murray believes that
Leibniz intends on preserving some form of creaturely freedom and avoiding making
God the author of sin. Though an incompatibilist may object to the compatibilist view of
free choice here espoused, Murray’s portrayal of Leibniz is ultimately one in which he
aims at making man, not God, the author of his own actions and thus of his own foibles.
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5. Eight Pivotal Interpretative Assumptions
From the above survey, the flow of Leibniz interpretation on free choice and
providence has a definite shape. The earliest polemical readings of Leibniz focus on his
doctrine of pre-established harmony, along with its apparent implications of determinism
and deism. These polemics are expanded in the next century to include additional insights
that bolster the case for Leibnizian necessitarianism, and the growing case gives way to
suspicions of something far more serious, namely, Spinozism. By the early twentieth
century, the suspicion of Spinoza develops into a more developed and scholarly reading
of Leibniz. Today scholarship has reopened the case against Leibniz, creating room for
any number of interpretations. Paull provides the sole voice in advocacy of a libertariantheism reading of Leibniz—or at least its possibility—while the majority of readers tend
either toward a hard necessitarian, bordering on Spinozism, or a softer compatibilist
theism. Nonetheless, the clear consensus favors a determinist understanding of Leibniz,
regardless of how the ramifications are understood.
Key to the above history of interpretation is eight assumptions, which come in and
out of the interpretative history in different combinations and degrees. These assumptions
are as follows:
(1) Leibniz’s clockwork analogy for pre-established harmony indicates a deistic
God-world relationship.
(2) The clockwork universe, assumed in pre-established harmony, indicates that
humans, as part of this clockwork, are mechanically determined.
(3) Libertarian free choice is not possible without indifference, while intellective
preference yields psychological determinism.
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(4) If God is not indifferent, then God is psychologically determined and our
world, the world he chose to create, is the only possible world.
(5) If the future is the product of divine decree, then the future is determined and
incompatible with libertarian free choice.
(6) If future contingents are analytic, future acts are not free but determined.
(7) Free choice requires the freedom to do good or evil, or moral indifference,
while moral necessity amounts to determinism.
(8) All possibles strain for existence means that possibles are self-actualizing,
pressing themselves from potentiality to actuality.
Various combinations of these assumptions appear throughout the history of Leibniz
interpretation. In the 1700s, points (1) through (5) are prominent; in the 1800s, points (6)
through (8) are added to the list of Leibnizian ills; and, while the mid-1900s to the
present has given way to a flood of research that has transformed the interpretive
landscape, the catalogue of above assumptions remain in various combinations and
incarnations.
In the next chapter, we will scrutinize the above interpretive assumptions in light
of the Augustinian tradition. In particular, we will look at evidence that the Augustinian
tradition is not only libertarian but was understood as such in Leibniz’s day. Moreover,
we will see that, despite its libertarian commitments, many within the Augustinian
tradition resist the very types of assumptions numerated above. In other words, what we
will see is that the assumptions that color the history of Leibniz interpretation represent a
shift in thinking that only begins to emerge in the 18th century, and this shift often stands
at odds with traditional Augustinians of the 16th and 17th centuries. Hence, if Leibniz is
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indeed a traditional Augustinian, as I will argue in later chapters, we have reason to
question whether the above assumptions are rightly brought to bear on his work, and
reason to question whether Leibniz is so easily forced down the necessitarian road if
these assumptions are removed.

CHAPTER 2
The Augustinian Tradition and Leibniz’s Interpreters

In the previous chapter, I identified eight interpretive assumptions that are
common to the history of Leibniz interpretation, but are suspect when scrutinized in light
of the Augustinian tradition. If, then, there is any validity to the claim of this project,
namely that Leibniz is a traditional Augustinian, this divide between Leibniz’s
interpreters and older Augustinian theology casts suspicion on the common portraits of
Leibniz. For they proceed from an entire set of assumptions that older and more
traditional Augustinian thinkers would reject out of hand.
My contention presumes three points, already identified above, which must be
defended prior to moving into Leibniz’s texts. The first point is that the traditional
Augustinian view of free choice and providence is libertarian. This point must be
defended because there is no consensus in the current literature regarding where this
tradition is best placed between the poles of libertarianism and determinism. A growing
number of interpreters would affirm my assumption, as they too maintain that Augustine
and his followers are advocates of libertarian freedom. So the argument goes, aspects of
Augustinian soteriology may be monergistic, but on the whole, the tradition aims at
protecting libertarian choice and understands providence to be synergistic—except,
perhaps, in matters of salvation. For God’s decrees include the decree that humans
possess free choice and achieve what they freely choose. Thus, the First Cause upholds,
rather than stifles, the proximate cause of human freedom.1 Others, however, dispute this
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reading, arguing that the Augustinian tradition is a form of determinism in which God’s
decrees are the First and only true Cause—pure monergism. On this read, human freedom
is free in only a compatibilist sense: creatures are free to choose as they please, but they
have no control over their desires, being physically or psychologically determined by the
nature given to them by God, the First Cause of all things.2
The second point that requires a defense is the rather crucial claim that, not only is
the Augustinian tradition libertarian, but Leibniz would most likely grant that it is
libertarian. This point is crucial because a convincing case that traditional

Herder and Herder, 1970); and John M. Rist, Augustine on Free Will and Predestination,” Journal of
Theological Studies 20, no. 2 (1969):420–447; for examples of libertarian readers of Aquinas and Scotus,
see Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (Routledge: London, 2003), 304–305; Norman Kretzmann, “Philosophy of
Mind” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, eds. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 147; Hannes Möhle, “Scotus' Theory of Natural Law” in
Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003), 326; Bernardino M. Bonansea, Man and His Approach to God in John Duns Scotus (Lanham, MD:
University Press of America,1983), 51, 80–81; Thomas Williams, “From Metaethics to Action Theory” in
Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003), 347–8; and Antonie Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2006), 413-30; and for libertarian readers of the Reformed scholastics, see, e.g., Antonie Vos,
“Always on Time,” in Understanding the Attributes of God, eds. Gijsbert van den Brink and Marcel Sarot
(New York: Peter Lang, 1995); A.J. Beck and Antonie Vos, “Conceptual Patterns Related to Reformed
Scholasticism,” Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 57, no. 3 (2003): 223-233; Richard A. Muller, “Grace,
Election, and Contingent Choice: Arminius’s Gambit and the Reformed Response,” in The Grace of God:
The Bondage of Will, eds. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books,
1995), 271; W.J. van Asselt and E. Dekker, eds., Reformation and Scholasticism: An Ecumenical
Enterprise (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2001), esp. A.J. Beck, “Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676):
Basic Features of His Doctrine of God,” 205-26, and Antonie Vos, “Scholasticism and Reformation,” 99119; Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed
Orthodoxy, ca. 1520-1725, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academics, 2003); and Willem J. van Asselt,
“The Theologian’s Tool Kit,” Westminster Theological Journal 68, no. 1 (2006): 23-40; and Willem J. van
Asselt et al., eds., Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in the History of EarlyModern Reformed Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2010).
2

Lord Henry Home Kames, Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (London:
J. Bell and J. Murray, 1779), 158-89; Monsieur Le Clerc, The Lives of the Primitive Fathers, viz., Clemens
Alexandrinus, Esebius, Bishop of Caesarea, Gregory Nazianzen, and Prudentius, the Christian Poet [. . .]
Also a Short History of Pelagianism (London: Printed for Thomas Ballard, 1701), 348-349; Johann Lorenz
Mosheim, An ecclesiastical history: antient and modern, from the birth of Christ, to the beginning of the
present century, 5 vols., trans. Archibald Maclaine, (printed for A. Millar, 1768), vol. 4, 373; The Athenian
Oracle: Being an Entire Collection of all the Valuable Questions and Answers in the Old Athenian
Mercuries. Intermix’d with many cases in Divinity, History, Philosophy, Mathematicks, Love, Poetry
(London: J. and J. Knapton, 1728), vol. 2, 193; “Die Christliche Lehre von der Sünde: von Julius Müller.
Breslau, 1844,” The North British Review 12, no. 24 (Nov 1849-Feb 1850): 438.

76
Augustinianism is libertarian only beckons the question of whether Leibniz would admit
this fact. If he would, all is well. But if he would not, then his continuity with the
tradition on numerous points does not, in itself, demonstrate his advocacy of libertarian
free choice. Rather, it demonstrates only his use of the tradition’s terms and concepts.
The third and final point I must defend is that the interpretive assumptions
identified in the previous chapter as common to Leibniz interpretation are at odds with
traditional Augustinian theology. This third point, however, requires the preliminary
substantiation of the first point. To illustrate, let us take one assumption on which I
believe Leibniz’s interpreters differ from traditional Augustinianism, namely, equipoise.
According to Leibniz’s interpreters, to reject equipoise is to embrace determinism. I
believe a traditional Augustinian would reject this entailment. However, while it is easy
to establish that more traditional Augustinians reject equipoise, unless the libertarian
nature of Augustinianism is also established, then this rejection of equipoise does not
demonstrate dissonance between these Augustinians and Leibniz’s interpreters. For the
Augustinian tradition could well reject equipoise because it embraces necessitarianism.
Hence, this last point will hang largely on the strength of the first point.
The strategy of this chapter will follow the above order of assumptions and reflect
the conjoined nature of these points. In section 1, I will offer three subsections that
highlight key piece of evidence that Augustine, medieval Augustinians, and postReformation Protestant Augustinians uniformly disapprove of determinism and operate
under an incompatibilist commitment (point 1). In section 2, I will supply evidence that
the libertarian nature of Augustinianism was well-known prior to the eighteenth century,
and was only later contested in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (point 2). In
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sections 3, I will devote attention to the differences between traditional Augustinian
theology and the assumptions of Leibniz’s interpreters (point 3). This groundwork will
set the stage for the exegetical chapters to follow, wherein I will draw out textual
evidence that Leibniz is a traditional Augustinian who affirms libertarian freedom, but
does so under a set of assumptions contrary to many of his interpreters.

1. Incompatibilism in the Augustinian Tradition
My examination of the Augustinian tradition on necessitarianism is chronological.
We will begin by looking at Augustine’s response to Cicero on fate and foreknowledge.
We will then turn our attention to the high medieval reception of Augustine’s views,
looking at the intellectualism of Thomas Aquinas and the voluntarism of John Duns
Scotus, respectively. Finally, we will turn to key representatives of post-Reformation
Reformed scholasticism, the prime example for some of Augustinian necessitariansim.
What we will see at each stage is that the Augustinian tradition displays an unwavering
commitment to incompatibilism.

1.1. Augustine’s Incompatibilism in Civitas Dei
While there are numerous places in Augustine’s corpus to which we could look
for a discussion of freedom, I will focus on a particularly relevant passage in book 5 of
civitas Dei. Therein Augustine addresses the apparent conflict between foreknowledge
and free choice, as propounded by Cicero, and his subsequent answer to whether
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Christianity affirms or denies fatalism.3 As we will see, Augustine’s comments in this
passage systematically eliminate the prospect of a necessitarian reading.
In De Divinatione, Cicero lays bare his fear that divination, or foreknowledge, is
incompatible with free choice.4 He thus makes every effort to undermine purported
instances of foreknowledge in order to protect freedom.5 Augustine summarizes Cicero’s
concern as follows: “if all events are foreknown, they will happen in the precise order of
that foreknowledge; if the order of events is determined, so is the causal order.... If the
causal order is fixed, determining all events, then all events ... are ordered by destiny. If
this is true, nothing depends on us and there is no such thing as free will.”6 The basic
problem, as Augustine sees it, is one of causality: Cicero believes that foreknowledge
implies a fixed order of causes; free choice is incompatible with a fixed order of causes;
therefore, if foreknowledge exists, free choice does not.7 Augustine’s response is simple:
“Our wills themselves are in the order of causes.”8 That is to say, our free choices are
included in the fixed order of causes foreknown by God.
Augustine’s reply in itself does not demonstrate that he is an incompatibilist.
After all, Lord Henry Homes Kames would claim the same thing, arguing that it is the
determined nature of things, in which our wills are included, that makes those future
3
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events certain.9 However, as we consider Augustine’s own exposition of his reply, we
will see clear evidence that Augustine rejects physical determinism, theological
determinism, and psychological determinism in favor of a libertarian view of freedom.
Augustine’s rejection of physical determinism becomes unmistakable in his
discussion of voluntary causes. Physical determinism (as discussed in the Introduction) is
rooted in a materialist worldview, which presumes that laws of motion are a brute fact of
reality and innate in matter. The guiding assumption is that all events are reducible to
matter in motion; hence, all happenings in our world, including human choice, are
determined solely by the laws of physics. Choice, while seemingly above the material
realm, is in fact determined by material movements and the laws that bind them.10
The claims of physical determinism are diametrically opposed to what we find in
civitas Dei. Augustine notes that there are various “causes” one may claim—“fortuitous
causes, natural, and voluntary causes.”11 According to Augustine, Christianity denies
“fortuitous” (or fated) causes and does not detach “natural” causes from God. What
Augustine goes on to argue is that “voluntary causes”—causes produced by God, angels,
and humans—are in fact “the only efficient causes of events….”12 Augustine makes the
case that laws of motion (or what we call physical laws) are not “natural,” if by this we
mean independent of God; rather, these laws are a product of God’s continual willing of a
certain world order. Unsuspended objects, for example, tend downward because God
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wills that they tend downward. Gravity is not an innate rule of matter or of motion, but is
a free act of God. And so it is with the rest of our world.
For our purposes, Augustine’s claim is significant. Unlike the physical
determinist, Augustine presumes that inanimate material objects remain inanimate unless
acted on by volitional agents. Hence, not only does Augustine reject the notion that
voluntary acts are a product of physical determinism; Augustine rejects the very premise
that there are causes external to the voluntary—a position entirely incompatible with
physical determinism.
Augustine’s rejection of theological determinism is apparent in two aspects of
his argument. The first is his discussion of divine concurrence. Augustine denies that the
will is bound by necessity such that its acts are inevitable. If necessity is to be applied to
the will, it applies only to the natural necessity that the will as will must be free, for such
is the nature of voluntas.13 We will return to this point in our discussion of psychological
determinism, but with regard to theological determinism, Augustine’s subsequent
discussion of God’s permissive will is more pertinent.
Augustine notes that while the will cannot be anything but free (as per its natural
necessity), obtaining what one chooses is another matter. Augustine is here wrestling, not
with determinism, but with fatalism: Does God allow free agents to achieve what they
freely choose? The question is a Stoic one.14 Augustine recognizes that, though
determinism is a form of fatalism, not all fatalism presumes determinism. Some Stoics,
such as Epictetus, grant that God has given man free choice that not even he can thwart,
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but these same Stoics reject the idea that this entails that God has given it to man to
achieve whatever he chooses.15 This distinction between choice and achievement is the
very rationale for Stoic ethics: Though our outward lot is fated, our inward response to
that lot is free. Granting my existence and freedom, not even God can hinder me from
freely choosing to raise my arms to type (again, as per natural necessity), but God need
not permit my arms to rise, and God can employ any number of circumstantial devices to
prevent me from typing. Augustine’s question is thus one of achievement, not choice:
Does God uphold or concur in the free choices of rational agents?16
Though Augustine’s answer is a noteworthy—Yes, providence works permissively
and synergistically with freedom17—more interesting is the question itself. Notice that for
a compatibilist, such as Kames, God’s will is accomplished because of what he has put
into creatures (e.g., the psychological and moral makeup he gives them).18 These personal
properties, in combination with the circumstances God sets around them, is what
guarantees “that a certain train of actions must necessarily follow….”19 On such a view,
the question of divine concurrence disappears entirely. For the determination of
creaturely choice is a unilateral affair: Whatever choice God desires from a creature, he
places into the creature via psychological wiring and circumstantial impetus. There is
nothing for God to concur with, since the choice of any given creature was chosen for
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that creature by God. The very fact that Augustine raises the question of divine
concurrence indicates that he does not hold Kames’s view.
This conclusion is made additionally clear by a second aspect of Augustine’s
argument, namely, his subsequent discussion of foreknowledge, which comes on the
heels of his talk of divine concurrence. In this discussion, Augustine admits the very
point made above, namely, that the God-world relationship he espouses implies a subjectobject relationship between God and creatures. In distinguishing between willing and
achieving, and in placing the achieving in the hands of the supreme will (viz., God’s), it
follows, argues Augustine, that God’s foreknowledge does not undermine freedom, but
rather establishes it. For if our will were the mere product of fate or unilateral
determination, our will would be no will at all, and there would be nothing in us for God
to foreknow. To use Augustine’s words, “It does not follow, then, that there is nothing in
our will because God foreknew what was going to be in our will; for if he foreknew this,
it was not nothing that he foreknew. Further, if, in foreknowing what would be in our
will, he foreknew something, and not nonentity, it follows immediately that there is
something in our will, even if God foreknows it.”20
Augustine thus makes plain that a view such as Kames’s is not, in Augustine’s
estimate, foreknowledge. For what Kames describes is not a will with its own free
choices that are foreknown by the divine mind, but a nonentity into which God places
choices. Such is not fore-knowledge but self-knowledge of what God has determined for
the agent.
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Augustine’s rejection of psychological determinism is apparent in Augustine’s
discussion of necessity and the will. As mentioned above, Augustine makes plain that,
despite God’s knowledge of future contingents, this does not indicate that the choices of
the will are necessary. To clarify the point, he distinguishes between two types of
necessity—the inevitable versus natural necessities. The former is clear enough, referring
to that which cannot be prevented or avoided. The latter has already been touched on
above. Natural necessity refers to the essential properties of a thing, such as the necessity
that God be omnipotent or that a circle have a flowing circumference. Augustine is clear
that inevitability does not apply to the choices of the will. But there is a natural necessity
that applies to the will, namely, the necessity that the will, if it is indeed a will, choose
freely.21 The claim in itself is (a) a clear rejection of internal necessity in the will’s
exercise of choice and (b) an insistence that the very nature of its operations be free. In
short, Augustine appears to offer a straightforward affirmation of libertarian choice, and
this appearance is confirmed by three additional features of his argument.
The first feature is the occasion of his argument, namely, Cicero’s concerns
regarding divination. As discussed at the opening of this section, Cicero’s fear is that if
foreknown acts can be known because they are produced by a preceding chain of causes,
then the act is not free.22 Clearly, Cicero is an incompatibilist. Yet, if we read Augustine
as espousing compatibilism in response, Augustine’s reply to Cicero is no reply at all; it
is a concession. It would be strange indeed for Augustine to reply to the charge that
foreknowledge implies determinism by affirming determinism! While the compatibilist
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must attribute this rather odd strategy to Augustine, this is plainly not what we find in
civitas Dei. Augustine’s argument does not begin by conceding Cicero’s fear (i.e.,
determinism), and then attempt to alleviate Cicero’s anxiety now that his worst fears are
confirmed—a common compatibilist strategy. We find no effort on Augustine’s part to
offer a compatibilist justification of law or reward and punishment or justice, despite
man’s lack of freedom. Nor do we find Augustine redefining freedom so as to be
compatible with determinism. On the contrary, Augustine puts forth great effort to refute
Cicero’s claim that foreknowledge implies determinism. To be sure, this is the very point
of Augustine’s argument! The fact that Augustine proceeds with this aim is itself a clear
indication that he is positively disposed toward Cicero’s incompatibilism; he simply
rejects Cicero’s conclusion that incompatibilism cannot survive alongside divine
foreknowledge.
The second feature of Augustine’s argument that confirms the appearance of
libertarianism is that Augustine separates the question of choosing from the question of
achieving. As discussed above, Augustine’s discussion of divine decree and
foreknowledge is aimed at the latter question: Does God permit creatures to achieve what
they choose? The initial question that Augustine asks regarding choice is one of internal
fate: Are the choices of the will inevitable? Unlike Kames and other compatibilists who
answer in the affirmative, Augustine denies the inevitability of choice, affirming instead
that the only necessity by which the will is bound is the natural necessity that, as will, it is
free. I, for one, cannot understand what this denial of inevitability, or fated choice, means
unless it is a denial of determinism in favor of libertarian powers of contrary choice.

85
The third feature of Augustine’s argument that confirms the libertarian reading
comes in the midst of his exposition on voluntary choice and his subsequent rejection of
physical determinism (discussed above). As stated in the Introduction, the compatibilist
maintains that for an act to be free, it suffices that the acting agent chooses in accord with
his desires.23 If a compatibilist were to try and force Augustine down the compatibilist
road, the best means to do so would be to use his argument regarding voluntary causes
against him. That is, if all causes in our world fall under the rubric of the voluntary, then
irrational animals must also possess freedom—a claim that fits compatibilism, but not
incompatibilism. However, such a strategy is doomed to failure precisely because
Augustine offers one important caveat in his argument: all voluntary causes “come from
God, or from angels, or men, or animals—if indeed one can apply the notion of will to the
movements of beings devoid of reason.”24 Augustine is explicit on the point: True
voluntas requires the faculty of reason. Hence, while there are numerous self-moving, or
“voluntary,” agents in the world, only those having a rational soul possess free choice.
Augustine does not here expound on what the unique quality is that the rational soul
brings to self-movement, but when combined with his sympathies for Cicero’s
incompatibilism and his rejection of internal necessity, the unique quality appears to be
the libertarian power of contrary choice.
What we find, then, is that Augustine rejects physical, theological, and
psychological determinism, and defends instead that the will is free by natural necessity,
that the freedom of the will is compatible with foreknowledge, and that foreknowledge
23
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itself testifies to a synergistic subject/object relationship between God and free creatures.
Moreover, the compatibility to which Augustine’s defense speaks is not a concession of
determinism that leads to a compatibilist redefining of freedom as uncoerced necessity,
but rather a case that the incompatibilist commitments of Cicero are in no way threatened
by divine foreknowledge, contrary to Cicero’s fears.

1.2. Incompatibilism in Medieval Augustinianism
Having seen evidence of Augustine’s own incompatibilist commitments, we turn
to a key piece of evidence that medieval Augustinianism retains this commitment. The
evidence I here consider is best set against the backdrop of eighteenth and nineteenth
century compatibilism. As compatibilist writers advance in earnest in these centuries, the
view takes up residence in a variety of theological circles. Some compatibilists, such as
Joseph Priestley, unblushingly admit that their position is innovative.25 However, those
compatibilists that seek a home in confessional Christian circles take a different
approach. Two strategies emerge.
The first strategy appears in a dispute between William Hamilton and William
Cunningham over the orthodoxy of compatibilism. Hamilton—a prominent Reformed
philosopher—argued that Jonathan Edwards’s determinism is heretical by the lights of
the Westminster Confession.26 Cunningham, an advocate of necessitarianism and a
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professing Calvinist, took it upon himself to defend compatibilism as a legitimate option
for Reformed theology. Cunningham dared not dispute the fact that Augustine and his
followers advocate free choice. Instead, what Cunningham argues is that, despite the
Augustinian advocacy of freedom, the door to psychological determinism remains open
because none in this tradition went so far as to explore whether uncoerced selfdetermination is itself predetermined by the psychological makeup of the acting agent. In
other words, traditional Augustinians may have insisted that acting agents move
themselves by uncoerced volition, but unless these authors clearly reject psychologically
determinism, a compatibilist could agree with the Augustinian tradition on this point.27
Cunningham thus claims the tradition is neutral on the compatibilist question.
A second, more aggressive strategy of eighteenth century compatibilists is found
in the work of Lord Henry Home Kames. Kames, like Cunningham, acknowledges the
push for free choice in the Augustinian tradition, but attempts to use its intellectualist
representatives to argue that psychological determinism is an acceptable stance for
Augustinians. Kames submits that because the intellectualist holds that the will
necessarily follows the final judgment of the practical intellect (voluntas necessario
sequitur ultimumm judicium intellectus practici), the position defaults into psychological
determinism. In other words, choice is the product of a chain of psychological events;
these events are determined by the capacities of intellect (or the psychological make of
the agent), not by the will; and these psychological events culminate in a final judgment
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of the intellect, from which the choice of the will necessarily follows (à la psychological
determinism).28
The above subsection on Augustine shows that both Kames and Cunningham
have an uphill battle with regard to Augustine himself. Putting aside Augustine, however,
is it true that his followers were less clear on matters of determinism and free choice? Is it
true that the medieval intellectualists stood on the opposite side of the issue from
Augustine, advocating psychological determinism? Because neither Kames nor
Cunningham dispute whether the Augustinian tradition affirms human volition nor deny
that God’s decrees uphold human volition, I will not rehearse the medieval echoes of
Augustine on these topics, discussed above.29 Rather, I will focus on the question of
whether either of the above compatibilist strategies is defensible in reference to medieval
Augustinianism.
Perhaps the best place to look when assessing the respective claims of Kames and
Cunningham is the medieval discussion of divine freedom. For this discussion makes
clear that the respective claims of Cunningham and Kames are both false. Within this
context, we find a clear recognition of the prospect of psychological determinism (contra
Cunningham), as well as the rejection of psychological determinism by both
intellectualists and voluntarists alike (contra Kames). As we will see, this dual
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recognition and rejection of psychological determinism testifies to a common
incompatibilist commitment among medieval Augustinians.
The issue of psychological determinism emerges in reference to God because of a
series of premises that stem from the traditional Christian understanding of the deity. It
was not uncommon for medieval figures, along with the Church fathers before them, to
hold that God (being omniscient) necessarily knows the best possible means to any given
end, and that God (being omnibenevolent and incorruptible) cannot but incline toward the
good, and indeed the best.30 The former negates the possibility of deliberation—none is
needed.31 And the latter appears to necessitate action on the known good.32 In light of
such assumptions, the danger of psychological determinism looms large. For if God need
not deliberate and cannot do anything but the best, then it seems to follow that both the
content of divine judgment and the divine choices that follow from this judgment are
necessary in an absolute sense. If God is free at all, he can be free in only a compatibilist
sense: He is a self-moving agent, free from external coercion.
The danger of such a conclusion is fully recognized from the patristic period
onward. But what we do not find among either patristic or medieval figures is acceptance
of divine determinism or a compatibilist defense of divine freedom. Rather, we find
opposition to psychological determinism as utterly incompatible with free choice, and
thus a rejection of the apparent necessity in divine choice.
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In patristic literature, the danger of divine determinism is acknowledged and
dismissed outright, but the dismissal is so uniform and uncontroversial that it involves
little by way of sustained argumentation. More often than not, the problem is identified as
entailing fatalism, which Christianity denies; it is recognized as a threat to creaturely
freedom, which Christianity affirms; and it is dismissed as falsified by the fact that God
can do things that he does not in fact do.33 In the medieval era, however, the question of
divine determinism receives more thorough scholastic attention.34 Despite this change in
approach, the common thread running through the two eras is the claim that divine
determinism is incompatible with Christian theology and must be avoided. The respective
positions of Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus on the matter are helpful, since they
represent the respective camps of intellectualism and voluntarism on free choice, and go
to the heart of the respective claims of Hamilton and Kames.
Beginning with Aquinas, we find that he is well aware that necessitarianism could
follow from his intellectualism. Having identified free choice as the free connection
between ends and means,35 the necessitarian implications of his denial of divine
deliberation are evident: God necessarily sees the given end in conjunction with its best
possible means, and because the will necessarily follows the final judgment of the
intellect, God necessarily chooses as he does.36 To use Aquinas’s words,
33
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The will of God is entirely unchangeable…. This cannot happen [i.e., that the will
be change], unless we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the
disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man
may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be
good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when
the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so
before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for
him, though he did not know it before; hence we take counsel in order to know
what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of
God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable. Therefore His will must be
entirely unchangeable.37
How Aquinas responds to this chain of reasoning is pivotal for unearthing whether his
commitments are compatibilist or incompatibilist.38 For, if Aquinas is a compatibilist,
then the implication of psychological determinism should be satisfactory. So long as God
is free from external coercion and is self-moving in accord with his own nature, the
compatibilist definition of freedom is satisfied. Only if one is an incompatibilist does
there emerge a need to avoid the necessary movement from judgment to choice. What we
find in Aquinas is an effort to break the chain of necessity from judgment to choice in
God, an effort that indicates his incompatibilist commitments.
Aquinas’s solution to the problem of divine freedom presumes standard medieval
faculty psychology. All free agents operate under an innate final cause (a fact of
ontology, not of choice),39 and the ordinary sense of ends and means in choice refers to
ends subordinate to a being’s final cause and means to these subordinate ends.40 For
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example, the final cause of man is happiness—this man wills necessarily.41 A subordinate
end to this final cause may be the satisfaction of hunger, and deliberation occurs when
considering particular means by which to satisfy this end. For creatures, freedom centers
on both subordinate ends, since various subordinate ends are compatible with happiness,
and deliberation regarding means to these ends—for example, one may eat salad,
pastrami, or some other food to satisfy hunger.42
In the case of God, however, Aquinas argues that omniscience and
omnibenevolence require that God see every subordinate end in conjunction with its best
possible means. Hence, no deliberation occurs.43 As for the final cause under which
God’s judgment operates, Aquinas identifies this as God’s own goodness.44 By
combining this final cause with a key ontological difference between God and creatures,
Aquinas arrives at his solution to the problem of psychological determinism. That key
difference is this: Unlike creatures, which consist of both potentiality and actuality,
knowing both ontological increase and corruption, God is pure actuality.45 God’s
goodness is thus complete in itself.46 The implication is that acts of creation and
providence that cohere with divine goodness do not enhance God’s goodness; they only
display it. In this light, Aquinas argues that God’s goodness does not necessitate any
subordinate end. In Aquinas’s words, “since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist
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without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows
that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary.”47 Given his
ontological self-sufficiency, God may act (volo) or not act (non volo). For inaction does
not threaten God’s goodness, and should God act, the particular action need only be
reflective of divine goodness; it is never necessitated by it.48 In short, by affirming the
pure actuality of God, Aquinas can maintain that God’s final cause (i.e., his own
goodness) has need of nothing, and thus God may freely couple this final cause with a
variety of subordinate ends or with none at all. To use Aquinas’s words, “God necessarily
wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily.… He has free will with respect
to what He does not necessarily will.”49
Regardless of whether Aquinas’s solution is successful, the fact that Aquinas
seeks to break the chain of necessity in this way testifies to his incompatibilist
commitment. He is cognizant of the danger of psychological determinism (contra
Cunningham), given what he affirms about God and the intellect-will relationship, and he
insists on avoid such determinism (contra Kames).
Despite Aquinas’s best efforts, medieval voluntarists, such as John Duns Scotus,
maintain that the intellectualist position cannot successfully avoid necessitarianism.50 To
be sure, Scotus’s concern is not Aquinas’s intentions. He recognizes that Aquinas intends
to avoid divine determinism and, by extension, to preserve the contingency of creation—
evident in the fact that he sees Aquinas’s approach as one among many proposed
47
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solutions to the problem of necessitarianism.51 Yet, Scotus argues that so long as choice
necessarily follows from intellective judgment, the modal necessity of divine knowing
will be distributed to divine choice and ultimately to the thing chosen.52
While Scotus disagrees with Aquinas on the nature of divine choice, he
nonetheless agrees that divine determinism is unacceptable. What is particularly
interesting about Scotus’s case is that he takes (what he perceives to be) the failings of
intellectualism as proof of voluntarism. That is, Scotus sees the existence of freedom and
contingency in our world as an axiomatic part of Christian theology.53 Because
intellectualism threatens freedom and contingency, Scotus thinks this is proof enough that
intellectualism is false and voluntarism is true.54 For if our world is free of modal
necessity—as Scotus presumes it is55—then the First Cause of our world must also be
free from modal necessity. This Scotus thinks is possible only in a voluntarist
framework.56
We will explore the details of Scotus’s defense of divine freedom in chapter 5.
For now, suffice it to say that Scotus’s own solution to divine determinism is rooted in
the question of how possibles are grounded. He insists that complex truth claims, such as
future contingents, are not grounded in God’s necessary knowledge (contra Aquinas57)
but are voluntarily grounded by the divine will and only then judged by the divine
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intellect.58 In other words, rather than leaving choice strictly on the post-judgment side of
God’s intellective acts, Scotus bookends the divine intellect with voluntary action—the
first act being the voluntary grounding of possibles, and the second being the voluntary
choice regarding the final judgment of the intellect.
For our purposes here, the feature of this solution that is most relevant is the fact
that Scotus, like Aquinas, looks for a way to break the chain of necessity in divine choice,
so as to avoid psychological determinism. Aquinas aims at this end by affirming the
actuality of divine goodness and its compatibility with numerous subordinate ends;
Scotus aims at this end by rejecting the idea that future contingents are part of God’s
necessary knowledge, and argues that they are freely grounded by the divine will and
only then submitted to the intellect for judgment. In both cases, however, the aim is to
avoid psychological determinism. Thus, the respective claims of Cunningham and Kames
fail, since the medieval Augustinians are not only aware of psychological determinism
(contra Cunningham) but are committed to avoiding it (contra Kames). Regardless of
whether one believes that either school of medieval thought can succeed in avoiding
determinism, the fact that both voluntarists and intellectualists have every intention of
doing so indicates a common incompatibilist commitment in both schools of thought.

1.3. Incompatibilism in Post-Reformation Protestant Scholasticism
We have now seen evidence that Augustine and his medieval followers were
incompatibilists. But does this commitment change with the post-Reformation era? To
answer this question, we will focus on Protestant theology, and specifically the Reformed
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scholastics, for several reasons. First, Leibniz sits on the Protestant side of the postReformation fence, so it is worth directing our focus there. Second, Leroy E. Loemker
identifies the Reformed scholastics as one of the main influences on Leibniz.59 Third, the
Reformed have long been accused of embracing necessitarianism,60 so if later
Augustinians abandon incompatibilism for determinism, we should expect to find this
amongst the Reformed. We will begin by looking at the question of divine freedom
addressed in the previous subsection.
Now, it must be noted that Reformed theology is not fully formed upon the dawn
of the Reformation, but undergoes development. Granting Richard Muller’s threefold
breakdown of this development, early Reformation theology is less scholastically
sophisticated than the “high orthodox” Reformed theology of ca. 1640-1725.61 As a
result, early Reformed theology continues to affirm the reality of divine freedom, but
does so with less scholastic clarity than many medievals.
All within early Reformed theology agree that God is free. However, some early
figures, such as Wolfgang Musculus (1497-1563), explicitly shy away from speculation
into the mechanics of free choice—the very speculation that is required to adjudicate the
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psychological-determinism question.62 Others, such as Girolamo Zanchi (1516-1590),
affirm that God possesses every type of freedom, including freedom from necessity,63 but
are unclear as to what this entails and what it excludes; hence, the claim remains
susceptible to a compatibilist reading of freedom as mere lack of coercion.64 In these
vague cases, however, one would be hard pressed to demonstrate conclusively a
commitment to either compatibilism or incompatibilism, since there is neither opposition
to medieval incompatibilism nor sufficient echo of it.
Thankfully, some within early Reformed theology comment with sufficient clarity
to label their position with confidence. Franciscus Junius (1545-1602), for example,
begins with standard fare for the Reformed, namely, the outlining of various types of
freedom with indication of which types belong to which beings.65 He reiterates the
standard Augustinian view that the freedom to do either good or evil (i.e., moral
indifference) is a product of fallibility and corruptibility, and that such freedom is inferior
to the freedom of God, who operates by moral necessity, doing only good. However,
Junius adds to this rather standard claim an added measure to avoid psychological
determinism. After identifying God as the freest of beings, and insisting that neither
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moral necessity nor omniscience negates this freedom, Junius insists that God retains
freedom of contradiction with regard to singular goods (viz., the best) and freedom of
contrariety with regard to multiple goods.66 In short, Junius makes clear that God is never
bound to act on any given judgment, but retains contrary choice whether faced with the
best or multiple comparable goods.
We find further confirmation of this libertarian commitment as we move into the
writings of the high orthodox Reformed scholastics. For as Catholic polemics against
Reformed theology become more sophisticated, the Reformed are forced to offer more
scholastically robust defenses of their positions and respond to the charges of
necessitarianism. Franciscus Gomarus (1563-1641), who debated Jacobus Arminius at
Leiden and whose theology became in many ways constitutive of Reformed orthodoxy
after the Synod of Dort, makes quite plain his libertarian commitments. Gomarus is
explicit that a mere lack of coercion (à la compatibilism) is inadequate for true freedom.
After all, notes Gomarus, even falling rocks and dogs are free from coercion. Freedom of
contrariety and contradiction, he argues, are required and these refer to the real possibility
of the opposite outcome or action by the given agent, the knowledge of the object
remaining the same.67 Notice that Gomarus’ insistence that the outcome could be
otherwise even if the knowledge is not otherwise is aimed specifically at psychological
determinism, which requires a change in knowledge (i.e., the psychological events) in
order for the choice to be otherwise. By adding this very specific condition, Gomarus
makes painfully clear his rejection of psychological determinism.
66
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Gomarus’ opposition to psychological determinism would echo in his student,
Gisbertus Voetius. Voetius reiterates Gomarus’ insistence that freedom requires not only
freedom from coercion but also from necessity. As for what freedom from necessity
entails, Voetius is quite clear that he means freedom from all intrinsic, absolute, and
natural necessity.68 In this triad, Voetius distances himself from every form of
determinism, including psychological determinism (intrinsic). Were Voetius not clear
enough on the point, his comments on indifference make plain his libertarian
commitments. Voetius argues that despite his belief that equipoise is a chimera69 (an
opposition to which we will return in section three), there are two legitimate senses in
which the will can be said to be indifferent. The first is that the presentation of a
judgment by the intellect to the will is offered in such a way that no psychological
necessity from judgment to choice follows from the presentation. The second legitimate
use of indifference refers to a root freedom in the will prior to it binding itself to any
particular choice. Suffice it to say that this second form of indifference can be read as
nothing other than an affirmation of the will’s power of contrary choice, or libertarian
capacity to actualize any number of possibilities.70
To these voices, we could add many others,71 such as Johannes Maccovius who
goes to great pains to demonstrate that while God provides existence to free agents via
concourse and supplies movement via premotion, the character of the act itself is freely
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determined by the agent,72 or Anglican Bishop Lancelot Andrews who identifies freedom
as an essential property of the soul, and includes among its capacities the power to
redirect thought (contra psychological determinism).73 Yet, for our purposes here, these
choice glimpses of incompatibilism in the post-Reformation Reformed tradition should
suffice.
The consistent pattern highlighted throughout this section is that the Augustinian
tradition displays an incompatibilist commitment in opposition to determinism. In
Augustine himself, we find that he rejects every form of determinism, and pours great
effort into demonstrating that libertarian free choice can exist alongside divine decree and
foreknowledge. In the medieval Augustinians, we see this same incompatibilist
commitment amid their efforts to avoid the snare of psychological determinism in God.
And these commitments continue to echo throughout the post-Reformation Reformed
scholastics. However, we still face the question of whether any in Leibniz’s day would
have recognized this. It is this question to which we turn in our next section.

2. Perceptions of the Augustinian Tradition on Free Choice
Though we have good evidence that the Augustinian tradition is committed to
incompatibilism, would any in Leibniz’s day have granted this? I will address this
question in two parts. We will first consider the recent essay by Richard Muller,
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“Jonathan Edwards and the Absence of Free Choice,” in which Muller looks at 18th
century reactions to this one very clear instance of “Calvinist” determinism. His findings
indicate that those involved the 18th century discussion agree that Edwards’
compatibilism is innovative and far from the Reformed position, which affirms
incompatibilism. After considering Muller’s findings, we will look at how perspectives
on the Augustinian tradition evolve from the 16th century through the 19th century. We
will see that there is a clear and uncontroversial recognition of the libertarian nature of
Augustinianism in the 16th and 17th centuries, and this general consensus goes
unchallenged until the 18th century, where it remains a minority report. Not until the 19th
century does the determinist reading of Augustinianism become commonplace, but this
reading still does not meet with consensus, as many continue to defend the older reading
of the tradition. In the end, we will see that both the findings of Muller and the
developmental understanding of the Augustinian tradition provide good reason to believe
that a writer in the 17th to early 18th century, such as Leibniz, would recognize the
incompatibilist commitments of the Augustinian tradition defended above.

2.1. 18th Century Reactions to Jonathan Edwards
In “Jonathan Edwards and the Absence of Free Choice,” Muller chastens the alltoo-common contemporary opinion that Edwards’ position on free choice represents the
standard “Calvinist” position.74 Over against this notion, Muller notes the opinion of
older scholarship that Edwards does not belong to traditional Reformed thought at all, but
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is of the lineage of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Anthony Collins.75 By drawing on
the respective writings of Joseph Priestley, George Hill, William Cunningham, and
William Hamilton, Muller demonstrates that this older scholarship, whether in favor of or
opposed to Edwardsian determinism, agrees that Edwards’ necessitarian views are
innovative and untethered to traditional Reformed theology, which is committed to
libertarian free choice.
Muller begins by comparing the respective perspectives of Priestley and Hill on
Edwards. Priestley, a famous philosopher and Unitarian universalist minister,
characterizes the Reformed and Remonstrant positions as in agreement with one another
on the issue of free choice: They both affirm, argues Priestley, the indifference of the will
with regard to particular acts, denying mechanism in the human mind that would
necessitate one action over the other. Hence, according to Priestley, both positions stand
in contrast to the doctrines of necessitarianism.76 (Whether the Reformed presume
indifference of equipoise is an issue to which we will return in the next section.) As
Muller points out, Priestley, an advocate of necessitarianism, does not trace his own
position back to the Reformed, but rather to Thomas Hobbes, chastising Locke for his
confused treatment of freedom in Essays on Human Understanding, and praising the
compatibilist Anthony Collins for clearing up the matter.77
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Muller notes the rather significant fact that one of Priestley’s opponents, William
Cockin, not only agrees with Priestley that Hobbes is the source of necessitarianism, but
sets necessitarianism in contrast with the Reformed doctrine of predestination as a
doctrine that presumes free agency, denying freedom only in reference to the procuring of
salvation. This concession by Cockin is significant because Cockin loathed the Reformed
understanding of predestination, and thus had no personal investment in defending it
from the charge of necessitarianism.78
Priestley recognizes that a number of “Calvinists” in his own day embrace
necessitarianism, but he states quite explicitly that he understands Edwards to be the first
to embrace this innovation.79 Priestley thus takes Edwards to be disingenuous in
representing his own position as Reformed and presenting philosophical liberty as
Arminian, since Priestley, like Cockin, recognizes that philosophical liberty is the
position held by Reformed and Remonstrant alike; the dispute is about the role of the will
in salvation, not about freedom per se.80 In Priestley’s assessment, Edwards was right to
side with necessitarianism, but no other Reformed figures prior to Edwards did so.81
After drawing out this material from Priestley, Muller looks at George Hill. Hill
offers a rather bleak assessment of older Reformed theology, but suggests that his own
more enlightened age had produced a new and more persuasive alliance between
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philosophy and theology that is manifest in the necessitarian brands of “Calvinism.”82
Unlike Priestley, however, Hill attributes this shift not to Hobbes, but to the
developments in Lutheran theology from Leibniz to Wolff and on into Israel Gottlieb
Canz, which eventually made their way into Reformed thought.83
Muller draws out some key similarities and differences between the respective
accounts of Priestley and Hill, which are instructive—especially for our purposes here.
The first obvious difference is the philosophy to which Priestley and Hill trace
“Calvinist” necessitarianism. Muller submits that the difference is less a matter of
historical scholarship and more one of strategy:
If the issue underlying these comments were a purely historical one, Priestley’s
account would certainly be closer to the truth, but the issue was more one of
pedigree, with Priestley identifying the line of thought leading to his own
philosophy and Hill identifying the line of development, leaving out the notorious
Thomas Hobbes, that would be more acceptable among Protestant theologians.84
A second difference is that Priestley understands Edwards to be departing from
Reformed thought in advocating necessitarianism, while Hill characterizes the shift as an
effort to place Reformed thought on more sure philosophical footing.85 Having said this,
Muller rightly points out that Hill’s characterization does not claim continuity between
older Reformed theology and then-contemporary Calvinism on the issue of freedom.
Rather, as Muller puts it, Hill saw that “there had been a major philosophical shift in
Protestant thought and that the shift was illustrated prominently by the work of Jonathan
82
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Edwards. Hill … identified the older Reformed theology as philosophically inept.”86 On
this point, there is agreement between Hill and Priestley, namely, that the necessitarian
trend is innovative and divergent from older Reformed thought.
Muller spends the latter part of his essay on the dispute between Hamilton and
Cunningham, referenced in the previous section. As noted above, Hamilton argued that
Edwards’ views on freedom are not only heterodox but heretical by the lights of the
Westminster Confession. Hamilton offers this assessment in both his Discussions on
Philosophy and Literature and in notes on a text of Dugald Stewart, which Hamilton
edited.87 As Muller points out, “Hamilton’s comment stood very much in agreement with
Stewart’s own conclusion that ‘the argument for Necessity’ as ‘insisted on both by
Collins and Edwards,’ if carried forward to the point of arguing the opposition of human
liberty and divine foreknowledge, would serve to ‘identify … the creed of the
Necessitarians with that of the Spinozists.’”88 Muller also points out that Stewart’s
association of Edwards with Collins affirms the lineage offered by Priestley, and links
Edwards more with 18th century rationalism than Reformed theology.89
Despite whatever agreement may have existed between Hamilton and Stewart,
Cunningham responded quite pointedly to this line of attack on necessitarianism, and he
had personal reasons for doing so. Not only was Hamilton a highly respected Calvinist
philosopher, but, as Muller points out, “an Edwardsian doctrine of predestination as
philosophical necessity had been espoused by quite a few eminent Scottish Presbyterian
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divines of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Identifying Edwards as a heretic
might become the basis for extending the compliment to the revered Thomas Chalmers,
and probably to Cunningham himself.”90
Significantly, Cunningham does not dispute the philosophical lineage of Edwards’
position espoused by Priestley.91 Cunningham’s strategy for defending necessitarianism
(touched on in the previous section) is to argue that the Westminster Confession and
Calvinist theology are both neutral on the issue, and thus can be coupled with
necessitarianism, though it need not be.92 The Westminister Confession simply argues
that divine foreordination does not imply that God is the author of sin, nor does it do
violence to the will of creatures or deprive them of liberty or contingency. Yet,
Cunningham somehow concludes from this that liberty is excluded. And, so the argument
goes, since Edwards did not take philosophical necessity to make God the author of sin or
to do violence to the will of creatures, necessitarianism must be compatible with the
Westminster Confession.93
Cunningham takes the same tactic in dealing with Augustine, Calvin, and
Turretin. He argues that neither of them explored the notion of psychological
determinism, and thus, while they defend the view that man is free to choose what he
desires, their views do not exclude the possibility that man’s desires are themselves
determined.94
90

Muller, “Jonathan Edwards,” 17.

91

William Cunningham, “Sir William Hamilton on Philosophical Necessity,” 206.

92

Cunningham, “Sir William Hamilton on Philosophical Necessity,” 211.

93

See Cunningham, “Sir William Hamilton on Philosophical Necessity,” 218; and Muller,
“Jonathan Edwards,” 18.
94

Cunningham, “Sir William Hamilton on Philosophical Necessity,” 213-216; and 227.

107
Muller raises a number of issues that Cunningham neglects in his treatment of the
Reformed tradition, including “the fact that the Confession affirmed contingency and
Edwards denied it,”95 and the fact that “Turretin is quite clear that the will, considered
absolutely or simply, in its primary actuality, is free not merely because it is spontaneous
and uncoerced but also because it has a root indifference prior to its act of willing and,
given that root indifference, it has both freedom of contrariety and freedom of
contradiction.”96 But regardless of whether his case is successful, Cunningham’s strategy,
given the lack of connection between philosophical necessity and traditional Reformed
theology, is to create room for necessitarianism by arguing the tradition’s neutrality on
the issue, not its advocacy thereof. However, as Muller points out, “[Cunningham’s]
response to Hamilton did not settle the issue of Edwards’s theology and its relation to the
older Reformed confessional tradition. In the same year of the British and Foreign
Evangelical Review, a substantial anonymous commentary on Edwards and the New
England theology appeared, much in line with Hamilton’s critique, highlighting Edwards’
determinism, identifying its affinities with pantheism, and questioning its Orthodoxy.”97
While Muller himself foregoes the question of Edwards’ orthodoxy,98 he does
conclude that Edwards’ determinism “stands in marked contrast to the resolution found
among Reformed orthodox writers like Gijsbert Voetius, Francis Turretin, and indeed,
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Edwards’ own favorite theologian, Petrus van Mastricht.”99 The contrast Muller
summarizes well and is worth quoting at length:
Among the differences between Edwards’ views on freedom and those of
the earlier Reformed tradition, perhaps the primary point concerns the basic
language of freedom itself. Whereas the older tradition consistently presented the
problem in terms of free choice or liberum arbitrium, understood as the
interactive act of intellect and will, Edwards presented the issue in terms of
freedom of will and grounded the issue in the will itself without reference to the
arbitrative function of intellect. In other words, the older Reformed theology
followed a traditional faculty psychology whereas Edwards did not. The older
tradition understood that there had to be a root indifference prior to the
engagement of will and intellect, defined by the potency of the will to multiple
effects and characterized by freedom of contradiction and contrariety, in order for
there to be freedom of choice—Edwards’ formulation not only denies these
points, it associates them with Arminianism.100
These shifts, argues Muller, constitute a major divergence from the older confessional
Reformed orthodoxy, and it is historically significant that, following the
deconfessionalizing of the early eighteenth century, 101 both proponents and opponents of
philosophical necessity in the eighteenth recognized this fact.102 In light of this evidence,
Muller concludes:
It is, then, to Edwards and to those who followed him in this path, as well
as to the Wolffian Reformed thinkers on the continent, that Reformed theology
owes much of its reputation for being a form of determinism or compatibilism,
rather than to the theologians from the time of Calvin to the time of Turretin and
van Mastricht who have typically been viewed as the arbiters of Reformed
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orthodoxy. In short, the nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholarship that tended
to characterize the entire older Reformed tradition as a form of predestinarian
metaphysic not only rested its claims on the work of nineteenth-century
theologians like Alexander Schweizer but also, probably with Schweizer, viewed
the tradition primarily through the glass of then rather recent developments in the
tradition, namely, the eighteenth-century rise of Calvinistic philosophical
determinism.103
Muller’s findings are significant for several reasons. First, Muller’s assessment of
the matter confirms the conclusion of the previous section that Reformed theology is
committed to incompatibilism. Second, these findings indicate numerous figures in the
18th century—both proponents and opponents of compatibilism—recognize
compatibilism as an innovation that is contrary to the position affirmed by traditional
Reformed theology. Third, compatibilists, such as Cunningham, who wish to dispel the
charge of heretical innovation do not attempt to jump over Reformed theology to
medieval or patristic Augustinianism because they recognize that compatibilism is an
innovation, foreign to the older literature.

2.2. Perspectives on Augustinianism from the 16th to the 19th Century
With Muller’s findings before us, we turn now to the evolution of perspectives on
the Augustinian tradition from the 16th century through the 19th century. As we will see,
the incompatibilist assessment of the Augustinian tradition remains dominant in the 16th
and 17th century, and does not meet with significant challenge until the 18th and 19th
centuries. Yet, even there, it advances with nothing like consensus.
Beginning with the 16th and 17th centuries, what we find is a general agreement
that the Augustinian tradition is bent on the affirmation of free choice. We have already
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seen Muller draw a contrast between the compatibilism of Edwards and incompatibilism
of the 16th / 17th century Reformed orthodox, Voetius, Turretin, and van Mastricht.104
This incompatibilist reading of Reformed orthodoxy is reinforced by the way the
Reformed/Remonstrant discussion is framed in this period. While Edwards and other
determinists, such as Kames, would later frame this discussion as a dispute between
incomaptibilism (Arminian) and compatibilism (Calvinist),105 this is not what we find in
the 16th and 17th centuries. Neither the Reformed nor Remonstrant of this period paint the
dispute as a controversy regarding whether man has free choice, but rather as a dispute
regarding whether free choice plays a role in regeneration. The accusations of
Pelagianism or of semi-Pelagianism center on whether prevenient grace is synergistic or
monergistic—that is, the question is whether the will cooperates with regeneration or is
merely a passive object being acted on by God in regeneration. The question is not
whether the will is free in general. As Voetius, the pupil of Gomarus who debated
Arminius, explains it, the Reformed deny that free choice plays a role in regeneration
precisely because the will is a passive object being acted on by God in conversion, while
the “Papists” and “Arminians” believe the will has a cooperative role to play.106 Or as
Arminius characterizes his own position, grace sufficient for salvation is given to the
individual, but this grace must be rightly used in order to affect salvation.107
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This understanding of the dispute is also reflected in the historical theology of the
period. Arminian theologians pour great effort into demonstrating Patristic precedent for
their position. Their goal is often to show that the Greek fathers or Augustine or both
affirm that God’s foreknowledge of future free acts plays a role in his decrees regarding
election. We can see this in Arminius himself, and more robustly in Gerardus Joannes
Vossius’ 830 page treatise on the history of Pelagianism.108 Vossius makes the case that
the Greek Church fathers unanimously view predestination as rooted in God’s
foreknowledge of pious living, faith, and perseverance, and Augustine’s views are novel
in comparison.109 Vossius’ claim is not that Augustine’s view of freedom is novel
(Vossius presumes continuity here); his claim is that Augustine’s understanding of
election and his notion of monergistic regeneration are novel, and therefore, the
synergistic alternative espoused by the Remonstrants should not be labeled Pelagian, lest
one label the whole of the Greek fathers Pelagian as well.110
This jockeying for Augustine (et al.) is not unique to the Arminians, but exists
throughout the literature—Remonstrant versus Reformed, Reformed versus Remonstrant,
Reformed versus Catholic; and Catholic versus Reformed.111 Among the Reformed
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apologies, there is no corrective offered to the belief that Augustine advocates free
choice. On the contrary, the Reformed frame the dispute precisely as the Arminians and
Catholics do, namely, as a dispute regarding the role of will in regeneration and
predestination. Hence, even Gomarus himself expounds on a libertarian view of free
choice, and offers no indication of a Reformed distinctive until coming to the question of
the abilities of freedom to affect salvation. Only here does he indicate a difference
between the Papists, the Remonstrant, and the Reformed.112 In short, how the literature
treats the topic indicates that, contrary to the claim of later compatibilists, the dispute is
not over the nature of freedom itself (viz., compatibilism versus incompatibilism).
Rather, the evidence points to agreement on the nature of freedom, but dispute over (a) its
post-lapsum abilities regarding salvation, and (b) where Augustine (and the other Church
fathers) stand on this very specific issue.
Now, if there is a dispute regarding the nature of freedom in the 16th and 17th
centuries, it is not incompatibilism versus compatibilism. Rather, the dispute is over
whether equipoise is required for libertarian free choice. The notion of indifference of
equipoise emerges during the 16th and 17th centuries, being commonly associated with
Jesuit theologians Luis de Molina and Francisco Suárez.113 In many cases in the 16th and
17th century, the given thinker’s position on indifference is unclear. What is clear is that
not all who affirm libertarian freedom advocate equipoise. As Willem van Asselt (et al.)
points out, “This was a hotly debated issue in Voetius’ days, especially in the aftermath
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of Luis de Molina’s Concordia … and the controversy between Molinism of the Jesuits
and Banezianism of the Thomists. As recent research has pointed out, this controversy
was resembled to a surprising level of detail by the famous controversy within Reformed
Protestantism between Arminius and orthodox theologians like Gomarus.”114 Both the
Thomists (whom we have seen oppose psychological determinism) in their disputes with
the Molinists and the Reformed in their disputes with the Remonstrants share a common
skepticism over the viability of equipoise as a theory of freedom—though we have seen
that both camps advocate incompatibalism.
Voetius is a good representative of the concern surrounding equipoise. As we saw
in the previous section, both Voetius and his teacher, Gomarus, insist on a libertarian
view of choice. Yet, Voetius goes on to oppose equipoise as a form of “chimerical
indifference.”115 As Voetius explains, there are certain valid uses of the term indifference
that accompany a rejection of necessity, such as his own. Those uses include objective
indifference and vital, internal, and choosing indifference. The former refers to the way
in which the intellect displays to the will a possible choice. To wit, it presents the choice
to the will without any necessary connection to the intended end, so that any danger of
psychological determinism—as per the necessary movement from judgment to act—does
not follow. The latter indifference refers to the innate libertarian capacities of the will,
“which belongs to the free potency that is not yet finally determined by the practical
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judgment.”116 Voetius sees both forms of indifference as essential to freedom, and the
implication is that contrary choice is possible and culpability is preserved. As Voetius
puts it, “Given these indifferences, no external agent, not even God, can overturn
freedom in its natural mode of acting. Thus the ownership of the will’s own acts is
permanently left to it.”117 If indifference is taken in the above two senses, Voetius has no
objection. However, this is not what he believes is being claimed by proponents of
equipoise. According to Voetius, indifference of equipoise suggests that “someone who is
determined to one component remains at the same instance indifferent to two, or perhaps
more, components.”118 In other words, Voetius’ opposition to equipoise is it presumes
that after the agent has removed its indifference in favor of a particular choice, it still
remains indifferent to that which it has chosen. Such a claim, argues Voetius, ends in
contradiction, namely, That which is self-determined is simultaneously indeterminate.119
Hence, Voetius thinks this form of indifference is nothing but empty words, having no
referent in reality—hence its chimerical status.
What Voetius’ assessment of equipoise represents is the 16th and 17th century
dispute over (a) whether equipoise is a coherent concept, and (b) whether it is a requisite
condition for libertarian free choice. Though many embrace equipoise, there are just as
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many Augustinians within this period who, like Voetius, advocate libertarian free choice
but reject equipoise as chimerical.
In the 18th century, the array of voices on Augustinianism undergoes a very
distinct change. Just as in 18th century Leibniz studies (see chapter 1, §1), a number of
figures emerge in Augustinian interpretation who presume that equipoise is synonymous
with libertarian freedom, and thereby maintain that to deny equipoise is to deny
philosophical liberty. This way of casting the dispute is absent in 16th and 17th century
treatments of the Augustinian tradition. Older literature often argued that an opposing
tradition was not tenable (e.g., the concept espoused is chimerical) or risks falling into
error (e.g., determinism cannot be avoided in that theory), but it also recognized that
neither incoherence nor determinism were not the intended ends of the given position.120
Yet, in the 18th century, some interpreters begin to cast the dispute more polemically and
thus matter-of-factly as a dichotomy between libertarians (pro-equipoise) and
determinists (anti-equipoise). The results are very much like what we see in Leibniz
studies. To wit, compatibilist readers begin to argue that the mere denial of equipoise or
affirmation of inclining reasons is an affirmation of psychological determinism. The work
of Kames is a good example. As noted in §1.2, Kames argues that the intellectualist
position, with its denial of equipoise and affirmation of intellective preference, is a
medieval theory of psychological determinism, and he proceeds to trace this faculty
psychology from Calvin forward as proof of the Reformed tradition’s affirmation of
determinism.121
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These compatibilist proponents also initiate a shift in 18th century treatments of
the historical-theological question of free choice. Whereas the 16th and 17th centuries did
not dispute Augustine’s affirmation of free choice, only his stance on its role in
regeneration and predestination, 18th century compatibilists separate Augustine from the
larger world of patristic theology, thus distinguishing Augustinian theology
(compatibilism) from Pelagianism, semi-Pelagianism, and Greek patristic theology
(libertarianism). Monsieur Le Clerc, for example, reads Augustine as a compatibilist who
understands freedom as mere uncoerced spontaneity, and sees providence as pure
monergism. Yet, Le Clerc does not thereby conclude that Christianity as a whole is
compatibilistic, for he reads the Pelagian-Augustinian divide as a divide between Greek
and Latin theology—the former being bent on upholding libertarian freedom and a
synergistic view of providence, while the latter defends monergistic determinism.122
Similarly, John Dunton (et al.) casts the positions of Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin as
outright denials of free choice in favor of pure monergism (in all things, not merely
regeneration), which he presumes to be true of Augustine as well. Dunton places this
position in contrast to Erasmus, who he takes to be a semi-Pelagian and thus a “moderate
free choice” advocate.123 Likewise Johann Lorenz Mosheim places the Catholic
understanding of freedom at odds with Jansenius, and then paints the latter as identical
hence, liberty has nothing to do with contrary choice. Humphry Ditton, A discourse concerning the
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unsigned; hence, I am merely attributing to Dunton, et al.
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with Augustine’s views, which he takes to be overtly necessitarianism.124 He goes on to
identify Augustinian necessitarianism as the view reflected in the Calvinists.125 (It is
noteworthy that Mosheim reads Leibniz as a necessitarian because he presumes that
Leibniz is a follower of Augustine.126)
Despite the emergence of these compatibilist readings of the Augustinian
tradition, the trend was far from uniform or even dominant. As we saw in §2.1, those 18th
century British authors who weigh in on Edwards (e.g., Priestley, Cockin, and Stewart)
agree that Edwardsian compatibilism is foreign to the Reformed tradition, which
advocates libertarian freedom just as the Remonstrants do. And these voices are far from
the only representatives who carry on the 16th / 17th century understanding. To cite just a
few examples, Nicholas French argues that Augustine and the Greek fathers are in
agreement in their advocacy of free choice.127 Likewise, Alexander Pope discusses the
synergistic nature of Augustine’s talk of God’s permissive will; he presumes continuity
between Augustine and the Greek fathers on the point;128 and lest he be read as a
compatibilist, he makes clear that he rejects a compatibilist definition of freedom,129
invoking the traditional libertarian case that reward and punishment presume contrary
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Johann Lorenz Mosheim, An ecclesiastical history: antient and modern, from the birth of
Christ, to the beginning of the present century, trans. Archibald Maclaine, 5 volumes (printed for A. Millar,
1768), vol. 4, 373.
125

Mosheim, An ecclesiastical history, vol. 4, 378.
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Alexander Pope, “Letter LXVII. To Prevent the Mistake Notions Some may entertain from the
Reading of M. de Voltaire’s Candid, or All for the Best,” in Universal Magazine of Knowledge and
Pleasure (Pub. for J. Hinton, July 1759), vol. 25, 15-19.
129

25, 16.
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choice.130 Augustin Calmet, too, distinguishes the Greek and Augustinian views on
predestination, but not on freedom.131 As for the distinction between Augustine and the
Pelagians or semi-Pelagians, he takes this to be a distinction of moral freedom—that is,
whether post-lapsum man has liberty to work “advantageously to salvation” or not.132
Not until the 19th century do we find the more significant shifts in perspective on
the Augustinian tradition. The dawn of the 1800s brings with it (a) an increasing number
of compatibilist advocates within theological circles, (b) an increasing tendency to equate
equipoise with libertarian freedom, and (c) a resulting presumption that the affirmation of
intellective preferences and/or the denial of equipoise constitutes an affirmation of
determinism. As these three trends converge, we find a number of authors who propound
the position—absent from the 17th century and obscure in the 18th century—that
Pelagianism is libertarian, Augustinianism (associated with Protestantism) is determinist,
and semi-Pelagianism (associated with Catholicism and Arminianism) is a middle ground
position that aims at preserving some modest amount of post-lapsum contrary choice.133
Despite an increase in 19th century determinist readings of Augustine, this
position does not replace the older reading. Hence, Cunningham’s strategy in the period
is to argue the neutrality of the tradition rather than its compatibilist bent, and there are
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See, e.g., “Die Christliche Lehre von der Sünde,” 438; The Encyclopaedia Britannica: A
Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and General Literature, 9th ed., ed. Thomas Spencer Baynes (New York:
Henry G. Allen & Co., 1888), arts. “Pelagius,” “Pelagianism,” and “Semi-Pelagianism,” vol. 18;
M’Clintock / Strong, Cyclopaedia, vol. IV, 561; and “The Augustinian System,” The Dublin Review 109
(July-Oct, 1891): 54-63 (The author is identified only as “The Author of ‘St. Augustine; An Historical
Study’”).
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strong Reformed voices, such as Hamilton and Hill (et al.) who unequivocally deny not
only the tradition’s neutrality but its compatibility with determinism. In addition, it is
noteworthy that most who defend Augustinianism from a compatibilist reading also
oppose the notion of equipoise as a condition for libertarian choice.134 Hamilton, for
example, is quite clear that equipoise is untenable as an actual phenomenon of human
experience, since we always have intellective preference and motives; but he is equally
clear that neither intellective preference nor post-lapsum moral corruption undermine
libertarian free choice evident in his opposition to Edwardsian compatabilism. And this
he takes to be the stance of the Augustinian tradition in general (including its Reformed
proponents), so much so that he labels compatibilism heresy.135
Samuel Harris, then-professor of Systematic Theology at Yale, makes the same
point, affirming that Augustinianism advocates libertarian free choice, but he keenly
points out the confusion that occurred in then-recent scholarship, namely, of conflating
libertarian freedom and moral liberty. Harris notes that libertarian freedom and moral
liberty are not the same thing. Moral liberty was lost in the Fall—post-lapsum man
cannot do works unto salvation—while libertarian freedom was not. The distinction,
Harris argues, is one that older theology recognized and thought important, but which the
newer theology of then-recent years had regrettably lost.136
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Both the findings of Richard Muller and the above survey of literature from the
16th century to the 19th century point in a common direction. Muller’s research indicates
that those British authors who discuss the theology of Jonathan Edwards agree that his
compatibilism is divergent from the Augustinian tradition generally and the Reformed
tradition specifically. Whether libertarian or determinist, Reformed or Unitarian, these
authors agree that the Reformed and Remonstrant are of one accord in their rejection of
compatibilism. This reading of the tradition is consistent with the above survey of 16th
and 17th century texts on the Augustinian tradition. Moreover, we found that the more
controversial point of the period is not whether libertarian freedom is part of the
Augustinian tradition, but whether such freedom requires equipoise. While the advocacy
of equipoise is found among Jesuits, et al., we saw that figures such as Hamilton and
Voetius who plainly oppose compatibilism in favor of incompatabilism but nonetheless
take serious issue with both the cogency of equipoise and its importance to libertarian
free choice.

3. Implications for Leibniz Interpretation
Applying the above findings to Leibniz studies, a number of implications emerge.
First, given the evidence that the Augustinian tradition is not only libertarian but is
recognized as such in the 16th and 17th centuries, we have good reason to believe that if
Leibniz’s views are a faithful extension of this tradition, as I will argue, then Leibniz is
knowingly employing an incompatibilist theology. This, in itself, should cast suspicion
on the compatibilist/necessitarian reading of Leibniz. Second, if the evidence supports an
Augustinian rereading of Leibniz, this creates difficulties for a number of the
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interpretative assumptions, identified in chapter 1, that are integral to the respective
necessitarian, deist, and Spinozist readings of Leibniz. By way of refresher, the eight
interpretative assumptions identified are:
(1) Leibniz’s clockwork analogy for pre-established harmony indicates a deistic
God-world relationship.
(2) The clockwork universe, assumed in pre-established harmony, indicates that
humans, as part of this clockwork, are mechanically determined.
(3) Libertarian free choice is not possible without indifference of equipoise, while
intellective preference yields psychological determinism.
(4) If God does not choose from a place of equipoise, then God is psychologically
determined and our world, the world he chose to create, is the only possible
world.
(5) If the future is the product of divine decree, then the future is determined and
incompatible with libertarian free choice.
(6) If future contingents are analytic, future acts are not free but determined.
(7) Free choice requires the freedom to do good or evil, or moral indifference,
while moral necessity amounts to determinism.
(8) All possibles strain for existence means that possibles are self-actualizing,
pressing themselves from potentiality to actuality.
When considering these assumptions in the light of sections 1 and 2 above, a great many
of them prove problematic.
Assumptions (3) and (4) (i.e., Libertarian free choice is not possible without
indifference of equipoise, while intellective preference yields psychological determinism
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and If God does not choose from a place of equipoise, then God is psychologically
determined and our world, the world he chose to create, is the only possible world) both
build on a conflation of equipoise with libertarian choice. This conflation aligns with the
post-17th century compatibilist reading of the Augustinian tradition, not with the older
literature.137 We saw in §2.2, this assumption is not a given in traditional Augustinian
theology, and we have clear instances of Augustinian theologians who emphatically
oppose determinism and reject equipoise (e.g., Hamilton and Voetius). Assumptions (3)
and (4) thus presume rather than demonstrate that Leibniz’s thought is reflective of
18th/19th century compatibilism. While one is certainly within his intellectual rights to
argue that Leibniz is rightly labeled a compatibilist and thereby submit that (3) and (4)
are justified, to presume it at the outset begs the question of whether Leibniz is a
compatibilist and runs the risk of becoming circular—We know that Leibniz’s rejection of
equipoise is not a libertarian-Augsutinian rejection because Leibniz is a compatibilist,
and we know Leibniz is a compatibilist because he rejects equipoise. Therefore, we must
revisit the equipoise question in both its larger historical and textual context in order to
see if Leibniz’s rejection of equipoise is intended to prove psychological determinism (à
la Kames) or is reflective of a more traditional Augustinian-libertarian position that
challenges both the coherence and the importance of equipoise to libertarian free choice
(à la Hamilton and Voetius). Our findings in this inquiry will also determine the viability
of assumption (7) (i.e., Free choice requires the freedom to do good or evil, or moral
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For an excellent example of how close contemporary Leibniz studies comes to the post-17th
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indifference, while moral necessity amounts to determinism). For this assumption reflects
the very conflation of liberty and moral liberty that Harris identifies as common among
compatibilist innovators but as contrary to traditional Augustinian theology.
Assumption (5) (i.e., If the future is the product of divine decree, then the future is
determined and incompatible with libertarian free choice) is also rather problematic from
a traditional Augustinian perspective. For as we saw in §1.1, Augustine argues the
compatibility of divine decree and human freedom on the very grounds that if creatures
are going to be free, God must (a) decree their existence, (b) decree their freedom, and (c)
decree to uphold their freedom. By appeal to this view of providence, over against fate,
Augustine argues that God’s decrees preserve rather than hinder the freedom of man.
Augustine’s position on the matter would be commonplace for future Augustinians. Thus,
Aquinas insists that God’s decrees preserve the free and contingent nature of the object
foreknown;138 Scotus likewise insists that the First Cause causes in a way that preserves
the contingency of the proximate cause;139 and the post-Reformation Reformed
scholastics insist that divine predetermination reflects God’s knowledge of the object and
his preservation of its free and contingent choices.140 One may critique the success of the
Augustinian insistence that divine decree does not violate free choice, but the fact that the
tradition has insisted on this compatibility is clear. Hence, assumption (5) must contend
with the question of whether Leibniz espouses the point from a tradition Augsutinian
incompatibilist perspective, or is doing something much more innovative.
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More could be said on the theological precedent of Leibniz’s clockwork
analogy141 or regarding assumptions (6) and (8) (i.e., If future contingents are analytic,
future acts are not free but determined and All possibles strain for existence means that
possibles are self-actualizing, pressing themselves from potentiality to actuality), but we
will leave these points to be looked at in their textual context. For now, suffice it to say
that there are reasons to believe that these claims, too, are not as innovative as they may
appear on first blush, and may well have their roots in traditional Augustinian soil.
What we can say in light of the foregoing is that there is a clash between
traditional Augustinian assumptions and many key assumptions of Leibniz’s interpreters.
The former is reflective of an older libertarian tradition that sees its incompatibilist
commitments as perfectly compatible with intellective preference, divine decree, and
post-lapsum moral determination, while the latter bears a set of assumptions foreign to
this tradition, except among compatibilist innovators of the 18th and 19th centuries. If
Leibniz is indeed a 17th / 18th century compatibilist, as the majority of his readers insist,
then this clash should not be surprising, and his assumptions, like the assumptions of his
interpreters, are likely antithetical to those of traditional Augustinianism. If, however,
Leibniz is a proponent of traditional Augustinian theology, then, by implication, Leibniz
has been read through lenses that wrongly color his theological and philosophical claims,
creating a distorted visage.
141

On the Christian, as opposed to deist, roots of clockwork analogies, see John North, God’s
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In the chapters to follow, we will revisit Leibniz’s texts with the above findings in
hand and with a view to placing his claims relative to the Augustinian tradition. I will
highlight the textual indications that Leibniz’s philosophical theology is a recapitulation
of traditional ancient, medieval, and post-Reformation Augustinianism. Moreover, we
will see that this textual evidence favors Leibniz’s commitment to the older
incompatibilist understanding of this tradition. The end result will demonstrate that the
reading of Leibniz as a traditional Augustinian incompatibilist theist is not only possible,
but viable in light of the textual and historical evidence.

PART 2
LEIBNIZ ON FREE CHOICE, PROVIDENCE, AND EVIL

CHAPTER 3
Leibniz on Free Choice and Providence Prior to 1700

As we now transition into Leibniz’s texts, several points should be made at the
outset. First, Leibniz scholars disagree over how many stages of intellectual revolution
Leibniz undergoes. It is safe to say that most all agree to the following:
(1) Leibniz parts ways with Aristotle at an early age—according to his letters to
Burnett and Foucher, respectively, by age fifteen (G 3:205; 1:371).
(2) Following his departure from Aristotle, Leibniz embraces the burgeoning
atomism of his day (see G 6:56-7), espousing it explicitly by 1665 in De arte
combinatorial (1665).
(3) Leibniz comes to doubt the adequacy of atomism by 1668—doubts he
expresses in Confessio naturae contra atheistas (1668) and later echoes in
Demonstratio contra atomos sumpta ex atomorum contact (1690) (G 6:108-9;
7:284-8)—and rejects it outright between 1668 and 1669, as testified to in two
letters (Oct 1668 and April 1669) to his former teacher, Thomasius.
(4) By 1671 Leibniz espouses a new metaphysic.
The disputed aspects of Leibniz’s intellectual development include, first, whether there is
a transitional philosophy between 1668 and 1671.1 Since we will be looking exclusively
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Milič Čapek, “Leibniz’s Thought Prior to the Year 1670: from Atomism to a Geometrical
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Bradley Bassler, argue that there is transitional position found Theoria motus abstricti that, while
anticipating, is not yet the fully articulated position of Specimen demonstrationum de natura rerum
corporearum ex phaenomenis (1671). See O. Bradley Bassler, “Motion and Mind in the Balance: The
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at post-1671 texts, I will forego this question. The second more relevant question is
whether Leibniz’s views on free choice and providence change after 1700. Some suggest
Leibniz is consistent, while others, such as Robert C. Sleigh, Jr., argue that Leibniz
moves from soft determinism (pre-1700) to hard determinism (post-1700).2
In light of this second dispute, I have divided my exposition into pre- and post1700 expositions. As we move through Leibniz’s pre-1700 work in this chapter and his
post-1700 thought in the next, we will be attentive to shifts in Leibniz’s thinking on free
choice and providence. However, for our purposes here, suffice it to say that the reading
of Leibniz I here advocate is so fundamentally different than that of Sleigh—and other
necessitarian readers who take this view—that the evidence he forwards carries little
weight in the present context. And though I believe it is possible that some subtle shifts
occur in Leibniz’s thought after 1700 (possible shifts I identify in the next chapter), none
are so significant as to give me pause when drawing on post-1700 texts that help
illuminate aspects of pre-1700 texts. Hence, while I have chosen to respect the pre1700/post-1700 dividing line in the structure of this project, I proceed under the
conviction that Leibniz remains generally consistent throughout his post-1671 writings. I
Transformation of Leibniz’s Early Philosophy,” Studia Leibnitiana 34, no. 2 (2002): 221-31. Bassler sets
his position in contrast with that of D. Garber and André Robinet, who do not recognize this nuance in their
treatment of Theoria motus abstricti (see D. Garber, “Motion and Metaphysics in the Young Leibniz,” in
Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays, ed. M. Hooker [Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press,
1982, 160-84; and A. Robinet, Architectonique disjunctive, automates systémiques et idéalité
transcendantale dans l’æuvre de G. W. Leibniz. Nombreux texts inédits [Paris: Vrin, 1986], 166.) Other
commentators, such as Christia Mercer, focus on the more global transition in Leibniz’s thought, and thus
see commentators such as Bassler (as well as Beeley and Arthur) as too concerned with the minutia of the
transition period: see Christia Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origin and Development (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 261, n. 12; 414, n. 105.
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will thus minimize but not refrain entirely from drawing upon post-1700 writings where I
think it is helpful in expositing Leibniz’s pre-1700 claims.
Now, a word should be said regarding the specific role of this chapter in the
current project, which helps illuminate my chosen pre-1700 point of focus. Because this
project focuses on Leibniz’s views on free choice and providence and how these views
play out in his theodicy, I am here less concerned with Leibniz’s stance on justification,
Trinity, Christology, or other tangential theological topics that could be expounded in
reference to Examen religionis Christianae, for example. Instead, I have chosen to focus
this chapter on Leibniz’s early treatment of modality, freedom, divine knowledge, divine
decree, divine predetermination, and possible worlds. For these topics will ultimately
serve as the building blocks for Leibniz’s later and more systematic response to the
problem of evil in Theodicée.
Given our focus, I have chosen to look at Leibniz’s 1686 essay, “Vérités
necessaries et contingentes” (henceforth “Vérités”).3 The reasons for this are two. First, I
find that the claims of “Vérités” match Leibniz’s claims in other writings from the period,
such as “Primae veritates” (C 518-23), “De la nature de la véritaté” (C 401-3), Brief: “sur
la nature de la liberté humaine”4 (B 115-17), et al. Moreover, “Vérités” not only echoes
the claims found in these other writings, but expounds on these claims with greater clarity
and systematic thoroughness than most other writings by Leibniz during this time.
Second, the reception of “Vérités” in Anglophone Leibniz studies confirms my
assessment. “Vérités” has played a significant role in Leibniz studies on the topic of free
3

“Vérités necessaries et contingentes” is found in C 16-24. Courturat provides the title by which it
has come to be known (“Necessary and Contingent Truths”).
4

I here identify the letter by its subject, identified by Leibniz in the first line, namely, on the
nature of human freedom.
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choice and providence, trends discussed above in chapter 1. The essay played a key role
in Louis Couturat’s case, made in 1902, that Leibniz is in fact a Spinozist, and it was the
evidence taken from “Vérités” that persuaded Bertrand Russell to abandon his own
published compatibilist/theist interpretation.5 More recently, in 1992, R. Cranston Paull
used “Vérités” to argue for a rare, if not singularly unique, incompatibilist reading of
Leibniz.6 And in 1998, Jack Davidson argued, contra Paull, that “Vérités” demonstrates
Leibniz’s compatibilism, not incompatibilism.7 Suffice it to say, the piece has been
recognized by Leibniz scholars as singularly significant to how we understand Leibniz’s
pre-1700 views on free choice and, by extension, his larger philosophy.
Positioning my own exposition of “Vérités” in the context of the above readings, I
will say that Paull’s insights into “Vérités” are, in my assessment, on the right track,
despite Davidson’s rebuttal. Yet, the great weakness of Paull’s essay is that it is purely
speculative and constructive, offering only ad hoc rejoinders to common staples of the
necessitarian reading. Paull supplies no historical basis on which one might prefer the
libertarian reading of the evidence over the more standard one. Such was the nature of
Paull’s speculative project, but this gap is where the Augustinian background of
5

See Louis Couturat, “Sur la Métaphysique de Leibniz,” Revue de Métaphysique et de morale 10,
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“Vérités,” on which we will focus here, is helpful. As we will see, in “Vérités” Leibniz
systematically echoes many of the theological resources used by the Augustinian
tradition to reconcile free choice and providence, and this resonance gives reason to
question the compatibilist/determinist renderings of “Vérités.”

1. Divine vs. Human Knowledge of Necessary and Contingent Truths
“Vérités” opens with Leibniz’s peculiar contention that all truths are analytic.
That is to say, “An affirmative truth is one whose predicate is in the subject”; and this is
true, says Leibniz, whether the particular affirmative truth is necessary or contingent (C
16; see also C 518-23). Therefore, “if anyone were to understand perfectly each of the
two notions [i.e., subject and predicate] just as God understands it, he would … perceive
that the predicate is in the subject” (C 17). This feature of Leibniz’s philosophy has been
a serious hurdle for those who would seek to deliver him from necessitarianism. But, as
we will see, Leibniz’s aim is to defend free contingencies, not deny them.
Despite their common analytic character, Leibniz sees a clear difference between
necessary and contingent truths. Necessary truths, says Leibniz, are propositions
grounded in the laws of identity and contradiction: “An absolutely necessary proposition
is one which can be resolved into identical propositions, or [sive], whose opposite implies
contradiction” (C 17).8 His preferred example is numerical: every duodenary (a number
divisible by twelve) is a senary (a number divisible by six) (C 17; see also Careil 183).
This type of truth is necessary because, “by the analysis of terms of a proposition, and by
substituting for the defined term a definition or part of a definition, one shows a certain
8

Seu, or sive, is a weak disjunctive participle. See B. L. Gildersleeve and Vonzalez Lodge, A Latin
Grammar (London: MacMillan, 1963), §474-97.
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equation or coincidence of predicate with subject in a reciprocal proposition, or in other
cases at least the inclusion of the predicate in the subject, in such a way that what was
latent in the proposition and … contained in it virtually is rendered evident and express
by the demonstration” (Careil 182).
Contingent truths, by contrast, cannot be so reduced or demonstrated. Take, for
example, the contingent truth Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 B.C. According to
Leibniz, the relationship between the predicate and the subject is such that negating the
predicate does not yield contradiction. The opposing proposition, Caesar did not cross
the Rubicon in 49 B.C., is thus possible, which means the subject/predicate relationship is
contingent.
Now, even though the subject/predicate relationship of contingent truths is
unnecessary, Leibniz still believes contingent truths are analytic. The reason is this.
Leibniz defines an affirmative truth as “one whose predicate is in the subject” (C 16). In
addition, Leibniz maintains that crossing the Rubicon in 49 B.C. is part of God’s concept
of Caesar in eternity. Yet, because neither Caesar nor the Rubicon nor our world is
necessary, this concept does not entail existence. Hence, God’s concept of Caesar (along
with the Rubicon and our world) must logically precede his decree to bring Caesar into
existence (cf. C 23-4). God’s grasp of the subject-predicate relationship between Caesar
and crossing the Rubicon in 49 B.C. must therefore be grasped apart from experience. In
other words, God understands this subject/predicate relationship a priori (C 16; 19).
Leibniz thus concludes that were we to perceive truth as God does, we too would see that
the predicate is in the subject, even though it is in the subject contingently. It is thus
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Leibniz’s theology (i.e., his understanding of divine knowledge and decree) that requires
him to affirm that even contingent truths are analytic.
How Leibniz vindicates this conviction is by a comparison of expressible ratios
with surd ratios. Expressible ratios can be reduced to smaller ratios and given
demonstration along lines similar to Every duodenary is senary. But surd ratios, such as
√2, are irrational numbers—their decimal never ends and has no repeating pattern. As
such, they cannot be reduced nor given demonstration the way every duodenary is a
senary can be (cf. C 17-8). Leibniz takes this difference to be significant because it
mirrors the difference between the created mind and the divine mind with regard to
contingent truths. In the case of surd ratios, we (creatures) discover these truths by
calculation, and even then never fully. For √2, when calculated, yields an infinite
decimal. Yet, God, “who comprehends the infinite at once,” comprehends surd ratios
fully, immediately, and a priori (C 17). Leibniz is convinced that the difference between
our knowledge of surd ratios and God’s provides an apt illustration of the difference
between creaturely and divine knowledge of contingent truths.
Leibniz’s surd ratio analogy is meant to demonstrate that a truth can be analytic,
and yet not subject to the type of reduction or demonstrate absolutely necessary
propositions are; that it may be accessible to the created mind in only limited ways that
are bound by temporal discursive reasoning, and yet grasped fully, immediately, and a
priori by the divine mind. Such is the case with surd ratios, and so it is with contingent
truths.9 While the creaturely mind comes to know contingent truths a posteriori, the
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Leibniz offers one caveat concerning this analogy, to wit, our ability to calculate surd ratios and
offer some demonstration thereto is the one point at which the analogy breaks down, for “in the case of
contingent truths not even this is conceded to a created mind” (C 18).
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divine mind grasps contingent truths apart from experience, and this a priori
apprehension indicates that these affirmative truths are analytic, not synthetic.
Nonetheless, because the subject/predicate relationship is such that it could be otherwise,
Leibniz insists that when contingent truths are grasped by the divine mind, the
subject/predicate relationship is grasped without necessity. Or, as Leibniz later puts it in
Theodicée: “in the region of the possibles they are represented as they are, namely, as
free contingencies” (G 6:126).
Ironically, Leibniz’s claim, All affirmative truths are analytic, is a feature of his
thought that is often taken to require necessitarianism.10 I say this is ironic because
Leibniz’s own assessment is quite different. After offering his surd-ratio comparison, he
states: “And so I think that I have disentangled a secret which had me perplexed for a
long time; for I did not understand how a predicate could be in a subject, and yet the
proposition would not be a necessary one” (C 18). Leibniz, unlike many of his
interpreters, is confident that he has successfully countered necessitarianism. When his
case is properly understood, one can see why: By numerical analogy Leibniz has supplied
an example of an analytic truth that is not subject to the type of reduction or
demonstration that other absolutely necessary propositions are, and yet is (presumably)
grasped by God a priori, while known to created minds in only limited ways by
calculation. He has therefore given analogical reason to think that it is possible for God to
grasp certain truths a priori, even if these same truths cannot be reduced to the definition
of the subject or be given demonstration or be grasped by creatured minds in advance.
10
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For this is precisely the case for surd ratios. Leibniz’s aim is not to show that contingent
truths are necessary truths but to show the opposite, namely, although contingent truths
are grasped by God a priori and must therefore be analytic, this does not mean they can
be reduced or demonstrated the way absolutely necessary propositions can; rather, they
retain their contingent character precisely because the subject/predicate relation is
unnecessary and thus can be negated without contradiction.
Now, as mentioned, Leibniz’s theology is what pushes him toward the claim that
all affirmative truths are analytic. For Leibniz could concede that an affirmative truth is
one whose predicate is in the subject, but deny that future contingents are affirmative
truths, as did Aristotle and the Socinians of Leibniz’s day (G 6:211-12). Yet, Leibniz’s
theological convictions are far more traditional, and Leibniz offers clues that these
convictions are not only generically Christian but Augustinian.
First, Leibniz’s terminology is noteworthy. He sets up his discussion of
affirmative truth on the backdrop of God’s perfect knowledge of propositions. More
precisely, he distinguishes God’s grasp of true and affirmative propositions by simple
intelligence (simplicis intelligentiae), as in the case of necessary truths such as
mathematics and the essence of things, from divine vision (visionis) of a thing or middle
conditions concerning its existence (media circa existentias conditionatas) (C 17).11 The
distinction between scientia simplicis intelligentiae and scientia visionis is an explicitly
Thomist one and became commonplace among a number of protestant scholastics.12
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Note that “mediating conditions” (media … conditionatas), which is the likely intent of C, 22 as
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See, e.g., Aquinas, Summa Theologiae,in Summa Theologiae, Textum Leoninum ed. (Rome,
1888), Ia q14 a9. (Bonaventure also discusses the distinction, giving credit to Aquinas: see Bonaventure,
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Whether this means that Leibniz is a Thomist is less clear. For, as Richard A. Muller
notes, “In the definitions and explanations of the seventeenth-century Reformed
orthodoxy … the more Thomistic language of scientia simplicis intelligentiae / visionis is
often explained in a voluntaristic manner, yielding the more Scotist model under the
Thomistic language.”13 We will return to the question of Leibniz’s Thomism later in this
chapter. For now, sufficient to say the fact that Leibniz uses traditional and indeed
technical terminology from the Augustinian tradition when establishing his understanding
of God’s a priori knowledge is significant in its own right.
Second, Leibniz’s claim that God has a concept of a given individual that includes
his contingent actions logically (as opposed to temporally) prior to God decreeing the
existence of that individual is not unique to Leibniz. Augustine himself sets the stage for
this type of claim in his characterization of the subject/object relationship between God
and creatures in foreknowledge. He states, “It does not follow, then, that there is nothing
in our will because God foreknew what was going to be in our will; for if he foreknew
this, it was not nothing that he foreknew. Further, if, in foreknowing what would be in
our will, he foreknew something, and not nonentity, it follows immediately that there is
something in our will.”14 While one could read Augustine as suggesting that God simply

vols. (Ad Claras Aqua (Quaracchi): Colegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882-), lI d39 q1 q3, scholion.) Cf. Francis
Turretin, Institutio theologiae elencticae, in qua status controversiae perspicu exponitur, praecipua
orthodoxorum argumenta proponuntur et vindicantur, et fontes solutionum aperiuntur (Geneva: Samuelem
de Tournes 1688), locus tertius, q13.
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foresees what is future, the fact that Augustine separates from foreknowledge the
question of divine permission indicates that the foreknowing here identified does not
entail the existence of the thing foreknown. This is a foreknowing that is (logically) prior
to the decree of permitting.15 This seems in keeping with how the reformed scholastics
understood Augustine on this point, since their concept of predetermination and
premotion presumes this as well. We find that reformed scholastics speak as if God has a
(logically) prior understanding of what is in the creature, such that when God
predetermines and premoves the creature permissively, that movement harmonizes with
the prior concept of the free choice that is within the creature. To use Voetius’ words,
“The predetermination turns the will sweetly and nevertheless strongly to that very end,
to which it—certainly being moved and premoved by God—would have turned itself.”16
Therefore, while Leibniz’s characterization of contingent truths as analytic may seem
novel, the premises that ground this characterization have clear theological precedent.
Third, it is noteworthy that, according to Leibniz, God has a priori knowledge of
contingent truths because God has perfect knowledge of the subject in whom contingent
predicates are found (C 16). As is evident from the above quotes of Augustine and
Voetius, it is common Augustinian fare to suggest that the object known in God’s grasp
of future contingents is the will of the agent. As Augustine puts it, “God foreknew what
was going to be in our will,” and again, “If, in foreknowing what would be in our will, he
foreknew something … it follows immediately that there is something in our will.”17
15
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Likewise, Voetius focuses not on how the subject would turn himself but on how the will
would turn itself: “The predetermination turns the will … to that very end, to which it …
would have turned itself.”18 The notion is an extension of Augustine’s claim that
voluntary causes (causa voluntaria) are the efficient cause of free action, and thus the
object known in God’s foreknowledge of free choices is the will from which these
choices proceed.19 Augustine’s claim would become standard among medieval and
protestant scholastics alike,20 and a careful examination of Leibniz’s talk of God’s
knowledge of the subject indicates that this is what sits in the background of his claim as
well.
In his 1677 essay, “Scientia media,” Leibniz echoes the point made in “Vérités”
that God’s knowledge of future contingents is a priori, and argues that such knowledge
consists in the knowledge of causes (cognitione causae). As Leibniz continues, it
becomes plain that by causes Leibniz means voluntary causes, given that he goes on to
talk of God’s knowledge of “the nature of the will of Paul” (natura voluntatis Pauli), for
example. He then goes on to point out that the perfection of God’s knowledge of
voluntary or free causes is something understood by “all true philosophers and
Augustine” (C 26), making clear the theological roots of this claim. This very same
concept echoes in “Vérités.” Just as God knows surd ratios fully, without calculation, and
a priori, so with future contingents: “God, who comprehends the infinite at once, … can
see how the one is in the other, and can understand a priori the perfect reason for
18
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contingency” (C 17). This is why, says Leibniz, God’s knowledge of voluntary causes is
infallible, not necessary. For God perceives how the predicate is in the subject, and
therefore perceives the relationship to be contingent precisely because the
subject/predicate relationship is free, or voluntary, and thus could be otherwise (C 17;
also Careil 178, and G 6:392).
Fourth and finally, the distinction Leibniz here uses between the infallible and the
necessary is noteworthy because it gives additional weight to the case for an Augustinian
backdrop. This very distinction is used by Augustine himself in his discussion of
voluntary causes. In his reply to Cicero’s concern that if foreknowledge exists then
determinism follows, Augustine is quite clear that though God knows the will of acting
agents and the future is therefore “utterly assured,” this does not mean that the will of
agents is governed by necessity. To the contrary, God foreknows future contingents as
they are: To wit, as free and contingent. Thus future contingents, though certain in God’s
mind, are not modally necessary.21 This insistence on distinguishing the infallibly certain
from the modally necessary would remain as standard throughout the Augustinian
tradition.22 We will return to the necessary/infallible distinction shortly, but for now
suffice it to say that Leibniz’s use of the distinction is not surprising, given that his appeal
to voluntary causes unblushingly credits Augustine.
What we see, then, in the opening remarks of “Vérités” are clues of the
Augustinian background of Leibniz’s claims. His theological terminology; his
understanding of the relationship between divine knowledge and decree; his
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understanding of voluntary causes and the object of divine foreknowledge; and his
distinction between the infallible and the necessary all point in this direction. Leibniz
fleshes out the distinction between the modally necessary and the modally contingent, we
find only further confirmation of this reading.

2. Modal Necessity and Contingency
After distinguishing necessary truths from contingent truths and defending God’s
a priori knowledge of both, Leibniz moves into a more thorough discussion of the
dividing line between the necessary and the contingent. There are propositions, says
Leibniz, that are “for the most part true; there are also propositions which are almost
always true, so that an exception would be ascribed to a miracle”; there are even “certain
propositions which are true with absolute universality, and which cannot be violated even
by a miracle” (C 19). Those propositions that are beyond God’s ability to overturn are
necessary truths, such as those of mathematics. Here Leibniz echoes the medieval realists
who maintain that contradiction is beyond the purview of omnipotence.23 With the
realists, Leibniz also identifies essences (essentia) as among necessary truths. That is to
say, the subject/predicate relationship displayed between a given essence (e.g., human)
and its essential properties (e.g., rational) is such that, like mathematical truths, it “can be
demonstrated by the resolution of terms; these are necessary, or virtually identical, and so
their opposite is impossible, or virtually contradictory. The truth of these is eternal; not
only will they hold whilst the world remains, but they would have held even if God had
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created the world in another way” (C 18; cf. G 6:131-32).24 Yet, all other truths whose
negation does not imply contradiction are contingent. Take, for example, the laws of
motion. Though typically stable, they could be otherwise, as they do not constitute
absolutely necessary propositions. Thus, echoing Augustine, who identifies laws of
motion as rooted in a voluntary cause (viz., God’s will), Leibniz contends that the
stability of such laws is found entirely in the fact that, having decreed them, “by that very
act [God] decreed that he would observe them” (C 19). 25 But, given that such laws have
no inherent necessity, a miracle poses no logical difficulty (cf. G 6:51-54). For example,
though unsuspended objects typically tend downward, there is no contradiction in them
not tending downward. Were such a miracle to occur, it would simply constitute a rare
instance in which God identified a weightier (potioris) final cause that merited the repeal
of his otherwise stable decree (C 19). Leibniz’s point, in short, is that a great many stable
and universal propositions are not necessary in the proper sense because they depend
entirely on God’s free decrees (libero DEI decreto).
The implication of Leibniz’s claim here is that all existential truths (save God
exists) are contingent. As such, he concludes that they are “hypothetical yet necessary”
(hypotheticè tamen necessarie) (C 20), alluding to the scholastic label for such
24

There is debate in Leibniz studies over the extent to which Leibniz is a realist, and how this
plays out in his posture toward hylomorphism versus idealism. See, e.g., Michael K. Shim, “Leibniz on
Concept and Substance,” International Philosophical Quarterly 46, no. 3(2006): 309-325; Justin Erik
Halldór Smith, “Christian Platonism and the Metaphysics of Body in Leibniz,” British Journal for the
History of Philosophy 12, no. 1 (2004): 43-59; Jean-Baptiste Rauzy, “An Attempt to Evaluate Leibniz’
Nominalism,” Metaphysica 5, no. 1 (2004): 43-58; Daniel Garber, “Leibniz on Form and Matter,” Early
Science and Medicine 2, no. 3 (1997): 326-52; Massimo Mugnai, “Leibniz on Substance and Changing
Properties,” Dialectica 59, no. 4 (2005): 503-16; Christia Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Brandon Look, “The Platonic Leibniz,”
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11, no. 1 (2003): 129-40. While I believe Leibniz to be a
realist, what seems relatively uncontroversial is that Leibniz affirms the Platonic Ideas in the mind of God,
however this plays out in his view of substance.
25

Augustine, De Civitate Dei 5.9.

142
contingencies: hypothetical necessity. Leibniz uses this scholastic label in other works
with clear awareness of its historical/theological roots and its philosophical impart (e.g.,
G 7:389; A 6.4:1652 and 6.4:1457-8; cf. A 6.4:1457-8; 6.4:2577). The term is linked to
medieval developments surrounding Augustine’s infallible/necessary distinction, which
Leibniz previously employed in “Vérités,” and was utilized by medieval (and later
protestant) scholastics in the context of divine decree on which Leibniz is here focused.
As the infallible/necessary distinction became common in medieval theology, highmedieval theologians, such as Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, among others, formalized
the logic of it. Scotus points out that a sentence, such as Everything which is, when it is, is
necessary, can be read in two ways. Read in the divided sense, when it is, is necessary
modifies Everything which is. On this reading, the sentence indicates a modal necessity,
namely, Everything which is, is necessary when it is. This type of necessity indicates that
the consequent thing (necessitas consequentis) is modally necessary and cannot be
otherwise. Read in the composite sense, however, is necessary modifies all that precedes
it, indicating only a necessary entailment, or necessity of the consequence (necessitas
consequentiae), that Everything is when it is. The consequence is thus only a hypothetical
necessity. The distinction offered a formal way of identifying the difference between that
which cannot be otherwise because it is a modal necessity (necessity of the consequent),
and that which is infallibly certain but could be otherwise (necessity of the consequence).
Now, as already noted above, Leibniz understands hypothetical necessities to
include more than just free choices. He admits, as per his discussion of created laws, that
a stone tending downward when unsupported “is not a necessary but a contingent
proposition” (C 20), for laws of motion are not strictly necessary but depend upon God’s
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free concurrence, and “[God] alone knows whether he will suspend by a miracle that
subordinate law of nature by which heavy things are driven downwards” (C 20). Hence,
even if it is infallibly certain that a given rock will tend downward, the subject/predicate
relationship this entails is contingent because (a) there is no contradiction in the rock not
tending downward, and (b) the rock only tends downward because of a free choice by
God, not due to a logical necessity that binds the subject and predicate. This said, though
both creaturely choice and the movements of inanimate objects are contingent, Leibniz is
clear that “free substances” are unique. For free creatures, unlike rocks, are self-moving
substances that may interrupt the natural course of efficient causes that act upon them. To
use Leibniz’s words, “free or intelligent substances possess something greater and more
marvelous, in a kind of imitation of God. For they are not bound by any certain
subordinate laws of the universe, but act as it were by a private miracle, on the sole
initiative of their own power, and by looking towards a final cause they interrupt the
connection and the course of the efficient causes that act on their will” (C 20).
In this rather remarkable passage, Leibniz indicates that free or intelligent
substances are unique precisely because they “act … on the sole initiative of their own
power.” And by this power, they perform a “private miracle,” interrupting the course of
efficient causes that act upon them. The deeds of free substances, unlike the motion of
falling rocks, are therefore grounded in something other than God’s monergistic
concurrence in typically-stable laws of motion. Free substances may in fact interrupt the
natural course of physical laws by looking to a final cause. The comparison with God is
apt. For, as Leibniz has already pointed out, a miracle is God’s suspension of physical
laws in view of a final cause he deems worthy of such suspension. Free deeds, in like
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manner, are those deeds by which free creatures interrupt the natural course of physical
laws by acting in accord with their identified final cause.
The emphasis here on final causality is also significant, since it is yet another
echo of the medieval and protestant scholastic understanding of free choice. As Richard
Muller points out, traditional theologies and philosophies of the 16th and 17th centuries
had argued the very nature of free choice as resting on the assignment of final
causes by rational agents in their engagement with concatenations of efficient and
material causality in the natural order—what could be identified as necessities of
the consequence (i.e. contingencies), specifically as “complex hypothetical
necessities.” Final causality, in this view, was intrinsic to the freedom of rational
agents—without it, free agency, even in the case of God, might be excluded.26
Leibniz, as mentioned, employs the connection between free choice and final causality
earlier in “Vérités” when discussing the basis on which God might perform a miracle (see
C 19); and final causality is here identified as the grounds on which other free substances
also interrupt the concatenation of efficient causes that act upon them. Hence, added to
the string of scholastic reverberations already heard in “Vérités” is Leibniz’s emphasis on
final causality as the foundation for free choice (see also G 7:389).
One additional feature of this passage worth noting is that Leibniz’s description of
free substances argues against both psychological and physical determinism. Choice, in
both forms of determinism, is itself part of the efficient cause nexus. While acting agents
are more complex than falling rocks, the determinist does not see freedom as dependent
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on the possibility of doing otherwise, or PAP.27 Instead, freedom is uncoerced liberty to
act in accord with one’s desires, but what one desires is determined by prior causes.28 By
saying that free substances “interrupt the connection and the course of the efficient causes
that act on their will” (C 20), Leibniz makes clear that he is no physical determinist. For
the will stands above the efficient cause nexus. But is Leibniz a psychological
determinist? Based on “Vérités,” the answer would again seem to be no. For Leibniz goes
on to deny that the will is determined by even psychological causes. He argues instead
that the will has the power to direct and redirect the mind—that is, the psychological
events that precede choice. More specifically, Leibniz extends the analogy of miraculous
redirection to the “mind’s thoughts,” indicating that these psychological events are
included in the sequence of efficient causes that are interrupted by the private miracle
performed by the will. As Leibniz puts it, “just as the course of the universe is changed
by the free will of God, so the course of the mind’s thoughts is changed by its free will”
(C 20).29
Necessitarian readers are quick to pounce on Leibniz’s seemingly epistemic
application of these points as a way of countering the libertarian thrust of the passage. In
particular, they home in on the following: “[I]n the case of minds, no subordinate
universal laws can be established (as is possible in the case of bodies) which are
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sufficient for predicting [praedicendam] a mind’s choice” (C 20). On a necessitarian
reading, Leibniz’s emphasis on “predicting” indicates that he is not saying that minds are
free from determinative causes, but simply that the number of causes involved is so vast
as to be beyond the grasp of finite minds—much like the infinite decimal of surd ratios.
If, however, we could perceive the infinite, as God does, we could know all relevant
causes acting on the will (which compatibilist readers presume determine the will) and
thus predict human choice. The difficulty with this reading is twofold. First, Leibniz’s
point, taken in context, is that the mind is not bound by the order of causes but may
redirect it. Hence, the necessitarian reading requires that we read Leibniz as saying the
mind is not determined by prior causes, only to do a volte-face and grant that the mind is
determined by prior causes. Second, such a reading reduces God’s knowledge of future
contingents to an inductive inference from cause to effect.30 Yet, such a view of divine
knowledge is the very view Cicero fears and Augustine rejects in his defense of voluntary
causes,31 and as shown above, Leibniz credits Augustine for his position on God’s
knowledge of causes. In this light, the more likely reading is a libertarian one in which
the contrast between human inability to predict choice and divine knowledge of future
contingents is a reiteration of the contrast established at the opening of “Vérités” between
human a posteriori knowledge of contingents and divine a priori knowledge of
contingents.

30

See, e.g., Sleigh, et al., “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 1267. Cf. Davidson, “Imitators of
God,” 402-3.
31

Cf. Augustine’s description of Cicero’s fear in De Civitate Dei 5.9

147
3. Moral Necessity and Physical Necessity
Bracketing some passing comments on the divine decree to which Leibniz returns
at the close of “Vérités,” we run headlong into the centerpiece of compatibilist readings,
such as Davidson’s. After describing various forms of mental deliberation, Leibniz makes
the following statement: “This [deliberation] at any rate holds in the case of minds which
are not sufficiently confirmed in good or evil; the case of the blessed is different” (C 21).
The difference, Leibniz goes on to explain, is this: “It is in a way a matter of physical
necessity that God should do everything in the best way possible…. It is also a matter of
physical necessity that those who are confirmed in the good—the angels or the blessed—
should act in accordance with virtue” (C 21). This passage Davidson, et al., takes to be
clear evidence that the power of contrary choice, possessed by sinful creatures, is not
freedom at all, on Leibniz’s view. For the blessed and God do not have this power. What
this passage demonstrates, argues Davidson, is that Leibniz is a compatibilist, since his
examples par excellence of freedom (viz., God and the blessed) are psychologically
determined: They perceive the good and do it.32
In one sense, this reading of Leibniz is right, and in another sense, it is far from
the mark. Leibniz does hold that our ability to reject the good in favor of evil is an
imperfect form of freedom. But, to be sure, two very different issues are at stake here.
The first is the question of whether or not Leibniz defines freedom as moral
indifference—that is, as the ability to do good or evil. The second is the question of
whether Leibniz understands freedom to require libertarian power of contrary choice—
that is, to satisfy PAP. These are two different issues. Yet, in the compatibilist reading,
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these issues are conflated. Such readers take Leibniz’s affirmation that God and the
blessed act by moral necessity to be a denial of the libertarian power of contrary choice,
and thus an affirmation of psychological determinism. Yet, this is a leap without
precedent in the Augustinian tradition.
The key passage for grasping Leibniz’s point comes just before his comments on
God and the blessed. It reads:
And although it is most true that the mind never chooses what at present appears
the worse, yet it does not always choose what at present appears the better; for it
can delay and suspend its judgment until a later deliberation, and turn the mind
aside to think of other things. Which of the two it will do is not determined by any
adequate sign or prescribed laws. (C 21)
A careful reading of this passage, and of what follows, indicates that the difference
between our fallen freedom and the freedom of God and the blessed are the respective
moral possibilities that fall to each. When speaking of which of the two the mind will
choose, the two in view is the perceived “better” (melius) and “worse” (deterius). Given
that the juxtaposition is between fallen humanity and the blessed, the contrast should be
read as a moral one: The better or worse that does not determine fallen humans is a moral
better or worse. For we are open to choosing either good or evil; but this is not true of
God and the blessed. Note that both deterius and melius can carry moral connotations—
deterius meaning lewder or naughtier and melius meaning with greater justice.33 And
such a reading seems inevitable for two reasons. First, Leibniz is clear that what is unique
about the blessed is that they always act out of virtue (ex virtute agant). Second, Leibniz
identifies our fallen ability to do the better or the worse as “that indifference which
accompanies freedom” (C 21). Given Leibniz’s consistent rejection of intellective
33
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indifference, or equipoise—a concept he elsewhere calls an “impossible chimera”
(chimaera impossibilis) (C 25)—such a passage makes sense only if read as a reference
to moral indifference (i.e., the ability to do good or evil).
On this point, Leibniz sits squarely within the Augustinian tradition. Contrary to
the Pelagian contention that freedom requires the ability to do good or evil,34 Augustine
holds that the most perfect form of freedom is freedom to do only good. This is evidenced
in the fact that evil has no reality of its own but is a parasitic privation of good (privatio
boni); thus, a will incapable of regressing into evil is not deprived of a perfection but is
complete in its perfection, just as an eye lacking the ability to be blind is not the lesser for
it.35 This theme continues throughout the Augustinian tradition into medieval theology,36
and is prominent in the writings of reformed scholastics. Common fare in reformed
treatises on free choice is the outlining of various types of freedom, with indication of
which types belong to which beings. In such treatises, the freedom to do good or evil
(moral indifference) is identified as inferior to the freedom of God and the blessed, which
does only good (moral necessity).37
Now, the question of whether moral necessity amounts to psychological
determinism, as Davidson, et al., suggests, is another matter entirely. On this point, we
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may ask whether Augustinian scholasticism understood moral necessity to carry this
connotation. The answer is plainly no in both its medieval and protestant incarnations. As
discussed in chapter 2, patristic writers recognize that God operates by moral necessity,
but reject outright divine determinism as contrary to Christian theology;38 early medieval
writers, such as Anselm, plainly identify God as operating in accord with moral necessity
but reject the notion that God’s choices displays modal necessity;39 and both medieval
intellectualists and voluntarists recognize the danger of inferring divine determinism from
divine moral necessity but are committed to avoiding this conclusion.40 The reformed
scholastics, as we saw, also echo this conclusion. Franciscus Junius is clear that God is
the freest of beings, and though recognizing that God operates out of moral necessity,
Junius notes that God retains freedom of contradiction with regard to singular goods and
freedom of contrariety with regard to multiple goods.41 Franciscus Gomarus is equally
clear on this point, and makes additionally clear his incompatibilism. For he sees a mere
lack of coercion as inadequate for true freedom (even falling rocks and dogs are free from
coercion); freedom of contrariety and contradiction refer to the real possibility of the
opposite outcome (PAP), the knowledge of the object remaining the same.42
In light of the foregoing, why presume that Leibniz’s affirmation of moral
necessity, which increasingly looks to be rooted in the Augustinian tradition, implies
38

See, e.g, Irenaeus, Contra Haereses, 2.1.1; and 2.5.4 (PG 7a:709c-710a; 723c-724a); Ambrose,
De Fide 2.3; and John of Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa, 1.14 (PG 94:860a-862a).
39

Cf. Anselm, De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis 1.3 with 3.4.

40

See chapter 2, §1.2 above.

41

See Junius, Theses Leydenses, xxii.

42

See the second definition of a “free act” in Franciscus Gomarus (Gilbertus Jacchaeus),
Disputatio theologica de libero arbitrio (Leiden: I. Patii, 1603); see also Gomarus’s pupil, Gisbertus
Voetius, Disputatio philosophico-theologica.See also chapter 2, §1.3 above.

151
determinism? Only two features of the passage in question give reason to think this. First,
Leibniz has already identified a rock’s falling as a physical necessity; and in C 21, he
suggests that God and the blessed also act out of physical necessity because they always
act out of virtue. Thus, one could suggest that there is a one-for-one correlation between
determinism and physical necessity. This reading, however, presumes a rather onedimensional understanding of the term physical necessity. For a classically minded figure
such as Leibniz, physica entails more than mechanical laws of motion; it includes the
concept of physis, or secondary substance, as per book two of Aristotle’s Physica.43 If it
is the nature of a thing to be free, one would rightly say it is a matter of physical necessity
that the thing acts freely. Likewise, if it is the nature of a thing to be virtuous, it is a
matter of physical necessity that the thing act virtuously. This type of necessity is no
doubt what is in view when Augustine says the only necessity by which the will is bound
is that it chooses freely, since free is its nature.44 The reformed scholastics use physical
necessity in precisely this way.45 And, as we have seen, theologians of Leibniz’s day
understood moral necessity to apply to God and to the blessed without negating the
physical necessity of freedom: It is a matter of physical necessity that God and the
blessed act in accord with virtue, and in so doing, they retain the power of contrariety and
contradiction because they have a will that is, by necessity, free.46
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The second feature of this passage that some read as necessitarian is Leibniz’s
suggestion that moral necessity could enable a prediction with certainty of what the elect
angels or the blessed would do in certain circumstances. Two points are noteworthy here,
however. First, Leibniz qualifies this claim: it holds only “in certain cases” (in
quibusdam). In light of this qualification, Leibniz is claiming only that there are some
situations in which there is only one virtuous option available to a creature, and thus the
conduct of those confirmed in righteousness would be certain—unlike the conduct of the
morally indifferent (see C 21-2). This contention is far from a blanket affirmation of
compatibilism. Second, such a claim does not in itself negate the prospect of contrary
choice, even in these circumstances. Note that Junius too acknowledges that there are
instances in which there is only one good available to God, such that what he would do if
he chose to act would be certain, but Junius insists that God retains freedom of
contradiction in such instances, since withholding choice (non volo) is always possible.47
Leibniz suggests the very same thing elsewhere: Though we may be certain that if God
decrees a world, then it will be the best (as per the moral necessity by which he operates),
nothing necessitates that God decree a world (A 6.4:1652). In this light, Leibniz’s claim
regarding instances of predictable choice can be read merely as a necessity of the
consequence, or hypothetical necessity—if the virtuous were in this or that circumstance
and choose (volo), then the choice would be x—but this is not a metaphysical necessity,
since choice itself is never necessary. Read in this way, the statement hardly amounts to
evidence that Leibniz has suddenly lapsed into determinism.

create, and thus, it is not truly a matter of physical necessity that he will the best; this necessity is
conditional upon him willing, given his freedom of contradiction in singular goods (see A., 6.4b, 1652).
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4. Free Choice and Divine Predetermination
With the above points established, Leibniz turns to a discussion of the “way
contingent things, and especially free substances, depend in their choice and operation on
the divine will and predetermination” (C 22). Leibniz’s starting point in the matter is
taken unblushingly from Augustine and consistently reiterated throughout his later works:
“My opinion is that it must be taken as certain that there is as much dependence of things
on God as is possible without infringing on divine justice” (C 22; cf. G 6:199-203; 33940; 344; 383-84; 347-50). As in other contexts, Leibniz has in mind here Augustine’s
claim that all being is good and is caused by God, while evil is a privation of good.
Therefore, God, in his extraordinary concourse, produces continually whatever perfection
or reality a thing may have (perfectionis sive realitatis est à DEO continuò produci) (C
22; cf. G 6:347-50). By contrast, evil—whether metaphysical or moral—is a privation; it
has no positive reality of its own and adds nothing to the perfections or realities God
supplies. Hence, “their limitation or imperfection belongs to them as creatures” (C 22).
Such a line of argumentation is precisely the point of Augustine’s privation metaphysic,
and it would continue to be so applied in medieval and later scholastic theology.48
Leibniz explains this line of argumentation using an analogy of force applied to
an object that faces limitations based on the body’s matter and mass. He uses this same
analogy in Theodicée, though with a more thorough explanation. There, he writes,
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Now God is the cause of all perfections, and consequently of all realities, when
they are regarded as purely positive. But limitations or privations result from the
original imperfection of creatures which restricts their receptivity. It is as with a
laden boat, which the river carries along more slowly or less slowly in proportion
to the weight that it bears: thus the speed comes from the river, but the retardation
which restricts this speed comes from the load. (G 6:383)
In this passage from Theodicée, Leibniz goes on to cite Augustine, referring to his
privation metaphysic as the background of this insight. But what is particularly
remarkable about this analogy is its precedent in the writings of reformed scholastics. An
example from Johannes Maccovius should serve to illustrate the point:
The following objection is forwarded: If someone is knowingly and
willingly the cause of an action to which deformity is attached, he truly and
properly sins: God is knowingly and willingly the cause of actions to which
deformity is attached: therefore God is truly and properly the cause of sin. I
respond: This is false and this can be shown by an example: for if someone moves
a limping horse, the horse limps, but that person is not the cause of its limping.49
The basic analogy is always the same: Motion is supplied by an external source, while the
object being moved has some defect or trait that determines the character of the resulting
movement. The point is straightforward: Though God may supply existence and motion
to moral agents (as per divine premotion and concourse), the character of the act itself is
located in the agent. Thus, while God is the source of all that has being within evil acts,
the corrupt character of the act does not have being, since evil is privative and results
when the will declines from the good. The parallel with Leibniz is unmistakable, as is his
use of proper theological vernacular (e.g., concurs, praedeterminatione) throughout his
discussion.50
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Leibniz’s subsequent comments on this analogy are equally in keeping with
reformed views on predetermination and free choice. According to Leibniz, the foregoing
is all that can be said regarding divine predetermination (C 22). In other words, the nature
of predetermination is such that God supplies whatever is ontologically positive via his
extraordinary concourse, so that the creature exists, moves, and is able to act freely, but
the character of the free action that follows, though predetermined by God, is
predetermined according to the character of the creature’s choice. To use Gisbertus
Voetius’ characterization: “[T]he predetermination turns the will sweetly and
nevertheless strongly to that very end [terminus], to which it—certainly being moved and
premoved by God—would have turned itself.”51 Or, as Leibniz puts it, “God understands
perfectly the notion of this free individual substance, considered as possible, and from
this very notion he foresees what its choice will be, and therefore he decides to
accommodate to it his predetermination in time” (C 22-3). It is noteworthy that for
Leibniz, as for the reformed (among others in the Augustinian tradition), God supplies
physical predetermination (physica praedeterminatione), not moral predetermination.
That is to say, God supplies what is ontologically necessary for the agent to be and to act
freely; God does not always approve of the creature’s acts—hence, the analogy in which
the character of the motion is located in the thing moved, not the source of its motion.
Now, one logical difficulty that faces the concept of predetermination is this. On
the one hand, predetermination presumes that no creature can exist without God acting as
the efficient, First Cause of the creature’s existence, and yet, on the other hand,
predetermination presumes that God has knowledge of the creature’s (contingent) choices
51

Voetius, Disputatio philosophico-theologica pt. II, thesis IV Cf. Augustine, De Civitate Dei
5.10; Anselm, De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis 2.3; Turretin, Institutio VI, v, 11.

156
logically prior to predetermining it. In other words, the view appears to argue from the
standpoint of ontology that predetermination is prior to the existence, and thus choice, of
the creature and then defend freedom by placing the choice prior to predetermination.
This difficulty is not unique to Leibniz, but could be noted in reference to any number of
proponents of predetermination.52 Regrettably, Leibniz does not acknowledge the
problem, so we are left to speculate as to how he might respond.
I suspect that this difficulty is the result of a misreading the implications of the
term praedeterminatione. Though the term, on the face of it, indicates a divine act that is
prior to the human act it predetermines, this may not be entirely correct. Rather than
presuming priority—choice preceding predetermination or vice versa—the position
seems to presume simultaneity: God supplies existence and motion, and the created will,
being permitted to achieve what it chooses, determines the character of the motion. In
other words, the divine act and human act are concurrent. This is in keeping with the type
of analogy employed by Maccovius, the reformed generally, and ultimately Leibniz
himself: The efficient cause of the motion is the external force; the deficient motion
results from an infirmity in the thing moved; but the efficient cause and the deficient
cause are simultaneous.
Granting such simultaneity, however, we might ask: In what sense is God’s
predetermination of the subject prior? Here we could answer that the predetermination is
prior because, though the divine act and human act are simultaneous in time, the future
contingent itself is foreknown as a contingent truth from eternity. Thus, if God decrees
from eternity to grant existence to a given subject and to move that subject in accord with
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its own self-determination, then this decree constitutes a predetermination of the motion
of the subject. Moreover, because this future contingent is a determinate truth, God
knows in advance the character of the motion that will result from moving the subject in
accord with its will. Thus, the act is predetermined not generically but specifically.
Immediately following his statements on predetermination, Leibniz moves into a
brief discussion of “determination” (Determinationem). Leibniz’s point on the matter is
open to a good deal of misunderstanding, given contemporary connotations of
“determinism.” Such terminology, however, was foreign to early modern thought,
originating only in the late 18th century.53 In Leibniz’s day, determination was tied to
final causality, or the identification of a terminus—hence its literal rendering,
“concerning an end” (de termino). It was thus linked with the free choice of a means
relative to an end. An agent is thus “determined” when he is freely self-determined with
regard to a chosen means to his end, or final cause.54 This background is important for
understanding Leibniz’s comments on the matter.
Leibniz states, “I understand a determination to be produced when a thing comes
into that state in which what it is about to do follows with physical necessity” (C 22); and
he goes on to make clear that there is no metaphysical necessity in contingencies until
they have occurred—that is, until they are past events. Nonetheless, the determination
from which physical necessity follows is a sufficient grounding for their truth. Such
determination never begins, says Leibniz, but is in the eternal notion of the subject and is
known perfectly by God, infallibly and without necessity. Determinist readers, such as
53
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Robert Sleigh, Jr., interpret such passages as indicating that Leibniz sees freedom from
metaphysical necessity as a sufficient definition of free choice, while physical necessity
(by which Sleigh means something akin to physical determinism) is compatible with
freedom of a certain kind—to wit, compatibilist freedom.55 However, taking into account
(a) Leibniz’s earlier rejection of physical necessity (so defined) in his talk of freedom as a
private miracle that interrupts the order of causes and (b) the distinct use of determinatio
in scholastic theology prior to the 18th century, Leibniz’s comments likely carry a
different meaning.
Rather than suggesting that determination follow from physical necessity, the
more viable reading is that Leibniz is saying that physical necessities take hold after an
agent is determined—that is, has made a choice in reference to a terminus. In other
words, even if an agent interrupts the natural course of efficient causes by means of the
private miracle of free choice (C 20), physical necessities still take hold after this
interruption. This reading fits better Leibniz’s earlier talk of free choice as a private
miracle and accords with the logical order Leibniz gives to determination and physical
necessity: Physical necessity, says Leibniz, is subsequent to (consequatur) the
determination (C 22). In addition, this reading matches another aspect of Leibniz’s
thought, namely, his stance on equipoise. It will be recalled from chapter 2 that Voetius
opposes equipoise as chimerical on the very basis that it yields a contradiction, to wit, it
requires that the will is indeterminate after being self-determined.56 Unlike proponents of
equipoise, theological opponents of equipoise in the 16th and 17th centuries maintain that
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determination does occurs at some point in free creatures, namely, after the creature has
made a choice in reference to a judgment of the practical intellect.57 Given on which side
of the equipoise fence Leibniz stands, it should not be surprising to find Leibniz speaking
of determination occurring at some point in free agents. For the more traditional position
(to which Leibniz holds) is that choice does in fact determine the individual. Yet, such
determination does not negate free choice; it presumes it. If read in this way, we can see
why Leibniz would deny that this determination is necessary prior to its occurrence, and
identifies this determination as a predicate that is contingently but eternally within God’s
concept of the subject. In the end, therefore, it would seem a misreading of Leibniz to
take his talk of determination in this context to be an affirmation of determinism in the
contemporary sense.

5. Divine Decree and Possible Worlds
Being satisfied that he has demonstrated the compatibility of free choice and
providence, Leibniz raises a lingering issue for divine decree, which occupies the
remainder of “Vérités.” Leibniz introduces the difficulty as follows: “But if one examines
the innermost reasons a new difficulty arises. For the choice of a creature is an act which
essentially involves divine predetermination, without which it is impossible for that
choice to be exercised” (C 23). Leibniz laid the groundwork for this issue in C 18. There,
Leibniz identifies three types of contingent truths known by God: (a) the general
possibility of things (rerum possibilitatem); (b) what is in fact actual (quid actu existat);
and (c) what would exist contingently, granting certain conditions (certis positis esset
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contingenter extiturum) (C 18). While the referent of (b) is clear enough, Leibniz’s
distinction between (a) and (c) echoes the less obvious distinction between logical
possibles and real possibles asserted by some scholastic theologians.58 According to this
distinction, while a subject/predicate combination may be free of contradiction and thus
possible in a semantic sense (what Leibniz dubs the general possibility of things),
contingent propositions are ontologically groundless unless somehow upheld by God. For
God’s decrees are amongst the necessary conditions for the existence of contingent
things, and in the case of free actions, the act cannot be conceptually separated from
predetermination, premotion, and concourse—hence, the distinction between (a) and (c).
Yet, in what sense can such contingent truths, known a priori by God in eternity, be
volitionally upheld by God? This is the problem of C 23.
Leibniz’s quandary has clear precedent in medieval theology, as does his
proposed solution. In the medieval context, the issue is framed relative to faculty
psychology. That is, what is the basis for the divine intellect’s a priori understanding of
contingent truths, and what role, if any, does the divine will play in the grounding of
those contingent truths that are known by the divine intellect? This framing is precisely
where Leibniz heads in “Vérités.” Looking to the medieval discussion, there are several
positions on the matter. Thomas Aquinas holds that God’s knowledge of the effect (i.e.,
creation) is derived from his knowledge of the cause (i.e., his own essence).59 Insofar as
God’s essence is the “first and per se object” of divine knowledge, and all other things
are seen in his essence (be they necessary or contingent), Aquinas concludes that God’s
58
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knowledge of possibles is just as much part of God’s necessary knowledge as necessary
truths.60 Hence, Aquinas creates the strict delineation that the actual involves the divine
will, while the possible involves the divine intellect only.61 The antithesis of this position
is the voluntarist approach of Henry of Ghent. According to this view, contingent truths
require a decree on the part of God (as per the very issue Leibniz raises). Therefore,
Ghent argues that contingent truths must be rooted in the divine will. If the divine
intellect knows a contingent truth to be so, it knows it only because it sees that
contingency is decreed by the divine will and knows that the will of God cannot be
impeded.62
Leibniz’s preferred solution in “Vérités” is neither the extreme intellectualist
approach of Aquinas nor the extreme voluntarist approach of Ghent. Over against the
intellectualist approach, Leibniz maintains that both intellect and will are involved in
God’s knowledge of contingent truths (C 23).63 Yet, Leibniz does not thereby move to the
voluntarist approach of Ghent. For Leibniz does not go so far as to suggest that
contingent truths are rooted solely in the divine will. Rather, Leibniz creates a dynamic
relationship between divine vision and God’s voluntaristic predetermination. He grants
that God sees contingent truths a priori, but suggests that in beholding these
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contingencies, the divine intellect also beholds the predetermination by the divine will
that grounds it as an affirmative truth.
The dynamic relationship between divine vision and predetermination Leibniz
proposes echoes the position of John Duns Scotus, which was later picked up by a
number of protestant scholastics.64 Scotus’ solution combines Aquinas’ insistence that the
ground of divine knowledge is the divine essence with Ghent’s insistence that the ground
of contingent truths is the divine will. How Scotus accomplishes this balancing act is by
separating the question of how contingent truths are grounded from the question of how
the divine intellect knows contingent truths. With regard to the former question, Scotus
sides with Ghent. He insists that a contingent proposition, considered in itself, has
nothing in it to determine its truth-value since contingents are conceptually inextricable
from the First Cause. Hence, a determination of the proposition by the divine will is
required. Positing such predetermination, however, (which is different than positing a
divine decree that this contingency exist) the given proposition has an affirmative truthvalue.65 Yet, Scotus goes on to deny Ghent’s claim that the intellect thereby knows
contingent truths via the will, siding instead with Aquinas. According to Scotus, God
knows his essence, and subsequently all things according to their being knowable.66 The
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ground of divine knowing in reference to contingent truths is thus the same as in
reference to necessary truths.67 Scotus’ concern is that we affirm that God know all truths
a priori, regardless of why they are true (i.e., what grounds them); and he fears that
Ghent’s approach runs the risk of ascribing to God discursive knowledge—that is,
knowledge that follows inferentially from what the intellect knows of and sees in the
divine will.68 Hence, while the divine will may provide grounding for the truth-value of
contingent propositions, the basis on which the divine intellect apprehends truths is
always the same, regardless of whether those truths are necessary or contingent, and thus
regardless of how they are grounded.
Leibniz shows clear signs of having read Scotus on this point (e.g., C 27; G
6:184), and he takes this same line of argumentation in C 23. Along with Scotus, and
indeed the predeterminators generally (cf. G 6:125-7), Leibniz identifies
predetermination as an essential condition for the very possibility of creaturely action,
since “the choice of a creature is an act which essentially involves divine
predetermination” (C 23). This is the very reason why Leibniz, with Scotus, rejects
Aquinas’ claim that God’s knowledge of possibles involves only the intellect. Because
predetermination is an essential condition of creaturely action, Leibniz maintains that,
whether actual or possible, “contingent truths involve the decrees of the will [voluntatis
decreta]” (C 23). Leibniz’s rejection of Aquinas in this context may be surprising to
some readers, since, as noted in §1, Leibniz invokes Thomist terminology in reference to
divine knowledge at the opening of “Vérités.” However, as also pointed out in §1, Muller
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See Scotus’ characterization of Ghent’s solution in Ordinatio I.39.64.
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identifies a number of reformed scholastics who retain the very same Thomist
terminology of scientia simplicis intelligentiae / visionis while invoking a more Scotist
understanding of divine knowledge.69 Hence, to find Leibniz doing so should not be
surprising, especially given the impact of reformed scholasticism on his thought.70
Leibniz’s concern with the intellectualist approach is that it risks the absurdity
that God “decree something because he sees that he has already decreed it” (C 23). The
circle Leibniz sees afoot runs something like this: If divine predetermination is essential
to the very nature of creaturely action, but predetermination concerns the actual only,
then the only contingent truths the divine intellect can know as possible are those that
God has predetermined to be actual; yet, if God’s knowledge of possibles logically
precedes his decree that they be actual, then God first foresees that he has decreed that
these possibles be actual and only then decrees what he has foreseen he decrees.
Leibniz’s solution follows Scotus. To wit, Leibniz posits two types of predetermination:
one by which God determines contingent propositions but only as possible (i.e., in
decernendo), and a second by which a specific series of contingent truths is granted
existence—that is, “by which God decides to render this decree actual” (C 24).
According to Leibniz, it is the former predetermination that the intellect sees in its a
priori apprehension of contingent truths. As Leibniz puts it, “I grant that when God
decides to predetermine the mind to a certain choice because he has foreseen that it
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See Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 3, 408. Cf. Beck, “Gisbertus Voetius,”
222-23; Vos, “Conceptual Patterns,” 229; and Willem J. van Asselt, “The Theologian’s Tool Kit: Johannes
Maccovius (1588-1644) and the Development of Reformed Theological Distinctions,” Westminster
Theological Journal 68, no. 1 (2006), 33-34.
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Leroy E. Loemker, “Leibniz and the Herborn Encyclopedists,” Journal of the History of Ideas
22 (1961): 323; Maria Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2011), 41-2; and Eric J. Aiton, Leibniz (Philadelphia, PA: Taylor & Francis, 1985), 13.

165
would choose in this way if it were admitted to existence, he foresees also his own
predetermination and his own decree of predetermination—but only as possible; he does
not decree because he has decreed” (C 23).
Leibniz’s uniqueness on this topic is in two areas. The first is relative to the
reformed scholastics who employ Scotus’ theory of divine knowledge. Unlike these
reformed thinkers, Leibniz utilizes this theory to undermine disputes over the order of
divine decrees, such as the infralapsarian/supralapsarian debate. For Leibniz understands
“the series” to be perceived by God in its entirety as a single whole, and insofar as the
divine intellect considers any given world as a whole relative to competing possible
worlds as a whole, Leibniz understands the decree to grant existence to one world to be a
decree in favor of the entire series. While the series may have a logical, and indeed
temporal, order of events, Leibniz takes the decree of existence to embrace all that the
given world entails simultaneously. As Leibniz puts it, when God chooses one such series
“by that very fact also [he] makes an infinite number of decrees concerning all that is
involved in it, and so concerning his possible decrees or laws which are to be transferred
from possibility to actuality” (C 24). In other words, if a given series includes both
Adam’s sin and the redemption of Christ, the decree to grant that series existence
simultaneously decrees all the particular decrees that are part of the concept of that series;
there is no logical order in which God first decrees the fall and then man’s redemption (or
vice versa). As we will see in the next chapter, this protestant dispute is precisely where
Leibniz applies this insight in his post-1700 writings.
The second area of uniqueness that differentiates Leibniz from Scotus, namely,
Leibniz utilizes this theory of divine knowledge to develop an entire theory of possible
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worlds, while Scotus stops short of this.71 As Leibniz goes on to argue, because the first
type of divine predetermination grounds contingent propositions as real possibles but
does not call them into existence—the decree of the actual is a distinct decree—it takes
only one additional step to suggest that not all propositions predetermined by the divine
will are granted existence. Leibniz takes this step; Scotus does not. Hence, Leibniz
conceives of God as first considering the innumerable ways in which he may create the
universe (i.e., its creatures and its laws) and grasps “that a different series of things will
come into existence if he chooses different laws of the series” (C 23). The implication is
that each series constitutes its own discrete world. Yet, each world is predetermined in
the realm of the possible only; existence is not granted to any of these possible worlds at
the outset. The divine intellect thus has before it innumerable possible worlds to judge
relative to God’s final cause, and in light of this practical judgment, God is free to render
actual that series which the intellect judges best (C 24).
Employing this understanding of divine decree, and using the example of Judas,
Leibniz closes “Vérités” by laying the foundation for what would become Theodicée. He
does so by summarizing how God’s decrees simultaneously preserve the freedom of
creatures, as per the above discussion of predetermination, while also fulfilling God’s
own ends. “All that [God] decrees is that Judas, whom he foresees will be a traitor, must
nevertheless exist, since with his infinite wisdom he sees that this evil will be
counterbalanced by an immense gain in greater goods, nor can things be better in any
way” (C 24). This decree recognizes that if God decrees the existence of Judas—the
concept of whom includes free choice—and predetermines Judas according to what is in
71
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his will, then Judas will freely and contingently betray Christ. This betrayal in no way
appeals to God. Yet, God foresees not only the free betrayal by this possible Judas, but
also how he (God) may counterbalance Judas’ evil choice for greater goods that do
appeal. Thus, “[God] allows it in his decree that Judas the sinner shall now exist, and in
consequence he also makes a decree that when the time of betrayal arrive the concourse
of his actual predetermination is to be accommodated to this” (C., 24). Yet, divine justice
is in no way tainted by this concurrence, since, drawing on the already established
metaphysic of good and evil, “this decree is limited to what there is of perfection in this
evil act; it is the very notion of the creature, in so far as it involves limitation (which is
the one thing that it does not have from God) that drags the act towards badness” (C 24).
In other words, Leibniz insists that God’s decree provides only what is ontologically
positive in the creature and its act; the limitations that drag this good down into
corruption belongs to the creature and his deficient exercise of choice. This evil is
permitted only because it attaches by concomitance to a greater good. It is this greater
good toward which God inclines, not the evil that occurs as a consequence.
In sum, Leibniz returns to the concept of predetermination utilized by Maccovius,
et al. God’s decrees and predetermination are in keeping with his understanding and
preservation of the choices of free subjects, but God providentially utilizes these
choices—be they for good or ill—for his own good ends. Moreover, because God’s
initial predetermination of contingent propositions grounds multiple possible worlds, he
is not bound to any single world, but may decree that world which is best relative to his
own final cause. In this way, both human freedom and God’s ends are preserved.
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***
The above exposition of “Vérités” gives good reason to think Leibniz was
strongly influenced by the Augustinian tradition generally and its protestant manifestation
in particular, and that this tradition was echoed with affirmation in Leibniz’s early
writings. Moreover, we have seen that the assumptions of this theological tradition on
predetermination, physical necessity, and moral necessity are often diametrically opposed
to the assumptions of Leibniz’s necessitarian interpreters. The impact of the Augustinian
tradition upon Leibniz thus gives reason to rethink the compatibilist and necessitarian
portrayal of his thought, or at least the legitimacy of these portraits in reference to
Leibniz’s early writings. In the end, it must be remembered that whether one believes
those of this tradition succeed in preserving free choice amid their theological
commitments is a matter entirely different than whether this tradition aimed at this end
and thought itself successful in reaching it. We have seen evidence that those of an
Augustinian mind do not see moral necessity or physical necessity, intellective preference
or divine foreknowledge, divine predetermination or divine decree as contrary to a
dynamic interplay of free choice and divine providence. And we have seen evidence that
Leibniz is of such a mind as well. We therefore have ample reason to question whether
Leibniz was in fact a modern necessitarian with deistic, if not Spinozist sympathies, as
some suggest, or has merely been labeled so by interpreters at odds with the theological
tradition in which Leibniz sits and to which he is indebted. In the next chapter, we will
look at Leibniz’s writings after 1700 to see if the above theological leanings undergo a
major shift or remain largely consistent.

CHAPTER 4
Leibniz on Free Choice and Providence in theodicée

In the previous chapter, we saw evidence that Leibniz’s pre-1700 writings echo
the Augustinian tradition on free choice and providence. Moreover, and in keeping with
the assessment of this tradition in chapter 2, we have seen indications that Leibniz
advocates incompatibilism. In this chapter, we move out of Leibniz’s thought on free
choice and providence more generally and into its application to the problem of evil in
Essais de theodicée (1711). I will make the case (a) that Leibniz remains consistent in his
understanding of free choice and providence, (b) that this understanding remains rooted
in the Augustinian tradition, and (c) that Leibniz’s application of this understanding to the
problem of evil is a logical extension of his Augustinian commitments.
The structure of this chapter takes its cues from Leibniz himself, who identifies
the major facets of the problem of evil that his theodicy aims to address. He suggests that
there are two difficulties that must be answered in order “to place reason at the service of
faith … in relation to evil” (G 6:102). The first concerns the apparent incompatibility of
creaturely freedom and the divine nature. The second difficulty is that God appears to be
far too involved in evil in both this life and the next (G 6:102-4). These problems, says
Leibniz, could be derived from natural revelation alone (G 6:143). Special revelation,
however, adds to these problems the difficulties of the Fall, election and reprobation,
original sin, and hell (G 6:104-5). In keeping with this presentation, the breakdown of
this chapter will be as follows. In section 1, we will examine the apparent tension
between freedom and providence, focusing on Leibniz’s post-1700 understanding of
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necessary and contingent truths (§1.1); his understanding of the various aspects of
providence (§1.2); and his understanding of the nature of free choice (§1.3). In section 2,
we will study the relationship between God and evil. Under this second rubric, we will
consider the three types of evil Leibniz identifies and how they relate one to another
(§2.1); we will explore Leibniz’s distinction between the antecedent and consequent will
of God (§2.2); and we will examine Leibniz’s thoughts on the possibility of a world
without evil (§2.3). In section 3, we examine the difficulties emerging out of special
revelation. In particular, Leibniz identifies four doctrines as problematic, namely, the Fall
of man and other rational agents (§3.1), election and reprobation (§3.2), the problem of
hell (§3.3), and the problem of original sin (§3.4).
In the end, our findings will echo those of the previous chapter. We will see that
Leibniz’s philosophical theology consistently takes its cues from and is situated within
the Augustinian tradition. Moreover, we will see that Leibniz’s understanding of this
tradition echoes the older, libertarian reading of the 16th and 17th centuries. And we will
see how Leibniz’s answer to the problem of evil in each of its components is merely an
application of this tradition to the difficulties raised in his day.

1. Free Choice, Providence, and the Best
My exposition begins with the relationship between free choice, providence, and
God’s decree of the best. Under this heading, I will consider three subjects. I will first
consider Leibniz’s comments on the difference between necessary and contingent truths,
and why God’s decree of the best follows by moral necessity from the very idea of God.
Next I will look at Leibniz’s view of providence, focusing on predetermination, possible
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worlds, personal responsibility, and pre-established harmony. I will close this section by
considering whether the incompatibilist reading of “Vérités” can be sustained in
reference to Theodicée. As we will see, this trio of topics will serve as groundwork for
Leibniz’s more direct claims concerning the relationship between God and evil in
Theodicée.

1.1. Necessary, Contingent, and Determinate Truths
In Theodicée, we find the same catalogue of modalities utilized throughout
“Vérités.” That which implies contradiction is impossible; that which implies no
contradiction is possible; that who’s opposite implies contradiction is absolutely
necessary; and that which is an affirmative truth but can be negated without contradiction
is contingent (e.g., G 6:217-8). By way of examples, the square is a circle lands in a
formal contradiction, given that the essential properties of square are incompatible with
circularity; hence, the subject-predicate relation is impossible. Royal will return to his
home on Archer Avenue tomorrow is void of contradiction, and thus is possible. If Royal
will return to his home on Archer Avenue tomorrow were an affirmative truth, albeit one
that could be negated without contradiction, it would be contingent. A square has four
sides of equal length is not only free of contradiction but cannot be negated without
contradiction, and thus is necessary.
In addition to this trio of modalities, Leibniz distinguishes metaphysical necessity,
which admits of no choice and cannot be otherwise (e.g., God is omniscient), and moral
necessity, which constrains the genus of action to the good in those confirmed in
righteousness and constrains the wisest (viz., God) to the best. Here we arrive at the
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central claim of Leibniz’s theodicy, namely, God is constrained to the best. On this point,
Leibniz makes clear that moral necessities are still matters of choice and are not bound by
metaphysical necessity; thus, the actions that follow from necessity of this kind are still
contingent (G 6:333). In keeping with this point, Leibniz continues to invoke the
distinction between the necessity of the consequence, which indicates a necessary if/then
relationship that is compatible with modal contingency, and the necessity of the
consequent, which indicates that the consequent within the hypothetical is modally
necessity. The former is a hypothetical necessity, while the latter is an absolute necessity;
and it is the former that applies to God’s decree of the best (e.g., G 6:123-4; 391-2).
Leibniz’s claim that God, of hypothetical necessity, decree the best builds on
three assumptions. The first is that, as per his advocacy of the ontological argument,
Leibniz presumes that the existence of God is a priori (G 4:405-6; 7:261-62; E 373-77).
Second, and as per the implications of this argument, Leibniz is a proponent of perfect
being theology, and thus grants the classical divine attributes. Finally, Leibniz presumes
classical faculty psychological, according to which the intellect judges the good, and the
will inclines toward the good (e.g., G 6:122-23). Leibniz’s claim concerning the best
simply follows the premises to their conclusion:
1.

An omniscient intellect is that which cannot fail to know the good and indeed
the best.

2.

God’s intellect is an omniscient intellect.

3.

Therefore, God’s intellect cannot fail to know the good and indeed the best.
(1 & 2)
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4.

An incorruptible will is that which cannot fail to incline toward every good
proportionate to its goodness and thus toward the best above all other goods.

5.

God’s will is an incorruptible will.

6.

Therefore, God’s will cannot fail to incline toward every good proportionate
to its goodness and thus toward the best above all other goods. (4 & 5)
If God’s intellect cannot fail to know the best and God’s will cannot fail to

7.

incline toward the best above all other goods, then if God chooses to create a
world, the world he creates will be the best possible world.
8.

God chose to create our world.

9.

Therefore, our world is the best possible world. (3, 6, 7, & 8)1

The central claim of Leibniz’s theodicy is thus a deductive (and valid) a priori
argument. Granting the ontological argument, as Leibniz does, the existence of God itself
is known a priori from the very idea of God. From this idea of God the above claims
concerning omniscience and incorruptibility follow, as per the perfect being theology the
argument (and Leibniz) presumes. Therefore, it becomes a matter of a priori certainty
that if God creates a world, then it must be the best possible world. Now, Leibniz does
not take this to mean that it is a matter of a priori certainty that the best exists. For, as
noted, he insists that God has free choice; hence the conclusion is only a hypothetical
necessity, or necessity of the consequence: If God creates, then he creates the best
1

1. All q is r.
2. All s is q.
3. .: all s is r. (1 & 2)
4. All t is u.
5. All v is t.
6. .: all v is u. (4 & 5)
7. ((All s is r) ∙ (all v is u)) ⊃ (w ⊃ x).
8. w.
9. .: x. (3, 6, 7, & 8)
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(proposition 7) (6:123-4; 391-2). The conclusion that our world is the best of all possible
worlds follows from the coupling of this a priori hypothetical necessity with the a
posteriori fact of creation (proposition 8).
Now, Leibniz suggests that reason proper concerns the a priori (G 6:49), and he
goes so far as to suggest that “nothing ever comes to pass without there being a cause or
at least a reason determining it, that is, something to give an a priori reason why it is
existent rather than non-existent, and in this wise rather than in any other” (G 6:127).
This is Leibniz’s well-known Principle of Sufficient Reason (henceforth PSR). The
connection between PSR and the hypothetical necessity if God chooses to create a world,
then the world he creates will be the best possible world is apparent. If we follow the
chain of causes from a contingency back to the First Cause, we will there arrive at the
very hypothetical necessity of proposition 7. In other words, the reason why this set of
contingencies and not another is because this set, if it is, is part of the best.
No doubt Leibniz’s PSR beckons the question of whether everything is absolutely
necessary. For if both the existence of God and his choosing of the best are the a priori
truths that satisfy PSR with reference to every contingency, then is not everything that
follows from God—which is quite truly everything—absolutely necessary? On this point,
Leibniz makes the important distinction between necessary and determinate truth. A
determinate truth can still be true contingently. For, according to the law of contradiction,
of two contradictory propositions, one is true and the other is false, but this does not
mean that the one that is true is modally necessary. A proposition may be true for
contingent reasons. PSR merely asserts that there is a cause or a reason why the
proposition is true; it does not require that the reason is modally necessary (G 6:127).
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Quite the contrary, Leibniz has already made clear that the moral necessity that God will
the best gives us only a hypothetical necessity (if God creates, then etc.); no modal
necessity is found here (6:123-4; 391-2).
Three additional points are noteworthy regarding Leibniz’s understanding of
truth, since each plays its own role in his theodicy. First, as in “Vérités,” we find that
Leibniz affirms realism. Thus, he includes among the eternal verities not merely
mathematical truths, but the essences of things that span the Great Chain of Being. In
other words, Leibniz holds a realist view of essential properties, such that to negate these
predicates in reference to the species to which they are essential is to land in
contradiction (e.g., rational or bipedal cannot be negated in reference to human without
contradiction) (G 6:114-5; 131-2; cf. C 18).2 Leibniz shies away from extreme realism,
however, denying that Ideas could subsist independent of the divine mind (G 6:226-7).3
Second and closely related to the first, Leibniz presumes that two truths cannot
contradict. This point is particularly relevant to miracles and mysteries of the Christian
faith. As in “Vérités,” Leibniz denies that miracles and the mysteries of faith are contrary
to reason, since physical laws are freely ordained by God and are thus contingent—that
is, they can be negated or suspended without contradiction. Hence, no demonstration can
be made from the a posteriori observation of physical laws that a miracle contrary to
such laws is impossible. For a miracle is nothing more than a rare instance in which God
suspends an otherwise stable, but nonetheless contingent, physical law that he freely

2

This is not to say that there are no humans without legs, for example, but it is to say that one
whose legs are crippled is still bipedal in his essence, or immanent form, human; the defect, corruption, or
deformity is located in the material reception, or lack thereof, of this essential property.
3

Plato’s theory of the Forms, which is the basis for extreme realism, is most famously espoused in
The Republic, 506d-521b. The doctrine of recollection can be found in Plato, Meno, 80d-86c.
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ordained (G 6:50-1; 53-4; cf. C 19). To be sure, Leibniz does not suggest that miracles
are arbitrary. In keeping with PSR, God only performs miracles when wisdom deems this
to be integral to the best; thus, miracles, like all contingent truths, are traceable to the
moral necessity of God’s will (G 6:80; 208-9).
Third, Leibniz presumes that God grasps all truths a priori by simple intelligence.
As in “Vérités,” the implication is that were we able to see truths as God does, we would
recognize that all truths are analytic, regardless of whether they are necessary or
contingent. Regarding the former, Leibniz affirms that the law of excluded middle (i.e., a
proposition is either true or false) holds even in reference to future contingents (e.g., G
6:127; and 211-12). On the theological side, Leibniz presumes that God grasps all truth
immediately and non-discursively; hence, future contingents are included in the
determinate truths God grasps a priori by simple intelligence (G 6:126; 129; 131-2).
One last point should be made in reference to Leibniz’s understanding of truth.
Leibniz distinguishes affirmative truths from existential truths (save God exists). That is,
Leibniz distinguishes God’s a priori grasp of affirmative truths in the realm of the
possibles from God’s decree to grant existence to a specific set of possibles (G 6:131-2).
For this reason, everything in our world is only a hypothetical necessity, since the
existence of our world is contingent on a free act of God (G 6:216-7). We will discuss
this point further below, but suffice it to say for now that this is an extension of Leibniz’s
realism. For, existence is understood as a predicate that is compatible with but not
entailed by modally contingent propositions. Hence, possible worlds are quite truly
worlds that subsist in the mind of God, identical to what they would be in reality with the
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exception that, if admitted into the realm of the actual, they would there possess existence
(cf. G 6:148).4

1.2. Concerning Providence
Leibniz’s claim that if our world is, then it is best only beckons the question:
Whence cometh evil? For, if God’s infallible intellect cannot misjudge evil to be good
(proposition 3) and God’s incorruptible will cannot decline from the good toward evil
(proposition 6), then God cannot will evil as such. Yet, evil is present in our world. How
do we explain this without resorting to some type of metaphysical dualism? Before
addressing this question directly, we must first excavate Leibniz’s understanding of
providence, on the one hand, and of free choice, on the other. We will begin with the
former. Under the heading of providence, four topics are worthy of attention, namely,
predetermination, possible worlds, the relationship of predetermination and possible
worlds to personal responsibility, and Leibniz’s theory of pre-established harmony.
Predetermination, as explained by Leibniz, is an extension of his ontology.
Leibniz takes the very traditional understanding of modality, which is presumed in
Aristotle’s cosmological argument and continues to be presumed in Christian theology to
Leibniz’s day.5 The basic idea is that creatures are modally contingent, given that
4

Cf. Christian Wolff’s De Notione Entis in Philosophia Prima Sive Ontologia, Joannes Ecole, ed.
(Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung Hildesheim, 1962), 1.2.3.132. The fact that actuals and possibles are
identical serves as the basis for Lessing’s argument for idealism in Über die Wirklichkeit der Dinge außer
Gott (1763) in Lessings sämtliche Werke in zwanzig Bänden, 20 vols., ed. Hugo Göring (Stuttgart: J.G.
Cotta, Gebrüder Kröner, 1882), vol. 19; see also G. E. Lessing, Philosophical and Theological Writings,
H.B. Nisbet, trans. & ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 30-1.
5

See Aristotle, Physics, 254b6-260a19; Metaphysics, 1069a18-1072b18. Cf. Gregory of
Nazianzen, Oratio 28.8 (PG 36:33d-36b); John of Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa, 1.4 (PG 94:797a-800c);
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae in Summa Theologiae, Textum Leoninum ed. (Rome, 1888), Ia q.2
a.3; and Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, in Summa Philosophica seu De Veritate Catholicae Fidei
Contra Gentiles, ed. P. Lethielleux (Parisiis: Imprimerie Laloux fils et Guillot, 1877), 1.13.
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existence is conceptually compatible with but not entailed by the concept of these
entities. Such entities require grounding in a First Cause that is modally necessary (e.g.,
G 6:106-7). As in Aristotle’s cosmological argument, the First Cause is not a temporal
first but an ontological first: contingent entities must be traced back to an ontological
bedrock that has existence in itself (a se) and supplies being to those that do not possess
existence innately. In Christian theology, this is the basis for the doctrines of divine
concourse, premotion, and predetermination, according to which God supplies both
existence and motion to creatures.6
Leibniz’s understanding of predetermination reflects his assumption that God
knows by simple intelligence the predicates that are in a subject, even if those predicates
are in the subject contingently. As in “Vérités,” Leibniz maintains that God knows the
specific act that is contingently within each subject. Therefore, like Augustine (et al.)
Leibniz presumes that if God decrees (i) that an agent exist, (ii) that he have free choice,
and (iii) that he freely achieve what he wills, then this decree is specific (not general),
since God knows what (iii) entails. As Voetius puts it, “the predetermination turns the
will sweetly and nevertheless strongly to that very end, to which it—certainly being
moved and premoved by God—would have turned itself.”7 In Theodicée, as in “Vérités,”
the divine contribution to a given act and the creaturely contribution are presented as
concurrent: God supplies existence and motion, and the created will, being permitted to
6

E.g., Augustine, De Civitate Dei, 5.10 (PL 41:152-153); Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia q14 a13;
Johannes Maccovius, Collegia Theologica, quae extant omnia. Tertio ab auctore recognita, emendata, &
plrimis locis aucta, in partes duas distributa (Franekerae: Impensis Vlderici Balck: 1641), ix, 120; Voetius,
Disputatio philosophico-theologica, continens quaestiones duas, de Distinctione Attributorum divinorum,
& Libertate Voluntatis (Utrecht: Joannes à Waesberge, 1652), pt. II, thesis IV; and Francis Turretin,
Institutio theologiae elencticae, in qua status controversiae perspicu exponitur, praecipua orthodoxorum
argumenta proponuntur et vindicantur, et fontes solutionum aperiuntur (Geneva: Samuelem de Tournes
1688), VI, v, 11.
7

Voetius, Disputatio philosophico-theologica pt. II, thesis IV. Cf. Turretin, Institutio VI, v, 11.
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achieve what it chooses, determines the character of the motion. Hence, Leibniz uses a
boat analogy, to which we will return later in this chapter, in which the river (analogous
to God) upholds and provides motion to the boat, but the traits of the boat itself
(analogous to the created will) determine the character of the motion (G 6:120-1). The
predetermination of the event resides, not in whether God or the creature act first, but in
the fact that what is contingently within the will is already known by God in the realm of
the possible and thus decreed to come to pass in the realm of the actual.
Does such predetermination negate free choice? As in his earlier writings, Leibniz
insists it does not. He reiterates that those things that are predetermined are only
hypothetical necessities, not absolute or metaphysical necessities. That is to say, despite
God’s decree that certain events will come to pass, “the events in themselves remain
contingent” (G 6:131). The reason is one of ontology. Setting aside the issue of
predetermination, the nature of the event is what makes it contingent: “the event has
nothing in it to render it necessary and to suggest that no other thing might have
happened in its stead” (G 6:131). As for God’s prescience of these events, Leibniz is
clear that “in the region of the possibles [free acts] are represented as they are, namely, as
free contingencies” (G 6:126). Therefore, if the event is foreknown as contingent, and is
predetermined to come about just as it is foreknown (i.e., contingently), and it comes
about contingently as God decrees, then the ontology of the event is fully preserved. The
fact that this contingency is known with certainty and decreed to come to pass as such
does nothing to its modal status. If anything the decree protects, not undermines, its
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contingency, which is the same line of response we saw in chapter 2 from Augustine to
Cicero.8
Possible worlds, as theorized by Leibniz, follows quite naturally from the
foregoing: The divine intellect apprehends all affirmative truth a priori. Included in the
ranks of determinate truths are future contingents. Yet contingents have no existence in
themselves but must receive this from God. If God decrees that a series become actual, he
supplies it with existence by concourse and predetermines the subjects in this series
according to what he knows is in the subject in the realm the possibles.
While the foregoing is clear in Theodicée, and how this translates into a theory of
possible worlds is also evident, less clear is the precise relationship between the divine
will and intellect in Leibniz’s post-1700 writings. As we saw in the previous chapter,
Leibniz’s 1686 view reflects neither the intellectualist approach of Thomas Aquinas,
which locates possibles in the divine intellect alone,9 nor the voluntarist approach of
Henry of Ghent, which locates possibles in the divine will and in the intellect’s
knowledge of the will,10 but the middle way of John Duns Scotus, which locates the
grounding of possibles in the divine will and the knowledge of possibles in the intellect’s
knowledge of all things knowable.11 In Theodicée (and other post-1700 works), it is
difficult to say whether Leibniz retains this earlier view. Of these positions, one may
safely eliminate the voluntarist stance of Henry of Ghent. For a point about which
8
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Leibniz is undeniably clear is that the eternal verities are in the divine understanding
independent of the divine will (G 6:114-5). Yet, he does not revisit the intellect/will
relationship as explicitly after 1700 as he does in “Vérités.” Moreover, some interpreters,
such as Michael Murray, suggest that Leibniz’s later dealings with Jesuit/Dominican
disputes indicate a preference for Molinism.12 We have yet to explore this option, and
since Leibniz discusses the Jesuit/Dominican dispute in Theodicée, it is appropriate that
we do so.
Molinism, named for Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, argues that God knows
not only the necessary, the possible, and what will be as a result of his decrees, but also
what would be under certain conditions. In other words, between God’s necessary
knowledge and God’s free knowledge is a pre-volitional middle knowledge (scientia
media), which displays what would obtain granting certain events, and it is with reference
to this middle knowledge that God orchestrates his providential determinations.13 The
majority of Leibniz’s engagement with Molinism centers on the failing of equipoise, the
view of freedom the theory presumes (e.g., G 6:126-30).14 Where Leibniz does discuss
middle knowledge, he frames it as a dispute between advocates of middle knowledge
(viz., Molinists) and predeterminators. Leibniz identifies the grounding object as the
12
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central concern that emerges from advocates of predetermination. The objection is that
when one traces the cause of the action back to its First Cause, one must arrive at the
decree of God. Therefore, “it will not be possible to separate such actions from those
causes so as to know a contingent event in a way that is independent of knowledge of its
causes” (G 6:125). As we saw in the previous chapter, Leibniz is sympathetic to this
view, as his entire theory of possible worlds in “Vérités” is built upon the presumption:
One cannot isolate the concept of a creature from its First Cause. Yet, in Theodicée,
Leibniz affirms that there is truth on both sides of this dispute. As he fleshes out this
point, what becomes clear is that Leibniz continues to side with the predeterminators on
divine predetermination and concourse. But his comments on middle knowledge are less
clear.
Leibniz states that if it were shown that “contingent futurities consisting in free
actions of reasonable creatures were entirely independent of the decrees of God and of
external causes, there would still be means of foreseeing” (G 6:126). Such a remark
makes plain that Leibniz does not think the case against middle knowledge is air tight,
but this concession does not amount to the type of advocacy of middle knowledge that
Murray suggests. Quite the contrary, the point is a hypothetical: Were future contingents
independent of God’s decrees, then etc. But Leibniz continues to side with the
predeterminators on this point, denying that future contingents are independent of God’s
decrees. While this point does not yield the entire theory of possible worlds offered in
“Vérités,” it does tell us that Leibniz rejects the prevolitional view of future
counterfactuals that Molinism presumes. Thus, Leibniz goes on to identify his own theory
of possible worlds as belonging to neither camp: “For this result [i.e., of showing truth on
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both sides of the dispute] I resort to my principle of an infinitude of possible worlds,
represented in the region of eternal verities, that is, in the object of the divine intelligence,
where all conditional futurities must be comprised” (G 6:126). On Murray’s reading,
truth favors the Thomists with regard intellectualism, while truth favors the Molinists
with regard to middle knowledge. However, at least one serious problem for this reading
(aside from Leibniz’s affirmation of the grounding objection, as per his views on
predetermination) is that Leibniz’s disagreement with the predeterminators is that some
of these “new Thomists” advocate equipoise (G 6:126-7). Thus, it is with reference to
free choice that Leibniz finds falsehood on both sides. The mixture of truth with
falsehood therefore falls to their respective views of the grounding of contingents and
God’s knowledge thereof. And this explains why he identifies his theory of possible
worlds as his own and not that of Molina.
If Leibniz’s possible worlds theory builds on neither the voluntarist theory of
Henry of Ghent nor the middle knowledge of Molina, then we are left with one of two
possibilities: Either Leibniz retains his broadly Scotist theory of divine knowledge (with
his addition of possible worlds) or moves toward a more intellectualist view. In favor of a
shift, one could argue several points. First, as noted, Leibniz is clear that the divine
intellect apprehends the eternal verities independent of the divine will (G 6:114-5).
Second, Leibniz includes in the eternal verities apprehended by the divine intellect, not
only absolute necessities, but all future contingents and thus possible worlds (e.g., G
6:115). Third, Leibniz establishes a logical order of divine power, understanding, and
will. Based on this hierarchy, it appears that divine power grounds possibles, divine
understanding judges possibles, and divine will acts (G 6:198-9). Granting this reading,
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the will enters into the equation only at the end. In light of these considerations, it could
well be that Leibniz moves away from his earlier view toward something more Thomist.
However, counter arguments can be made on the side of continuity as well. First,
the claim that the intellect grasps contingent truths apart from the will does not resolve
the issue. Ghent, not Scotus, argues that the divine intellect grasps contingents via the
will.15 Scotus’ position, in fear of ascribing discursive reasoning to God,16 insists that the
divine intellect grasps contingent propositions via the divine essence just as it grasps
necessary truths; the position corrects only the grounding of these propositions.17 Second,
the fact that Leibniz locates contingent propositions in the eternal verities is not at odds
with the Scotist position, since Scotus understands the determination of contingent
propositions to be an eternal act of the divine will.18 Third, the logical order of divine
power, understanding, and will only shows that Leibniz affirms the standard scholastic
distinction between God’s potentia absoluta and his potentia ordinata;19 this does not
answer the question of the grounding of contingent propositions.
There are affirmative considerations in favor of continuity as well. Leibniz
continues to affirm that physical laws are rooted solely in the free choice of God (G
6:50); he advocates specific, as opposed to general, divine concourse because the idea of
the creature cannot be separated from its First Cause (G 6:118-21; cf. C 23-4); and he
15
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argues that miracles and prayer are compatible with divine decree because these divine
actions are part of the representation of our world in the realm of the possibles (G 6:132).
If, then, possible worlds are represented to the divine intellect precisely as they would be
in reality, save existence, we have reason to think that, for Leibniz, God’s own possible
actions are part of the general representation of things, ranging from physical laws to
predetermination or miracles. But we need not argue the point, since Leibniz states
explicitly that God’s decrees are represented in signo rationis (G 6:147). Leibniz’s
continued insistence on this point means that the difficulty identified in “Vérités”
remains, namely, if God sees his decrees before he decrees it, then are we left to conclude
that he decrees thus because he has foreseen that he decreed thus (C 23)? As we saw in
the previous chapter, Leibniz’s solution in “Vérités” is to posit two decrees: God first
decrees things in the realm of the possible and then decrees that the best possible world
should be actual. Given that Leibniz (i) continues to affirm that God’s decrees are
represented in the realm of the possible and (ii) that not all possible worlds are granted
existence, I see no alternative than to conclude that in Theodicée Leibniz continues to
affirm God’s two decrees, and thus the theory of divine knowledge articulated in
“Vérités.”
Granting that Leibniz retains his earlier theory of divine knowledge, the
relationship between divine decree and possible worlds unfolds as follows. God decrees
as possible a world system. In that system is free agents; God decrees that such agents are
not only present but also freely achieve what they choose; and God thus moves these
agents according to what he knows to be (contingently) within them. God orchestrates the
history of this world in the realm of the possibles precisely as he would in the realm of
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the actual, bringing out of it the most good (ontological and historical) possible. The end
result is that both free contingencies and God’s providential actions are represented to the
divine intellect according to their knowability just as they would be in reality. If judged
best and determined that this possible world should be brought into existence, God
decrees that existence should be added to the sequence.
In the above theory, possible worlds are so like the real world that it is
questionable whether possible individuals occupy more than one world. Is there one
possible world in which Adam eats the apple and another possible world in which Adam
does not eat the apple? There is reason to think Leibniz would say no. In A 6.1.490, he
identifies three positions on the locus of identity. The first is the hylomorphic view of
Aristotle, Aquinas, Bonaventure, et al., which submits that the entirety of the thing—its
form and matter, essential and accidental properties—constitute the particularity of the
thing.20 The second position identifies individuation as something physical in the thing
that determines its function or essence. The third is that of Scotus: Each individual, for
Scotus, has one discrete property, namely, haecceitas or the property of being this.21 The
passage unfolds as follows: Individuation (p) is either the entire entity (q) or not the
entire entity. If p ≠ q, then this negation indicates either a negative property (p = non-q)
that itself constitutes individuation or it indicates some positive property (r) that simply is
some property other than q. If p = r, then r is either a physical trait (s) that determines the
existence of the thing or a metaphysical property (t) that determines its nature. Leibniz
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rejects p = r, and then embraces the view that individuation is a positive property (p = q),
not a negative one (p ≠ non-q). Thus, in the end, Leibniz embraces the hylomorphic view.
The claims of Theodicée reflect this position. Leibniz takes a realist stance on
essence (G 6:114-5; 131-2); he sides with the moderate realist reading of form as
immanent form or essence (not shape) around which matter organizes (G 6:150-1); and
he holds that creaturely particulars cannot exist without location and situation, presuming
the inevitability of both accidental and essential properties in created particulars (G
6:179). These points in themselves would suffice to show that Leibniz takes the
hylomorphic view (though colored by the monadology, of course),22 but his comments on
identity and possible worlds make the point plain. Leibniz considers the question of
whether God could assign the lot of this world to a group other than us (i.e., those to
whom it has been assigned). To this, Leibniz replies: “If it were others, would not these
others be those known as We?” (G 6:178) In other words, because Leibniz understands
identity to be constituted by the totality of a thing’s essential and accidental properties (as
per the hylomorphic view of identity), the question of whether someone other than Richie
could be Richie is equivalent to asking if u could be ~u, or whether v, which is ~u, could
be u. The law of contradiction says no, and Leibniz agrees.
This conclusion also fits the monadology. Leibniz understands monads to be
windowless and self-movement (E 705), which is yet another reason why he presumes
the concept of the subject contains its predicates (C 16). Were a distinct set of predicates
present in the monad, it would not be the same monad. The conclusion once again
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reflects the hylomorphic view of identity: The particularity of the subject is the entirety of
its essential and accidental properties; were these properties otherwise, it would not be it.
Now, this view of identity raises the problem of superessentialism. That is, if no
property can be changed without altering the identity of the thing, then every property
(and every choice) is essential to that subject, and this implies the strictest form of
necessitarianism.23 We will devote the whole of chapter 5 to this problem. For now, let
two points on the matter suffice. First, those predicates that are in the subject are in the
subject contingently. That is, they are in the subject in such a way that they could be
otherwise. With regard to the claim that the subject would not be the same subject
without these predicates (i.e., were they negated), this should not be read as suggesting
that even contingent predicates are essential properties, since such a reading is utterly
incompatible with Leibniz’s claim that the predicate could be negated without
contradiction (C 16-7; G 6:217-8). Rather, the claim should be read in light of Leibniz’s
infallible/necessary distinction and Leibniz’s broader claims concerning possible worlds.
To illustrate what I mean on this point, let us say that Pagoda exists in possible
world 1 (PW1), and in PW1 Pagoda freely chooses w. Leibniz’s claim, I maintain, is this.
The choosing of w is in Pagoda in such a way that it could be negated without
contradiction—that is, Pagoda could have chosen otherwise but did not. Had Pagoda
chosen otherwise, that otherwise (~w) would be the predicate that obtains in PW1, but
God is certain that Pagoda in fact chooses w, not ~w. To posit the negation of w,
therefore, is to imagine a world other than PW1 (say, PW2), and though we may imagine
a figure in PW2 named Pagoda who chooses ~w, this Pagoda would be a discrete subject
23
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in a discrete possible world, and thus would not be the subject in PW1 who is known to
choose w. In short, subjects in possible worlds, just like subjects in the actual world,
constitute only one discrete subject in that world, and these subjects cannot
simultaneously be a different subject in a different world.
Second, this way of understanding possible worlds echoes what we have seen in
reference to Leibniz’s realism, namely, that the actual and the possible are distinguished
only by the addition of existence (G 6:148). In this light, the best starting point for
thinking about possible worlds is not semantic or logical subject/predicate relations. The
best starting point is the real world. For, this is the one possible world (granted existence)
to which we have direct access, and from which we may conceptually work backwards
by removing existence in order to arrive at a possible world.
Starting with our own possible world, we can better understand how Leibniz’s
claims concerning identity are compatible with contrary choice. Granting that subjects in
our world have such choice, what we find is this. In the actual world, individuals face
choices and, though having the power of contrary choice, must settle on one choice to the
exclusion of other choices. This settling is no threat to freedom, however, because
freedom resides in the nature of the choice itself—Dusty chooses x contingently, or in
such a way that he could have chosen ~x. So in possible worlds, individuals do not float
from world to world, choosing x in PW1 and ~x in PW2. Rather, they are discrete
subjects who must settle (albeit contingently) on single choice to the exclusion of other
choices. Just like real individuals, possible individuals do not exist in multiple worlds
with multiple lives, landing in multiple fates, but subsist with a single identity and a
single fate in their discrete possible world. The only difference between these possible
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individuals and real individuals is that those in the realm of the possible lack existence.
But it is this that God grants to a given possible world, should he decree that it move
from the realm of the possible to the realm of the actual. In doing so, he upholds the
respective natures of every particular thing in that world, including the contingency of
free choices made therein.
Providence and personal responsibility is no doubt an issue that beckons
attention in Leibniz’s philosophy generally and his theodicy specifically. For if God has
decreed the best, and all choices are included in that decree, then all is determined, as
Leibniz admits (G 6:134). Moreover, prayer seems futile, given that God has already
decreed the whole and only that which serves his final aim matriculates into his decree (G
6:174). Thus, it would seem that God does what he will regardless of what men choose,
and one may easily slip from this conclusion into fatalism.
Though the concern is fair, a careful examination of Leibniz’s claims regarding
providence reveal that fate has no place in Leibniz’s philosophical theology. I will begin
by looking at Leibniz’s answer to the problem of prayer. His response is a traditional one,
reflecting the sort of answer one finds in early Christian writers, such as Origen or
Augustine:24 Because prayers, like other free actions, are known by God in advance,
these contingencies are already part of the world as represented to the divine mind in
eternity. In other words, there is a conceptual error afoot in the objection. It presumes that
because prayer asks God to act in a way that he might not otherwise act, prayer requires
that the world be one way first and then altered in light of prayer. Leibniz’s point is
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nothing new. God need not first decree the world void of answered prayers and then
modify it; he merely needs to take into account the prayers that he infallibly knows will
be offered. If God foreknows that a person will freely pray wisely and in faith, and God
chooses to honor that prayer by acting in a way he otherwise would not have had they not
prayed, then we can truly say that God answers prayers (G 6:132).
A noteworthy feature of this solution is that, according to Leibniz, God’s
synergistic interaction with rational agents is part of what God deems best about our
world. In the context of prayer, Leibniz understands God to take prayers into account
when determining his own actions, and this mode of providence is deemed superior (or
best) in comparison with a unilateral determination of history, vis-à-vis, fatalism. We will
discuss below Leibniz’s notion that evil attaches by concomitance to the best (e.g., G
6:169-72), but it is additionally noteworthy here that one can see immediately why evil
might attach by concomitance to this particular feature of the best. To wit: If, in the best,
God answers wise and good prayers and refrains from acting where prayers are foolish or
have been withheld, then this good (i.e., prayer) opens the door to the evil that some may
fail to pray and certain good divine actions may be withheld as a result.
This last point brings to the fore personal responsibility more generally. Leibniz’s
insistence on personal responsibility amid divine decree echoes what we find in reference
to predetermination. That is, God’s knowledge of the subject in the realm of the possibles
includes those predicates that are in him freely and contingently, and God’s
predetermination moves the subject accordingly, upholding free choice. In short, Leibniz
espouses the traditional Augustinian view that providence is not fatalistic but
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synergistic.25 Personal responsibility is preserved on this view precisely because what
God decrees takes into account and upholds what he infallibly knows to be freely in the
subject. Therefore, as Augustine counsels, if one fears what God has decreed for him, he
should choose rightly and pray for perseverance in the good, since such contingent
choices are the object of God’s infallible knowledge in eternity.26
Pre-established harmony is the last of the topics to which we turn in this
treatment of providence. The foregoing discussions of predetermination, possible worlds,
and providence generally help show how Leibniz can preserve free choice amid these
doctrines and the long precedent these views have in Christian orthodoxy. Yet, Leibniz’s
doctrine of pre-established harmony (henceforth PEH) beckons the question of whether
free choice is possible in Leibniz’s metaphysic. I contend it is, and the reason I have
chosen to treat PEH in this subsection is because an careful reading of Leibniz on this
topic shows PEH to be a subset of Leibniz’s view of providence generally and of his
understanding of divine decree in specific. I further submit that when this is recognized,
the problems for freedom (and the solutions thereto) are plainly identical with the
problems (and solutions) emerging out of the Augustinian tradition on divine decree.
Before moving into PEH, Leibniz offers some preliminary notes that merit
attention. First, he suggests that the cause/effect relation in PEH is entirely contrary to
Islamic fate (Fatum Mahometanum). Such fatalism, according to Leibniz, assumes an
arbitrary act of divine power, not foresight or good counsel (G 6:135). The concern here
25
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is the very same that Leibniz later expresses in reference to some supralapsarians,
namely, that divine justice “is an arbitrary thing” and God operates by “a despotic power
which can go so far as being able to condemn innocents” (G 6:209). Suffice it to say,
Leibniz does not understand divine justice to be arbitrary or capable of condemning
innocents. Rather, he takes the realist stand that the good is part of the eternal verities and
plays an integral role in God’s choosing of the best (see, e.g., G 6:208-10). Second,
Leibniz makes a promise regarding what he will show in reference to freedom: “It is well
to show, notwithstanding, how this dependence of voluntary actions does not
fundamentally preclude the existence within us of a wonderful spontaneity, which in a
certain sense makes the soul in its resolves independent of the physical influence of all
other creatures” (G 6:135). Leibniz, surprisingly, identifies spontaneity as “a
consequence of the System of Pre-established Harmony” (G 6:135). These opening
remarks are of particular interest because both points are contrary to what is often thought
to result from PEH, namely, a strong necessitarianism that free choice cannot possibly
survive.27 Yet, Leibniz promises to show the opposite.
Leibniz’s treatment of PEH begins with the mind/body problem of his day,
following from Descartes.28 That is, “since it has been recognized that thought and
dimensional mass have no mutual connexion, and that they are creatures differing toto
genere, many moderns have acknowledged that there is no physical communication
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between soul and body, despite the metaphysical communication always subsisting,
which causes soul and body to compose one and the same suppositum, or what is called a
person” (G 6:135). The difficulty is that soul and body are commonly presumed to
engage in physical communication. Descartes, for example, thinks of the soul as able to
stir the body the way a rider does a horse. Yet, as Leibniz points out, this solution
presumes a mechanical interaction, which is impossible if soul and body are not
mechanically connected (G 6:135-6). From what Leibniz can tell, “this effect cannot be
inferred from any notion conceived in the body and in the soul” (G 6:135).
Leibniz’s strategy in Theodicée reflects his strategy elsewhere regarding PEH. He
sets up three explanations of causality—mechanical, occasional, and harmony—and
argues the superiority of the third. We see this strategy in Leibniz’s infamous clock
analogy. Two clocks are in perfect synch, which can be explained in one of three ways:
(a) they are mechanically connected; (b) something moves the one at the same time it
moves the other; and (c) the wisdom of the clockmaker suffices to explain their harmony.
Leibniz suggests that (c) is most worthy of God (G 4:498-500). In the same manner,
Leibniz sets up PEH in Theodicée in juxtaposition to both a mechanical and an occasional
mind/body explanation. The former, he suggests, demands “a complete derangement of
the laws of Nature” for the non-physical soul to act physically on the body (G 6:136), and
the latter “produce[s] a God, as it were, ex machina, to bring about the final solution of
the piece, maintaining that God exerts himself deliberately to move bodies as the soul
pleases, and to give perceptions to the soul as the body requires” (G 6:136). PEH, by
contrast, is best in keeping with respective concepts of body and soul (contra
mechanicalism) and is most worthy of God (contra occasionalism).
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Were these considerations insufficient, Leibniz adds to his case two key insights
in his day: (1) that the quantity of force is conserved and is different from the quantity of
movement; (2) “the same direction is still conserved in all bodies together that are
assumed as interacting, in whatever way they come into collision” (G 6:136). Such
insights Leibniz credits with his conviction that the direction of the body is as
independent of the soul as its force, and thus his conclusion that the synchronicity of soul
and body is a harmony of independent entities.
None of the foregoing is surprising, but the same cannot be said for the next step
of Leibniz’s argument. Leibniz goes on to make a distinction between his rationale for
harmony and his rationale for the pre-established predicate. He suggests that he came to
believe in harmony due to the above considerations, but then adds that it is his belief in
divine decree that prompts his conviction that this harmony is pre-established: “Thus I
could not fail to arrive at the system which declares that God created the soul in the
beginning in such a fashion that it must produce and represent to itself successively that
which takes place within the body, and the body also in such a fashion that it must do of
itself that which the soul ordains” (G 6:137). In other words, the theory of harmony
merely asserts that force is within the monad, and monadic “interaction” is actually
harmonious, independent movements of monads. PEH is built on the conviction that God
knows a priori those contingencies that will obtain in our world, and in decreeing the
existence of our world, God also predetermines each monad to move in harmony with
these contingencies (cf. C 22; 26). Much like the way Leibniz’s view of divine
knowledge informed his claim in “Vérités” that all truths are analytic, so in Theodicée we
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see that Leibniz’s convictions concerning divine decree fuel the pre-established aspect of
PEH.
As for the question of whether PEH yields determinism, Leibniz offers two lines
of reply. The first emphasizes the independence of the soul. As Leibniz points out, PEH
provides the soul far more independence from surrounding influences that might
determine it than any other theory of causation: “all that passes in the soul depends …
only upon the soul.… [H]ow can one give it a greater independence?” (G 6:137) In other
words, the dangers of physical determinism should disappear entirely under PEH, since
there is no mechanical connection between the soul and the world around it.
Yet, does this mean that the soul is entirely free from all influence of the physical
world? Certainly not. Leibniz admits that while all that happens in the soul depends on it,
not all that happens is a product of choice. He notes its peculiar imperfections that it has
distinct perceptions (its dominion) and confused perceptions (its passions). No doubt
these perceptions influence the ultimate choice of the soul, and this is what raises the
question of psychological determinism. Leibniz’s response is noteworthy. He suggests
that the soul has some control over the passions; that it can form new habits; that it can
slow inclinations and redirect its thoughts: “[The soul] even has a like power over the
more distinct perceptions, being able to endue itself indirectly with opinions and
intentions, and to hinder itself from having this one or that, and stay or hasten its
judgment” (G 6:137-8). In reference to beliefs, Leibniz claims that “one sometimes, takes
measures nevertheless, to will and even to believe in due time, that which one does not
will, or believe, now” (G 6:138). We will discuss such claims at length in §1.3. For now,
suffice it to say that Leibniz’s claim echoes what we find in “Vérités,” namely, he resists
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psychological determinism by suggesting that the mind is not passive but is able to take
hold of those inclining reasons and redirect its thoughts.
All this raises yet another question, however: How can Leibniz’s apparent
resistance to both physical and psychological determinism be reconciled with PEH? If the
movements of monads are set in eternity by divine decree, does this not imply that no
interruption or redirection is possible? Note that this line of questioning is identical to
that which is found in the problem of prayer. The error in both cases is that the objection
presumes that interruption and redirection require that the world be one way first and
then altered. Yet, just as in the problem of prayer, Leibniz does not need God to first
decree the world void of free interruptions and then permit free agents to interrupt this
course; he merely needs God to know in advance those free choices that will be made, so
that God may put into each monad what is required of it to reflect these interruptions and
redirections.
Leibniz proposes a thought experiment to illustrate this very point. He draws on
the work of Isaac Jacquelot who forwards a hypothetical: Individual A knows in advance
all that individual B will ask of his servant. So, individual A designs a servant robot that
will perform every request exactly as requested, when requested. The thought experiment
is meant to show two things: (1) the freedom of individual B is in no way negated by the
actions of individual A; (2) it would appear that the robot spontaneously replies to
individual B, even though it does not (G 6:137). So it is in the monadology. Intelligent
substances are able to freely and spontaneously choose and even interrupt or redirect the
natural course of events that act upon them, but the effect on surrounding monads is only
an apparent interruption or redirection, since the surrounding monads that are not free
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have already been “programmed” by God to redirect themselves in harmony with these
free choices. Such programming does not indicate a lack of freedom in rational subjects,
but reflects only the infallible certainty of God who decrees the course of monads.
In this light, Leibniz notes that our talk of the soul depending on the body is
perspectival, the way we speak of the sun rising on the one hand (Ptolemy) and then it
being stable on the other (Copernicus) (G 6:138). Despite appearances to the contrary,
there is no mechanical dependence of the body on the mind; there is only ideal
dependence. Given that my body is ordered to harmonize with foreseen free choices, God
has ordered it thusly because he has foreseen that my choices are thus. Were my choices
otherwise, my body would be ordered otherwise. Likewise, the passions of the soul are
ordered thusly to coincide with the appearance of the body. As Leibniz puts it,
This had already happened when God ordered beforehand the harmony that there
would be between them. Even so would that automaton, that should fulfill the
servant’s function, depend upon me ideally, in virtue of the knowledge of him
who, forseeing my future orders, would have rendered it capable of serving me at
the right moment all through the morrow. The knowledge of my future intentions
would have actuated this great craftsman, who would accordingly have fashioned
the automaton: my influence would be objective and his physical. For insofar as
the soul has perfection and distinct thoughts, God has accommodated the body to
the soul, and has arranged beforehand that the body is impelled to execute its
orders. And in so far as the soul is imperfect and as its perceptions are confused,
God has accommodated the soul to the body, in such sort that the soul is swayed
by the passions arising out of corporeal representation. (G 6:138-9)
In short, what we find is that the very line of response to the potential determinism of
PEH is the same line of response to its antecedent theological doctrines of
predetermination and divine decree. God has established this harmony thusly because he
has foreknown thusly, and were our choice otherwise, so would be his knowledge and
thus his permissive decrees.
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1.3. Leibniz on Free Choice
Each of the above facets of providence touches on a distinct quandary
surrounding Leibniz’s view of free choice, and the above treatment of these quandaries
presumes a libertarian understanding of Leibniz. In this subsection, we will examine
directly the issue of freedom in Theodicée. In particular, we will consider whether the
libertarian reading of Leibniz, defended in the previous chapter, remains defensible after
1700 or whether Leibniz moves away from his earlier incompatibilism to a form of
compatibilism or even hard determinism. I will argue that Leibniz remains consistent in
his incompatibilism.
Leibniz affirms classical faculty psychological, stretching from Aristotle through
the patristics and into medieval and post-Reformation scholasticism. On this view, what
the will desires is good, and the good that creatures seek is happiness. Only the Highest
Good, God, can bring creatures felicity. But because creatures are fallible and corruptible,
they may attempt to find satisfaction in lower goods (e.g., sensuality) or in misguided
means to the good (e.g., revenge) or in disproportionate amounts of otherwise appropriate
goods (e.g., gluttony). Moral evil emerges out of such pursuits (G 6:122). In addition,
Leibniz, in keeping with this tradition, maintains “that our will is exempt not only from
constraint but also from necessity” (G 6:122). The former condition affirms that in free
acts “we are not being forced” (G 6:122). As for the latter condition, this is an affirmation
of the modal contingency of the act. At the very least, the subject-predicate relationship
in a free act is not absolute, but could be negated without contradiction. Hence, the
relationship between Judas and betrays Christ, for example, is not the same as the
relationship between circle and flowing circumference (see also G 6:123-4). To these
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conditions, Leibniz adds the conditions of reason, choice, and spontaneity. This trio
reflects the traditional faculty psychology view that choice in rational agents involves an
intellective assessment of the good, which is followed by a choosing of the desired good,
and this results in voluntary self-movement or spontaneité (G 6:122-3).
While the foregoing displays a traditional view of free choice, the question we
face in Theodicée is whether the choices of the will, though not logically necessary, are
inevitable in a compatibilist sense. For Leibniz denies equipoise, suggesting that we
never incline toward multiple paths equally (e.g., G 6:122-3), and for this reason, can
easily be read as a psychological determinist who maintains that we choose as we do
because we desire p over q, but whatever inclines us toward p in the first place is not in
our control. Is this Leibniz’s position? We will begin by looking at some of the more
problematic passages for a libertarian reading.
One of the most challenging passages for this reading appears in G 6:126-7. The
passage reads:
[1] In a word, I am of the opinion that the will is always more inclined towards
the course it adopts, but that it is never bound by the necessity to adopt it. [2] That
it will adopt this course is certain, but it is not necessary. [3] The case corresponds
to that of the famous saying, Astra inclinant, non necessitant, although here the
similarity is not complete. [4] For the event towards which the stars tend (to speak
with the common herd, as if there were some foundation for astrology) does not
always come to pass, whereas the course towards which the will is more inclined
never fails to be adopted. [5] Moreover the stars would form only a part of the
inclinations that co-operate in the event, but when one speaks of the greater
inclination of the will, one speaks of the result of all the inclinations. [6] It is
almost as we have spoken above of the consequent will in God, which results
from all the antecedent wills.
Allow me to first lay out the pessimistic reading. (I have numbered the sentences
for ease of reference.) The first sentence is not necessarily troubling, since Leibniz has
just finished a discussion of the Molinist dispute. His treatment of that discussion begins
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with his rejection of equipoise; thus, the first statement merely affirms the reality of
intellective preference. The second sentence, however, is more troubling. It could be read
as stating that, although the cumulative inclinations that act on the will do not determine
it (the will must determine itself), we can nonetheless be certain that the will always
chooses in keeping with whatever is dominant out of all inclinations that press in on it, as
per psychological determinism. Hence, while the choice that follows is not logically
necessary, it is inevitable.
This determinist reading seems to be reinforced by the saying concerning the stars
in sentence 3. For Leibniz states in sentences 4 and 5 that the difference between stars
inclining but not necessitating and the will inclining but not necessitating is that what the
stars incline toward sometimes does not come to pass. Yet, what the will inclines toward
certainly comes to pass. Leibniz then goes on to talk about the dominant inclination of the
will as the cumulative result of all competing inclinations—external and internal. The
reference in sentence 6 to the antecedent/consequent will of God refers back to Leibniz’s
discussion in G 6:115-7 in which he talks of God willing antecedently the good but
consequently willing the best, which ultimately excludes certain goods to which God
antecedently inclines. We will discuss the antecedent/consequent will distinction in §2.2
below. For now, let it suffice that, on first blush, the analogy indicates that the choice of
the will is merely the result of cumulative pulls toward various goods, in which one
combination is strongest. Thus, in keeping with the claim in sentence 5 that choice is the
result of all competing inclinations, so it is here: passions, reason, and other factors
unknown to us press in on the will and the strongest combination wins. Needless to say,
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this string of claims can quite easily be read as an overt affirmation of compatibilist
determinism.
Despite this rather bleak assessment of the passage, there are a number of counter
considerations that are worthy of examination. Regarding sentence 1, as mentioned, it is
aimed at equipoise and merely reaffirms Leibniz’s rejection thereof. As shown in chapter
2, there are clear instances in post-Reformation scholasticism of those who both oppose
compatibilism and reject equipoise as chimerical, affirming instead the reality of
intellective preference alongside libertarian freedom.29 Hence, this affirmation of
intellective preference is no threat to a libertarian reading. As for sentence 2, the focus is
once again the distinction between certainty and necessity—a reading reinforced by the
fact that Leibniz begins his entire discussion of Molinism (which precedes this passage)
with the very same distinction as key to understanding the compatibility of free choice
and providence (G 6:123-4). As we have seen in reference to Augustine and those after
him, this is historically in keeping with an incompatibilist commitment. Now, if we take
the incompatibilist reading of sentence 2, the meaning of Leibniz’s reference to the stars
inclining and so on (sentences 3-4) has nothing to do with outward or inward causes; it is
merely stating that astrology does not provide certainty of future contingents, whereas
divine foreknowledge is rooted in an a priori infallible understanding of determinate
truth. The contrast, then, is not between indeterminism and determinism, but between
certainty and uncertainty.
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The most serious difficulties appear in sentences 5-6. There, Leibniz suggests
that, even if the herd was right and stars play a role in our fate, the stars would only be
one of many inclining factors. Yet, when one speaks of the “greater inclination of the
will, one speaks of the result of all the inclinations” (G 6:127). As noted above, it sounds
as if Leibniz is saying that the inclination of the will that determines choice is merely the
product of cumulative incentives and inclinations that combine until one emerges as
dominant. This certainly sounds deterministic, since the choice of the will is nothing
more than a product of colliding goods.
The subsequent reference to God in sentence 6 both helps and hurts. It helps
insofar as the antecedent/consequent discussion centers on the will inclining toward all
goods but not being able to choose all goods. In this sense, one could read Leibniz’s point
as again echoing the rejection of equipoise: What the will desires is good, but the will
cannot have all goods and thus incline equally toward all goods, lest choice become
impossible. This could soften the point a bit. However, the more problematic feature of
the antecedent/consequent reference is that Leibniz denies that God has deliberative
choice, since God always chooses the best. For God sees a given end tied to its best
means (not an unusual claim in the history of Christian theology).30 While creatures do
not always choose the best, Leibniz could be read as asserting that, in the case of
creatures, there is still a dominant inclination that inevitably wins out, just as in the case
of God the best inevitably wins out. Can the conclusion of determinism be avoided in this
light?
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One interpretive possibility is that Leibniz is not as plainly an intellectualist as he
is often thought. The features of Leibniz’s thought on choice that typically point in the
intellectualist direction are (a) his rejection of equipoise (or affirmation of intellective
preference); (b) his principle of sufficient reason, which affirms that there must be a
reason for the choice made; and (c) his talk of reasons inclining but not necessitating,
which is most often read as indicating that the will never chooses contrary to the final
judgment of the practical intellect—even if the choice does not rise to the level of
metaphysical necessity. However, there are a number of considerations that argue against
this conclusion.
First, a libertarian may rightly ask whether there is a sleight of hand in play in the
claim that reasons incline but do not necessitate if this claim regarding inclination is read
in a compatibilist sense. That is, if the very concept of the will includes (i) that it moves
toward the perceived good, (ii) that the final judgment of the practical intellect is the
source of this perceived good, and (iii) that it always acts on that toward which it is
inclined (i.e., it cannot reject the final judgment of the practical intellect), in what sense is
the will not necessitated to act on this inclination? For to negate the predicate that obtains
in the subject (i.e., the act) would be to negate one of the above conditions, which is part
of the very concept of will; and this would result in a contradiction akin to negating
spherical in reference to circle. However, if (iii) is denied, then one can see how reason
inclines but does not necessitate. To wit: though what the will desires is good, and in
finite creatures the good is a matter of perception as presented by the practical intellect,
so long as the will retains the power to choose (volo) or withhold choice (non volo), such
a judgment would incline but not necessitate action.
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Second, Leibniz’s comments concerning God’s choosing of the best are in
keeping with the denial of (iii). That is, Leibniz grants that it may well follow from the
very idea of God that he choose the best. However, after granting both the modal
necessity of God and the moral necessity of this choice, Leibniz does not thereby grant
modal necessity to the best. One may readily ask why, given that the distribution axiom in
modal logic would dictate that the modal necessity of God is transferred to anything that
exists as an extension of the idea of God.31 We might add that this point would up the
stakes of the previous libertarian objection. For if the best follows from the very idea
God, and the acts of the creatures in this world are part of the idea of the best, it would
seem that the modal necessity is distributed not only to the best but to all the subjectpredicate relations contained therein. Yet, Leibniz denies this conclusion. Why? Leibniz
writes,
And therefore, one may concede that it is necessary to God to choose the best
[optimum], or the best is necessary; yet, it does not follow that to choose is
necessary, because no demonstration is given that the best is. And here in this
place we have the recent distinction of some between the necessity of the
consequence and consequent…. [I]n the end the necessity is a necessity of the
consequence, not consequent, that … because the best is supposed from that
granted hypothesis of the infallible election of the best is necessary. (A 6.4:1652)
Leibniz’s remarks here are significant. For if Leibniz maintained that action
always follows from inclination combined with practical judgment, then it could be
conceded that a demonstration that God exists would yield a demonstration that the best
obtains. Yet, Leibniz does not grant this conclusion. The moral demonstration that the
best follows from God only yields the hypothetical necessity that if God chooses to create
a world, then it must be the best. But this is a hypothetical necessity, not an absolute
The distribution axiom in modal logic runs as follows: □(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (□A ⊃ □B). The symbol “□”
means necessary and “⊃” means if-then.
31
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necessity. I, for one, do not know how to read this claim unless Leibniz here upholds that
the will is never necessitated to act by any inclination. For the power to choose (volo) or
withhold choice (non volo) is always in the will—which explains why Leibniz
distinguishes a soul with understanding but no will from a soul that has both
understanding and will (G 6:122). Given that Leibniz appeals analogically to the
antecedent/consequent will of God in his discussion of creaturely inclination (G 6:127),
we have reason to believe that the power to choose or not choose holds true for both God
and creatures.
Third, a careful consideration of Leibniz’s comments on inclining reasons and the
ability of the mind to redirect its thoughts not only confirms the above two points but
opens the door to a reading of Leibniz that is more nuanced than the intellectualist
portrait. We saw in the previous chapter that in “Vérités” Leibniz affirms the ability of
the mind to redirect its thoughts (C 20), and the above subsection highlighted a very
similar claim in reference to PEH (G 6:137-8). On this point, Leibniz’s Nouveaux essais
sur l’entendement humain (1703) is helpful. Therein, Leibniz defines free choice (Latin:
liberum arbitrium = French: franc arbitre) as following: “But the freedom of spirit,
opposed to necessity, concerns the naked will, and in so far as it is distinguished from the
understanding. This is what is called free choice [franc arbitre] and it consists in this, that
we will that the strongest reasons or impressions which the understanding presents to the
will do not prevent the act of the will from being contingent, and do not give it an
absolute, and, so to speak, metaphysical necessity” (E 252). This denial of both absolute
and metaphysical necessity in reference to choice is often read as a mere affirmation that
the subject/predicate to follow can be negated without formal contradiction. However, the
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more cogent reading is that the will retains its power of choice in the face of the strongest
inclinations. When combined with later statements in Nouveaux essais, a finely nuanced
balance of intellectualism and voluntarism begins to emerge.
Leibniz remarks later in Nouveaux essays that the mind has the ability to slow or
redirect the dominant train of reason and stir counter inclinations. Now, he does affirm
that “The execution of our desire is suspended or stopped when this desire is not strong
enough to move us and to overcome the trouble or inconvenience there is in satisfying it”
(E 261-2), and such a claim appears to suggest that action inevitably follows where the
inclination is strong enough and the resistance weak enough. But Leibniz recognizes that
one could very easily slide from this claim to the conclusion that sins are inevitable,
given that they follow from inclinations that are too strong to be resisted (à la
determinism). In reply, Leibniz suggests that the mind has the ability to take preventative
measures against such tendencies. The mind, he says, has the ability to slow the train of
reasoning; it can fixate on reason and not “insensible and casual impressions”; it may
consider why it is where it is and where this train ends up; it may call to mind duty, and
so on (E 262). All of this Leibniz identifies as conditioning oneself “to stop the effect of
our desires and passions, i.e. to suspend (their) action” (E 262), and he suggests that in so
doing we discover means of combating these inclinations.
The determinist safe haven in the passage is Leibniz’s remark to follow that this
combating is always through determined paths and not equilibrium. However, given
Leibniz’s concern to avoid the inevitability of sin, the better reading of this reference to
determined paths is that Leibniz is suggesting (contra equipoise) that we always act for
reasons; hence, if we choose contrary to p we must have a reason for doing so. Yet, a
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rational agent has the miraculous power of interrupting the natural course of efficient
causes that act upon hi will and of redirecting hi thought world (contra determinism). He
can therefore recognize the path toward which he is inclined and redirect his thought
world away from this path (contra determinism), but to do so effectively—that is, in a
way that might result in a choice contrary to the one his current path inclines him—he
must redirect it toward other reasons (contra equipoise). He can do this by slowing the
path of a certain not-yet-too-strong inclination and redirecting his mind toward another
set of inclinations in an effort to nurture it, so that they might become dominant (E 262).
By way of analogy, let us think of a flat table that has atop it a maze, or labyrinth,
such as the ones that scientists sometimes use for rat experiments. If instead we place a
metal ball in the maze and the maze is kept level, the ball does not move. But if we lift or
tilt the table, the ball begins to roll. We may control the speed with which the ball rolls by
controlling the angle of the table; we may also control which direction the ball rolls by
adjusting the tilt of the table. If the ball begins to roll in a direction we would rather it not
go, we may slow its pace and seek to redirect the ball down a different route. But despite
these controls, the movements of the ball are still bound to the determined pathways of
the labyrinth. So in the above reading of Leibniz, the mind may identify and slow a
certain train of thought or inclination, and it may even identify an alternative set of
inclinations and seek to stir these so that they become dominant. But because choice
always operates according to dominant inclination, this power of the mind is limited by
the determined pathways within which it must work.
If we take this reading of Nouveaux essais, then what we find is precisely what
Leibniz argues in “Vérités.” To wit:
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[F]ree or intelligent substances … are not bound by any certain subordinate laws
of the universe, but act as it were by a private miracle, on the sole initiative of
their own power, and by looking towards a final cause they interrupt the
connection and the course of the efficient causes that act on their will… . For just
as the course of the universe is changed by the free will of God, so the course of
the mind’s thoughts is changed by its free will (C 20).
In other words, the natural course of events identified in Nouveaux essais is the course of
inclinations that bombard the soul, but the mind has the ability to stay choice, slow this or
that inclination, and even redirect the inclination by looking towards a final cause. Such
actions, if taken, constitute a miraculous redirecting of the mind’s thoughts and a
miraculous interruption of the subordinate laws of the universe. The end result of this
reading is a nuanced balance of intellectualism and voluntarism. On the one hand,
Leibniz affirms that the will must act on the dominant inclination (or final judgment) if it
acts, but he insists that the will is never necessitated to action, and has the ability to slow
and indeed redirect the natural trajectory of inclinations. Thus, while the dominant
inclination always wins out in choice, what inclination will be dominant is not outside the
control of free and rational agents (cf., e.g., G 6:137-8).
It is noteworthy that such a picture of choice is not without precedence in the
Augustinian tradition. Bishop Lancelot Andrews, for example, includes amongst the free
capacities of the soul the power to redirect thought, and for this reason, chastises Eve for
not redirecting her thoughts in the hour of temptation from what she could not have
toward what she had been given, so as to stir gratitude rather than covetous.32
Returning, then, to the above passage in Theodicée (G 6:126-7), we see how the
claims of the passage are compatible with libertarian freedom. Leibniz can affirm that the
32
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choice of the will never fails to accord with the dominant inclination, which is the result
of all inclinations that assail the soul, and yet deny that either the inclination or the choice
is necessary. Let us say, for example, that Margot faces a choice at T1. At T1 the
dominant inclination, which is the result of all inclinations, is to have an affair with Eli. It
can be certain that if Margot chooses at T1, she will choose to have an affair. Yet, Margot
may passively refrain from choice (non volo), and this inclination may change at T2 due
to either internal or external changes in those things that assail Margot and incline her
toward an affiar. At T2 it once again falls to Margot whether to choose or refrain from
choosing. Moreover, Margot need not remain passive, since she may recognize where
this train of thought leads and thus actively slow or even redirect this train by looking to
other final causes, such as duty or other competing inclinations. By T3, it may be that, due
to her active redirection of thought, the dominant inclination in Margot is distinct from
both her dominant inclination at T1 and her dominant inclination at T2. In the end, three
different hypotheticals emerge: If Margot wills at T1, she wills p; If Margot wills at T2,
she wills q; and If Margot wills at T3, she wills r. Which hypothetical obtains falls to
Margot’s free spontaneity, and is infallibly certain to God who knows the determinate
truth-value of future contingents a priori. However, the contingency of this hypothetical
necessity falls to (a) the very nature of Margot’s free choice, which makes it so that
neither her choice nor her inclination are necessary, and (b) the fact that God’s free
choice with regard to the best makes it so that neither Margot nor her world necessarily
exist. In other words, the contingency is more than a mere semantic alternative, but one
rooted in the libertarian capacities of Margot of and God, each of which satisfy PAP. 33
33
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Note that in this reading, there is no violation of PSR—the very topic Leibniz
raises immediately after the passage in question. As Leibniz defines it, PSR states that
“nothing ever comes to pass without there being a cause or at least a reason determining
it, that is, something to give an a priori reason why it is existent rather than non-existent,
and in this wise rather than in any other” (G 6:127). As R. Cranston Paull has argued,
Leibniz’s PSR does not prevent free decisions from constituting sufficient reasons: “the
fact that the chooser has the specific [nature] that he does provides a sufficient reason for
the miraculous choice.”34 The existence of the world is explained by the existence of God
and his free choice in accord with the moral necessity that inclines him toward the best.
Margot’s existence and possession of freedom is explained by their harmony with the
best. And Margot’s free action is explained by both her free spontaneity and her
dominant inclination at the moment of choice. In all explanations, the chimera of
equipoise is avoided, but free spontaneity is preserved, as is both PSR and PAP.
The above insight provides an avenue for addressing most all of problem passages
on free choice in Theodicée. For example, Leibniz makes various remarks in G 6:127-31
(§§45-52) that on initial inspection may imply a compatibilist interpretation. However,
keeping in mind (a) that a denial of equipoise is not, historically speaking, constitutive of
a denial of libertarian free choice, and (b) the above comments on inclining reason and
the power of choice, these difficulties are easily resolved. In G 6:127-8 (§45), Leibniz
discusses the determination of the will by the perceived good and suggests that this holds
true for not only fallen creatures, but also God and the blessed, since to act without
“inclining reason” is a defect—they would be irrational. Though this could be read
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through a compatibilist lens, we have seen how the rejection of equipoise in favor
intellective preference (which is the context of this remark) does not constitute a rejection
of libertarian freedom; and we have also seen how Leibniz can affirm the role of
inclining reasons without falling into psychological determinism. Leibniz’s subsequent
remarks, moreover, align with this reading: “they are none the less free in consequence of
that. God fails not to choose the best, but he is not constrained so to do: nay, more, there
is no necessity in the object of God’s choice, for another sequence of things is equally
possible” (G 6:128). Leibniz continues, “There is therefore a freedom of contingency or,
in a way, of indifference, provided that by ‘indifference’ is understood that nothing
necessitates us to one course or the other” (G 6:128). Such a comment makes sense in
light of the above nuances concerning the power of choice, and it is noteworthy that the
Reformed scholastics who deny equipoise but affirm incomaptibilism likewise affirm a
root indifference in the will if by this one means that nothing necessitates the connection
between the will and its chosen course of action.35
Other potential problem passages could be mentioned, such as G 6:128-30 (§§4651), wherein Leibniz invokes Buridan’s ass—the story of an ass that, when faced with
two piles of hay of equal size and luster, could not choose and thus starved.36 The claim
in each instance, however, is that equipoise is chimerical and inclining reasons always
play a role in choice (e.g., G 6:183-4; or 218-20). Thus, the above line of reply can be
utilized effectively throughout Theodicée.
35
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Before closing this section, it is worth turning from those passages that challenge
the libertarian reading of Leibniz to those that give affirmation of this reading. I will
briefly highlight four such points in Leibniz’s argument. The first is his treatment of
reward and punishment in G 6:139-43. In this passage, Leibniz refutes the idea that
absolute necessity would undermine reward and punishment entirely, providing examples
of practical uses amid a necessitarian framework (e.g., putting down a rabid animal,
inflicting pain to train someone, or using capital punishment to instill fear and restrain
observers) (G 6:139-41). Despite the utility of certain rewards and punishments amid
necessitarianism, Leibniz suggests that “a kind of justice and a certain sort of rewards and
punishments appear not so applicable to those who should act by an absolute necessity,
supposing such necessity existed” (G 6:141). The kind of justice Leibniz has in mind here
is punitive justice. The contrast is between a form of reward and punishment that can be
justified by its utility and that which merely exacts reward. According to Leibniz, only
corrective justice, not punitive justice, can be maintained in a system of absolute
necessity (G 6:142-3). The argument presumes the libertarian condition of culpability,
namely, PAP. For the elements of punitive justice (praise and blame) are built on the
assumption of contrary choice, which makes the agent praiseworthy or blameworthy for
what he chooses—a point consistently affirmed throughout the patristic period.37 Though
Leibniz’s main point is that reward and punishment of a certain kind can survive
necessitarianism, it should not be missed that Leibniz grants that punitive justice requires
PAP, and he is clear that punitive justice exists in our world (e.g., G 6:142; or 153-61).
37
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Leibniz’s comments in G 6:148-53 on original sin point to the same conclusion.
We will consider Leibniz’s take on original sin at length in §3.1. For the purposes of this
section, I merely want to highlight how Leibniz frames his inquiry. The problem of
original sin, as set up by Leibniz, is a question of how God can permit original sin, which
is the apparent root of actual sin. As the question unfolds, it has two dimensions: (1)
whether divine goodness is tainted by original sin, and (2) whether individuals can justly
be held culpable for actual sin, given the presence of this root. The first dimension of the
problem (divine justice) is peculiar on a compatibilist read, for it asks whether God is the
cause of evil, given that he supplies the dispositional root of what gives way to actual sin.
However, on the compatibilist reading of Leibniz, this is precisely what God has done
since before the Fall in Eden: God supplied both the internal and external causes that
determined Adam toward sin. Were Leibniz a compatibilist, he could simply reply that
original sin poses no difficulty, since those infected still act without constraint and
according to their desires.38 The fact that Leibniz resists the idea that God supplies the
root of sin points away from the compatibilist reading toward an incompatibilist one.
The second dimension of the problem of original sin (i.e., culpability) emerges in
Leibniz’s subsequent discussion of hell in G 6:153-61. After dealing with God’s role, or
lack thereof, in the origin of original sin, Leibniz turns to an inquiry concerning infant
damnation. Again, we will treat the details of G 6:153-61 in §3.3 below. Here, I merely
want to highlight that Leibniz’s inquiry presumes the libertarian conditions of culpability,
namely, knowledge of what one ought to do and the power of contrary choice.39 Leibniz’s
38
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discussion of infant death yields a subsequent discussion of those who die without
hearing the gospel of Christ. The concern in both cases is that both groups do not satisfy
the culpability requirement of knowledge (G 6:153-6). And as Leibniz develops possible
solutions to this first difficulty, he raises concern over the second condition as well—that
is, even with this knowledge, can they respond apart from prevenient grace (G 6:157)? In
this context, Leibniz makes clear his Arminian leanings with regard to the culpability
question: “I would be rather on the side of those who grant to all men a grace sufficient to
draw them away from evil, provided they have a sufficient tendency to profit by this
succor, and not to reject it voluntarily” (G 6:155). His sympathies for this position are of
particular interest because it seems unnecessary under compatibilist constraints. So long
as an individual sins without constraint and in accord with his desires, he is responsible.40
Yet, Leibniz consistently desires the additional layer that the reprobate has the requisite
grace available to him; he need only grab hold of it. Thus, responsibility for his failure to
do so falls to his use of contrary choice.
The fourth and final feature of Leibniz’s argument we will consider here concerns
the possibility of a world without sin. Again, we will look at Leibniz’s claims on this
topic in §2.3. For now, suffice it to say that Leibniz suggests that such a world would
require (among other things) that God regularly interrupt the free choices of rational
agents by a perpetual miracle (see G 6:166; 172-4; 178-9; and 202). Such a claim makes
little sense if God can “program,” as it were, the psychological events that determine the
choice of an individual. For the compatibilist, no miracle is required to make free agents
choose the good perpetually; agents need only be created with an inclining desire to do
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so. The fact that Leibniz suggests that such miraculous intervention would be required
indicates that he does not think free choice is so easily controlled or manipulated.
What we find, then, is that Leibniz’s comments in Theodicée can be read in
keeping with the libertarian remarks in “Vérités” and De praedestinatione. Though
problem passages emerge that lend themselves to a compatibilist reading, a careful
treatment of these claims opens the door to a more nuanced understanding of the
relationship between inclining reasons and the power of choice. Moreover, far from
simply permitting an incompatibilist reading, we find that a number of Leibniz’s
questions and answers presume and indeed require a commitment to the libertarian
conditions of culpability. Thus, we have reason to believe that the incompatibilist
commitment Leibniz harbored in his earlier writings continues in Theodicée.

2. God and Evil
Before moving into Leibniz’s answer to how it is that God can permit evil to
“exist” in our world, we must first flesh out Leibniz’s definition of three types of evil,
their respective modal statuses, and God’s role therein.

2.1. Three Types of Evil
Leibniz identifies three different types of evil: metaphysical, physical, and moral.
His basic definitions run as follows: “Metaphysical evil consists in mere imperfection,
physical evil in suffering, and moral evil in sin” (G 6:115). In existential terms, no
manner of evil is necessary, since God is the only existentially necessary being, and the
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idea of God excludes all three kinds of evil. However, if we include the eternal verities in
the discussion of evil, as Leibniz does, then what we find is quite different.
Metaphysical evil Leibniz identifies with finitude, or limitation in essence and
understanding. Defined in this way, metaphysical evil is part of the very concept of
creatures per se, being “an original imperfection” that precedes all sin (G 6:115). Leibniz
points out that many of “the ancients” located the source of evil in matter, which was
thought to be uncreated and independent of God. Yet, he points out that for those who
“derive all being from God” (as Leibniz and orthodox Christianity generally do) the
answer must be “sought in the ideal nature of the creature” (G 6:114). In other words, as
we saw in §1.1 above, Leibniz is a realist who understands the myriad of essences in the
Great Chain of Being to be among the necessary truths housed in the eternal verities.
Because this chain of creaturely essences necessarily includes metaphysical finitude,
Leibniz concludes that metaphysical evil must be located in the eternal verities
themselves, “which are in the understanding of God, independently of his will” (G 6:1145). Moreover, insofar as every possible world that God might create is a world system of
creatures, Leibniz concludes that metaphysical evil is present in every possible world:
“[I]t is necessary that there be an infinitude of possible worlds, that evil enter into divers
of them, and that even the best of all contain measure thereof” (G 6:115). It is worth
noting that Leibniz is in perfect harmony with historical Christian orthodoxy on this
point, since creedal Christianity has been quite clear from the time of the Arian dispute
onward that one of the central differences between God and creatures is that God is
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uncircumscribed (aperigraptos), while creatures—all creatures—are circumscribed
(perigraptos).41
Physical evil refers to pain or suffering. Leibniz distinguishes the role of God in
physical evil from the role of creatures. Regarding God’s direct role, Leibniz suggests
that physical evil may be willed by God as a form of punishment; it may also be used as a
catalytic means to a specific end, such as the amendment of one’s life; or it may serve to
prevent greater evils, such as the pain that leads to repentance and faith and thus prevents
the greatest physical evil, namely, damnation (G 6:116-7; 146). In other words, Leibniz
ascribes to God only upright motives in his promotion of physical evil. As for God’s less
direct role, two themes emerge. The first is that God acts “according to the rules, as well
as physical as moral, that wisdom has made him choose” (G 6:119). The implication is
that God’s goodness and wisdom do not require him to perform a miracle every time a
physical law might result in pain. The second more problematic created cause is the
rational creatures God has made. In contrast with divine benevolence, rational creatures
have a tremendous ability to inflict physical evil, and their reasons for doing so are rarely
virtuous. As Leibniz puts it, one Nero or Caligula produces more harm than any
earthquake (G 6:118). Such an abuse of free choice, however, moves us from physical
evil into the realm of moral evil.
Moral evil find its footing, as it were, in metaphysical evil—specifically in
creaturely limitations that allow for fallibility and corruptibility. However, unlike
metaphysical evil, moral evil is rooted in the free choice of rational agents and is not
41
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necessarily present in every possible world simply because creatures are in those worlds.
Here we find the antithesis of Leibniz’s application of faculty psychology to God.
Because God’s infallible intellect cannot fail to know the good and his incorruptible will
cannot fail to incline toward every good proportionate to its goodness, it follows that
God, of moral necessity, always wills the best. Yet, the same cannot be said of creatures.
On this point, Leibniz follows a very traditional path from Plato and Aristotle through the
medieval scholastics: The intellect judges the good; the will desires the good; and the
good at which rational creatures aim is happiness. Only the highest good (God) can bring
felicity, but due to creaturely finitude, the intellect can misjudge the good, esteeming
lower goods more than it ought and disregarding higher goods it ought to esteem.
Likewise the will, being corruptible, may incline toward lower goods more than it ought
and decline from higher goods toward which it ought to incline (G 6:122). Thus, the
fundamental metaphysical difference between God and creatures yields an equally
fundamental moral difference.42
As for the nature of moral evil itself, Leibniz again invokes the Augustinian staple
that being is good, and thus evil must always be a defect in, corruption of, or privation of
good (bonum ex causa integra, malum ex quolibet defectu). For this reason, we must
clarify our talk of the “existence” of evil. Evil, as nonbeing, cannot be said to have an
efficient cause, as if it were something that had being, like a tree or dog. Rather, evil, as
corruption or privation, can have only a deficient cause (malum causam habet non
efficientem, sed deficientem). In the case of moral evil, the willing of evil is always a
regressive or retrograde resistance by the will to being (see also G 6:115; and 122).
42
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Both the corruptibility of creaturely faculties and the meontic nature of evil are
aimed at explaining metaphysically how evil can “exist” without being caused by God.
This metaphysical groundwork is crucial because even if we speak of God permitting evil
acts, there is still the difficulty that all things have their existence, capacity, and motion
from God. The problem this modal link between God and creatures raises is that it seems
to require that God is directly, and indeed physically, involved in every instance of moral
evil. For if God perpetually supplies creatures with existence, capacity, and movement,
then it seems inevitable that God is involved in every evil action from conception to
completion. Or to use Leibniz’s words, God “effects all that is real in the sin of the
creature” (G 6:118).
One possible way to distance God from evil, which Leibniz notes but rejects, is
forwarded by certain medieval nominalists, such as Durand de Saint-Pourçain and
Cardinal Aureolus. To wit, God creates beings, gives them the force they need, and then
leaves them to themselves.43 In other words, divine concourse is only “general and
mediate” (G 6:118). Leibniz, however, sides with the more traditional understanding of
concourse, according to which “the action of God in conserving should have some
reference to that which is conserved” (G 6:118). Hence, he speaks of God continually
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creating and providing “perpetual immediate influence which the dependence of the
creature demands” (G 6:119).44 But such particular concourse is the very thing that
beckons the question: Is God the author of evil?
Leibniz, in keeping with the consensus patrum of Christian tradition, rejects the
idea that God causes evil.45 But how can he do this while affirming particular concourse?
His solution is twofold. First, Leibniz builds on his discussion of metaphysical evil. As
noted above, metaphysical evil is what makes possible fallibility and corruption, which is
the basis for moral evil. Yet, Leibniz insists that ontological finitude in creatures is not
the result of weakness in God, but an inevitable result of being a creature. For God cannot
communicate his full perfection to another being without making another God. Therefore,
ontic limitations are rooted in the “ideal reasons which restrict it” (G 6:121)—that is, in
the essential properties of its nature that make it a circumscribed entity. In this light,
should moral evil result from metaphysical evil, God remains guiltless for several
reasons: (1) because the metaphysical limitations are part of the very concept of the thing,
and is thus an absolute necessity that not even God can overturn; (2) because the
limitation, while making moral evil possible in rational creatures, does not make evil
necessary, given the powers of free choice; and (3) because God provides perfection to
each creature as far as each is able to receive it (G 6:121).
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The second part of Leibniz’s reply invokes Augustine’s insights concerning the
privative nature of evil, discussed above (G 6:119). As noted, evil has no being of its
own, since existence itself is a perfection and thus ontologically positive. Thus, evil can
only be a privation of the good (privatio boni).46 For this reason, Leibniz insists that God
cannot be the cause of evil, for evil has no efficient cause. As nonbeing, it can have only
a deficient cause, since it adds nothing (ontologically speaking) to the subject. In this
light, he concludes that God supplies all that is ontologically positive in the agent and in
the act; the creature is the deficient cause of the privation in malformed movements (G
6:114-5).
To illustrate the point, Leibniz invokes an analogy of inertia in which a boat is
weighed down and resistant to the movement of the river beneath it. The analogy depicts
God’s impartation of being and the resistance thereof in evil acts. Leibniz writes:
The current is the cause of the boat’s movement, but not of its retardation; God is
the cause of perfection in the nature and the actions of the creature, but the
limitation of the receptivity of the creature is the cause of the defects there’re are
in its actions…. [O]ne may say that the current is the cause of the material
element of the retardation, but not the formal: that is, it is the cause of the boat’s
speed without being the cause of the limits to this speed. And God is no more the
cause of sin than the river’s current is the cause of the retardation of the boat. (G
6:120-1)
As pointed out in the previous chapter, this very same type of analogy is found
among a number of Reformed scholastics and is used to explain the relationship between
divine premotion and evil. We saw that Johannes Maccovius uses the illustration of a
limping horse:
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The following objection is forwarded: If someone is knowingly and willingly the
cause of an action to which deformity is attached, he truly and properly sins: God
is knowingly and willingly the cause of actions to which deformity is attached:
therefore God is truly and properly the cause of sin. I respond: This is false and
this can be shown by an example: for if someone moves a limping horse, the
horse limps, but that person is not the cause of its limping.47
The basic analogy is the same: motion is provided by an external source, while the object
being moved has some defect or trait that determines the character of the resulting
movement. The point is straightforward: though God is the cause of the agent’s
movement, the agent himself is the deficient cause of the defective character of the
movement. Yet, this defect is not an ontological addition to the act anymore than
brokenness is an addition to a previously healthy limb. Thus, it is in the deficient cause,
namely, the corrupt will, where we find the locus of evil.48 As for why God would permit
the existence of evil, Leibniz’s answer is found in the distinction between God’s
antecedent and consequent wills.

2.2. God’s Antecedent and Consequent Will
In section 1, we saw how Leibniz moves from perfect being theology and faculty
psychology to the hypothetical necessity If God chooses to create a world, then the world
he creates will be the best possible world. We also saw how this only heightens the
question: Whence cometh evil? For, if God’s infallible intellect cannot misjudge evil as
good and God’s incorruptible will cannot decline from the good into evil, then on
Leibniz’s own assumptions, God cannot will evil as such. Yet evil is present in our world.
How do we explain this? Leibniz’s answer appeals to a distinction between the
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antecedent will of God and the consequent will of God. This distinction, to my mind, is
the crux of Leibniz’s theodicy. For it explains how God, who cannot will evil per se,
permissively decrees a great many evils, and it is this distinction to which Leibniz
consistently turns when professing confidence that God has chosen the best and when
answering objections leveled by Bayle.
The antecedent/consequent will distinction is not Leibniz’s own but, as he notes
in De praedestinatione et gratia dissertatio, comes from John of Damascus and is
conceptually (though not terminologically) present in the writings of John Chrysostom
(PGD 3a).49 Leibniz explains the distinction as follows. The antecedent will reflects the
fact that “will consists in the inclination to do something in proportion to the good it
contains” (G 6:115). This is an entailment of the faculty psychology as applied to God: If
God infallibly knows the good of each object and his incorruptible will inclines toward
every good proportionate to its goodness, then we must affirm that God inclines toward
every particular good to whatever extent it is good (G 6:122). Each good considered in
itself is thus tended toward proportionate to its goodness. In this sense, every good (trees,
dogs, Pegasī, virtue, the prevention of evil, the salvation of every man, etc.) is
antecedently willed by God. Hence, we may rightly say that God is earnestly disposed “to
sanctity and to save all men, to exclude sin, and to prevent damnation” (G 6:116). This
will, or inclination toward particular goods, would be effective in determining God’s
choice were there not “some stronger reason to prevent it” (G 6:116). This “stronger
reason” brings us to the consequent will of God.
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Because not all possibles are compossible, God must make hard decisions, as it
were, regarding which goods to will and which to exclude as a result, since not all that
are antecedently willed can be consequently willed. For example, it is a good that men
are free and it is a good that all men pray, but it may not be possible for God to will the
former and the latter simultaneously, since the former places in the hands of men the
choice of whether to bring about or shun the latter good. The conclusion, then, is this.
There are goods that God antecedently wills but may not consequently will because they
are incompossible with the good of the whole, and thus with his providential duties to
creation; and there are evils that God antecedently does not will but consequently permits
because they attach by concomitance to the good of the whole, and thus to his
providential duties to creation (G 6:117).
In both ancient and medieval Christianity, the antecedent/consequent will
distinction is meant to explain how God, who does not and cannot will evil per se, may
guiltlessly permit evil. The medieval scholastics are clear that there are only certain
conditions under which evil may be so permitted. One cannot, for example, justify the
performing of evil (the direct object of one’s actions) because one has a good end in
mind—good ends do not justify evil means. Evil is permissible only when it is the best
and only means available for preventing a greater evil from occurring. For, to permit a
lesser evil in order to avoid a greater evil is to actually have a good end and a good
object, despite the fact that a lesser evil is permitted in the process.50
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Leibniz follows not only the Christian terminology on this point, but its substance
as well. with other medieval scholastics, argues that one may guiltlessly permit evil if and
only if (a) the prevention of evil would result in a still greater evil or (weak disjunctive)51
(b) one must commit evil to prevent evil. Since God has permitted evil in our world, and
God cannot sin (propositions 3 and 6 of Leibniz’s argument that God wills the best), we
must conclude that one or both conditions are met in God’s permissive willing of evil. In
this light, God cannot be said to will evil qua evil. On the contrary, Leibniz maintains
that God permits evil if and only if it is found to be inextricably connected with other
goods to which God is duty bound and the shunning of which to prevent said evil would
result in a greater evil still (G 6:117). Thus, when God permits evil, both his end and his
object are good: God wills the good of the whole (end), along with every particular good
that attaches thereto, and he permits evil only because the prevention of said evil would
result in still greater evils (object).
Speaking by analogy, Leibniz compares God’s consequent willing of evil to a
guard who occupies an important post in a time of danger and does not abandon his post
out of obligation to the town, even though he knows there are two men in the town
(toward whom he harbors no malice) who want to kill one another and may succeed in
doing so if he remains in his post. In willing his duty, therefore, the guard must also
permissively will the death of one of these two men, since to prevent this evil would
require not only that he sin by failing in his own duty but open the door to a still greater
evil, namely, the sacking of the entire town (G 6:117). So, in the case of God, his primary
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duty of doing the best cannot be done without permitting evil, though God does not cause
this evil himself:
But in relation to God … nothing can be opposed to the rule of the best, which
suffers neither exception nor dispensation. It is in this sense that God permits sin:
for he would fail in what he owes to himself, in what he owes to his wisdom, his
goodness, his perfection, if he followed not the grand result of all his tendencies
to good, and if he chose not that which is absolutely the best, notwithstanding the
evil of guilt, which is involved therein by the supreme necessity of the eternal
verities. (G 6:117)
In this sense God permits evil “as the sine quo non or as a hypothetical necessity which
connects it with the best” (G 6:117).
In short, Leibniz maintains that God permits evil when the prevention of evil
requires that he fail in his own duty to the whole and bring about still greater evils (G
6:117; cf. 118-9). This is precisely why Leibniz affirms Bayle’s claim that permitting evil
is excusable only when the prevention of an evil introduces greater evils. Leibniz agrees.
For he thinks this is precisely what is affirmed in the antecedent/consequent will
distinction: If God were to allow the antecedent will to prevail and stop every evil that
repelled him, then he would do so at the expense of the best, and the destruction of the
best—whatever this would look like—would bring greater evil than those particular evils
prevented. Moreover, to commit this evil would bring about the greatest evil of all,
namely, the destruction of God’s very wisdom and goodness (G 6:182).
Now, three misconceptions could quite easily emerge out of Leibniz’s
antecedent/consequent will distinction, despite its rather straightforward nature. The first
is that God, in his consequent will, inclines toward evil, preferring a world with
corruption, horrors, and damnation to a world free from these evils. Second, and certainly
related to the first, is that God is the cause of evil, since he apparently could prevent the
ills of this world but chooses not to because he finds the mixture of good and evil to be
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preferable. The third, is that God permits evil for the greater good in a utilitarian sense—
that is, the cumulative happiness justifies the miseries of some—and thus God treats
people as mere means that may be disposed of in the trash heap of hell or Auschwitz or
elsewhere. Each of these represents a rather serious distortion of Leibniz’s position.
I. God, in his consequent will, inclines toward evil, preferring a world with
corruption, horrors, and damnation to a world free of these evils.
Leibniz is painfully clear that this first misconception has no place in his theodicy.
Three points should be kept in mind here. The first is that the antecedent/consequent will
distinction is meant to make plain that God in no way inclines toward evil. Or, put more
forcefully, God is repelled by evil (e.g., G 6:116-7). This distinction is meant to show
instead how God can be repelled by evil, but still deem the goods to which evils attach by
concomitance and the prevention of still greater evils that would result otherwise
desirable enough to overcome his hatred for evils permitted. Leibniz is quite clear that
God hates evil and vice proportionately to the contempt they are due, but he also loves
the good proportionately to its due, and his love for the good represented in the best is
greater than his hatred for the evils that attach to it by concomitance (G 6:167-8).
The second point that should be kept in mind is that even in consequently
inclining toward the best, Leibniz does not conceive of God as doing so without
(anthropomorphically speaking) regret or anxiety over the evil that attaches to the best.
We find a number of analogies throughout Theodicée that illustrate this point. One of
these has already been considered above, namely, the analogy of a guard keeping watch
over a town (G 6:117). In reply to Bayle’s accusation that to permit a preventable evil is
to not care whether it be committed, Leibniz forwards the analogy of a government that
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leaves irregularities in coinage during war. He suggests that the fact that the government
does so does not indicate a lack of anxiety over it or even approval thereof. How much
more must it be with God in regard to those evils that attach by concomitance to the best?
But Leibniz again insists that there is no fault to be found here, for “Not only does he
derive from them greater goods, but he finds them connected with the greatest goods of
all those that are possible: so that it would be a fault not to permit them.” (G 6:181).
We find this same theme in reference to Bayle’s objection that God is like one
who gives a suicidal individual the instrument of his suicide while knowing its intended
use. Leibniz replies with two hypotheticals. In the first, a man holds several mythical
objects that he knows will be used for evil, for he has been given the gift of prophecy by
Apollo on the condition that his prophesies shall never be believed. Were the man
pressed to return these items to their proper owners and he could show no proof of future
misuse, a just judge would compel the man to return the items. In the second
hypothetical, “Jupiter promises Semele, the Sun Phaeton, Cupid Psyche to grant whatever
favor the other shall ask. They swear by the Styx, Di cujus jurare timent et fallere
Numen. One would gladly stop, but too late, the request half heard, Voluit Deus ora
loquentis Opprimere; exierat jam vox properata sub auras” (G 6:175). One would draw
back, except that, being compelled by oath and the unbreakable law of the Styx, it must
be fulfilled, no matter how harmful. Leibniz’s point is this: “the moral of these fables
implies that a supreme necessity may constrain one to comply with evil” (G 6:175). Thus,
wisdom and goodness constrain God to the good of the whole and thus to the best, but
because evil attaches thereto, God is bound by his providential duty to the whole to
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permit these evils, since to prevent these would be to fail in his own duties and bring
about still greater evils.
The third point that should be kept in mind against the idea that God inclines
toward evil is that Leibniz not only thinks God desires good for all men but does all that
can be done to produce good without violating his obligations to the whole. Leibniz
insists that “To make men better, God does all that is due, and even all that can be done
on his side without detriment to what is due” (G 6:180-1). As we will discuss more in
§3.2, Leibniz understands God to give to all men grace necessary for salvation, so that
none may charge that they are found reprobate due to a lack of grace on God’s part. Thus,
the evil of damnation, for example, is permitted because God cannot save every man
while fulfilling his obligation to the whole. Yet, Leibniz believes that God still gives
enough grace that, hypothetically speaking, every man could be saved were he to make a
right use of what God gives (G 6:180-1; 187-8).
As an aside and in reference to the claim that God does all that can be done, it is
noteworthy that Leibniz balks at the idea that there is more evil in our world than good,
an objection he recognizes but thinks to be a gross exaggeration (G 6:109; 198-108).
Leibniz rebuts the claim as erroneous, pointing out that we recognize sickness as an evil
precisely because health is the norm (G 6:109); and similarly, “there are incomparably
more houses than prisons” (G 6:198). Leibniz admits that mediocrity is quite common
among men, but it is the fault of historians that we focus on the evils of our world in a
disproportionate degree (G 6:198). In addition, Leibniz suggests that we do not in fact
know how vast the world truly is. We do not know how many intelligent species God has
made, how many planets are inhabited, and it may be that our world is a tiny blip in the
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whole of creation (G 6:113-4). Leibniz’s point here is very much like what we find in C.
S. Lewis’ science-fiction series in which the philologist, Ransom, discovers that our
world is only one among many populated with intelligent life, but what makes earth
unique is that its angelic caretakers and human inhabitants have been corrupted, whereas
all other planets are free from moral blemish.52 In short, Leibniz is convinced that the
good God has brought into existence and even brought out of the evils of our world is
incomparably vaster than the evil we encounter, and this is unquestionably the case if we
consider not only history, but the future life and eternity as well.
II. God is the cause of evil, since he apparently could prevent the ills of this world
but chooses not to since he thinks the mix is preferable.
To this second misconception Leibniz is again quite clear that this is not his
position. As we saw in reference to predetermination and Leibniz’s boat analogy, God
supplies all that is ontologically positive, but it is the will of the creature that retreats
from the good toward nonbeing (G 6:120-1). God’s predetermination is permissive,
moving the creature in accord with what is known to be freely and contingently in him,
but God neither approves nor causes the movement toward evil. To use Leibniz’s words,
“God co-operates morally in moral evil, that is, in sin, without being the originator of the
sin, and even without being accessory thereto. He does this by permitting it justly, and by
directing it wisely towards the good” (G 6:162-3). The former refers to God’s permissive
will, just described, while the latter refers to God’s providential use of evil for the good—
the good (not the permitted evil) being the object of God’s consequent will.
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Here, it is worth returning to Leibniz’s understanding of free contingencies and
possible worlds, discussed above. As argued in §1.2 above, Leibniz does not conceive of
possible worlds in a mere semantic sense in which Adam sins and Adam does not sin are
both semantically possible and thus constitute two distinct and equally possible worlds.
On the contrary, though both are possible, this does not mean that both obtain in a
possible world. For the enduring subject, Adam, must either sin or not sin in the realm of
the possibles, just as he must sin or not sin in the actual world. Though the subject,
Adam, may be coupled with either predicate, and both predicates find grounding in
Adam’s contrary choice, one predicate is contingently in Adam based on his free choice,
and this predicate is known infallibly by God. I would submit that such an understanding
of hypothetical necessities is the only one that makes sense of Leibniz’s claim that a
miracle would be required to prevent sin (e.g., G 6:202). For if every semantic
combination void of repugnance constitutes a possible world, there should be a world
available to God in which Adam (and every other rational agent) is never combined with
sins; no miracle would be required. But if in the realm of the possible, as in the realm of
the actual, Adam is a single subject who, though possessing contrary choice, must in fact
choose in his various circumstances and only that which is chosen obtains in his possible
world, then to create Adam is to grant him existence in full knowledge of his future
choices.
This point is crucial because it distinguishes two different ways of thinking about
God’s choice to give existence to our world. In one rendition, every semantic possibility
is a possible world to which God may grant existence. In this conception, it is difficult to
avoid the idea that God does not prefer a world with evil and is in fact the cause of evil.
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For on this rendition, numerous Adams are present in numerous possible worlds, and in
some worlds Adam sins and in other worlds Adam does not sin. On such a rendition, not
only does God forego a world without sin, but with regard to those sins permitted, it is
God, not Adam, who determines which Adam comes into existence and whether Adam
sins. In the other rendition, however, while we may speak of the possibility of Adam not
sinning, Adam’s presence in the realm of the possibles is just as singular as in the realm
of the actual. His choices are contingent, and these predicates are in him in such a way
that they could be negated without contradiction, but only one set of predicates is within
him, just as in the realm of the actual only one set of predicates obtains. On this second
rendition—which I have defended above and will defend extensively in the next
chapter—God’s choice is not whether to create the Adam that sins (and thus the world in
which he sins) or the Adam that does not sin (and thus the world in which he does not
sin), but whether or not to grant existence to Adam and in so doing permissively decree
the sin that God infallibly knows Adam will commit. In short, in the second rendition,
Adam is truly the author of his own sin, and God’s decree is truly permissive.
The above point brings us face-to-face with the permissive will of God. Leibniz’s
comments on the matter in response to Bayle are illuminating. Bayle takes to task the
notion of God’s permissive will, appealing to Calvin (et al.) in an effort to show that God
wills evil in an affirmative rather than permissive manner (G 6:203-4). To illustrate his
point, Bayle forwards an analogy: A prince sends out a number of men on a journey with
a set amount of money and threat of imprisonment should they fail the journey. He is
certain that some shall incur expenses along the way and will fail, and will be imprisoned
upon return. Surely this prince could not be said to have any kindness toward them. Yet,
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this seems to be precisely how God treats a great many men. Leibniz replies (a) that the
knowledge that some will fail makes these men no less deserving of imprisonment; (b)
there are a great many other things the prince may do to earn the label kind, even if this
single act is not rightly labeled kind; and (c) even if the prince knew this outcome, might
he not justly put them to the test that their disposition may be revealed and made known
to others? In short, such action may well seem absurd detached from surrounding
circumstances but reasonable in a larger context. Thus, Leibniz concludes, “All the more
must one deem that God has acted well, and that we should see this if we fully knew of
all that he has done” (G 6:205-6).
To press the point further, Bayle draws on a letter from Descartes to Princess
Elizabeth, explaining God’s absolute and independent wills.53 Therein, Descartes
describes a king who forbade duels, knowing full well that a certain two men will engage
in a duel nonetheless. Following his prohibition on duels, the king takes steps to ensure
that these two men meet, so that the duel may proceed. Descartes suggests that we may
distinguish two wills in the king: the one whereby he wills that men not duel, as per his
decree, and the other whereby he wills that these men duel, as per his efforts to ensure it.
So theologians distinguish between God’s absolute and independent will, according to
which God wills that things be done as they are in fact done and the other whereby he
wills that they obey his laws (G 6:206-7). Bayle replies that the king simply desires that
the men duel; there are no two wills to be found. To illustrate the point, Bayle forwards
the counter analogy of two princes, each of whom have a son, and each of whom desires
that his respective son poison himself. One prince knows his son is inclined to poison
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himself, so he merely employs constraint in stopping his son from doing so. The other
prince actively induces grief in his son sufficient to bring about the poisoning. In the end,
however, both princes are equally bent on the death of their respective sons, whether they
bring this about by permitting the circumstances that lead to this result or by actively
engage in brining it about. Hence, Descartes is “assuming an unreal fact” that does not
resolve the difficulty (G 6:207).
Leibniz replies that Descartes speaks “crudely” of God’s will when he says that
God, knowing our free determination toward evil, wished it in not willing to constrain us
(G 6:207). “He speaks no less harshly … saying that not the slightest thought enters into
the mind of a man which God does not will, and has not willed from all eternity, to enter
there. Calvin never said anything harsher; and all that can only be excused if it is to be
understood of a permissive will” (G 6:207). Leibniz suggests that Descartes’ references
to God’s “good pleasure” (inter voluntatem signi et beneplaciti) is entirely foreign to the
ancients. While God may command certain things but not will the action (e.g., for
Abraham to kill Isaac), when commanding virtue and forbidding sin, “he wills indeed
that which he ordains, but it is only by an antecedent will” (G 6:208). The point here is
that God does in fact repel evil and antecedently will that men not sin. But insofar as evils
have contingently attached to the best, and this is what God has decreed into existence, he
has consequently and permissively allowed this evil to come to pass, but only due to its
concomitance with the best, not because he inclines toward the evil itself.
One final exchange between Bayle and Leibniz on this matter is worth
highlighting. Bayle points out that God chose to create a world in which Adam and Eve
sin rather than any number of other possible worlds, and we can never be made to
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understand why (G 6:204). His point is quite plainly the very misconception in view here:
that God is the author of evil and somehow prefers its presence to its absence. One
feature of Leibniz’s response is expected, namely, God cannot incline toward evil; thus,
his willing is necessarily permissive and only consequently so, given the greater good
found in the best (G 6:203-4). This we can understand, even if we do not know all that
facets of what makes this world best (G 6:204). The second feature of his response is
more surprising, however. Leibniz speaks approvingly of Jacquelot’s speculation that
perhaps God cannot simultaneously uphold the good of freedom and hinder the evil that
proceeds from creaturely freedom: “Supposing the impossible, that God could not
prevent the wrong use of free will without destroying it, it will be agreed that since his
wisdom and his glory determined him to form free creatures this powerful reason must
have prevailed over the grievous consequences which their freedom might have” (G
6:204).54 This is telling because a tacit feature of Bayle’s objection that God could have
made any number of different worlds is the assumption that some of those worlds include
free agents who do not sin. Yet, Leibniz is open to the possibility that this may not be so.
That is, it may be that the good of freedom cannot be had without evil attaching by
concomitance. We will explore Leibniz’s thoughts on this more in §2.3 below, but for the
purposes of the antecedent/consequent will distinction, this highlights an important
feature of the distinction as expounded by John of Damascus.
John, in granting the very same divine attributes affirmed by Leibniz, suggests
that we may conclude the following about God’s will:
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[P]rovidence is that will of God by which all existing things receive suitable
guidance through to their end. But, if providence is God’s will, then, according to
right reason, everything that has come about through providence has quite
necessarily come about in the best manner and that most befitting God, so that it
could not have happened in a better way.... God alone is by nature good and wise.
Consequently, in so far as He is good He provides, because one who does not
provide is not good. Even men and brute beasts naturally provide for their own
offspring, and the one that does not will incur blame. Then, in so far as He is wise
He provides for existing things in the very best way. 55
The parallels with Leibniz on this point are striking, as is the fact that Leibniz
credits John of Damascus with the antecedent/consequent will distinction, citing this very
passage (PGD 3a). John’s comments on the matter help illuminate Leibniz’s own
position. For, the qualifications John adds are of note. John indicates quite plainly that
what falls to God alone is done in the best possible way. However, “I am referring to
those things which do not depend upon us, because those which do depend upon us do
not belong to providence, but to our own free will.”56 His view of providence entails that
our world system reflects God’s wisdom and goodness, and God’s own activities in
history are done in the very best way. But this does not mean that everything done in our
world is done in the best way, since providence has chosen to create free creatures and
permit them to act freely, even when their choices are not the best. Such is part of the
best, and reflective of divine wisdom. This, it seems to me, is precisely what we find in
Leibniz:
This mixture, therefore, or this compound [of good and evil], is not to be
conceived as a grace or as a gift from God to us; but the good that is found
mingled therein will nevertheless be good. Such is God’s gift of reason to those
who make ill use thereof. It is always a good in itself; but the combination of this
good with the evils that proceed from its abuse is not a good with regard to those
who in consequence thereof become unhappy. Yet it comes to be by
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concomitance, because it serves a greater good in relation to the universe. And it
is doubtless that which prompted God to give reason to those who have made it an
instrument of their unhappiness. Thus nothing prevents us from admitting that
God grants goods which turn into evil by the fault of men, this often happening to
men in just punishment of the misuse they had made of God’s grace. (G 6:171;
see also 197-8)
For Leibniz, therefore, it is a very real possibility that the good that God cannot
bring about without evil attaching as a consequence is the existence of rational agents
who possess free choice. From this we may infer that God values the good of freedom
more than he hates the evil that results. What does not follow from the misuse of free
choice is that God should withhold freedom to avoid its misuse. For this would be an evil
toward the whole, which itself would be a greater evil than the ones brought about by free
creatures and one for which God would be blameworthy.
III. God permits evil for the greater good in a utilitarian sense, that is, the
cumulative level of happiness justifies the damnation of some, and thus God treats people
as mere means that may be disposed of in the trash heap of hell or Auschwitz or
elsewhere.
This third misconception appears to sit behind a number of Bayle’s theological
detractors, but Leibniz is repeatedly clear that this is not his position. For, the
antecedent/consequent will distinction, as noted above, rejects the idea that God has an
evil object (willing evil per se) that he justifies by a good end. Nonetheless, such a
misconstrual of God’s permissive will plays out in Bayle’s anthropomorphic renditions of
God as one who desires a specific good consequently at the expense of individuals who
would otherwise be of value antecedently. Bayle offers the portrait of God as one who
permits sin in order to have someone to punish (i.e., the reprobate) and someone on
which to show mercy (i.e., the elect). Leibniz catalogs various analogies utilized to
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illustrate the point, such as the portrait of God as a Caligula “who has his edicts written in
so small a hand and has them placarded in so high a place that it is not possible to read
them” (G 6:209). Elsewhere Bayle suggests that only a malicious person offers goods that
he knows will bring pleasure for a time but will eventually be lost and bring greater
unhappiness to the person than had they never experienced these goods; yet, this is
precisely what God does (G 6:175-6).
Leibniz reacts harshly to such characterizations, identifying them as blasphemous
ways of speaking about God; for “God has care for men, he loves the human race, he
wishes it well, nothing so true” (G 6:176). Leibniz’s own position is quite unlike that of
the Caligula portrait, since Leibniz maintains, as already noted, that God offers to every
man at least the minimal grace due to remain culpable, and even goes beyond this
wherever it can be accomplished without doing violence to the whole (e.g., G 6:187-8).
What Leibniz identifies as the consistent problem with Bayle’s analogies is that they are
highly anthropomorphic, typically using examples of a single individual with a basic
moral obligation to another individual that can easily be fulfilled without doing violence
to any competing duty. Yet, according to Leibniz, God is unlike a mother, guardian, or
tutor precisely because his duty is not to one individual but to the whole of creation.
The great irony that emerges here is that those who oppose Leibniz along these
lines often find in his theodicy generally and his antecedent/consequent distinction in
specific a callused indifference to the plight of individuals in favor of a cold, calculated
assessment of which world maximizes the good. Yet, Leibniz’s response argues exactly
the opposite. Rather than suggesting that God shuns his duty to the individual as a matter
of indifference, Leibniz suggests that it is God’s duty to every individual aspect of his
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creation that demands that he consider the whole and not just one individual’s plight. In
other words, we should not read Leibniz as a utilitarian who is suggesting that God is
willing to damn an individual to bring greater happiness to the whole. For his claim is far
more deontological: divine justice and goodness demand that God carry out his
obligations to all things, and not just one specific individual. Hence, if God’s justice and
goodness toward the whole cannot be fulfilled without permitting the unhappiness of
some, he must permit that result, even though he desires for that individual, considered in
himself (i.e., antecedently), nothing but goodness and happiness.
As we will see plainly in the next section, Leibniz is unconvinced that God, like
the average tutor or mother or even king, can prevent every evil while fulfilling this
larger and infinitely complex obligation (G 6:175-7). Leibniz’s emphasis is therefore
always on the vast complexity of that to which divine wisdom and goodness must attend:
We cannot wonder enough at the beauty and the contrivance of its structure. But
when we see some broken bone, some piece of animal’s flesh, some sprig of a
plant, there appears to be nothing but confusion, unless an excellent anatomist
observe it: and even he would recognize nothing therein if he had not before seen
like pieces attached to their whole. It is the same with the government of God:
that which we have been able to see hitherto is not a large enough piece for
recognition of the beauty and the order of the whole. (G 6:188)
Though we cannot grasp the whole, Leibniz is convinced that if we could see “the city of
God” from his perspective, we would recognize it is indeed the best, and “sin and
unhappiness (whose entire exclusion from the nature of things reasons of the supreme
order did not permit), are well-nigh nothing there in comparison with the good, and even
are of service for greater good” (G 6:177-8). For reason of our epistemic limitations,
Leibniz refuses to offer specific explanations for specific evils. But he does believe we
can be assured of certain things: (1) that evil repels God; (2) that God does not operate by
an arbitrary or despotic power that condemns innocence (G 6:208-9); (3) that God desires
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nothing but good for every individual creature; (4) that God actively provides as much
good as can be provided without violating his obligation to the whole; and (5) that evil,
when permitted, is permitted only because it is found to be inextricably linked with God’s
duty to the much larger and more complex whole.

2.3. Concerning a World without Evil
At several points in Theodicée, Leibniz considers whether a world without evil
would be superior to our own. This is one of the most obvious objections against
Leibniz’s central claim that our world is the best of all possible worlds, namely, that it
seems prime facie that a world without evil is better than a world with evil. But Leibniz
challenges this claim from three fronts.
The first front is the most natural, given Leibniz’s response to the problem of evil.
The inference is straightforward enough:
1. The world God creates is the best possible world.
2. Our world is the world God creates.
3. Therefore, our world is the best possible world. (1-2)
4. Some evil is that which exists in our world.
5. That which exists in our world is that which exists in the best possible world.
6. Therefore, some evil is that which exists in the best possible world. (4-5)
Once again, the entire claim builds on the assumption that the very idea of God provides
a priori certainty of God’s existence and the moral necessity that if he creates, he creates
the best. The a posteriori fact of evil cannot negate the a priori certainty of the inference;
hence, the supposed prime facie conclusion that a world without evil is better must be
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rejected. In fact, Leibniz denies that we are able to judge the infinitude of possible
worlds, so as to make a judgment of either what is in fact available to God or what is in
fact better. The more wise judgment is to judge this world best from the effect (ab
effectu), which tells us in light of what we know of its cause that it is best (G 6:108).
Leibniz’s second and third replies to the claim that a world without sin is best aim
at providing some rationale for why the prime facie claim is false. The first is rather
simple, but is certainly worthy of consideration. Leibniz notes several instances in which
the negative enhances the positive. Men relish health more after having experienced
sickness. Shadows enhance color. A little bitterness is something more pleasurable than
pure sugar, and so on (G 6:109). The question this raises is whether it is in fact obvious
that a world with no evil is better than a world with some evil. If goods can be enhanced
by evils, and certain goods cannot obtain at all apart from adjacent evils, then is it so
obvious that the goodness of a world is greater when only good is present? Here Leibniz
adds to the inquiry the theological backdrop, which goes back to Augustine (et al.),
namely, that the evils that attach to our world amplify the good and even enhance the
happiness of those who better understand and appreciate their own happiness as a result.57
Leibniz appeals to the Roman rite sung at Easter: O certe necessarium Adae peccatum,
quod Christi morte deletum est! O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere
Redemptorem!58
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To be sure, Leibniz does not endorse that we praise evil, or that we commit evil so
that God might bring good out of it. Quite the contrary, Leibniz reminds his readers that
St. Paul condemns this very way of thinking (Rom 3:8) (G 6:108-9).God does not incline
toward our world because of the evils that attach to it, but because of its goods. He recoils
from its evils. God, says Leibniz, does not treat individual men as mere means, sending
miseries on some to enhance the happiness of others; rather, God antecedently inclines
toward their good and their salvation, but he must consider his obligations to the whole,
and it is in reference to the whole that God, in his wisdom, is able to work evil for good.
We must, therefore, disapprove of the evils that men bring to our world, but we rightly
approve and praise God who, in the face of evil, causes grace to abound even more (Rom
5:20) (G 6:109).
In short, Leibniz’s first two replies aim at (a) demonstrating that we have reason
to think that a sinless world is not better than our own, given our certainty that God
creates the best, and (b) providing some initial consideration of why this claim might be
false, given that goods can be enhanced by evil and some tremendous goods—the
greatest being the redemption of man by Christ—are not possible without evil. In
Leibniz’s third reply, he continues down the road of providing rationale for why this
prime facie claim may be false. His third reply is much more nuanced than his second
and concerns the question of whether a world without evil, which we so easily imagine, is
in fact as possible as we may think.
In Leibniz’s 1686 Examen religionis, he states quite plainly that it is within God’s
power to create a world without sin. Citing Augustine, Leibniz grants that all creatures
bear a finitude that makes them liable to corruption, but Leibniz suggests God could have
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created a world in which creatures are capable of falling but never do fall. He does not
develop this claim, except to point out that God apparently chose to permit evil because
he saw how to convert evil into good, and how this would result in even greater goods, as
per the above line of argument (A 6.4:2358-9). Echoing what we find in “Vérités,”
Leibniz uses the example of Judas’ betrayal, which God utilized for the redemption of
humanity (cf. C 24). In these cursory treatments, Leibniz’s dealing with this objection
could be perceived as pithy. However, he spends much more time on the objection in
Theodicée and qualifies quite heavily his claim that it is within God’s power to create a
world without sin. Though he continues to entertain the possibility, he does so with great
suspicion.
When raising the question in Theodicée of whether God could produce a world
with souls that have thoughts that only please him, Leibniz grants the possibility, but he
offers two caveats. The first is that while God might be able to create a certain type of
creature that always inclines toward the good, Leibniz doubts whether this could be done
for every rational creature. It is evident that our world varies greatly, and Leibniz thinks
“it was not feasible for all rational creatures to have so great a perfection, and such as
would bring them so close to the Divinity” (G 6:173). The second caveat is that a sinless
world “would be to act by miracles, more than his most perfectly conceived plan admits”
(G 6:166). When considered in the whole of his argument, such a conclusion boils down
to this: Our world system is indeed the best possible world system, and to that system evil
attaches by the free choice of creatures. Thus, if God were to make the best system (i.e.,
our own), but also prevent it from falling, he would need to intervene miraculously to
prevent the fall of angels and of men. Leibniz is unconvinced that such intervention
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would be a one-time affair but may require perpetual intervention, which may be neither
wise nor rational (see G 6:172-4, 178-9, and 202).
As Leibniz develops the point, his rationale becomes apparent. He denies that the
felicity of rational creatures, or more specifically man, is God’s sole aim in creation. Yet,
the assumption that this is God’s sole aim is an error present in a number of Bayle’s
objections to evil (G 6:168-9). Leibniz admits that the felicity of intelligent creatures is
no doubt central, since we are most like God, but Leibniz denies that one can prove that
this end is God’s sole aim in creation. Utilizing the nature/grace distinction, Leibniz
suggests that while nature serves grace, grace “is also in some way adapted to that of
nature, so that nature preserves the utmost order and beauty. And there is no reason to
suppose that God, for the sake of some lessening of moral evil, would reverse the whole
order of nature” (G 6:168).
Leibniz’s argument is essentially one of divine justice. God, who renders to each
what is due (justitiae), has obligations to all things. As Leibniz argues, divine love (or
hatred) for any given thing is proportionate to its good (or evil) (G 6:178-9). Since no
created thing is absolutely good or absolutely evil, God has regard for all of creation, not
just for man, and his regard is proportionate to its ontic due. Leibniz appeals to the story
of Jonah as an excellent example. God’s desire to see the people of Nineveh repent was
indeed related to his love for them, but he expresses concern for the animals who would
be destroyed as well (G 6:168-9; cf. Jonah 4:11). Man may well be ontologically superior
to the beasts of the field and more worthy of consideration than they, but this does not
mean, argues Leibniz, that “God prefers a single man in all respects to the whole of lionkind” (G 6:169). And even if God would choose to destroy all of lion-kind for the sake of
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one man, this does not mean that for the sake of a certain number of men that God would
diffuse disorder through an infinite number of other creatures. In short, having created an
elaborate world system that includes an infinite number of things beyond man, God, in
his goodness and justice, must carry out his obligations to the whole of the system and
everything in it, not just man.
Leibniz adds yet another layer to God’s obligations. For Leibniz denies that all
things that contribute to the happiness of a given creature thereby exist solely for the sake
of that creature’s happiness. On the contrary, Leibniz suggests that part of divine wisdom
is the very fact that all things are connected. Therefore, though a certain thing may well
contribute to the happiness of a particular creature, that same thing may well exist for a
number of other ends as well—presumably as many as possible. “Thus God has more
than one purpose in his projects. The felicity of all rational creatures is one of the aims he
has in view; but it is not his whole aim, nor even his final aim” (G 6:169-70).
The above points regarding divine justice and wisdom are key to understanding
Leibniz’s thought experiment regarding a world aimed solely at the felicity of rational
creatures. Such a world, argues Leibniz, must include either only those rational creatures
with whom God is concerned (that God may justly show concern for them alone) or only
those rational creatures and those things that exist solely for their sake. It is worth noting
that Leibniz puts the possibility of sinlessness in the conditional even in this scenario: If
man’s felicity were God’s sole aim, “perhaps [peutêtre] neither sin nor unhappiness
would ever occur, even by concomitance” (G 6:172). This opens the door once again to
the possibility that evil may not be preventable simply because freedom does not admit
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prevention, which Leibniz entertains elsewhere (cf. G., vi, 204).59 But granting that God
could wisely and justly prevent evil in a world consisting of only rational spirits, Leibniz
raises the question of whether such a world is in fact possible. According to Leibniz,
creaturely spirits require the order of time and place, and Leibniz believes that time and
place requires matter, movement, and physical laws (G 6:172-3). Leibniz fleshes out this
point as follows:
What would an intelligent creature do if there were no unintelligent things? What
would it think of, if there were neither movement, nor matter, nor sense? If it had
only distinct thoughts it would be a God, its wisdom would be without bounds… .
As soon as there is a mixture of confused thoughts, there is sense, there is matter.
For these confused thoughts come from the relation of all things one to the other
by way of duration and extent. Thus it is that in my philosophy there is no rational
creature without some organic body, and there is no created spirit entirely
detached from matter. (G 6:179)
Leibniz’s claim here comes very close to that of the objective idealists (and later process
philosophers) that consciousness is not possible without differentiation and succession,
and neither differentiation nor succession are possible without matter.60 Of course,
Leibniz stops short of this claim, since God is conscious. The difference is that Leibniz
understands God alone to have the divine manner of consciousness—hence his claim that
without a material world, spirits would be Gods. Leibniz thus finds it questionable that a
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world of only spirits is possible. In short, “God’s wisdom must have a world of bodies, a
world of substances capable of perception and incapable of reason” (G 6:179).61
Here and in Leibniz’s earlier remarks, he submits that to consider which world
system is most conducive to rational spirits is to arrive at our own system of matter, time,
and space, along with its governing laws. If we are pressed back to our own world
system, then we once again face God’s obligations to the whole and everything in it.
Hence, Leibniz forces a dichotomy: We could wish that God part ways with the good of
freedom because of the evil it occasions, or we could wish that God grant free choice but
prevent every misuse of it. The latter requires that only rational spirits exist, which may
not be possible. The former requires that God create a world void of the greatest and most
God-like entities in the Great Chain of Being—that is, a world that is less than the best.
In light of this line of argument, we can better understand Leibniz’s claim that a
sinless world would require a perpetual miracle on God’s part, but such action would be
unwise and irrational. It would be so because such a perpetual miracle is possible (a) if
God makes a world inferior to our own (ontologically speaking) that consists of only
rational souls or (should a world of rational souls alone be deemed impossible) (b) if God
show disproportionate concern for a single species within the world system, which would
be unjust and thus impossible for God to do, given his nature. This is why Leibniz insists
that the gift of reason itself is meant to provide its own guidance to man (and angels),
such that a perpetual miracle on the part of God is unnecessary if rational creatures make
right use of what they have been given:
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God, in giving him intelligence, has presented him with an image of the Divinity.
He leaves him to himself, in a sense, in his small department…. He enters there
only in a secret way, for he supplies being, force, life, reason, without showing
himself. It is there that free will plays its game: …. Thus man is there like a little
god in his own world or Microcosm, which he governs after his own fashion….
But he also commits great errors, because he abandons himself to the passions,
and because God abandons him to his own way. God punishes him also for such
errors, … and evil comes to pass most frequently when these intelligences or their
small worlds come into collision. (G 6:197)
With this, Leibniz returns to his point regarding God’s obligation to the whole and
the antecedent/consequent will distinction. Though with reference to the antecedent will
of God Leibniz grants that God desires nothing but good for every particular creature,
and indeed can be said to desire the happiness of every individual creature, his divine
obligation is to the whole and everything in it. Even if it could be said that reason brings
to man more evil than good—a claim Leibniz denies—this does not address the question
of whether the whole is better for containing free agents and thus whether it would be a
greater evil to shun such beings to prevent the evils they choose. Leibniz writes:
[Reason] is always a good in itself; but the combination of this good with the evils
that proceed from its abuse is not a good with regard to those who in consequence
thereof become unhappy. Yet it comes to be by concomitance, because it serves a
greater good in relation to the universe. And it is doubtless that which prompted
God to give reason to those who have made it an instrument of their unhappiness.
Thus nothing prevents us from admitting that God grants goods which turn into
evil by the fault of men …. (G 6:170-1)
In short, reason is the prime example of a good given to man as an instrument of felicity
to which evil attaches by concomitance. Yet, for God to thereby withhold this good from
the world because of his hatred for evil runs the risk of him failing in his obligation to the
whole and to his very wisdom and goodness. In other words, “a still greater evil would
have been altogether inevitable” (G 6:183).
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3. Theological Difficulties
Leibniz’s treatment of the problem of evil admits a shift from problems (and
solutions) raised by natural revelation to problems that emerge in the course of special
revelation (G 6:143). For Leibniz’s part, he believes that the majority of the above points
concerning modality, providence, and so on, could be discerned merely from natural
revelation. Yet, there are specific doctrines, such as election and reprobation, which raise
their own peculiar difficulties. In this section, we will look specifically at the four
theological problem areas Leibniz identifies, namely, the Fall of man (and other rational
agents), election and reprobation, hell, and original sin.

3.1. The Fall of Man (and Other Rational Agents)
The fall of man (and of angels) raises its own difficulties, as it begs the question
of God’s role in this first act of rebellion and his role in the perpetuation of evil through
original sin which follows (G 6:104). We will here deal with the first part of this
difficulty, namely, God’s role (or lack thereof) in these first instances of evil. The second
part of the question concerning original sin we will look at below in §3.4.
Leibniz’s understanding of the fall is a traditional one. He affirms the Christian
tradition that the Devil was an angel who rebelled and led angelic revolt (G 6:202-3), and
Leibniz’s explanation of this rebellion is an equally traditional free choice defense. He
points out that Scripture says the Devil was a murderer from the beginning (Jn 8:44), and
suggests that such rebellion sprung from his will (G 6:280). Here, Leibniz appeals to the
eternal verities, reiterating the idea that God, knowing the subject with its predicates,
knew beforehand that were he to create the Devil, this angel would rebel—a line of
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argument he also uses in reference to Adam and Eve (G 6:280-1). Yet, in both instances,
Leibniz insists that both the Devil and man rebelled freely and without any necessity.
And it was only because of this free act of rebellion that God handed these over to
hardness (G 6:281).
Despite having placed in the hands of rational agents the act of sin, Leibniz
recognizes that there are at least two objections that contest whether these creaturely
rebellions can rightly be laid wholly at the feet of these creatures. The first line of
objection is a biblical one. There are numerous biblical passages that appear to identify
God as the instigator of evil. For example, God is said to be the one who hardens
Pharaoh’s heart (Ex 4:21; 7:3; Isa 63:17); God is said to send lying spirits (1 Kgs 22:23);
he is said to deceive the prophet (Ezek 14:9); he is said to make men vessels of dishonor
(Rom 9:21); he is said to speak cryptically, so that some will not understand nor repent
nor be forgiven (Mk 4:12; Lk 8:10); and these are just a few of the examples that could
be offered (see G., vi, 281-2). Do not these passages indicate that God does in fact author
evil, and that the free choice defense is misguided?
In response, Leibniz rejects this reading of Scripture, and on this point, he is very
much in line with the ancient and medieval Christian writers.62 He notes that God made
man sinless, so there is nothing in his original nature to which the origin of evil may be
traced. But in this spotless nature was also the power of choice that could remain in the
good or turn from it. The fact that neither man nor angel was created with blemish and
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were given freedom that in no way necessitated evil but made possible persistence in the
good indicates that God is not the author of these original acts of rebellion. Rather, these
creatures fell by their own power of contrary choice (G 6:282). In addition, Leibniz
insists that even after the fall some semblance of freedom remains. Even though corrupt
agents incline toward sin, no single act of rebellion is ever necessitated. If chosen, it is
chosen in such a way that it could have been rejected, and thus culpability remains. The
free choice (be it for or against God) may be certain, but it is not necessary (G 6:282-3).
In addition to this lack of necessity, Leibniz points out that God places before
men life and death and beckons man to choose life. He places before man
commandments and not only beckons the good and the rejection of evil, but promises
blessing for the former and curses for the latter (Deut 30:19; Jer 21:8), and his call to the
good, Leibniz insists, is genuine (see G., vi, 207-8). If men choose sin, they do so
because they desire it. It is his own lust that leads him astray, not God (James 1:13-4),
which is why St. James insists that we must never say that it is God who tempts us. For
we are tempted by sin because we find sin tempting (G 6:282).
Taking these two points together, Leibniz’s answer becomes apparent. God is not
the author of sin, for God provided man (and angels) with a sinless nature and capacity to
persist in the good. Thus, sin springs from the creature, not the Creator. God infallibly
knows what sins man (and angels) will do and utilizes these evils for his own ends. But
God does not tempt nor does he incline toward evil. Rather, he earnestly beckons good
and forbids evil. Should a future evil be certain, however, God will bring as much good
out of it as possible. Yet, he uses it as an evil permitted, not as an evil that is necessary or
desirable. Hence, culpability always remains with the agent who chooses to sin.
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Now, the second line of objection concerns circumstance. To wit: conversion or
perversion often comes down to the circumstances in which we find ourselves (see G., vi,
158-60).63 As Christ himself states, Tyre and Sidon would have profited from his
preaching and remained rather than been destroyed (G 6:159). Surely the same might be
said for the Devil or Adam and Eve or any number of other figures. In this light, is not
God culpable for placing these figures in such circumstances?
Leibniz anticipates one line of reply, namely, that God is not obligated to offer
such circumstantial resources to anyone. This answer Leibniz finds insufficient, for it
risks portraying God as malicious and perhaps as inclining toward evil. Hence, Leibniz
suggests that there must be greater reasons that “prevent him from making all his
goodness felt by all” (G 6:159). He considers the solution posited by some that God knew
by a form of mediate knowledge that were this or that reprobate to receive grace by
means of other circumstances, they would later reject it and arrive in a worse state than
before.64 This solution Leibniz thinks risky because it places God’s reasons in the merit
and demerit of man, which, according to Leibniz, runs contrary to the doctrine of grace as
taught by St. Paul. He recognizes the more moderate version of this theory that God gives
more grace to those whose resistance he sees is less and thinks this could be affirmed
without falling into Pelagianism, but Leibniz does not think it could be affirmed as a
normative rule (G 6:160).
Leibniz’s preferred solution is again the antecedent/consequent will distinction.
That is, we may affirm that God inclines only toward the good, and antecedently desires
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nothing but the good and indeed the best for every particular man (e.g., G., vi, 175-7;
180-1). Yet, in his consequent will, he must consider his obligation to the whole. In this
light, we may rightly draw a number of conclusions: (1) God does not incline toward the
damnation of any, but permits this evil only when it attaches by concomitance to the best
(G 6:165-6; 208); (2) God’s permission of damnation is not arbitrary, but grounded in his
wisdom and goodness, and thus there are good reasons for orchestrating things the way
he has, even if we are ignorant of these reasons (G 6:160); (3) God’s reasons are
multifaceted, taking into account both considerations regarding the particular man as well
as considerations of every aspect of the world he has created (G 6:175-7); (4) God
apparently cannot fulfill his obligation to the whole while orchestrating the salvation of
every man (G 6:172-4; 178-9; 180-1); (5) to save every man at the expense of the whole
would be a greater evil than the damnation of some, and for this greater evil God would
be culpable (G 6:169-72); and (6) God apparently deems a world with free creatures who
are permitted to rebel better than whatever would be required to prevent this rebellion (G
6:204-5; see §2.3 above).
In the end, Leibniz’s resistance to particular rules of divine action, such as
foreknowledge of apostasy, is not because these explanations are without merit, but
because Leibniz thinks we must admit that God’s reasons are far more complex than any
single rule admits, and it is better to affirm what we can be sure of in reference to divine
providence. And what we can be sure of is this:
[S]ince the general plan of the universe, chosen by God for superior reasons,
causes men to be in different circumstances, those who meet with such as are
more favorable to their nature will become more readily the least wicked, the
most virtuous, the most happy; yet it will always by aid of the influence of that
inward grace which God unites with the circumstances…. One may say that men
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are chosen and ranged not so much according to their excellence as according to
their conformity with God’s plan. (G 6:160-1)
In other words, Leibniz sees the various explanations tried as having a modicum of
plausibility. Their shortcoming is that they are too acute, since “all these attempts to find
reasons, where there is no need to adhere altogether to certain hypotheses, serve only to
make clear to us that there are a thousand ways of justifying the conduct of God.” (G
6:161)
Two points are noteworthy before closing out this line of reply. First, in reference
to God’s obligations to the whole (i.e., his consequent will), we have seen that Leibniz is
open to the conclusion that one obligation to the whole and indeed the best is to make
free agents, and it may not be possible for God to prevent the misuse of free choice by
creatures without simultaneously destroying free choice (e.g., G 6:204). Once again,
however, Leibniz’s preferred strategy is to grant that this is a very real possibility that
may be a factor in God’s consequent will, but ultimately admit ignorance regarding all
that factors into God’s decision to create as he does.
A second point, which will be explored more fully in the next section, is that
Leibniz believes that God gives grace necessary for salvation to all. This is crucial to
Leibniz insistence that the rebellion is certain but not necessary. For Leibniz consistently
seeks to protect the libertarian conditions of culpability: (a) knowledge of what one ought
to do or not do, and (b) the ability to do it or not do it. Hence, in reference to the original
rebels, Leibniz insists that their rebellion was certain but not necessary; and in reference
to man post-lapsum, he suggests that the grace necessary for salvation is also given to all.
Leibniz’s reasons are precisely that God must not be considered blameworthy for
withholding these necessary conditions, even if they are foreknown to be rejected and the
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individual becomes worse as a result (e.g., G 6:166-7). Therefore, in the end, whether
speaking of the original rebellion or ongoing rebellion, Leibniz insists that the evil itself
is never necessitated, and God provides sufficient means for it to be avoided.

3.2. Election and Reprobation
An additional theological difficulty to which Leibniz devotes attention is the issue
of election and reprobation according to which God predetermines the ultimate destiny of
every man, ordaining him to either eternal bliss or eternal torment. Concerning this
doctrine, Leibniz admits vast disagreement across theological lines. He breaks down the
dispute into three sub-dispute: metaphysical versus moral, universal versus particular,
and absolute versus respective. The first of these (metaphysical versus moral) is
Leibniz’s peculiar way of identifying the respective theological emphases of the
Remonstrant and counter-Remonstrant positions. Leibniz suggests that the former treat
God and his election along metaphysical lines, emphasizing God’s ontological
independence in juxtaposition with creaturely dependence, while the latter treat God’s
election from the moral perspective, emphasizing divine justice and goodness. The
second division (universal versus particular) concerns the question of whether God
desires to save all men and has indeed elected to redeem all of mankind or whether his
election is of only a select segment of the massa damnata. And the third sub-dispute
(absolute versus respective) regards the question of whether this destination is absolute or
whether there is a consideration of the good and evil actions of those whom the decree
concerns.

257
To the metaphysical versus moral dispute, Leibniz’s position is in keeping with
his irenic approach in De praedestinatione et gratia dissertatio. He suggests that there is
something true about both the emphasis on God’s ontological independence and the
emphasis on God’s goodness and justice. As Leibniz puts it, “But to act rightly we must
affirm alike on one side the independence of God and the dependence of creatures, and
on the other side the justice and goodness of God, which make him dependent upon
himself, his will upon his understanding or his wisdom” (G 6:144). The dispute, says
Leibniz, boils down to a disagreement over God’s aim in his decrees: Is his aim to show
his glory and manifest his attributes (counter-Remonstrant) or to have regard for free and
intelligent substances, “considering what they would will and do in the different
circumstances and situations wherein he might place them, so as to form a fitting resolve
thereupon” (Remonstrant) (G 6:144; cf. PGD 2)? Framed in this way, Leibniz suggests
that the opposing positions are easily reconciled. One can plainly affirm that God created
the world in order to “manifest and communicate his perfections” in a way worthy of his
greatness, wisdom, and goodness, but in this affirmation maintain that “that very purpose
pledged him to consider all the actions of creatures while still in the state of pure
possibility, that he might form the most fitting plan” (G 6:144).
To illustrate his point, Leibniz invokes an architect analogy: “For a wise person in
laying his plans cannot separate the end from the means; he does not contemplate any end
without knowing if there are means of attaining thereto” (G 6:144). His point is this.
Some presume that God’s metaphysical independence means that all outside of him (i.e.,
creation) is a matter of indifference, but Leibniz replies that this deprives God of both
wisdom and goodness. Even if God’s ultimate end is the display of his goodness, this
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does not mean that the means are a matter of indifference. The underlying assumption
here is one Leibniz uses throughout Theodicée. We saw it at play in the above
subsections on God’s antecedent/consequent will and the question of a world without
evil, and we will see it emerge again in Leibniz’s treatment of hell. The assumption is one
concerning divine justice: God renders to each what it is due; hence, divine love (or
hatred) for any given thing is proportionate to its good (or evil) (G 6:178-9). Since no
created thing is absolutely good (as it would then be God) or absolutely evil (as per the
understanding that evil is a privation of good and thus has no being of its own), God has
regard for every possible, particular being according to its due. In the context of election
and reprobation, Leibniz insists that nothing is a matter of indifference to God; he
inclines toward all things proportionate to their goodness (e.g., G 6:115-6). Hence,
though God’s ultimate decree concerns the whole, and the ultimate aim of this decree
may well be the display of his own glory, wisdom, and goodness, this ultimate aim is not
indifferent to the means employed or to antecedent inclination toward all particular lower
goods. Leibniz writes,
We need only observe that he considers himself and neglects nothing of what he
owes to himself, to conclude that he considers his creatures also, and that he uses
them in the manner most consistent with order. For the more a great and good
prince is mindful of his glory, the more he will think of making his subjects
happy, even though he were the most absolute of all monarchs, and though his
subjects were slaves from birth, bondsmen …, people entirely in subjection to
arbitrary power. (G 6:145; cf. PGD 2.a)
Rather than suggesting that this somehow demonstrates the truth of the
Remonstrant position, Leibniz maintains his irenic posture, suggesting that this
conclusion should be considered perfectly compatible with the counter-Remonstrant
position. For he notes that key defenders of absolute decree, such as John Calvin, hold
that God has great and just reasons for his decrees; their insistence is that these reasons
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are unknown to us, not that they do not exist (G 6:145). Hence, both parties should
readily admit the truth of both the metaphysical and moral perspective on God’s decrees.
Having said this, Leibniz does believe that some advocates of absolute decree—namely,
certain supralapsarians—come dangerously close to suggesting that God’s justice “is an
arbitrary thing,” that God has “a despotic power which can go so far as being able to
condemn innocents,” and that “good is not the motive of his actions” (G 6:209). Leibniz
is clear that this type of conclusion must be avoided. For it either places God beyond
good and evil or posits the impossibility that God inclines toward evil, a claim utterly
incompatible with the idea of God, as per his infallible knowledge of the good and
incorruptible inclination toward the good. Yet, as Leibniz also points out, the
infralapsarian position is the more common view and is the position favored by the Synod
of Dort (G 6:146). (We will return to Leibniz’s stance on the infra/supralapsarian dispute
in the context of the absolute versus respective sub-dispute below.)
Concerning the universal versus particular debate, Leibniz suggests that this subdispute is really a conflict over semantics, provided that one keeps separate God’s will to
save all men from the particular decrees concerning the existence of our world. Here,
Leibniz invokes again the antecedent/consequent will distinction. In keeping with
Leibniz’s insistence that God antecedently inclines toward every particular good
according to its due, Leibniz suggests that God antecedently inclines toward the good and
thus the salvation of every human person (universal); yet, his consequent will concerning
the actual regards the whole, and this decree involves far more considerations than just
his inclination toward the good of any one person. For this reason, God, in his consequent
will, decrees the salvation of only particular individuals (G 6:145-6). Leibniz’s position,
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as becomes apparent in his later dealings with Bayle, is that God antecedently desires to
give every particular man grace that is not only required for salvation but that he knows
every man will accept, but this cannot be carried out “in the general plan of things”—that
is, when executing the best (G 6:166-7). Since God is bound by moral necessity to the
best, God cannot bring about the salvation of every human person if doing so would
require that he shirk his duty to the whole and everything therein (e.g., G 6:182-3). In
short, “God is not lacking therein [i.e., in benevolence toward all mankind], he could do
the good that we would desire; he even wishes it, taking it separately, but he must not do
it in preference to other greater goods which are opposed to it” (G 6:177).
Leibniz’s treatment of the third sub-disputes, absolute versus respective, is the
most telling with regard to his own position on predestination. In addressing “whether
this destination is absolute or respective,” Leibniz begins by distinguishing moral evil
from physical evil. He suggests that all parties agree that God does not decree moral evil,
“that is to say, that none is destined to sin” (G 6:146). But the same cannot be said for the
greatest of physical evils, namely, damnation. For clearly some theological parties
maintain that a great many individuals are absolutely destined to this fate. Where does
Leibniz stand on this matter?
The first stage of Leibniz’s reply distinguishes destination from predestination.
As Leibniz understands this distinction, “predestination appears to contain within itself an
absolute destination, which is anterior to the consideration of the good or evil actions of
those whom it concerns” (G 6:146). Leibniz suggests that with regard to reprobation, this
is not absolute but is based on foreseen impenitence. Hence, one may speak of being
destined to damnation but not predestined to damnation. The reasons should be evident
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from the foregoing: If damnation is an evil from which God recoils and salvation is a
good toward which he inclines, then God cannot affirmatively will the damnation of any,
but can only permit it in his consequent will if this evil attaches by concomitance to the
best.
Leibniz recognizes that not all within the discussion would concede this
distinction and its application. In particular, he focuses on the infralapsariansupralapsarian dispute over whether God’s decree of election logically subsequent (infra)
or prior to (supra) the decree of the fall of man (lapsum). Given that the supralapsarian
position is named for its stance that God, wishing to show mercy and wrath, chose to
bestow grace on the elect through Christ and rejected the damned “prior to all thought to
sin, even of Adam” (G 6:146), Leibniz identifies this camp as the point of resistance.
Leibniz makes three appeals on his behalf. First, he reiterates the dominance of the
infralapsarian position, and thus thinks his own stance to be quite safe. Second, he
appeals to Augustine who held that God permitted Adam to sin, but his mercy beckoned
that, for reasons just but hidden, he choose some to be freely saved while allowing others
to suffer damnation—a position Leibniz takes to be similar to his own. Third, Leibniz
invokes on his behalf the Schoolmen, who dub the saved Praedestinati (predestined) but
the damned Praesciti (foreknown) for precisely the reasons Leibniz names.65
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Concerning the destination of the elect, however, Leibniz identifies the dispute as
one regarding whether election is absolute or founded on the prevision of final faith.
According to Leibniz, Evangelicals (i.e., those of the Augsburg Confession) hold the
latter. For there is no need for a hidden cause of election when Scripture offers a cause,
namely, faith in Jesus Christ: “and it appears to them that the prevision of the cause is
also the cause of the prevision of the effect” (G 6:147). The Reformed, however, dispute
this conclusion, observing “that often the cause anterior to the effect in execution is
posterior in intention, as when the cause is the means and the effect is the end” (G 6:147).
Hence, the question is whether faith or salvation is anterior in God’s intention.
Leibniz’s own position seeks to bypass the order of decrees entirely. For he
suggests that all decrees are simultaneous, not only with respect to their temporal order,
but also with respect to how they are represented in divine reason (in signo rationis) (G
6:147). Leibniz has in mind here his theory of possible worlds. What is present to the
divine mind in eternity are entire sequences, including “how the first parents sin and
corrupt their posterity; how Jesus Christ redeems the human race; how some, aided by
such and such graces, attain to final faith and to salvation; and how others, with or
without such or other graces, do not attain thereto, continue in sin, and are damned” (G
6:148). Leibniz understands divine judgment to regard the comparison of each possible
world with competing possible worlds in order to determine the best of all possible
worlds—that is, which sequence in total is best relative to other sequences. God does not
“tweak” the sequence, since to do so is to yield an entirely new sequence that, if truly
possible, is already represented in the divine intellect. Hence, should God decree that one
of these sequences come into being, there is no sequence, logical or temporal, to the
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decree; God “simply decrees its existence” (G 6:148). As Leibniz puts it, “God grants his
sanction to this sequence only after having entered into all its detail, and thus pronounces
nothing final as to those who shall be saved or damned without having pondered upon
everything and compared it with other possible sequences” (G 6:148). Leibniz
understands his position to undermine the infra/supra problem of election, and he
believes that the Formula of Concord (drawing on some passages of Augustine)
concludes the very same thing in reference to election, namely, God decrees both
salvation and its means (G 6:147).
In light of the foregoing, Leibniz’s stance on several disputes becomes apparent.
Over against a strictly moral or strictly metaphysical view of God, Leibniz suggests that
one may rightly hold both that God aims to display his glory in creation, and does so in a
way that does not treat the means to this display as matters of indifference. Moreover, so
long as one distinguishes God’s antecedent will, which inclines toward all goods, and his
consequent will, which concerns the whole, one can rightly say that God wills the good
and indeed the salvation of every man, though consequently God has chosen the best in
which, presumably, only some are saved. As for the order of decrees, there is no need for
such a dispute, since God’s decree concern the existence of the whole and all that it
entails. All of these points carry a certain irenic tone, showing the legitimacy of both
Remonstrant and counter-Remonstrant concerns; seeking to show the particular/universal
dispute to be semantic; and aiming at undercutting the supralapsarian/infralapsarian
divide. Yet, with regard to the more fundamental divide between Remonstrant and
counter-Remonstrant on whether grace is cooperative, these points leave Leibniz’s
position ambiguous.
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Leibniz’s aim in De praedestinatione is to reconcile disparate theological parties,
and thus the Remonstrant dispute is treated accordingly. To wit: the dispute concerns
whether the effects of grace are per se effective or per accidens effective, a point about
which we could admit ignorance, granting that in our world grace is effective for those
who persevere to the end, and insofar as God has decreed this world in total, he has
effectively elected those in it. Yet, in Theodicée, Leibniz’s own position becomes
apparent: “I would be rather on the side of those who grant to all men a grace sufficient to
draw them away from evil, provided they have a sufficient tendency to profit by this
succor, and not to reject it voluntarily” (G 6:155). Leibniz maintains that God does
indeed grant grace to all men. His concern, as elsewhere in Theodicée, appears to be the
libertarian conditions of culpability, namely, knowledge of what one ought to do and the
power of contrary choice. In keeping with the latter condition, Leibniz suggests that God
gives grace necessary for salvation to all men, but men must make a right use of it. In
short, Leibniz prefers to be counted among the Remonstrants on this point.
Leibniz’s Remonstrant leanings play an important role in how Leibniz fleshes out
God’s antecedent/consequent will in reference to salvation. According to Leibniz, God
cannot be charged with disingenuously offering salvation to any. For God antecedently
inclines toward the salvation of every particular human person, and only destines
individuals to damnation in light of their free rejection of grace (G 6:146). In fact,
Leibniz goes so far as to suggest that God not only extends the grace necessary for
salvation to every man, but “To make men better, God does all that is due, and even all
that can be done on his side without detriment to what is due” (G 6:180). In this statement
(and others like it), Leibniz makes clear that God does not offer the bare minimum

265
required for salvation, so that culpability is preserved; God goes beyond what is due,
doing all that can be done on every person’s behalf—all that can be done, that is, without
violating God’s duty to the whole. The qualification (without violating his duty, etc.) is
essential to Leibniz’s case. For if God inclines toward the salvation of every particular
man and does all that can be done for every man’s salvation but all are not saved, one
might conclude that damnation is a necessary predicate in some subjects. But Leibniz
denies this (G 6:215-6). Instead, Leibniz reiterates that God has obligations to more than
just men; and though the “felicity of all rational creatures is one of the aims [God] has in
view; … it is not his whole aim, nor even his final aim” (G 6:169-70). The implication is
that God provides grace to all and works for the salvation of all, but the evil of
damnation, like all evil, is permitted only when found to be an inextricable consequence
of God’s duty to the whole (G 6:116-7; and 182).
This understanding of grace and divine decree plays an integral role in how
Leibniz responds to a number of Bayle’s theological detractors in part 2 of Theodicée.
Three in particular build on this foundation. And Leibniz’s responses help make clear
precisely what he is and is not claiming in his response to the problem of evil.
(1) The first objection to which the above view of grace is key builds on the
ontological argument. The claim is that the apparent way in which God grants his
benefits is inferior to other possible concepts of a benefactor, and thus is not true to the
greatest possible being. Bayle suggests that a true benefactor imparts benefits that aid
only in happiness, and does not permit that they should aid in unhappiness. Moreover, if a
wrong use of his benefits could destroy the recipient, he would give only sure means of
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using them rightly. Otherwise these would be no benefits at all, and the concept of the
benefactor would be less than one we could conceive (G 6:169).
We need not consider the whole of Leibniz’s reply in this section, as we have
already touched on much of it under other topics. The bulk of the reply is familiar:
Leibniz denies that the happiness of rational agents is God’s sole aim, and thus the
benefits he gives to rational creatures serve the whole, not just these creatures;
unhappiness may occur by concomitance in view of a greater good to which God is
obliged (G 6:168-9); but “God will produce as much reason and knowledge in the
universe as his plan can admit” (G 6:170). The more important point for our purposes
here is the extent to which Leibniz invokes a free choice defense. Leibniz insists that we
must keep separate the question of whether reason is good in itself from the question of
whether its misuse and the subsequent mixture of good and evil is good. Leibniz writes,
This mixture [of good and evil] … is not to be conceived as a grace or as a gift
from God to us; but the good that is found mingled therein will nevertheless be
good. Such is God’s gift of reason to those who make ill use thereof. It is always a
good in itself; but the combination of this good with the evils that proceed from
its abuse is not a good with regard to those who in consequence thereof become
unhappy. Yet it comes to be by concomitance, because it serves a greater good in
relation to the universe. And it is doubtless that which prompted God to give
reason to those who have made it an instrument of their unhappiness. Thus
nothing prevents us from admitting that God grants goods which turn into evil by
the fault of men, this often happening to men in just punishment of the misuse
they had made of God’s grace. (G 6:171)
In other words, Bayle assumes that the only consideration God faces is whether
any individuals will misuse reason and find themselves unhappy. Yet, Leibniz suggests
that God’s obligation to the whole beckons the question of whether the world is better
with rational agents who misuse reason or better without evil and without rational agents.
The dichotomy is the same as in reference to the prospect of a world without evil.
Granting the good of reason may well lead to moral evils and even to the greatest of
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physical evils, damnation, but to deprive the world of rational agents for the sake of those
who will misuse reason is to do violence to the whole. To be sure, Leibniz insists that
there is no malice in God. For he does not incline toward evil, nor orchestrates
damnation, nor finds the evil of damnation per se to enhance the whole, but he permits it
only because of its inextricable tie to the best (G 6:169-72). This permission, however,
should not be taken to indicate approval of this evil or a lack of anxiety over its presence
(G 6:181).
(2) Bayle suggests that a true benefactor does not make those he loves suffer long
before receiving his benefits. If he cannot impart these benefits without pain, he may
acquiesce, but he avoids this road wherever possible, imparting the good without
mingling it with evil. Moreover, Bayle suggests that only a malicious person offers goods
that he knows will bring pleasure for a time but will be lost, and upon loss will bring
greater unhappiness to the person than had they never experienced these goods. Yet, this
is precisely what God does (G 6:175-6).
Leibniz replies that this way of speaking about God is blasphemous and empty.
As per the above description of God’s will toward men, Leibniz states, “God has care for
men, he loves the human race, he wishes it well, nothing so true” (G 6:176). The problem
with Bayle’s objection is one that consistently emerges throughout his theological
detractors, namely, that it is highly anthropomorphic. Unlike a mother, a guardian, or a
tutor who is responsible for the good of only one child and his or her sole obligation in
that role is the good of that one person, God must care for the whole and every particular
thing in it from golgi bodies to archangels. Leibniz hints at his own doubt that God can
grant happiness to all rational agents—evident in his qualifier about this possibility, “so
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they say” (dit on)—but granting God’s ability to do this, should he? Leibniz cautions
against the inference that if God is able to make all men happy, the only reason he would
not is because he is malicious. If we make such an inference, “then we are comparing our
true God with the God of Herodotus, full of envy, or with the demon of the poet whose
iambics Aristotle quotes … who gives good things in order that he may cause more
affliction by taking them away” (G 6:177).66 Such errors anthropomorphize God into one
who deals with objects individually, “and who lacks either aptitude or good will” (G
6:177). Leibniz’s response here, as elsewhere, is that God antecedently does care for each
individual, desiring nothing but good for him. But God’s consequent will aims at his
obligation to the whole, and Leibniz’s maintains that not every particular good can be
preserved amid this greater obligation (G 6:177).
(3) The third and final objection from Bayle that we will here look at aims
specifically at the supralapsarian position. Bayle suggests that God permits sin in order to
have someone to punish (i.e., the reprobate) and someone on whom to show mercy (i.e.,
the elect). Leibniz catalogs various analogies utilized to illustrate the point. But one will
suffice, namely, that of Caligula “who has his edicts written in so small a hand and has
them placarded in so high a place that it is not possible to read them” (G 6:209).
Leibniz’s reply shows little sympathy for the supralapsarians and highlights once
again his Remonstrant sympathies. According to Leibniz, this objection holds only for
those who think justice is arbitrary and God operates by a despotic power that may
condemn innocence (G 6:209). But Leibniz is clear that this is not his position. To the
contrary, his entire understanding of the antecedent/consequent will presumes that justice
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is not arbitrary, that there is a good toward which the will inclines, and that there is a best
for wisdom to discern and commend. Now, to be sure, Leibniz is equally clear that the
counter-Remonstrants do not make God the author of evil (G 6:210). However, Leibniz
does fear that some supralapsarians are in danger of this conclusion, given their fear that
if God takes into account man’s actions when determining his decrees this may lead
down the slippery slope toward election based on merit and demerit. For Leibniz’s part,
however, we can be sure that justice is not arbitrary and God does not operate by despotic
power and may not condemn innocence. In fact, he goes so far as to suggest that because
God antecedently inclines only toward good and recoils from evil, we must maintain that
God hinders evil so far as possible without undoing his justice for all and his obligation to
the whole and everything therein: “God prevents the sin and the misery in so far as the
perfection of the universe … may permit it” (G 6:210).
In the end, what we find is that Leibniz’s own position is irenic on several fronts,
from his dealings with the order of decrees to his assessment of the Remonstrant/counterRemonstrant dispute. Yet, in the end, he does not hide what he takes to be the best
position. He believes that God antecedently inclines toward the salvation of all mankind,
and that the evil of damnation can have no pull in God’s antecedent will but is permitted
only if attaching by concomitance with God’s duty to the whole—a duty that, if shunned,
would constitute a still greater evil. Moreover, Leibniz maintains that God gives the grace
necessary for salvation to all men, though they must make a right use of it; and God does
all that he can to prevent evil and bring men salvation without, so long as those things
done do not violate his obligation to the whole.
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3.3. The Problem of Hell
The problem of hell emerges in Theodicée in the context of future judgment.
Much like the Psalmists, Leibniz appeals to future judgment in the face of the objection
that in this world the wicked prosper, while the righteous do not (G 6:110-11; cf., e.g., Ps
73:1-20). Leibniz suggests that “the remedy is all prepared in the other life: religion and
reason itself teach us that” (G 6:111). Yet, this remedy raises a concern, namely, it seems
strange that evil should have the advantage, since the many are damned and the few are
saved. Leibniz explores various solutions offered throughout Christian history.
He begins by considering purgatory and universalism, two positions that have
precedent in the Christian tradition and offer recourse against the very claim that the
many perish. Leibniz notes figures, such as Prudentius, Gregory of Nyssa, and Jerome,
who appear to believe in a “sphere between Hell and Paradise” (G 6:111). In Theodicée,
Leibniz spends little time on this subject, which may or may not indicate his sympathies
(or lack thereof) for the position after 1700. However, in Leibniz’s pre-1700 writings, he
appears to be positively disposed toward the doctrine.
Though Leibniz suggests that purgatory was not an article of faith in the early
Church, since Augustine discusses it with some question (A 1.10:89-90), and thus no
Christian is obligated to affirm the doctrine, Leibniz himself appears to endorse the view.
In his 1677 De purgatorio (Grua 1:150-55), he explores two forms of purgatory—one in
which individuals undergo some type of purging post-mortem and the other in which the
resurrection itself constitutes a type of purging that all undergo. Following a rather
elaborate treatment of both biblical and patristic texts, Leibniz concludes favorably
toward the first understanding, going so far as to suggest, “the Ancients would
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unanimously protest anyone who claimed that the prayers for the dead are useless and
that all souls are immediately saved or immediately damned” (Grua 1:155).67 Leibniz
echoes this opinion in his 1686 Examen religionis. There he acknowledges that there is
no uniformity among the Church fathers as to the mode of this purgation—some held that
it was a certain place of temporary purification; others held that the purification was by
means of fire; still others by means of the fires of chastisement; some that the fire was the
same as hell fire; others that it was different than hell fire, and so on.68 But Leibniz
insists:
[I]t is a most ancient belief of the Church, that prayers are to be offered for the
dead; that the dead are assisted thereby; and that, although those who have
departed from this life may, through the merits of Christ, have been received into
favor by God, and, by the remission of the eternal punishment, have been made
heirs of eternal life, they continue, notwithstanding, to suffer a certain paternal
chastisement or purgation, especially if they have not sufficiently washed out the
stain during life (A 6.4:2454-55).
Hence, whatever the disagreement regarding the precise mode of purgation, Leibniz
concludes in these early works that “almost all agreed as to the existence … of a paternal
chastisement or purgation after this life, to which the soul, enlightened at its parting from
the body, and touched with extreme sorrow for the imperfection of its past life, and for
the hideousness of sin … voluntarily subjects itself, insomuch that it would not desire to
attain to supreme happiness on any other condition” (A 6.4:2455).
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Leibniz also places on the table, as it were, the fact that some within the Christian
tradition speculate regarding universalism. He appeals to St. Paul’s peculiar claim that all
Israel will be saved (Rom 11:26), and discusses Origen’s notion of apokatastasis, along
with then-contemporary recapitulations of the Origenist view (G 6:60-1). Though Leibniz
entertains both of these notions—purgatory and universalism—and shows sympathies for
the former in his early writings, he thinks neither is necessary when addressing the
problem of hell: “it is enough to keep to the ideas accepted in the Church” (G 6:165).69
The basic difficulty facing the doctrine of hell is one of justice: If individuals
must hear and respond to the gospel to avoid this fate, but they cannot do the former for
themselves (others must preach it) nor can they do the latter for themselves (God must
provide prevenient grace), how can they be held culpable for their unbelief? Here Leibniz
echoes the basic sentiment—affirmed by a great many of the Greek fathers of the
Church—that culpability presumes (a) knowledge of what one ought to do or not do, and
(b) the power of contrary choice. If either condition is lacking, the individual is not
culpable for his actions.70 Yet, it would seem that either one or both conditions are
lacking for a great many who are damned: either they have not heard, or they have heard
but have not received grace sufficient for repentance.
Leibniz’s response echoes what we found in the above section on election and
reprobation, namely, that he has Remonstrant sympathies with regard to God’s universal
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offering of prevenient grace (G 6:155). Leibniz rejects the idea that only those who are
saved have received the grace necessary for salvation. On the contrary, he maintains that
God grants the grace required for salvation to all, and men have free choice by which to
voluntarily make right use of this grace or to reject it. Hence, according to Leibniz,
condition (b) is satisfied in all men. The immediate question that emerges, then, is
whether the same can be said for condition (a). For it certainly seems that a great many
men pass out of this world without hearing the gospel of Christ.
With regard to the condition of knowledge, Leibniz raises several possible
solutions. The first is to suggest that individuals are culpable for their response to the
light of the gospel to whatever extent they have been exposed to this light. Hence, if the
only light received is that of general revelation and conscience, then an individual is
judged relative to his response to this general revelation. On this point, Leibniz appeals to
Francis Xavier, Roman Catholic missionary and co-founder of the Society of Jesus, who
told the Japanese that if their ancestors did in fact respond to the light given them, they
are indeed saved;71 and Leibniz notes that Francis of Sales, Bishop of Geneva, approves
of Xavier’s assessment (G 6:156).72 Leibniz’s point is that the Roman Catholic Church
does not condemn all outside its communion or even outside of Christianity simply by
virtue of this alien status.
A second approach that Leibniz entertains echoes the intent of a post-mortem
repentance (viz., Purgatory), but does not require a middle place. This approach merely
raises the question of whether God might provide special illumination to the soul, not
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post-mortem, but in the process of death itself. Leibniz’s point is this: We do not know
what passes through the soul at the point of death (G 6:157). Is it possible that God might
provide an extraordinary illumination to the soul as it departs this life, so that it has
knowledge sufficient to make a decision regarding the gospel of Christ? If so, and
Leibniz sees no reason to deny this as impossible, then it is possible that all pass into the
next life having received not only grace for repentance but knowledge necessary to
decide for or against the gospel of Christ.
In short, Leibniz believes that both conditions of culpability can be quite easily
met. His Remonstrant leanings answer how all can be said to have the ability to respond
to the gospel of Christ. As for knowledge of the gospel, whether one turns to Purgatory,
universalism, mortem illumination, or merely appeals to individuals being judged relative
to their level of knowledge, the difficulty is resolved. In the end, Leibniz’s point is not to
answer how God does in fact judge individuals or what resources he may use. He admits
ignorance. But he also notes that ignorance of which solution is true is far from an
admission that no solution is forthcoming (G 6:157).
Having provided various ways of addressing the fate of adults, Leibniz gives
special attention to the fate of infants. He notes the opposing positions of Gregory of
Nyssa and Augustine of Hippo on the matter. Gregory denies that infants are damned,
while Augustine suggests that, apart from baptism, infants are subject to damnation.73
Leibniz also notes the middle position of some schoolmen, namely, that infants arrive in
Limbo, deprived of the beatific vision.74 And there are any number of gradations between
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this middle way and a positive outlook. Molina and Salmeron, for example, suggest
infants experience natural bliss, while Cardinal Sfondrati goes so far as to suggest that the
state of infants in the afterlife is preferable to that of the elect in heaven (G 6:153-4).
For Leibniz’s part, he takes Sfondrati to go too far, but he does not thereby side
with Augustine. Leibniz recognizes Bayle’s point that there are many things in
Christianity that seem harsh, so why should the fate of infants be any different? But
Leibniz replies, “that does not lead to the conclusion that these instances of harshness
may be multiplied without proof” (G 6:154). Leibniz thinks it is noteworthy that the
Roman Catholic Church has historically shown resistance to adopting Augustine’s view
that infants are damned outright. Moreover, Evangelical theologians have typically
withheld judgment on the fate of infants, commending trust in the clemency of the
Creator and admitting that we do not know all the means God may use to illuminate a
person (G 6:154-5). In addition, Leibniz identifies what he sees as an inconsistency
among strong predestinarians who take a negative stance on the issue. To wit: The logic
of the case against infants insists that they must be damned because original sin requires
that God foresee sin or rebellion at the first use of freedom, and these infant souls should
thus be justly damned. But the same theologians who make this case resist efforts to
make foreknown sin being the basis for damnation in adults (G 6:155).
As in his treatment of election and reprobation more generally, Leibniz “would be
rather on the side of those who grant to all men a grace sufficient to draw them away
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from evil” (G 6:155), and taken in context, the reference to all men includes infants. For
Leibniz takes the problem raised by infant death to be essentially the same problem raised
with reference to those who die without cognizance of the gospel or prevenient grace. He
thus echoes the reply he identifies as that of the Evangelicals: Without excusing sin or
appealing to a middle place, we may still ask: How do we know these do not receive
some “ordinary or extraordinary succor of kinds unknown to us?” (G 6:155).75 Not only
do we not know what passes through the soul at death, but if Lutheran theologians can
justify infant baptism by appeal to infant faith that is later forgotten as adults,76 why is
not this very same faith, or even a more definite faith, possible at the point of death (G
6:157)? Leibniz’s point, as in other areas of Theodicée, is not that one particular solution
is certain, but that there are many possible solutions to the problem that are available
within historical Christian thought, and each has its own plausibility. Hence, there are
countless paths open to God by which he may save men; though we do not know with
certainty which he will employ (G 6:157). In the end, Leibniz is transparently resistant to
the notion of infant damnation, but he remains agnostic regarding precisely how such
damnation is prevented.
Even if the foregoing gives reason to believe (i) that none are unjustly damned
(i.e., the conditions of culpability are preserved in future judgment) and (ii) it is not the
many who are damned while the few are saved, hell still leaves us with one of the
greatest examples of physical evil in the whole of the cosmos, since the traditional
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concept of hell is one of eternal suffering—a fact Leibniz admits (G 6:275). The problem
this raises is one of proportion. Leibniz notes the work of Ernst Sonner (later discovered
to be a Socinian)77, who opposed the notion of eternal punishment on the grounds that
“there is no proportion between an infinite punishment and a finite guilt” (G 6:275).78
Can this disproportionate punishment be justified? This is the last of the issues
surrounding damnation that we will address in this sub-section.
The explanation Sonner considers and rejects is that “sin has become of infinite
weight through the infinite nature of the object offended, who is God” (G 6:275).79
Leibniz, however, prefers a different explanation for the eternity of hell, one that Sonner
does not consider, namely, that the duration of penalties suffered lasts precisely as long as
the duration of offenses committed. Such a form of justice is undoubtedly proportionate.
How this can be so is readily seen if we recognize that the damned do not cease to be
active agents after death, and thus continue in their offenses eternally: “Since the damned
remained wicked they could not be withdrawn from their misery; and thus one need not,
in order to justify the continuation of their sufferings, assume that sin has become of
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infinite weight through the infinite nature of the object offended, who is God” (G 6:175).
Leibniz anticipates that some may question the orthodoxy of such a solution, given that
Lombard, in his sentence commentary, denies that there is either merit or demerit after
death. But Leibniz does not think that Lombard’s claim “can pass for an article of faith”
(G 6:275).
Leibniz appeals to a number of theological voices throughout the history of
Christian thought that he believes either endorse his position or counter Lombard’s
position. His first appeal is to Johann Fechte who argues in his Consideratio status
damnatorum that “God cannot change his nature; justice is essential to him; death has
closed the door of grace, but not that of justice” (G 6:275).80 Leibniz also notes Lutheran
theologian, Johann Gerhard, who also takes this position (G 6:276);81 Zacharius Ursinus
who, after forwarding the explanation attacked by Sonner, goes on to say that it is
because none of the damned cease to sin that the punishment never ceases;82 Lutheranturned-Jesuit, Jeremias Drexel, who suggests that the damned are perpetually punished
because their sins and blasphemous always persist;83 and Reformed theologians, Pierre
Jurieu and Isaac Jacquelot, who Bayle himself admits holds a similar view (G 6:27677).84
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Now, Leibniz recognizes that Jean Le Clerc, an Origenist, holds to a position that
bears similarities with Leibniz’s own;85 hence Leibniz feels bound to reply to the
objection of Bayle “that this dogma of the Origenist is heretical, in that it teaches that
damnation is not founded simply on sin, but on voluntary impenitence.”86 In response,
Leibniz, first, takes it as given that the damned do not cease to rebel if they indeed remain
rational agents, and he is unsure what to label voluntary impenitence if not a continuation
of sin (G 6:277). Second, Leibniz beckons a corrective to Bayle’s characterization, which
brings to the fore an important nuance regarding man’s pre- and post-mortem position.
According to Leibniz, damnation occurs at the close of this life “because man does not
take advantage of the succor of grace to aid him to recover himself” (G 6:277). However,
after this life, Leibniz suggests that even if the succor of grace is no longer available,
“there is always in the man who sins, even when he is damned, a freedom which renders
him culpable, and a power, albeit remote, of recovering himself, even though it should
never pass into action” (G 6:277). In other words, though the damned may no longer have
available the grace necessary for salvation, this does not mean that every act of rebellion
is a matter of necessity. Leibniz’s point is one of culpability. To wit: Moral necessity
does not eliminate contrary choice. In this light, while the damned necessarily operate
outside the sphere of salvific acts, this does not mean that their non-salvific conduct is
maximally rebellious. Enough freedom remains that the damned are rightly held culpable
for every act of rebellion. This is why Leibniz employs, once again, the distinction
between necessity and certainty. The damned retain freedom from the former but not the
85
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latter. Though every particular act of rebellion is free from necessity (freedom from the
former), the eternality of that rebellion and thus of the requisite punishment due for this
perpetuation of sin is still certain (G 6:277).
This point brings out an interesting nuance in Leibniz’s treatment of hell, namely,
that there may in fact be degrees of punishment that vary proportionate to the free
rebellion of the damned. Leibniz notes that the Mass for the dead “asks for the abatement
of the torments of the damned” (G 6:279), and along similar lines, Augustine suggests
that while the damned may not be delivered, their pains may be mitigated.87 Leibniz’s
comments on Augustine’s claim are of particular interest. He states, “If the text implied
that, the abatement would, as regards its duration, go on to infinity; and yet that
abatement would, as regards its extent, have a non plus ultra. Even so there are asymptote
figures in geometry where an infinite length makes only a finite progress in breath” (G
6:279). Combining this remark with Leibniz’s previous points concerning the perpetual
but proportionate nature of punishment, what emerges is a postulation that the pains of
the damned may be alleviated perpetually—assuming an increasing restraint of
rebellion—while never being alleviated so far as to bring blessedness. On this point,
Leibniz calls to mind the story of the Rich Man and Lazarus and notes that, contrary to
the picture of supreme madness and wickedness, the Rich Man displays charity towards
his brothers (G 6:279). Hence, we need not conclude that eternal damnation and even
punishment is always infinite, but that the damned may exercise restraint and decrease
their torments.
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In the end, Leibniz’s reply to the problem of hell aims at showing several things:
that the all men are rightly held culpable for their response to grace; that we may not
conclude with confidence that the many are damned and the few are saved; and even if
we do find that the many are damned, the eternal punishment of the damned can be
explained in a way that does not violate our moral intuitions. His conclusion is well
summarized in his statement, “one must admit that all this detail is problematical, God
having revealed to us all that is needed to put us in fear of the greatest misfortunes, and
not what is needed for our understanding thereof” (G 6:279-80). As throughout his
theodicy, Leibniz does not aim at prescribing a particular answer to every problem raised,
but simply at showing that there are many answers that could be given from the Christian
tradition.

3.4. The Problem of Original Sin
The last of the difficulties we will consider in this chapter is the problem of
original sin. The issue Leibniz identifies is twofold. The first is that this corruption,
which is inherited apart from the volition of the creature, is the apparent root of actual
sin. This raises the question: How can God justly permit this transmission which only
perpetuates evil? The second difficulty concerns the metaphysical question of the origin
of form, in the Aristotelian sense,88 and this origination relates to original sin (G 6:14950). Although Leibniz sets these difficulties up as two distinct problems, they are linked
in Leibniz’s thinking. For the latter difficulty leads back to Leibniz’s monadology and
provides his peculiar solution to the former difficulty.
88
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Leibniz sets up the first difficulty relative to three Christian positions on the
generation of man and the transmission of corruption. The first is the Origenist theory of
the pre-existent soul; the second is traducianism; and the third is creationism. The first
two of these theories provide clear avenues for distancing God from original sin. The
theory of the pre-existent soul attributes original corruption and the ultimate fate of the
soul to its own free choices made prior to its union with the body.89 As for traducianism,
this theory distances God from original sin by making the transmission of the soul part of
the natural biological procreative process in which the soul is transmitted in the seed
(tradux) of the father; hence, the corruption of original is traceable to Adam’s free choice
that corrupted him and his seed.90 Creationism Leibniz identifies as the most problematic
of three theories, insofar as it requires that God create ex nihilo a soul that is corrupt and
thus prone to actual sin (G 6:149).91
Leibniz’s own solution is a combination of the pre-existent theory of souls and
traducianism. He introduces his view by raising the second difficulty, identified above,
concerning the origin of form. Leibniz begins by highlighting rather standard Aristotelian
scholastic theology concerning soul. He notes the identification of soul by the name

89

See Origen, De Principiis. 1.7.4-5 (PG 11:173b-176a). This position was condemned at Second
Council of Constantinople (451 A.D.). See anathemas i, ii, iv-vi. John Behr challenges this reading of
Origen in The Way to Nicaea (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Press, 2001), 195-97.
90

Traducianism is often traced in Western theology to Tertullian, a position for which Augustine
had sympathies but also harbored reservations. Perhaps the most thorough post-Augustine treatment of
original sin and traducianism (which defends the latter) is Odo of Tournai’s De Peccato Originali (PL
160:1071a-1102d). For an excellent treatment of the subject generally and this work in particular, see A. J.
Ashworth, “Odo of Tournai’s De peccato originali and the Problem of Original Sin,” in Medieval
Philosophy & Theology, eds. Stephen F. Brown, David B. Burrell, Kent Emery, Jr., Mark D. Jordan,
Norman Kretzmann, Eleonore Stump (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), vol. 1.
91

This position was adopted by the Fifth Lateran Council under Pope Leo X (1512-17 A.D.),
following the opinions of Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, and Robert Pullen. See Aquinas, Summa
Contra Gentiles l2.86-87; Peter Lombard, Sentences l2 d17 c1-2; and Robert Pulleyn, Cramer 6 p. 474.

283
entelechy or act. He then notes, “This word ‘Entelechy’ apparently takes its origin from
the Greek word signifying ‘perfect,’ and hence the celebrated Ermolao Barbaro expressed
it literally in Latin by perfectihabia: for Act is a realization of potency” (G 6:150).92 His
point has to do with the basic distinction between the essential properties of a nature and
transient accidental properties. A permanent “act” is the essence or substantial form of
the subject, while successive acts constitute accidental form, or properties that last only
for a time, such as being a specific color. As we saw in the above treatment of PEH,
Leibniz employs the theory of entelechy and utilizes it in his theory of force and harmony
(cf. G 6:149-50). In the present context, however, Leibniz uses the theory of entelechy,
along with the accompanying notion of innate force, to argue a specific solution to the
generation of form and ultimately his answer to the problem of original sin.
Leibniz identifies three theories of the origin of form. The first is that form is
derived passively from matter (eduction). Analogically, this is thought of as akin to the
removal of superfluous material from a chunk of marble in the making a statue. Leibniz
submits that this theory is ultimately meaningless, as it reduces form to shape, which is
plainly not what the term means in Aristotle. The second is that form is sent from heaven
by God or created ex nihilo at the same moment the body is produced. The third is that
there is an active potency in the efficient cause itself: either God or the other forms from
which the subsequent form comes in the process of generation (G 6:150-1).
Leibniz identifies the primary difficulty for traducianism (which presumes the
third theory of form) that, unlike accidental properties, essential properties are without
change by definition. Hence, they can admit only creation (existence in total) or
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annihilation (non-existence in total). This point will serve an important role in Leibniz’s
own theory. But before proceeding, Leibniz identifies a significant point of confusion in
theological treatments of this subject, namely, the confusion of indestructibility with
immortality. Immortality, Leibniz suggests, presumes continued personality and retention
of moral qualities and consciousness that experiences either punishment or reward.
Indestructability, by contrast, merely presumes that the given object is simple, not
composite, and thus does not admit decomposition; it can only cease to exist in total
(annihiliation) or exist in total (creation). Organic generation must, therefore, be the
organization of entelechy around a head monad, not the generation of the soul.
Leibniz’s theory builds on this distinction between indestructible and immortal.
Leibniz suggests that the concept of soul or entelechy is the concept of a simple
substance. Hence, its concept does not admit decomposition (it is not composite), only
creation or annihilation. In this light, Leibniz argues for the preexistence of the soul, but
not in the sense of the Origenists. The Origenist theory builds on the idea that the soul
exists in a conscious, moral state prior to its incarnation. This Leibniz denies. Instead, he
suggests that, as per his theory of harmony, that all entelechies exist from the point of
creation, but the preexistent soul has only feeling and perception (as defined in the
monadology), not reason. All human souls are thus present in Adam, transmitted in
procreation, and later endowed with consciousness. As Leibniz explains,
[A]s the formation of organic animate bodies appears explicable in the order of
nature only when one assumes a preformation already organic, I have thence
inferred that what we call generation of an animal is only a transformation and
augmentation. Thus, since the same body was already furnished with organs it is
to be supposed that it was already animate, and that it had the same soul: so I
assume vice versa, from the conservation of the soul when once it is created, that
the animal is also conserved, and that apparent death is only an envelopment… . It
is thus my belief that those souls which one day shall be human souls, like those
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of other species, have been in the seed, and in theprogrenitors as far back as
Adam, and have consequently existed since the beginning of things, always in a
kind of organic body. (G 6:152)
As for the emergence of reason after generation, Leibniz suggests that this could
be explained either by some natural instruments by which God raises the soul to a
sentient entity (akin to contemporary emergentism)93 or by a supernatural endowment. He
takes the latter explanation to be the simpler of the two. And since Holy Scripture
includes instances of God operating immediately upon the souls of men, there is no
reason to think it is out of character for God to do so (G 6:152-3).
Leibniz’s theory thus combines several aspects of all three theories of generation
in an effort to address the problem of original sin. In keeping with the sensibility of
creationism, Leibniz grants that the soul originates from God by creation, and that it
admits only creation or annihilation, not composition. However, rather than identifying
this creation at the point of physical generation, Leibniz identifies this creation as part of
the creation of the whole of our world. The souls of men are thus part of the original
structure of the world that harmoniously organizes according to the eternal decrees of
God. Lest this contention fall into the heretical notions of the Origenists, however,
Leibniz denies that the soul, in its preexistent state, is conscious. It has only feeling and
perception—that is, the basis for its self-movement in accord with PEH; reason, moral
agency, and consciousness are later gifted to the soul following its generation. In this last
claim, Leibniz brings to his theory what the traducianist desires, namely, that the
generation of the soul follows from the parents, and if the soul (to which God grants
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reason, etc.) is corrupt, then this corruption is a product of sin, not of direct divine
agency.
In this way, Leibniz believes he has dissolved the problem of original sin.
According to Leibniz, Adam’s sin justly brings physical corruption upon himself and his
children in the process of generation. What God supplies in the process of generation is
not a corrupted soul; rather, a corrupted soul is what is provided in the procreation
process by the human parents. God provides only the additional perfection of reason and
consciousness—or what is ontologically positive—to the soul. In short, rather than
providing a body with a corrupted soul, God provides a corrupted soul with reason (G
6:152-3).
Leibniz’s distancing of God from the source of corruption is consistent
throughout his treatment of the problem. For example, Leibniz later goes on to deny that
we must conclude that God prohibited the eating of the apple arbitrarily, or that the
corruption to follow was supernaturally endowed in mankind as a result of sin. On the
contrary, he suggests that the prohibition may be in keeping with the natural consequence
of the act, such as why parents prohibit children from playing with knives; and the
resulting punishment may likewise be a very natural consequence, akin to the way that
drunkards often give birth to children with a propensity to drink.94 In other words, the
corruption that followed from sin, and is thus present in the souls that are transmitted in
procreation, may be the natural result of the laws of this world (G 6:164-5; 180-1).
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***
In the foregoing, we have seen that Leibniz’s commitment to the faculty
psychology and perfect being theology of the Augustinian tradition provides the
foundation for his claim that God of moral necessity wills the best. Moreover, we have
seen that the foundations of these claims not only have precedent the Christian tradition,
but the conclusion is stated explicitly by figures, such as John of Damascus. Moreover,
we have seen that Leibniz follows John and the medieval scholastics after him in his
employment of the antecedent/consequent will distinction, and that in Leibniz, just as in
his theological antecedents, this distinction is employed to explain how God can
guiltlessly permit evil in our world. In this light, the insights of Leibniz’s theodicy are
anything but innovative, but are merely the recapitulation of insights that precede Leibniz
in the creedal Christianity to which Leibniz ascribes.
As for how these insights play out in the theological arena, we found that Leibniz
places his own views in conversation with the mainstream positions of historical
Christianity. His reply to the problem of miracles echoes responses going back to Origen
and Augustine, and his treatment of predestination, hell, and original sin are framed by
the mainstream positions in historical Christianity, and placed amid then-current
discussions amongst protestants and between protestants and Catholics. Leibniz’s own
positions often display an irenic tone and seek to mediate opposing views, but in the end,
his own position is consistently stated in reference to these discussions and with a view to
taking a stance within the bounds of Christian orthodoxy.
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In the end, we have reason to believe that Leibniz’s views on free choice,
providence, and evil are not only consistent with his earlier philosophical theology, but
are an undefiled extension of historical Christian orthodoxy.

PART 3
REMAINING DIFFICULTIES AND THEODICY TODAY

CHAPTER 5
Leibnizian Possible Worlds and the Problem of Superessentialism

With the exegesis of Part 2 before us, we have ample reason to think that
Leibniz’s thought is an extension of the Augustinian tradition, and reflects the
incompatibilist commitments of this tradition, along with its synergistic understanding of
providence. However, there are a number of objections in the contemporary literature that
are unaddressed by the above chapters. In Part 3, we will address these objections and
assess Leibniz’s relevance, under the above understanding, to theodicy today.
In this chapter, we devote our attention to one particular problem facing Leibniz,
namely, the problem of superessentialism, or the view that every property of an entity is
an essential property. Some interpreters argue that Leibniz’s denial of haecceitas
combined with his notion of identity (discussed in the previous chapter) lead to a form of
superessentialism that is necessitarian to its core. This concern is only exacerbated by
Leibniz’s claim that God chooses the best out of moral necessity, since this claim raises
serious concern over whether God has free choice and, by extension, whether our world
is in fact the only possible world. When these two issues are combined, it seems that,
regardless of what we might find in Leibniz’s texts about human choice, his stance on
these matters undermines all hope of genuine contingency and libertarian freedom. For if
the very concept of a particular individual entails it doing what it in fact does, and if God
is not free to actualize a world other than our own, then Leibniz has once again placed us
on the fast track to a necessitarianism hardly different from that of Spinoza.
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In this chapter, I will scrutinize these lingering hurdles. This chapter consists of
three sections. In section one I lay bare the problem facing Leibniz’s denial of haecceitas
and the corresponding notion of superessentialism. In particular, I will draw on the work
of David Blumenfeld and his exploration (and refutation) of possible solutions to
Leibnizian superessentialism.
In section two, I will expound on the metaphysical underpinnings of Leibniz’s
possible worlds by drawing once again on the Medieval and post-Reformation backdrop
of his discussion. Building on both the Scotist understanding of divine knowledge and the
view of possible worlds argued in Part 2, we will identify fundamental differences
between Leibniz’s view of counterfactuals and the views of contemporary interpreters.
With these differences in view, we will see how Leibniz is able to deny haecceitas
without falling into the type of necessitarianism described by the superessntialist reading.
Section three of this chapter addresses the question of divine freedom in reference
to possible worlds. Even if Leibniz can manage to avoid the charge of superessentialism
in the creaturely realm, we still face the question of whether divine choice can survive
Leibniz’s claims regarding moral necessity. I will navigate this question by
contextualizing Leibniz’s view of divine choice by looking at the Christian antecedents of
his claim. By drawing on this historical background, I will flesh out the resources found
therein that help alleviate the problems facing divine freedom.
I will close this chapter with a postscript on the nature of freedom. I will submit
that despite the arguments of this chapter, there lingers a first-principles divide between
compatibilists and libertarians on the question of choice that none of these resources can
resolve. In light of this divide, the results of this chapter will likely prove satisfactory for
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libertarians, but compatibilists and determinists will likely be less than satisfied. That
said, the dissatisfaction of the latter will prove no greater than the general dissatisfaction
with libertarian choice generally. In short, if problems linger for the libertarian reading of
Leibniz, these problems will be shown to be in no way unique to Leibniz, but part of a
larger dispute on the nature of freedom in general.

1. Leibniz and the Problem of Superessentialism
David Blumenfeld ascribes to Leibniz superessentialism, or the view that, “every
property that an individual has (save existence) is an essential part of his nature”1 (cf. G
2.42; 2.53; 2.56; 4.455; CA 46, 59-60, 63; L 322). Blumenfeld’s claim is based on
Leibniz’s denial of haecceitas—that is, the view of John Duns Scotus that there is an
irreducible metaphysical property (haecceitas) that constitutes the this-ness of the thing,
as opposed to the Aristotelian/Thomist hylomorphic notion that particularity is the unique
combination of essential and accidental properties in the enduring subject.2 This denial of
haecceitas, combined with Leibniz’s claim that all truths are analytic, lead Blumenfeld to
conclude, “If all properties (other than existence) are part of the concept of an individual
... then anyone with any other properties would be a different individual.”3
The conclusion here presumes that Chas1 in possible world 1 (PW1) and Chas2 in
PW2 have no material connection; they are two distinct enduring subjects in two distinct
worlds. Therefore, if identity is rooted in the enduring hylomorphic subject, then Chas1
1

David Blumenfeld, “Superessentialism, Counterparts, and Freedom,” in Leibniz Critical and
Interpretive Essays, ed. Michael Hooker (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 103.
2

For a synopsis of Scotist haecceitas, see Antoine Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 11.4.1-5.
3

Blumenfeld, “Superessentialism,” 103.
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and Chas2 must constitute two distinct enduring subjects and thus be two distinct
particulars according to an Aristotelian/Thomist view of particularity.4 Only if there is a
transferable or common metaphysical property that constitutes the Chasness of Chas
(haecceitas), which these two subjects share can Chas1 and Chas2 in some sense
constitute two distinct fates of the same person. Apart from haecceitas, then, the deeds of
Chas1 belong to Chas1 alone, and the concept of Chas1 doing otherwise does not yield a
distinct version of Chas1 but constitutes an entirely different individual (be it Chas2 or
Chas3) in an entirely different world (be it PW2 or PW3) who has no connection with
Chas1. Hence, the deeds of Chas1 are essential to the very concept of Chas1.
The difficulty this claim raises for free choice is that it implies de re falsehood of
any claim in which an individual who behaves one way could behave otherwise; such
claims must be de dicto. While Blumenfeld recognizes Leibniz’s commitment to human
liberty, Blumenfeld concludes that existence is the only predicate that could be otherwise
for Leibniz. Using the example of Adam, Blumenfeld contends that, following Leibniz’s
premises, if Adam did not sin he would not be Adam; thus, Adam’s sinning is only
contingent because Adam’s existence is contingent. However, Blumenfeld thinks that
even the supposed contention that existence is contingent is questionable, given Leibniz’s
theology. Blumenfeld argues the point as follows:
4

I am here using individual and particular interchangeably, even though I recognize that there is
discussion over whether these terms are in fact interchangeable in Aristotle. Some take Aristotle to
distinguish an individual (tode ti) from a particular (kath’ hekasta), arguing that the latter is the
individuated universal or form in the particular, while the latter is the hylomorphic whole. On this read,
while a particular is non-repeatable and cannot be predicated of another object, a universal can be
individual and in this sense is immanent and undivided. The interpretive controversy centers on Aristotle,
Metaphysics, Z 13. See, e.g., G.E.R. Lloyd, Aristotle: The Growth & Structure of His Thought (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1968); Frank A. Lewis, Substance and Predication in Aristotle (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Joseph Owens, Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry (Houston,
TX: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1992). Because this issue is of little consequence for how we read
Leibniz, however, I will use the terms individual and particular interchangeably throughout.
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(1) N(God exists).
(2) N(If God exists, God wills what is best).
(3) N(If God wills what is best, God actualizes BPW).
(4) N(If God actualizes BPW, BPW actually exists).
(5) Hence, N(BPW actually exists). (From (1)-(4)).
(6) If (5) is true, then everything that occurs, occurs necessarily.
(7) Thus, everything that occurs, occurs necessarily. (From (5)-(6)).
(8) If everything that occurs, occurs necessarily, then no one ever acts freely.
(9) Therefore, no one ever acts freely. (From (7) and (8)).5
Though Blumenfeld acknowledges that Leibniz wants to deny premise (2), he
thinks Leibniz’s ability to do so is dubious: “[I]t is difficult to see how this stance is
consistent with Leibniz’s superessentialism: if God is good, then his goodness is among
his essential properties.”6 Nonetheless, even without (2), Blumenfeld thinks one can still
make the case against human freedom. Given that if Adam refrained from sinning he
would not be “the same individual as Adam,” Adam’s sinning is necessary. And,
presuming PAP,7 Adam, whose concept excludes the possibility of not sinning, is not free
with regarding to his sinning.

5

Blumenfeld, “Superessentialism,” 104. In the above argument, BPW = best possible world and N
= Necessarily.
6
7

Blumenfeld, “Superessentialism,” 104.

See the above Introduction, §2 (Terminological Issues and Clarifications) for a definition of PAP
(Principle of Alternative Possibilities). Blumenfeld believes that Leibniz accepts all premises required to
establish PAP. See Blumenfeld, “Superessentialism,” 105.
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One way of attempting to deliver Leibniz from this problem is to employ David
Lewis’ counterpart theory.8 Blumenfeld acknowledges that Lewis’ theory is not
forwarded in reference to Leibniz, nor has it been applied to Leibniz with a view to
solving the problem of superessentialism. Instead, it has merely been acknowledged that
Leibniz could be read as espousing something akin to Lewis.9 Nonetheless, Blumenfeld
explores what this theory might offer by way of relief. Lewis summarizes counterpart
theory as follows:
Where some would say that you are in several worlds, in which you have
somewhat different properties and somewhat different things happen to you, I
prefer to say that you are in the actual world and no other, but you have
counterparts in several other worlds. Your counterparts resemble you closely in
content and context in important respects. They resemble you more closely than
do the other things in their worlds. But they are not really you. For each of them is
in his own world.... The counterpart relation is a relation of similarity.10
Lewis’ conclusion is that while we may speak of my counterpart as “me” in another
world, strictly speaking this is not the case. Nonetheless, on Blumenfeld’s reading of
Lewis, “Lewis allows for the possibility of there being a world in which two individuals,
A1 and A2, are both counterparts of, for example, ‘our’ Sextus.”11
Fabrizio Mondadori invokes counterpart theory in reference to Leibniz, but
modifies Lewis. Contrary to Lewis, who presumes multiple counterparts, Mondadori
offers what he calls a “uniqueness requirement.” This requirement, briefly stated, is that a
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counterpart belongs to one particular individual who constitutes a complete concept in the
actual world.12 The point of this requirement is that it ensures (or is intended to ensure)
the intelligibility of the language of it being my counterpart. That is, counterpart A1 is
Sextus’ counterpart precisely because it is Sextus’ and no one else’s.
Blumenfeld acknowledges that Mondadori’s reading of Leibniz offers one way of
reconciling Leibniz’s simultaneous use of counterfactuals and de re modal predications
with his superessentialist premises. On Mondadori’s read of Leibniz, it is necessary that
Sextus undergo the events that befall him—had he not, he would not be the same
individual (as per superessentialism). Therefore, taken literally, counterfactuals about
Sextus (e.g., Had Sextus not raped Lucretia, he would have lived a happy life) are false
because they imply that our Sextus could be otherwise. Yet, if we understand these
counterfactuals as referring to our Sextus’ counterpart, then we can identify a link
between not raping Lucretia and a happy life, and we can accept the counterfactual as
meaningful and true.13 The assertion is what Mondari calls “deferred naming.” That is,
we begin with the actual individual (“our” Sextus), move to an alternate complete
concept via a counterfactual (Sextus does not rape Lucretia), and end with the counterpart
to our individual.14 The implication of Mondari’s reading is that when Leibniz asserts had
so-and-so done otherwise and it appears that he is saying something about this particular
individual, he is not in fact doing so; he is speaking about the individual’s counterpart.15
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Now, Blumenfeld acknowledges that Mondari is not seeking to address the free
choice question in Leibniz.16 Nonetheless, he suggests that one could build on Mondari in
answer to the free choice question by arguing that one essential property of a given
individual is “the property of having such-and-such counterparts in such-and-such
world.”17 On such a solution, while it remains essential to the concept of Joe that he
perform q, it is just as essential to the concept of Joe that he might have performed ~q,
since the concept of Joe entails a counterpart who performs ~q.
Blumenfeld objects to this mode of rescuing Leibniz because he thinks it
presumes a view of possible worlds quite unlike the view held by Leibniz. According to
Blumenfeld, Leibniz has a different view of “actual” than Lewis. Lewis takes actual to
mean present—be it in this world or another world. Leibniz, by contrast, takes possible
worlds to be wholly dependent upon the mind of God; they are ideas in the divine mind
and without the divine mind upholding these possibilities, they do not “exist” (see, e.g., G
6.226-7; 7.304-5; L 488). The privileged status of the actual, therefore, has to do with it
being elected by God and endowed with the predicate exists, as argued in Part 2.18
While this may seem like a point of metaphysical minutia, Blumenfeld sees this
difference as quite significant when applied to God. Blumenfeld summarizes:
Leibniz’s view that mere possibles have only an objective existence in the mind
of God conflicts with the idea that there are a series of God-counterparts, each
actual at its own world. On the contrary, it implies that a single divinity exists
who is real in an absolute sense, and whose thoughts form the only basis of the
existence of unactualized possibilities.... Leibniz treats actuality as a unique
status. It is possessed tout court, if it is possessed at all; and it is something
conferred by God on the basis of perfection. But this means that the God who
16
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actually exists (and who exists of necessity) would himself have existed whatever
world had been actual. After all, the one absolutely real God is the worldactualizer. This again conflicts with the counterparts picture, which would express
the fact that God necessarily exists in terms of an infinity of different Gods, each
real at his own world.19
Blumenfeld admits that one could detach counterpart theory from Lewis’ theory
of actuality and use it in service to Leibniz. Yet, Blumenfeld suggests that the alternative
view of actuality (i.e., the view in which actuality is conferred by God) runs into
absurdity when applied to counterparts, since this view would require that God could
actualize a world that does not contain himself but contains a distinct individual (his
counterpart) who is like him in crucial respects.20 Blumenfeld takes this claim to be prime
facie non-sense, and if such is the result of the counterpart theory, its failure is evident.
Even if one were willing to embrace this absurdity, however, Blumenfeld argues
that counterpart theory cannot save Leibniz from determinism. As he points out, Leibniz
clearly wants to say that Adam is able to do otherwise, but he cannot mean our Adam
could do otherwise, since our Adam would then be a different Adam. Hence, even with
counterpart theory applied, such counterfactuals must be read non-literally. And
therefore, despite clearing up inconsistencies in Leibniz’s language, Leibniz is no less of
a determinist.21 For insofar as PAP is required for genuine freedom, PAP is not embraced
under the non-literal reading of counterpart theory, since any particular individual (e.g.,
our Adam) is not free to do otherwise.22
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Were this difficulty not enough, Blumenfeld notes two additional problems that
emerge for counterpart theory generally and its Leibnizian form in particular. The first
rather basic problem is that counterpart theory begs the question: How can an individual,
distinct from myself, acting in a way contrary to myself in a circumstance similar to my
own, but occurring in a world other than my own, grant me freedom in my circumstance
in my world?23 Under counterpart theory, there is no clear connection between particular
individuals and their counterparts other than the conceptual link based on common traits
and like circumstance.
This lack of connection raises a second, more difficult question, namely, If
counterparts are necessary for freedom, but it is not in my control whether counterparts
exist, then in what sense am I free with regard to any given act? In other words, if
freedom refers to the libertarian capacities of my will, but those capacities are libertarian
only if I have a counterpart, then I do not have libertarian choice unless I have the ability
to generate a counterpart in another possible world. For freedom does not reside in my
capacities in this particular circumstance or choice (PAP), but in my ability to have or not
have counterparts. As far as I can tell, none of my choices have ever entailed the choice
of whether to generate a counterpart, and thus, counterparts, if taken as a necessary
condition for freedom, undermine rather than uphold freed choice.24
This problem of the grounding or source of counterparts Blumenfeld takes to be
particular potent with reference to Leibniz. Even if one wanted to defend the idea that
creatures could generate counterparts, in Leibniz’s view possible worlds are grounded by
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the will of God. Therefore, whether I have a counterpart in any given instance depends on
God, not me. In such light, even if Leibniz is read through the lens of counterpart theory,
he cannot assert that creatures are free.25 As for whether counterpart theory may uhpold
divine freedom, this could be suggested, given God’s apparent ability to generate
counterparts, but, as already noted, this suggestion comes at the cost of asserting that
divine freedom is rooted in God’s ability to actualize a world in which he does not exist.
In the end, Blumenfeld concludes that such difficulties demonstrate that Leibnizian
superessentialism cannot be overcome by counterpart theory.
One final theory Blumenfeld entertains is that possible individuals are somehow
merged initially but split from one another at instances of free choice. Hence, Raleigh1
and Raleigh2 are a single Raleigh until that Raleigh faces a free choice. At that point
Raleigh splits into two different individuals (Raleigh1 and Raleigh2) in two different
possible worlds (PW1 and PW2). This solution provides an initial material connection
between Raleigh1 and Raleigh2, so that their respective decisions somehow belong to the
same original source—Raleigh.
The objection Blumenfeld has to this solution is that Leibniz understands identity
to be rooted in the entirety of predicates associated with the subject (past, present, and
future). Whatever will occur in Raleigh’s future is already part of Raleigh’s identity—as
Leibniz would put it, Raleigh is great with the future. Hence, there remains an utter
incompatibility between Raleigh1 and Raleigh2 insofar as Raleigh1 has an entire set of
predicates distinct from Raleigh2. Even if some predicates overlap (viz., those prior to the
split between Raleigh1 and Raleigh2), the divergent future predicates make it impossible
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for Raleigh1 and Raleigh2 to ever have a common identity. Thus, even at the initial point
of overlap, there would be contradictory future predicates within Raleigh derived from
his divergent futures in Raleigh1 and Raleigh2. The view cannot, therefore, be
compatible with Leibniz’s view of identity.
Now, it will be recalled that Blumenfeld begins his case for Leibnizian
superessentialism by noting Leibniz’s denial of haecceitas. An alternative approach to
softening Leibnizian superessentialism would be to take issue with the supposed denial of
haecceitas. Such is the approach we find in the joint work of O’Leary-Hawthorne and
Cover (henceforth OC). OC find a general agreement in Leibniz studies that Leibniz’s
metaphysic “is a robust substance-accident realism, complete with individual substances
underlying the attributes in which they’re clothed, and a commitment to some version of
essentialism.”26 Despite this consensus, OC find a tension in Leibniz’s thinking on
transworld identity, and this tension surrounds the question of whether Leibniz is so
clearly opposed to haecceitas as typically thought.
OC appeal to David Kaplan who contends that positions on transworld identity
are split between pro-haecceitas and anti-haecceitas. According to Kaplan, the prohaecceitas position has a basis for affirming a this-ness that extends throughout possible
worlds, while the anti-haecceitas position has no foundation for affirming transworld
identity. Parallel individuals, or counterparts (to employ Lewis’ terminology), may be
linked by “a common concept,” but there is no “metaphysical reality of sameness.”27 OC
acknowledge that the anti-haecceitas reading of Leibniz is the majority report in Leibniz
26
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studies, and this leaves Leibniz susceptible to superessentialism. However, OC submit
that Leibniz’s frequent talk of transworld identity should be taken as evidence of a prohaecceitas posture. In saying this, OC are not suggesting that Leibniz is free from
determinism. On the contrary, OC contend that Leibniz still displays superessentialist
tendencies throughout his writings when discussing identity. But OC suggest Leibniz’s
superessentialism is best explained by his determinism, while his talk of transworld
identity is best explained by a tacit affirmation haecceitas. In other words, “one who can
make perfect sense of de re modality and questions of transworld identity, who yet
happens to believe that all assertions of tranworld identity are strictly speaking false.”28
OC contend that deterministic haecceitism makes the most sense of the
aforementioned tension in Leibniz. Referencing Robert Sleigh, Jr.’s Leibniz & Arnauld,
OC point to his conclusion that Leibniz’s modal theory is weaker than superessentialism,
and yet, if taken as a de re account, Leibniz’s views are strong enough that they could
underwrite a rejection of transworld identity.29 This tension is the very tension that OC
think a determinist haecceitism could explain. That is, de re accounts of transworld
identity make sense because Leibniz holds to a form of haecceitism, but the determinist
features of Leibniz’s view indicate the falsehood of transworld claims about alternative
choice. On such a view, some transworld claims might “sneak through” as true, but even
granting this possibility, Leibniz still leaves us with a strong superessentialism.30
28
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Now, there are at least two hurdles facing OC’s theory. The first is the fact that
Leibniz explicitly rejects haecceitas in his 1663, Disputatio metaphysica de principio
individui. OC’s retort is that “this piece says absolutely nothing about the modal issues
broached here, and moreover is too early to count as a guide to Leibniz’s considered view
of individuation.”31 They thereby set aside the text as moot and argue for the hermeneutic
necessity of a pro-haecceitas position, given the tension in Leibniz’s claims. Since OC
can see nothing in general propositions that allows for tracking particular objects across
possible worlds, they argue that to make cogent Leibniz’s simultaneous affirmation of
transworld identity and his apparent determinism, we must diverge from common
wisdom. Yet, in so doing there is no deliverance for Leibniz from the problem of
determinism; the pro-haecceitas reading only makes Leibniz’s determinism coherent.
The second hurdle is the question of whether the pro-haecceitas position does in
fact link Raleigh1 and Raleigh2, for example, as it claims. If we look at the notion of
haecceitas in its historical context (the context in which Leibniz would know it)
haecceitas is a discrete property, and is necessarily so. For haecceitas is the property of
being this thing, which excludes the possibility of it being not-this thing. Antonie Vos
summarizes Scotus’ insight thusly:
[I]t is his point that if we can talk of one item of something real, we have to
accept that such a unity enjoys being (entitas). However, we exclusively meet
being one in an individual. An individual is as such individual, it is essentially
individual. It cannot be subdivided into more identical individuals. For Scotus,
the notions of being individual, numerical unity, or countability and singularity
are equivalent. What does he mean by them? Articulated unity (unitas
determinata) is at stake. He calls it by a fine metaphor: signed unity. This unity—
the unity of being this—is signed unity. Being individual and being subdivided
into more subjects are incompossible, but what accounts for this
31
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in(com)possibility? This thing cannot be not-this thing; it is signed (signatum) by
its singularity.32
To my mind, the use of haecceitas in the contemporary transworld identity discussion
runs the risk of violating the very purpose of haecceitas. Haecceitas is the discrete
property of being this; it is not a universal that can be shared by multiple particulars, the
way the predicate human can—hence Vos’ point that the individual cannot be subdivided
into identical individuals. Yet, in the contemporary transworld discussion, haecceitas is
used in just this way, namely, to subdivide individuals. If Raleigh1 and Raleigh2 are
thought of as discrete particulars residing in separate worlds, and each Raleigh has its
own unique set of predicates (past, present, and future), as per Leibniz’s view of identity,
then the efforts to link these discrete particulars is an effort to subdivide Raleigh’s
identity into multiple subjects.
Assuming this is in fact how haecceitas is being used, this fails on two levels.
First, it fails insofar as haecceitas on this use has ceased to be haecceitas. That is, on such
a use, haecceitas is no longer the discrete property of being this particular, but a universal
shared by multiple particulars. Yet, Scotus’ very concern that sparked the haecceitas
insight was that hylomorphic views of identity do not give being to particularity, but
ascribe being to universals only—hence particularity is nothing more than the enduring
conglomeration of a set of universals. Haecceitas was aimed not at identifying a yetunnamed universal but at granting being to one discrete (i.e., non-universal) property. As
Vos puts it, “[W]e are not even able to say that the inalienable dignity of the individual
had been lost in Greek philosophy. It was never there, nor in other archaic and ancient
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cultures. It had to be discovered.”33 In this light, I do not see how haecceitas, taken in its
historical meaning, can resolve the issue of transworld identity. For both haecceitist and
hylomorphic views of identity see particularity as equally discrete, despite their
differences on the grounding of particularity. Insofar as the “pro-haecceitas” positions on
transworld identity treat haecceitas as a universal shared by multiple particulars, I must
conclude that they are developing a notion of identity—and thus a solution to transworld
identity—quite unlike that of Scotus, and thus something very unlike what Leibniz
himself would have known as haecceitas.
The second way in which the pro-haecceitas solution fails is in its specific
application to Leibniz. Even if we grant that Leibniz underwent a shift in his views on
haecceitas, and thus harbors an unstated support for haecceitas, we would still face the
difficulty that Leibniz links the identity of a particular with its past, present, and future.
Hence, even if Raleigh1’s particularity is grounded in haecceitas rather than the
conglomeration of predicates associated with him, Leibniz links the identity of this
Raleigh with those predicates. And this means that Leibniz necessarily dissociates the
identity of Raleigh1 (this Raleigh) from the identity of Raleigh2 (that Raleigh). This
results in both an ontic and epistemic issue. On the epistemic side, even if Raleigh1’s
identity is rooted in haecceitas, the predicates associated with Raleigh1 still serve to
identify which particular (identity) we are referencing; and the result would seem to
beckon that we disassociate Raleigh1 from Raleigh2 who is referenced by a distinct set of
predicates, and thus ascribe to Raleigh1 a haecceitas different than we ascribe to
Raleigh2. If this epistemic problem is overcome by appeal to ontology (there exists a
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property, haecceitas, in both Raleigh1 and Raleigh2 that links them, even if we face
epistemic hurdles in pinpointing this association), we run into a more serious
metaphysical difficulty, namely, that Raleigh1 and Raleigh2 are then the same particular,
but the concept of this particular (Raleigh) entails contradictory predicates. What this
means is that by linking Raleigh1 and Raleigh2 in such a way that they are the same
particular, the concept of Raleigh becomes logically impossible because his concept
contains a formal contradiction (or perhaps several). The pro-haecceitas solution thus
leaves us in the same position as the hylomorhpic reading, neither fixing Leibniz’s
tranworld language, nor delivering him from determinism.
Are the above positions the only possible ways forward for dealing with Leibniz
on transworld identity? I believe the answer is No. I would contend that none of the
above models are in keeping with the metaphysics of Medieval and post-Reformation
scholasticism on the topic of contingency and, by implication, transworld identity. In
keeping with the thesis of this project, this omission is rather serious. In the next section,
I will offer an alternative reading of Leibniz on contingency that is in keeping with older
more metaphysical way of thinking of contingency and identity, and I will argue that this
alternative reading not only balances the tensions with which the above readings are
wrestling, but offers additional support to the libertarian reading advocated in Part 2.

2. A Scholastic Reply to the Problem of Transworld Identity
All voices noted above in the transworld-identity discussion proceed as if possible
worlds and possible individuals are wholly isolated from one another, “living,” as it were,
in different semantic or conceptual universes. And yet, the freedom of Raleigh1 in PW1
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depends in some way on the “existence” of a corresponding Raleigh (Raleigh2) in PW2
who displays contrary behavior in like circumstance. Under such a view, problems
emerge for hylomorphic views of identity generally and Leibniz’s view in specific. For
generic hylomorphism finds the apparent separation between Raleigh1 in PW1 and
Raleigh2 in PW2 to raise the question In what sense are these two Raleighs the same
Raliegh? If the particularity of Raleigh in PW1 (Raliegh1) is grounded in the fact that
Raleigh is an enduring form-matter composite, and the Raleigh of PW2 (Raleigh2) is an
entirely separate enduring subject, there is no apparent connection between these two
Raleighs that might link their respective identities. Added to this is the unique difficulty
that Leibniz brings, namely, he roots identity in the complete set of predicates—past,
present, and future. Because the Raleigh1 in PW1 and the Raleigh2 in PW2 are not only
materially divided but also include contradictory sets of predicates, given their contrary
choices, they cannot be the same Raleigh. This divide constitutes the problem of
transworld identity, which is thought to place libertarian freedom in danger and must be
overcome if free choice is going to survive Leibniz’s philosophy.
In answering the problem of transworld identity, we must first recognize that the
approach to contingency in the above discussion displays a very contemporary
sensibility, indicative of current dialogs in modal logic. The problem I see with this
approach to Leibniz is that it runs the risk of being anachronistic. The precise nature of
possible world semantics, modal terminology, transworld identity, and the like is hotly
contested throughout the still-relatively-recent history of formal modal logic. Modal
logic, as espoused by Gottlob Frege and his followers, used mathematical functions to
analyze predication, semantics, and thought structures. In its early form, predication
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analysis was thought to be merely linguistic, having no metaphysical requirements
whatsoever. As Frege put it in his November 13, 1904 letter to Bertrand Russell,
[I]f all that matters to us is the sense of the proposition, the thought, then all we
need to worry about is the sense of the signs that constitute the proposition;
whether or not they also have a Bedeutung does not affect the thought. And this is
indeed the the case in legend and poetry. Conversely, if it is not immaterial to us
whether the signs that constitute the propsosition are bedeutungsvoll, then it is not
just the thought which matters to us, but also the Bedeutung of the proposition.
And this is the case when and only when we are inquiring into its truth. Then and
only then does the Bedeutung of the proposition enter into our considerations; it
must therefore be most intimately connected with its truth.34
While Russell and Alfred North Whitehead carried on the propositional nature of logic in
their Principia mathematica (1910-13), logicians would become increasingly aware of
the unavoidability of metaphysics in logic. In 1948, W. V. Quine argued that statements
of logic cannot avoid ontological entailments, since arguing for a property shared by red
houses and red cars commits us to believing that such properties are entities.35 And, more
recently, Bernard Linsky has argued that the older forms of logic, such as Russell’s, are
indeed metaphysical in nature. In the case of Russell, his logic builds on an unstated and
then-unrecognized theory of universals and particulars.36 Regrettably, the metaphysical
implications of contemporary modal logic continue to be fiercely disputed today, with no
clear indication of consensus.37
Given this lack of consensus, it is not always clear to me how contemporaryminded analytic philosophers understand Leibniz’s possible worlds. Is the reading merely
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semantic or is it metaphysical? If semantic, is this is a creative rereading of Leibniz or is
it thought to be true to Leibniz’s philosophy? If metaphysical, what is the metaphysic
employed and is that metaphysic thought to be true to Leibniz’s own? Rather than wading
through these questions—the answers to which vary from one interpreter to another—I
think it best to leave behind the contemporary discussions surrounding modal logic and
deal with Leibniz in more historical terms. After all, Leibniz’s talk of possible worlds and
modality has a long history prior to him in Medieval philosophy and on into the
Protestant scholastics. This backdrop I think to be the more appropriate and helpful way
forward, and as we will see, it provides solutions untried in the above discussion on
transworld identity and contingency. I will begin, in particular, by discussing the model
of contingency and possible worlds found in John Duns Scotus.38 As argued in Part 2,
Leibniz’s claim in VNC offers a nuanced understanding of divine knowledge that
balances God’s a priori apprehension of future contingents with the dependence of such
contingents on God’s decrees. I argued that this theory was most like Scotus’ and that
there is good reason to believe that Leibniz retains this view in Theodicée. Thus, I will
here focus on this theory of divine knowledge.
Scotus makes an important distinction between logical possibles and what we
might call real possibles, which is particularly relevant to the topic at hand. According to
Scotus, logical possibles are much broader than real possibles. To rise to the level of
logically possible, all that is required is a subject-predicate combination that is free of
formal contradiction, or a combination without repugnance.39 Real possibles are a subset
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of logical possibles. However, to rise from a mere logical possible to a real possible
something more than coherence is required. Real possibles require both a coherent
subject-predicate relationship and ontological grounding. Regarding the latter, all real
possibles must first find their footing in God. For unless God is willing that anything
other than himself exist, no contingent thing—even if logically possible—can constitute a
real possible.40 The rationale here is a common one in Medieval theology, namely, that
the concept of a particular contingent thing is never an isolated concept. We can certainly
speak in an isolated way about the generic concept of human and identify this concept as
logically possible, since biped-rational-animal is void of contradiction, but the concept of
the particular human person Chas entails additional concepts of a great many things on
which this particular is contingent, to wit: Chas’ parents, Chas’ world, and a whole
network of related contingencies. Moreover, every contingent thing—be it Chas or the
things on which Chas is contingent—is ultimately traceable to a non-contingent ground,
or First Cause, namely, God.41
Keeping this in mind, we may establish the logical possibility of Chas by (a)
demonstrating both the internal subject-predicate coherence of the concept of Chas and
(b) the compatibility of this concept with the concepts of other things on which Chas is
dependent. However, unless God is willing that anything contingent exist, all contingent
concepts (both Chas and those contingent things on which Chas is contingent) are void of
ontic grounding and are mere logical possibles. For they have no footing in the First
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Cause, God. This is why (as noted in chapter 3) Scotus suggests that contingent
propositions must be made determinate by an eternal act of the divine will.42
Assuming that God is willing that things other than God exist and determines
propositions accordingly, ontic footing is provided for contingencies to rise to the level of
real possibles. Now, the specifics of how this divine grounding of real possibles works
with divine knowledge is disputed among Medieval scholastics. As discussed in chapter
3, Aquinas, speaking as an intellectualist, understands divine simplicity to entail that
God’s existence is also his act of understanding;43 and insofar as his existence is perfect,
so must his knowledge be.44 Since, God is the First Cause, God’s perfect self-knowledge
must entail a perfect knowledge of all things, necessary and contingent, for all things are
either God or have their existence from God. Hence, “God sees His effects in Himself as
their cause….”45 Henry of Ghent, speaking as a voluntarist, maintains that contingent
truths require a decree on the part of God. If the divine intellect knows a contingent truth
to be so, it knows it only because it sees that contingency decreed by the will and knows
that the will of God cannot be impeded.46
Scotus harbors concerns over both positions. He fears that the intellectualist
approach yields necessitarianism, or (less anachronistically) Averroism. Scotus’
particular concern is that the intellectualist, who believes that the will necessarily follows
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the judgments of the intellect, must maintain that divine choice is necessary as well. For
if the intellect knows necessarily, and the will necessarily follows the intellect, it follows
that the modal necessity of divine knowing translates to a modal necessity in divine
choosing; this modal necessity in divine choice translates to a modal necessity in that
which the divine will chooses.47 Scotus here argues what contemporary jargon would
label the distribution axiom: □(A→B)→(□A→□B).48 In short, if the divine intellect bears
a modal necessity and all flows from divine intellect by necessity, then the modal
necessity of the intellect is distributed to that which follows from it, and all is modally
necessary.
As for Ghent’s solution, Scotus agrees that the divine will is required for the
grounding of contingents, and grants that this conceptual link between contingents and
the will of God beckons a voluntary grounding of propositions. However, Scotus fears
that Ghent’s approach runs the risk of ascribing to God discursive knowledge, since it
God’s knowledge follows (so it seems) inferentially from what the intellect knows of and
sees in the divine will.49
Scotus, unlike Aquinas, maintains that only simple truths fall to God’s necessary
knowledge. Complex truths, such as future contingents, must be grounded by the divine
will, as Ghent argues. Yet, Scotus denies Ghent’s claim that the intellect knows
contingent truths via the will, siding instead with Aquinas: God knows his essence, and
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subsequently all things according to their being knowable.50 As we saw in chapter 3,
Scotus accomplishes this balancing act by separating the question of how contingent
truths are grounded from the question of how the divine intellect knows contingent truths.
To the former, Scotus affirms the need for the will to determine propositions; to the latter,
he defends the grounding of divine knowledge in the divine essence.51
Now, under Scotus’ approach to real possibles, grounding is not limited to the
divine side of the equation. For the First Cause is not the only cause involved. Contingent
things entail both the concept of the First Cause and the concept of its proximate cause.
For example, the relationship between a particular fire burning a particular combustible
object must first be grounded by divine choice—that is, by God willing the possible
existence of that particular fire and particular combustible object. However, the
relationship between the fire and the object must also be consistent with the respective
natures of the particulars (i.e., the proximate cause) in order for this hypothetical to have
both coherence and ontic grounding, and thereby constitute a real possible. Hence, if it is
in the nature of fire to emit heat, and if it is in the nature of the object burnt to be
combustible, then the proximate causes are also consonant with this hypothetical.
Granting both God’s choice to ground this hypothetical (i.e., God’s possible concourse)
and this hypothetical’s grounding in the respective natures of the particulars involved
(viz., burning and combustion), this hypothetical constitutes a real possible.52
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Noteworthy is Scotus’ point that even though the real possible of fire burning is
contingent, there is a sense in which this possible displays a necessary cause-effect
relationship. For Scotus here distinguishes two types of necessity. The first is simple
necessity (necessaries simpliciter), or what we might dub absolute necessity. Simple
necessity does not exist in our world, according to Scotus, since our world as a whole is
contingent—a fact Scotus treats as axiomatic.53 The second type of necessity does exist in
our world, and this is what is meant when we say a contingent relationship is necessary in
a certain respect (necessaries secundum quid). The cause-effect relationship between fire
and burning combustible objects, for example, is necessary in this weaker sense. Strictly
speaking, the relationship between fire and combustion is not necessary (a) because
neither the existence of fire nor of combustible objects is necessary, and (b) because the
effect of burning combustible objects can be miraculously stayed, should God choose to
not concur in the effect—as in the story of the three youths in the fiery furnace (Daniel
3:19-97).54
To be sure, simply because God-not-concurring-in-fire-burning is logically
possible, and simply because we have an instance of God refusing such concourse, this
does not mean that not burning is a real possible in every instance in which fire is related
to a combustible object. As stated above, if not burning is to rise to the level of a real
possible, not burning must be not only coherent but ontologically grounded in either the
First Cause, proximate cause, or both. Because fire has only one natural potency, namely,
to burn combustible objects, the grounding of not burning is never found in the proximate
53
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cause, fire. If found, it is found solely in the First Cause, God. This is precisely why the
relationship is necessary in a certain sense: its opposite depends entirely on God
performing a miracle. If God does not or would not consider refusing concurrence in the
effect of fire, not burning remains a merely logical possible void of ontic footing in either
the First Cause or proximate cause (i.e., this logical possibility does not correspond to
any determinate contingent proposition present to the divine intellect).
In the case of free creatures, Scotus contends that the nature of contingency is
much stronger. Unlike fire, which has only one natural potency, free creatures by nature
have (a) multiple potencies and (b) the power of choice regarding which potency to
actualize.55 Thus, it is both God’s willing that Raleigh have freedom (First Cause) and
Raleigh’s free nature itself (proximate cause) that ground contrary possibles. Or, put
otherwise, because God wills freedom and Raleigh has freedom, contrary possibles are
naturally grounded as real.
Again, the ontology in play here must be kept in mind. Scotus is not concerned
with the soft claim that Raleigh wills ~p is void of subject-predicate conflict, despite the
fact that Raleigh wills p is true. Scotus’ concern is ontological. His claim is that Raleigh
wills ~p is a real possible because it has ontic grounding in God’s concourse, which
upholds freedom, and the fact of Raleigh’s freedom of contradiction (will p or will not p),
contrariety (will p or will ~p), and specification (will q instead of p).56 Contrast this with
the possibility of fire not burning a combustible object. Fire-not-burning has no
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ontological grounding in fire itself. If it is to constitute a real possible, God must consider
refusal of concourse in its natural effect. Yet, in the case of free creatures, God has willed
that the creature itself have a nature that grounds multiple possibles and freely actualizes
one possible in such a way that could have actualized a different possible. Hence, free
contingencies are quite different than contingencies that are necessary secundum quid.
The latter display a natural connection between proximate cause and effect that is
necessary, barring a miracle; the former by natural necessity displays a relationship
between proximate cause and effect that is free and contingent and could be otherwise.
The claim here is an echo of Augustine’s realist contention, embraced by many
Medieval and post-Reformation realists, that not even God can make a will that is not
free. For a will void of freedom is on par with a circle void of circularity. It is a matter of
natural necessity that will have libertarian choice, since this is part of its very concept and
possibility.57 Therefore, if God grounds the real possible of a given free agent (say,
Margot), God’s choice to do so entails the grounding of those real possibles that are
grounded in Margot and her choices regarding which possibles to freely actualize.
The foregoing metaphysic, with its distinction between real possibles and their
grounding, provides a way of thinking about libertarian choice quite unlike the
approaches outlined in section one of this chapter, and this difference is particularly
relevant to the problem of superessentialism and transworld identity.
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Under this more metaphysical understanding of possibles, free contingencies and
the possibility of contrary choice are not grounded in the “existence” of parallel possible
worlds or in transworld identity. Contingency and alternate possibles are ontologically
grounded in things or possible things, namely, the First Cause willing free creatures, the
nature of free creatures itself, and the creature’s choice. Note that both the myriad of
potencies and the free relationship to which of these potencies is actualized are part of the
concept of that individual in that possible world. In the case of Margot, the nature of
Margot’s freedom is part of the concept of this particular Margot; no parallel Margot is
needed in some other possible world to make Margot free or her actions contingent.
Hence, we need not posit Margot1 and Margot2, each residing in discrete possible
worlds; it suffices that this Margot has inward potencies to multiple acts and freedom of
choice regarding his course of action. These ontological facts suffice to make sense of
statements regarding the (real) possibility of contrary choice.58 Simply because the idea
of Margot includes the idea of her freely choosing one particular act over another, this
neither eliminates the fact that her will grounds possibles she has not chosen nor negates
that her choosing is free and could be otherwise.59 For possibles in this scheme identify
what has ontic grounding, given the nature of things, while the actual identifies what is
contingently actualized in such a way that it could be otherwise. This ontology is what
grounds contingency and the reality of contrary choice, not parallel possible worlds.60
Another way of putting the difference between Scotus’ view and the
contemporary approach is this. The contemporary discussion tends to link possible
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worlds with the logically possible and thus link contrary choice with transworld identity.
In this approach, if there is no subject-predicate conflict, the specific semantic
combination constitutes a logically possible world. Therefore, if Joe can be related to p or
~p without contradiction, both Joe wills p and Joe wills ~p each constitute a discrete
semantic world. By contrast, the metaphysical discussion of real possibles takes a more
robust meaning of possible worlds. The ontology in play is derived from Medieval
realism. To the medieval mind, contingent entails that existence is an accidental property,
or a predicate that is compatible with but unnecessary to the concept of the given thing.
Under such a metaphysic, possible (or contingent) worlds are worlds that subsist in the
mind of God (i.e., in the realm of the possible) just as they would in reality with the
exception that they lack the property of existence. The singular difference between this
world as it subsists in the realm of the possible and this world as it subsists in the realm
of the actual is that in the realm of the actual it possesses this additional property.
For this very reason, future contingents obtain in possible worlds in precisely the
same way they obtain in the real world. This is why it was said in chapter 4 that the best
starting point for thinking about possible worlds is not semantic or logical subjectpredicate relations; the best starting point is the real world. For this is the one possible
world (granted existence) to which we have direct access, and from which we may
conceptually work backwards by removing the predicate exists to arrive at a possible
world. Starting here, what we find is that individuals face choices and, though having the
power of contrary choice, must settle on one choice to the exclusion of others. No parallel
individuals are generated by this choice, nor are they needed to protect freedom. For
freedom resides in the nature of choice itself. Margot is free because, by natural
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necessity, she has libertarian capacities and thus is freely related to p in such a way that
she could have chosen ~p instead—even though she did not. The fact that she cannot
choose p and ~p simultaneously is no threat to her freedom, nor is it a threat to her
freedom that there is no universe next door in which a parallel Margot exists choosing ~p.
So it is in possible worlds. Individuals do not float from world to world; nor do they exist
in multiple worlds, with multiple lives, landing in multiple fates. Just as in the real world,
they subsist with a single identity and a single, freely-chosen fate in their discrete world.
But also as in the real world, their choices are always such that they could have chosen
otherwise, and it is this (not some parallel self) that makes their choice free and
contingent. The only difference is that those in the realm of the possible lack existence.
And it is this property that God grants to a given possible world, should he decree that it
move from the realm of the possible to the realm of the actual. The proof of this fact is
the contingency of our world, which demands that it once subsisted only in the realm of
the possible just as it does now in the realm of the actual with the exception of existence.
Notice that this metaphysical approach to the issue of contingency enables us to
accept the charge that an anti-haecceitas view cannot draw any real connection between
Raleigh in PW1 and Raleigh in PW2; they are discrete particulars. However, this
concession has no bearing on the ability of either the pro-hylomorphism or pro-haecceitas
positions to affirm free choice, since this divide between Raleigh1 and Raleigh2 is
irrelevant to the question of Raleigh’s freedom in PW1 under the older metaphysic. In
fact, the divide is as irrelevant as the divide between any other discrete enduring subjects
(say Chas and Raleigh). For freedom is not grounded in parallel possible selves in
parallel possible worlds, but in the nature of freedom itself.
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If Leibniz is indeed working amid such a metaphysic, as argued in Part 2, such a
conclusion clears up the confusion surrounding Leibniz’s views on transworld identity,
superessentialism, and freedom. Under the older metaphysical approach, Leibniz can
deny transworld identity, affirming that an enduring subject (such as Raleigh) subsists in
only world possible world (say PW1). For this reason, Leibniz can also affirm that a
modification to the predicates associated with Raleigh in PW1 would yield a different
Raleigh and a different world. But he can also affirm that these choices (and other
predicates) obtain contingently, denying superessentialism. For all of these same points
can be made in reference to the real world. If our world were otherwise, it would not be
the present world; and if my choices were otherwise, I would not be the present me. I
have no parallel self. But this does not mean that my accidents are not accidents or that
my choices are not contingent. For it is the nature of my power of choice itself—the
libertarian capacities I possess—that make my choice such that it could be otherwise and
grounds meaningful references to alternative possibilities that I could have actualized.
But in the end, only one set of choices obtain (albeit contingently) in this world. Such is
true in both the realm of the possible and the realm of the actual.

3. Leibniz and the Problem of Divine Determinism
The above solution may help secure freedom for Raleigh or Margot, but what are
we to make of divine freedom? It will be recalled that one of the first arguments offered
by Blumenfeld for Leibnizian necessitarianism centered on God’s lack of freedom,
which, by extension, carries implications for creaturely freedom (or the lack thereof). In
this section, we will look at the question of divine freedom and whether the above
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framework merely delays the problem of Leibnizian necessitarianism, given Leibniz’s
understanding of divine choice.
Leibniz espouses that the very idea of God entails that God always choose the
best. Hence, when it comes to creation, we can have confidence that the world God has
chosen to create (i.e., our world) is the best possible world (BPW). This central point in
Leibniz’s theodicy raises serious concerns regarding free choice—for both God and
creatures. First, the prime facie reading of this claim is that God has no freedom
regarding which world to create. To wit: the very nature of God entails that God will
BPW and only BPW; no other choice is compatible with the divine nature.
Second, this lack of freedom in God appears to carry implications for creaturely
freedom. For if the very concept of a contingent thing entails the concepts of those things
on which it is contingent (as Leibniz maintains), and if all contingent things are
ultimately traceable to their common non-contingent ground, God (as Leibniz also
maintains), then in order for a thing to rise to the level of a real possible (i.e., to have
ontic grounding), it must be compatible with BPW, since the very concept of the divine
nature entails the choosing of BPW and only BPW. With regard to creaturely freedom,
any creaturely choice that is contrary to the choices found in BPW would thereby be void
of ontic grounding. Hence, all contrary choices fall outside the realm of real possibles.
Third, such a metaphysic casts suspicion on even the logical possibility of
contrary choice. Since Leibniz maintains that the concept of a given thing is not isolated
but implies an entire world, the question of subject-predicate coherence extends beyond
the creature to those things external to the creature but entailed by its concept—the
greatest of which is God. If a predicate is applied to Raleigh that does not obtain in BPW,
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then this subject-predicate combination would constitute a logical impossibility, given
that the predicate runs into contradiction when traced back to its First Cause. Hence, it
may well be that any subject-predicate combinations regarding choices contrary to those
that obtain in BPW are not only ontologically but logically impossible. Even this very
minor difference between Leibniz and Spinoza would then dissolve.
To address these difficulties, I will divide the problem of divine freedom into two
distinct issues to be addressed in separate sub-sections. First, I will address the question
of whether, granting divine determinism, creaturely freedom is also undermined. By
appeal to the metaphysic of the previous section, I will argue that creaturely freedom
could survive divine determinism. The second issue I will address is whether Leibniz
does in fact affirm divine determinism, or is ineluctably driven to it, given his premises
elsewhere. I will argue that Leibniz neither affirms divine determinism, nor needs to
affirm divine determinism, since he has sufficient resources in his philosophy to preserve
divine choice.

3.1. Divine Determinism and Creaturely Freedom
It will be recalled that the way in which Blumenfeld articulated the difficulty of
divine determinism and the problems it creates for creaturely choice was as follows:
(1) N(God exists).
(2) N(If God exists, God wills what is best).
(3) N(If God wills what is best, God actualizes BPW).
(4) N(If God actualizes BPW, BPW actually exists).
(5) Hence, N(BPW actually exists). (From (1)-(4)).
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(6) If (5) is true, then everything that occurs, occurs necessarily.
(7) Thus, everything that occurs, occurs necessarily. (From (5)-(6)).
(8) If everything that occurs, occurs necessarily, then no one ever acts freely.
(9) Therefore, no one ever acts freely. (From (7) and (8)).61
Added to this difficulty was the very peculiar implication that counterparts (or whatever
one might prefer to name alternate selves with alternate choices) have their grounding
first in divine choice. Hence, one implication of God willing something other than BPW
is that, in so doing, God would be willing a world in which he does not exist. Such
absurdity would appear to give prime facie evidence that anything other than BPW is
simply impossible, being utterly incompatible with the concept and nature of God.
In order to answer Blumenfeld, we must keep before us the differences between
the contemporary approach to modality employed and the metaphysical approach
discussed in the previous section. As argued above, the metaphysical approach does not
locate contingency in alternate possible worlds or alternate possible selves. To treat
contingency and possible worlds as one and the same topic is, by these scholastic lights,
to conflate two distinct issues. Assuming Leibniz is working with this same voluntarist
metaphysic, as I have argued, the same is true when these issues are collapsed in Leibniz
studies. Granting this older view to Leibniz, contingency does not require the “existence”
of an alternate self or alternate world. Free contingencies require (a) the grounding of free
agents and their choices by God willing their possible existence, (b) a creaturely nature in
these free agents that has multiple potencies that thereby ground multiple real possibles,
and (c) the libertarian capacity in these agents to choose one of these potencies in such a
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way that another could have been chosen (PAP). So long as all three of the above
conditions obtain in BPW, the freedom of choosing agents is preserved. Whether there
“exists” an alternate possible world or alternate possible individual very much like our
free individual in BPW is irrelevant to the issue of that individual’s freedom in BPW.
By the light of the above reading of contingency, premises (6) and (7) in
Blumenfelds argument fall into the error of conflating the issue of possible worlds and
the issue of contingency. Even if BPW necessarily exists, as per the necessary existence
of God and God’s necessary choosing of the best, this does not demonstrate that all that
occurs within BPW is modally necessary. (I am here interpreting modality through the
above metaphysic, rather than contemporary possible world semantics.)
The common wisdom against which I am here arguing is a certain use of the
distribution axiom: □(A→B)→(□A→□B). While I think it is certainly the case that if
there is a modal necessity to A, and there is a necessity to the if-then relationship between
A and B, then the modal necessity of A entails a distribution of modal necessity to B. If A
is God’s willing of the existence of Chas and concurrence in Chas’ free choice, then it
indeed follows that whatever Chas freely chooses necessarily occurs. However, I
understand this modal necessity to indicate the necessity of a category of thing, namely,
whatever it is that Chas freely chooses. Contingency regarding the particularity of what
Chas chooses can survive this type of necessity.
By way of analogy, let us say that there is a choosing agent standing before three
doors (door p, q, and r), and behind each door is a chef. The respective chefs may freely
cook whatever they choose. Now, if there is a modal necessity to the choosing agent’s
choosing of door q, then there is a modal necessity that the choosing agent open the door
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to whatever it is that the chef behind door q cook. However, because the chef behind door
q freely chooses what he cooks, unbound by modal necessity, there is no necessity to the
particular dish that this necessary choice entails. The species of thing chosen is modally
necessary (whatever is behind door q); the particular is contingent and variable.
So in the same way I think it is possible for free choice to survive divine
determinism. Even if it is granted that God necessarily wills BPW, this does not mean all
that occurs in BPW is modally necessary. For if part of BPW is God’s willing that there
are free agents in BPW that accomplish whatever they freely choose, then modal
necessity applies only to the category of thing—whatever they freely choose—not to the
particular choice. God, in his foreknowledge, would still have certainty of what this
category of thing will yield—hence the decree entails a foreknown particular, or
hypothetical necessity—but metaphysically speaking, the particular could be otherwise
since it is grounded in the libertarian freedom of the agent decreed and upheld by divine
concourse, as argued in the previous section. (The distinction between the infallible and
the necessary is relevant here.)
Another way of making the same point is this. The problem of divine determinism
asks, in part, whether freedom can survive if the idea of God entails that he make only
one specific world. Framed in this way, the question may benefit from consideration of a
feature of Patristic literature. In the writings of the Church fathers generally, there is no
indication that multiple possible futures attach to a given world—an important contrast
with contemporary authors. I think it fair to say that contemporary thinkers often think in
terms of multiple possible futures attaching to one world or, perhaps more accurately, one
world system. Hence, if God considers creating possible world system 1 (PWS1), then
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several possible futures (PFs) attach to PWS1, and each coupling of PWS1 with a
different PF constitutes its own possible world (PW). Hence, PWS1 + PF1 = PW1; PWS1
+ PF2 = PW2; etc. This is the rationale behind the idea that, if Adam freely sins in PWS1,
then PWS1 + Adam freely sins constitutes one possible world, while PWS1 + Adam
freely does not sin constitutes a second possible world. This thinking is foreign to
Patristic literature, however.
What we see in the Church fathers, and on into early Medieval thought, is the idea
that a given world has a single future attached to it, namely, whatever future contingents
are foreknown to be true of that world. Even though the free creatures have multiple
potencies and freedom regarding what they choose, the law of excluded middle still
applies, such that whatever is future in that world is future. In other words, there is only
one answer to the question What is future? as applied to a given world. That future is
indeed contingent and could be otherwise, given the nature of free choice, but there is
still a knowable or determinate truth to what will be freely done in that world.62
Because we have focused on the Augustinian tradition throughout this project, I
will take Augustine as an example. As discussed in chapter 2 above, in book 5 of civitas
Dei, Augustine addresses Cicero’s concern that divination undermines free choice.63 His
reply is (1) the will is itself a cause that is of necessity free; (2) the Christian notion of
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providence sees God as bent on preserving free choice.64 For our purposes here, I want to
focus on the second point. Augustine develops a dynamic picture of the relationship
between God and creatures, placing the Christian understanding of providence and divine
decree in contrast to the Stoic notion of fate. Fate, for the Greeks, advances without
reference to human freedom: What the fates have woven before Zeus must be;65 all that is
left to freedom is whether what is fated occurs willfully (as per Zeno of Citium) or
ironically (as per Oedipus).66 Providence, by contrast, takes into account what is
foreknown about human freedom, dynamically weaving together God’s ends with the
free actions of men. In developing the point, Augustine inverts the foreknowledge
problem, arguing that the very concept of foreknowledge implies a subject-object
relationship: foreknowledge implies there is something in the subject to be foreknown.
Contrary to Cicero, who fears that foreknowledge implies necessity, Augustine argues
that foreknowledge demonstrates the opposite, namely, the future existence of wills that
make free choices.67 The balance here is between the ontic dependence of creatures upon
God’s decrees and the genuine freedom of creatures. Our existence as creatures is wholly
dependent upon God; yet, it is God who chooses to create free agents and permit them to
achieve what they will. Hence, God’s decrees in eternity display a synergistic subjectobject relationship rooted in foreknowledge and preservation of free choice: “A man does
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not sin unless he wills to sin; and if he had willed not to sin, then God would have
foreseen that refusal.”68
Notice that Augustine does not understand creaturely freedom to ground several
possible worlds—some in which a given agent does this and others in which he does that.
Rather, Augustine understands God’s decree that a given free agent exists and achieves
what he freely chooses to entail a single foreknown outcome that is foreseen because it
will be so. Unlike a view that understands God to determine which world is better—the
world in which Adam sins or the world in which Adam does not sin—the older view
understands divine prerogative to fall to the question of whether Adam exist; the
hypothetical necessity that attaches to the world in which Adam exists (e.g., Adam eats
from the tree) falls to Adam; God’s decree is permissive and in keeping with his decision
that Adam exist and have freedom. And Augustine is not alone.
I think it fair to say that Patristic writers generally do not seem to have a concept
of possible worlds subsisting in the mind of God that precede God’s decision to grant one
existence. Writers such as Tertullian speak as if God’s choice to create the world is the
very thing that grounds God’s foreknowledge of what will transpire in it. In fact,
Tertullian goes so far as to suggest that it would be unjust of God to interact with
creatures, or penalize them, on the basis of things they have not yet done. Hence, if it is
foreknown that man sins, God cannot justly revoke the gift of freedom on the basis of
that foreknowledge, since this would be to punish man for misconduct that he has not yet
engaged in nor would engage in if his freedom were revoked.69 The implication is that
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God cannot justly make decisions based on a merely possible world, but must interact
with actual creatures and actual worlds if he is to deal justly with creatures.
Now, combining this understanding of foreknowledge as linked to the actual only
with John of Damascus’ comments on providence, we arrive at the same problem at the
fore of this section. John of Damascus displays all the same assumptions concerning
foreknowledge as his fellow Patristic writers, but he adds to it the following view of
providence:
[P]rovidence is that will of God by which all existing things receive suitable
guidance through to their end. But, if providence is God’s will, then, according to
right reason, everything that has come about through providence has quite
necessarily come about in the best manner and that most befitting God, so that it
could not have happened in a better way.... God alone is by nature good and wise.
Consequently, in so far as He is good He provides, because one who does not
provide is not good. Even men and brute beasts naturally provide for their own
offspring, and the one that does not will incur blame. Then, in so far as He is wise
He provides for existing things in the very best way. 70
If we grant that God does not face a choice between multiple possible worlds, but creates
only one and knows only its future, and we add to this view that God’s act of creation and
all his subsequent acts of providence are (by their very concept) done in the very best
way, void of all deliberation, then we may ask the very same question of John that we
pose to Leibniz: Is our world and all that occurs in it absolutely necessary?
One feature of the answer is found in the qualification that John adds to his claim
that God does the best, and this qualification opens the door to the very reply offered
above. He states, “I am referring to those things which do not depend upon us, because
those which do depend upon us do not belong to providence, but to our own free will.”71
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In other words, John’s view of providence includes the idea that God deemed it best to
give to certain creatures free choice and permit them to act freely, even when their
choices are not the best. In this light, I think we can safely say that John presumes that
our world is the BPW (following from the idea of providence). But because one feature
of the best is the existence of free creatures, the particulars that attach to the BPW may
vary. Had the future that attached to our world include Adam not eating of the apple, for
example, this would not change the fact that ours is the best world system, that God’s
choices in our world would be done in the best way, or that God’s way of synergizing our
ends with his own would be done in the very best way. What would change is merely the
content added by us which providence engages.
Returning, then, to the case made earlier (viz., that creaturely freedom can survive
divine determinism if God necessarily wills the existence of free creatures and permit
them to act freely), John’s claims regarding providence is in keeping with this case. John
grants a categorical necessity that God always choose the best. Even if we infer from this
that it is necessary that God choose to create our world system and that it is equally
necessary that God conduct himself in the best possible way amid world history, it does
not follow that either necessity entails that every happening in our world is modally
necessary. For one of the things that the above necessities entails is that God create free
creatures and permit them to behave freely—a common assumption throughout Patristic
literature. Hence, even if we take the claim that God always does the best to indicate that
God lacks freedom of contrary choice (a claim neither I nor John of Damascus grant),
free variables would remain, given the existence of free creaturely agents and God’s
decree to permit them to choose freely.
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Building on this point, it is noteworthy that if the divine decree entails variables in
our world—namely, the free choices of creatures—this adds a reciprocal layer of modal
contingency to divine choice as well. For if providence entails that God do all things in
the very best way, but this best includes God giving it to creatures to determine certain
futurities, then God’s providential acts in history are not monergistic. Rather, God’s
providential acts are best in a synergistic sense.72 We can thus be certain that God has
orchestrated his ends in this world in the best way, given the fact of Adam’s sin, for
example, but if Adam’s sin is free in a libertarian sense and could be otherwise, the
orchestration of God’s ends (as well as the particularities of divine concourse) would
look different had Adam not sinned.
In this light, if the modal necessity applied to creation in the distribution axiom
entails only a necessary genus of thing (i.e., it is necessary that whatever a free
creaturely freely chooses come to pass), which leaves the particular choice contingent,
then the same follows with regard to the divine modal necessity in the distribution axiom:
God does things in the best possible way, but because this best entails the preservation of
free contingencies, the modal necessity that God do the best must apply to the genus of
divine action only. There is a reciprocal contingency here between free contingencies and
what constitutes the best relative to those contingencies. In other words,
□(A→B)→(□A→□B) holds true in reference to the God-world relationship if A refers to
the categorical best and B refers to the necessity of freedom entailed by the best;
however, because the categorical necessity of freedom entails contingent particulars, and
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best in the context of providence is synergistic, the particulars of providence must also
reflect the modality of freedom. Hence, on the synergistic particulars of providence,
◊C→◊D holds where C represents particular free choices and D is the best providential
use of these particulars in the orchestration of divine ends.73
Now, to be sure, this layer of modal contingency does not demonstrate freedom in
God. It merely hedges against the danger of absolute necessity in God’s decree, which
some fear could spill over into creation. The point is simply this: even if God is somehow
determined by his nature to do as he does and no different, this does not amount to
absolute necessity, since part of what God does is preserve freedom in creatures.
In sum, if Leibniz is working under the metaphysical approach to possible worlds
described in §2 above, then we have reason to think that even if God necessarily chooses
the BPW and this genus of divine action is modally necessary this would not mean that
the same necessity extends to free actions in the BPW. For one of the necessities to which
God’s wisdom and goodness bind him is his willing of the existence of free creatures, the
preservation of their choices, and his making the best use of what these creatures choose.
Hence, this modal necessity in God (should there be one) would not pass to the particular
choices free creatures make. Quite the contrary, this modal necessity would make it an
absolute necessity that creatures within the BPW are free.

3.2. Leibniz and Divine Freedom
The foregoing defense of contingency still presumes that divine determinism is an
implication of Leibniz’s view of providence. But is this so? Does Leibniz believe that
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God has free choice? If so, does Leibniz’s metaphysic leave adequate room for such a
belief?
In addressing these questions, I will begin by addressing one of the issues that is
more easily dealt with, namely, the issue of moral necessity. It will be recalled that in
chapters 2 and 3 this problem came to the fore. Some readers take Leibniz’s affirmation
that God acts by moral necessity (e.g., C 21) to be a denial of the power of contrariety
and thus an affirmation of psychological determinism.74 As we saw, however, Leibniz
merely affirms the very traditional position that God (and the blessed) always acts out of
virtue (ex virtute agant); there is no indication that this in itself entails psychological
determinism. Patristic writers recognize that God operates by moral necessity, but reject
outright divine determinism as entirely contrary to Christian theology;75 early Medieval
writers, such as Anselm, plainly identify God as operating in accord with moral necessity,
but simultaneously reject the notion that God’s choices displays modal necessity;76 and,
as we saw in chapter 2, both Medieval intellectualists and voluntarists recognize the
danger of inferring divine determinism from divine moral necessity, but both camps are
committed to avoiding this conclusion.77 The Reformed scholastics, as we saw, also echo
this conclusion. Franciscus Junius is clear that God is the freest of beings, and, though
recognizing that God operates out of moral necessity, Junius notes that God retains
freedom of contradiction with regard to singular goods and freedom of contrariety with
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regard to multiple goods.78 Franciscus Gomarus is equally clear on this point, and makes
additionally clear his denial of compatibilism in favor of libertarianism. For he sees a
mere lack of coercion as inadequate for true freedom (even falling rocks and dogs are
free from coercion); freedom of contrariety and contradiction refer to the real possibility
of the opposite outcome (PAP), the knowledge of the object remaining the same.79
Hence, there is clear precedence within the Augustinian tradition for affirming both
moral necessity in God and libertarian choice with regard to God’s specific acts.
The more serious difficulties surrounds the question of whether God’s specific
acts are absolutely necessary, given Leibniz’s claim that the very concept of God entails
that God know and choose the best. For even if the claim of the previous subsection that
the best is relative to creaturely choice is so, this only demonstrates that the
circumstances with which providence deals could be otherwise; it does not indicate that
the possibility of contrary action in God is grounded in divine freedom. Instead, we have
only established that God, acting relative to free creatures, may well have acted otherwise
had his creatures acted otherwise. Can divine determinism be avoided, given Leibniz’s
insistence that God necessary knows and wills the best? I believe it can.
To begin answering this question, I will return once again to John of Damascus,
whom, we have noted, is a forerunner of Leibniz’s claim that the very concept of
providence indicates that God always knows and does the best.80 In keeping with the
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faculty psychology of the Church fathers, John understands creaturely deliberation
regarding means and ends to indicate ignorance, fallibility, and corruptibility—ignorance
because it shows uncertainty regarding the good; fallibility because the creature is
susceptible to apparent goods, rather than true goods; and corruptibility because the
creature is open to goods inferior to the highest good. Neither ignorance, nor fallibility,
nor corruptibility applies to God, however. Hence, John concludes that deliberation is
wrongly applied to the deity who always knows the best means relative to any given end
and is always disposed toward the good. In keeping with these premises, the extension to
the conclusion that our world, being chosen by God, is thereby the BPW is not surprising.
John of Damascus, as we saw above, explicitly affirms this implication in his treatment of
providence.81 Given Leibniz’s familiarity with and use of this particular passage in John,
it is worth asking whether John, the forerunner of Leibniz, understands this conclusion to
entail divine determinism.
John does not spend a good deal of time on the question of divine freedom.
However, in the context of expositing God’s immutability and, subsequently, his eternal
acts of knowing, seeing, and willing, John offers a very brief statement aimed at the
preservation of divine freedom amid divine immutability: “And, finally, there is the fact
that all that He wills He can do, even though He does not will all the things that He can
do—for He can destroy the world, but He does not will to do so.”82 John indicates that
divine power is capable of carrying out whatever God wills, but this does not mean that
God does everything of which he is capable. In short, John echoes the standard patristic
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position that God possesses the power of choice regarding how he uses his power and
thus acts freely, unbound by necessity.83 To speak anachronistically, John defends the
idea that God has both freedom of contrariety (there are things that God’s power makes
possible but God does not do) and freedom of contradiction (though he has chosen to
preserve our world, he could choose to destroy it).
In his Greek context, John presumes a distinction between the nature (ousia or
physis) of a thing and its operations (energeia). Just as the mind has a simple rational
nature but many operations (math, logic, linguistics, etc.), so with God, the divine ousia
is one and simple, but the operations (kata energeia) of its innate powers (kata dynamus)
are many.84 Such a distinction was thought vital in Greek patristic thought (a) because
they presumed both the simplicity of the divine nature and the irreducible multiplicity of
divine operations,85 and (b) because, despite the natural necessity that God is what he is,
God retains freedom regarding his chosen use of his natural operative power.86 The latter
point is the Greek patristic equivalent of the later Latin scholastic distinction between
God’s absolute power (potentia absoluta) and ordained power (potentia ordinata).87
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John’s rejoinders to divine determinism have clear precedence in Leibniz’s own
texts. Leibniz affirms, with John, that God knows all determinate truths without
deliberation (G 6.126; 129; 131-2), and Leibniz affirms that God never fails to do the best
when acting; hence, whatever world he has chosen to create must be the BPW (G 6.4950; 106-7; 127; 131-2). Moreover, Leibniz affirms, like John, that God’s power grounds a
great many possibles (even if John does not develop this into a possible world
metaphysic) that are nowhere actual (e.g., G 6.115; 126). Yet, the most significant
qualifier John offers is that God has freedom of contrariety and of contradiction. As
argued above, John understands providence to always do the best in whatever world God
has chosen to create, but John is clear that God need not do anything, and thus, to make
the world and uphold its ongoing existence is a matter of divine choice. Can Leibniz say
the same?
In answer to this question, I begin by returning to a point made in chapter 4 in my
treatment of Theodicée. It will be recalled that in my treatment of free choice, I identified
two key features of choice, identified by Leibniz, that protect against determinism. The
first is that the mind is able to slow and redirect patterns of thoughts, stirring and working
within various determined pathways. We illustrated the point with reference to a metal
ball in a maze that could be tilted this way and that.88 Unfortunately, this solution is of no
help in reference to God. For the analogy presumes the successive and mutative existence
of creatures, the assailing passions, and other influences that prompt certain involuntary
movements with which the mind must work. Such realities do not apply to God.
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The second point raised is more helpful in the current context, namely, the
scholastic distinction between volo (choice), nolo (active resistance), and non volo
(passive refraining from choice). I argued that, while Leibniz maintains that the will
always chooses in keeping with the dominant inclination, this does not in itself require
determinism or undermine contrary choice because the creature need not choose at all.
Here the concept of non volo is key, for if the statement the creature need not choose is
read as nolo, then this is simply a negative choice that must therefore reflect the dominant
inclination. However, if the creature need not choose is understood as non volo, this
indicates a lack of movement or passivity, which is not a choice in the proper sense of
opting for one option over another; it is a withholding of choice. This seems to be the best
reading of John of Damascus’ claim that God need not do anything of which he is
capable. While John would not use the Latin terminology of non volo, it was common for
the Church fathers to insist that no passion or reason can move the will, which is
precisely why the will must move itself;89 hence, John’s claim is that only God’s will can
move God to action.
The value of the non volo / nolo distinction in the creaturely context is that it
enables Leibniz to affirm that action is always in keeping with the dominant inclination
without presuming determinism. For Leibniz could affirm, as argued in chapter 4, that if
Etheline chooses at T1, Etheline will choose in keeping with her dominant inclination at
T1; however, Etheline is free to not choose (non volo) at T1 and wait until T2 or T3. If
Etheline refrain from choosing at T1 and choose at T2 instead, Etheline’s dominant
inclination may well be different than at T1. Hence, determinism does not follow simply
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because the will always chooses in keeping with the dominant inclination. For the will is
never compelled to movement by any inclination; it remains free to choose (volo) or not
choose (non volo). Could this nolo / non volo distinction be used by Leibniz in defense of
divine freedom?
On first blush, the answer appears to be No, or at least not in the same way.
Unlike creatures, God is immutable; hence, no mutation in inclining reasons occurs. It
would thereby seem to follow that whatever inclining reason toward the BPW is in God,
that reason must be an extension of his nature (i.e., his knowledge, wisdom, and
goodness), and God necessarily chooses as he does. That is, even though it is God’s
choice to do the best in every instance, and this is the first of the divine decrees (G 7.30910), this decree is the only choice compatible with the divine nature. (We will return to
the question of whether Leibniz’s theology negates divine freedom of contrariety in a
moment, but for now, let us grant it.) While we cannot say the same of God that we say
of Etheline—namely, that if God refrains from choosing for a time his inclining reasons
will shift—it is important to recognize nonetheless that Leibniz grants the freedom to not
choose (non volo) to God. In a statement on modal contingency, Leibniz writes, “And
therefore, one may concede that it is necessary to God to choose the best [optimum], or
the best is necessary; yet, it does not follow that to choose is necessary, because no
demonstration is given that the best is. And here in this place we have the recent
distinction of some between the necessity of the consequence and consequent…. [I]n the
end the necessity is a necessity of the consequence, not consequent, that … because the
best is supposed from that granted hypothesis of the infallible election of the best is
necessary” (A 6.4:1652). Leibniz here grants that if God choose, he chooses the best—
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there is a necessity of the consequence (i.e., of the if-then relationship) at play. What he
does not grant, however, is that there is a modal necessity in divine choice, full stop. For,
as John of Damascus affirms, God need not choose at all. In short, God possesses
freedom of contradiction.
At the very least, then, Leibniz is able to stay the necessity of divine choice,
preserving God’s freedom in one instance, namely, whether to choose. The BPW may
well follow necessarily from divine choice should it occur, but the occurrence of divine
choice does not follow necessarily from the divine nature or the idea of God; it has its
roots in divine freedom. This would explain why Leibniz insists that our world is
contingent because it is a product of divine freedom (e.g., G 6.50-1; 53-4; 216-7). If
divine choice follows necessarily from the idea of God, then God’s modal existence
would extend to the BPW (as per the distribution axiom). However, Leibniz stays this
necessity by affirming that God can withhold choice (A 6.4:1652).
Now, is this the only room Leibniz leaves for divine freedom? Is divine choice
limited to the withholding of choice (non volo) or choose the BPW? Or might Leibniz
have room for freedom of contrariety in God? To answer this question, we will need to
look beyond John of Damascus to Medieval scholasticism (and beyond) in which divine
choice is coupled with something much closer to the possible world metaphysics with
which Leibniz is working. In particular, I will look at the approaches of Thomas Aquinas
and John Duns Scotus, respectively.
In keeping with John of Damascus, Aquinas affirms that the concept of
providence entails that God always do the best.90 To see how, we must review the
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difference between faculty psychology as understood in reference to creatures versus
God, as discussed in chapter 2. Aquinas presumes that final causality is rooted in the
nature of the given thing—the eye for seeing, the ear for hearing, and so on.91 In
reference to man, what the will desires is good, and the particular good the will desires is
happiness. That is to say, happiness is the overarching end, or final cause, that governs all
human choice.92 While there is no liberty of choice with regard to this ruling end,
freedom of choice remains in reference to subordinate ends and the means of achieving
these subordinate ends.93 In keeping with the governing end of happiness, Richie may
choose life over death and thus will to eat rather than starve; and in reference to the
subordinate end, eat, Richie has a freedom of means—eat salad or pastrami. Richie may
also refrain from choosing (non volo), should none of these means be deemed desirable
and not choosing be compatible with choosing life over death.94
Several differences emerge between divine and creaturely choice. First, as already
stated in reference to John of Damascus, a key difference between God and creatures is
that creatures are fallible and corruptible. As such, a creature may fail to see the true good
and associate deficient subordinate ends with its final cause as well as deficient means
with that subordinate end.95 In the case of God, however, neither fallible judgment nor
corruption is possible.96 Second, according to Aquinas, God himself is the object of his
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own willing. In other words, divine goodness is to God what happiness is to man.97 Third,
appetite in creatures is directed at an end it lacks and thus action brings a movement from
potentiality toward actuality; however, such a movement is inapplicable in reference to
divine goodness because God lacks nothing. The perfection of divine goodness is in fact
what (or part of what) preserves divine freedom, for Aquinas. God may will his own
goodness without willing creation. For divine goodness has no necessary attachment to
any of the subordinate ends or means associated with those subordinate ends precisely
because God’s goodness lacks nothing and is not enhanced by his actions. To quote
Aquinas, “Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily
will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can exist without other things.”98
This third point is important to Aquinas’ understanding of divine freedom.
Aquinas speaks of the willing of both means and of ends. For example, he says, “if
anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the
end will be the cause of his willing the means.”99 Aquinas does not exclude such talk in
reference to God; instead, he offers the qualification that God does not understand means
subsequent to ends, but in conjunction with them: “Hence, as in God to understand the
cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the
cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills
the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but
does not will this on account of that.”100 As in the case of creatures, the governing end
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(for creatures happiness, for God divine goodness) canvasses all choices. Every choice is
under this larger genus of acts, and in both God and creatures, there is no freedom with
respect to that governing end. However, this does not mean that there is no freedom
whatsoever with regard to ends. For there is a freedom with regard to ends subordinate to
this final cause. A great many choices, including the choice to not create at all, are in
keeping with divine goodness. The existence of PW1 or PW2 does not increase divine
goodness; it is only a product of it.
In short, it is necessary that God will his own goodness, but because this goodness
is perfect in itself, nothing willed attaches to it necessarily. We might think of it as if the
governing end (divine goodness) constitutes the genus of whatever God wills; the
subordinate end for which God creates the world is a species beneath this genus; and
whatever God does in that world in service to that subordinate end constitutes the
particulars within that species. Given the necessary connection between means and ends,
the connection between the species and particulars is necessary; however, because the
genus (divine goodness) has no necessary entailment, any of the species (subordinate
ends) is in the purview of divine choice.
Leibniz’s own texts offer little clarity on this particular solution to the problem of
divine choice. No doubt Leibniz is working with an older faculty psychology that
presumes judgment in reference to both means and ends (e.g., G 6.116-7; 119; 143-6).
Moreover, Leibniz is clear that God is operating in relation to certain ends—God is
rational, not arbitrary (e.g., G 6.218-21). What Leibniz leaves unclear is whether God has
any liberty of subordinate ends. He is quite clear that means are not a matter of
indifference to God because, like a grand Architect, he gives careful consideration to both
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the whole and all the particulars contained therein (G 6.144-6). Because subordinate ends
are themselves a means relative to the governing end, presumably subordinate ends are
not a matter of indifference either. Later Leibnizians would invoke the idea of
subordinate ends in response to the charge of necessitarianism.101 But I think it would be
a hard case to establish Leibniz’s own sympathies for this solution.
Putting aside the question of textual evidence, a rather serious question lingers in
my mind when considering the viability of Aquinas’ solution for Leibniz. The first is
raised by Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). To wit, even if there is no
necessary connection between divine goodness and its subordinate ends (the way there is
between subordinate ends and their means) we still must ask: What is the basis for God
choosing a subordinate end? It will be recalled that in chapter 4, the defense of
libertarian freedom still granted that the will, when it wills, wills in keeping with the
then-dominant inclination. Given that God’s inclinations do not undergo change, I see an
undesirable dichotomy afoot. On the one hand, we could force Aquinas to admit that the
divine intellect has a reason for judging one subordinate end preferably to others—that is,
for judging it best—and this admission would beg the question of why God does not see
this subordinate end in conjunction with the governing end, just as he sees the best means
in conjunction with subordinate ends. For at the end of the day, the chosen subordinate
end is a means to the governing end. On the other hand, if Aquinas denied this connection
to preserve God’s freedom of contrariety (which is what this solution aims at) we could
read Aquinas as endorsing equipoise. That is, because there are a host of subordinate ends
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compatible with the governing end, and no subordinate end is tied by necessity to this
governing end, there is a certain indifference in divine choice concerning subordinate
ends—the practical intellect offers no decisive judgment to the will. This latter option, of
course, would be rejected out of hand by Leibniz, as it makes God’s choice arbitrary and
irrational, and it espouses the chimera of indifference (e.g., G 6.218-21). Applied to
Leibniz, then, this solution is no solution at all, since (from what I can tell) it demands
either equipoise—a demand Leibniz could never meet—or a rejection of freedom of
contrariety, which is the very problem it attempts to solve.
The only alternative I see under this particular solution is this. One could take the
one horn of the dilemma above that does not eliminate freedom of contrariety (viz.,
equipoise), and argue that divine choice can still be rational and satisfy PSR. Let us
suppose that because divine goodness is fully actualized and ontologically independent of
creation, all subordinate ends are a matter of indifference, so long as they are compatible
with God’s justice and goodness. Reason therefore offers no judgment that may incline
God toward one or another. Here, we arrive in the Buridan’s ass scenario, so let us use
this scenario as a starting point. As Lloyd Strickland has pointed out, the ass really faces
three choices: pile of hay 1, pile of hay 2, or starve. If the ass has rejected the third choice
(i.e., starvation), then he has a sufficient reason for choosing randomnly between hay 1
and hay 2.102 Such a random choice would be the most rational decision available. And
one could therefore argue, as Richard Swinburne has for different reasons, that God “has
reason to use some process of random selection or some arbitrary feature of a world to
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determine which to create.”103 One need not go as far as Swinburne on Aquinas’ solution;
one could simply affirm that God randomly chooses a subordinate end, and this
narrowing of the field, as it were, allows the intellect to offer definitive judgment
concerning the best means to this subordinate end. God therefore has a clear rationale for
his chosen means, but the subordinate end under which these sit is randomly selected.
The difficulty I see with this solution is threefold. First, it treats non volo as an
affirmative choice. In other words, the solution presumes that God faces two choices:
create or do not create. Presented in this way, however, God faces a choice between volo
and nolo. But the latter presumes that an affirmative judgment has been made in
reference to creation, and the will must decide whether to operate in accord with that
judgment (volo) or refuse it (nolo). In the above scenario, however, the problem is that no
affirmative judgment has been made that might be refused. Thus, the choice is one
between random choice (volo) or passive restraint of choice (non volo). In this light, the
choice is singular: Do you want to act randomly? If the answer is No, and we can easily
see this as the response from a rational and good agent, non volo follows.
The response I anticipate to this objection brings us to the second difficulty I have
with this solution, namely, that it is better to create than to not create. I expect that some
might argue that the choice is better framed, not by randomness, but by creation: Would
you like to create a world? The negative reply is not as obvious when framed in this way.
However, I suspect the contemporary impulse to suggest that it is better for God to create
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than to not create is due to a divergence from the older Patristic and Medieval
metaphysics. My guess is that there is some sympathy for the notion that God gains
something by creating; that perhaps his goodness or justice or love is not fully actual
without objects on which to bestow them—they are mere potential. Suffice it to say that
neither Aquinas nor Leibniz nor any other orthodox Patristic or Medieval figure would
grant this. While it is part and parcel of creaturely existence that we are filled with
potentiality that is not moved into actuality without active harnessing of this potency, this
is not true of God. By way of analogy, I have the ability to learn to play the piano. If I
begin to practice, this act will display whatever level of perfection I currently possess, but
it will also serve to move my potentiality in this area into actuality. Let us say, however,
that I harness my maximal potential in the area of piano, so that I became the greatest
pianist the world has ever known, and I have no room for growth—no further potentiality
to move into actuality. Two things would follow. First, when I play, I would not be
moving potentiality into actuality, but merely displaying outwardly by operation
(energeia) an inward perfection already possessed and fully actualized. Second, if I sat
passively before a piano and told someone I was the greatest pianist the world has ever
known, this statement would be true, even though I am not actively playing piano. And if
I refused to play for that person, it would remain true. The latter part of the analogy is the
closest creaturely approximation we have for God. In his act of creation, God does not
move his own potential into actuality; he merely displays outwardly by this operation a
perfection fully actualized and already possessed. This is what Aquinas means when he
suggests that God’s goodness is complete in itself and not enhanced by any subordinate
end. In this light, it is not as obvious as one might think that God would choose creating
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over not creating, anymore than a pianist might choose to play rather than not play.
Moreover, if we frame the question by combining both of the above characterizations, we
get this: Do you want to create a world randomly? Again, there is reason to think that a
just and good agent would answer No, especially if nothing of his justice and goodness is
enhanced by an affirmative reply.
The third difficulty I have with this solution is that I am unconvinced it enhances
divine freedom. For the end result of this solution is not that God possesses freedom of
contrariety, since he still inevitably links the best means with his chosen subordinate end.
It merely adds a layer of randomness to the choosing process. Aside from the fact that I
think Leibniz would be appalled by such an idea, I think this layer of randomness is both
dangerous and unnecessary. Regarding the former, a great many of Leibniz’s responses to
Bayle build on the insistence that God does not randomly condemn any man or randomly
allow evil. Rather, he justly and dutifully considers his obligations to every individual
alongside his duty to the whole, and seeks to bring about the maximal good possible amid
this complex network of duties. If, however, the subordinate end that points God to our
world is perfectly random, then it seems that evil truly is the product of blind chance
against which God battles. As for the point at which it is unnecessary, this randomness at
best protects against the modal necessity of divine choice and thus against the distribution
of that necessity to our world; it does not produce freedom of contrariety in God. Yet, this
protection against modal necessity has already been satisfied by God’s ability to refrain
from choosing (non volo). Therefore, I see no reason to entertain this so-called solution.
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An alternative solution is found in Scotus, and it is found in the context of the
very theory of divine knowledge that I have argued is closest to Leibniz’s own.104 In
Lectura I.39.5.42-44, Scotus argues for a voluntarist reading of divine choice by taking
aim at the intellecustlist position. Scotus poses the basic question: What produces the acts
of the first cause, God’s intellect or will?105 Not surprisingly, Scotus answers God’s will.
Scotus’ contention is rooted in his concern that an intellectualist view of choice
undermines divine freedom and leads to absolute necessity. There are two layers to the
problem, but both build on Scotus’ insistence that necessity follows from necessity (as
per the distribution axiom). The first layer of the problem identifies divine knowing as a
modal necessity, and submits that if one of the things known with necessity is divine
choice, then the modal necessity of divine knowing passes to divine choosing, lest the
divine will falsify the divine intellect, which is impossible. The second layer is that if
there is modal necessity in the knowing of divine intellect, and the will necessarily
follows the intellect, as in an intellectualist framework, then that modal necessity is
passed on to divine choice. If the First Cause (God) operates by absolute necessity, then,
according Scotus, that modal necessity is passed on to secondary causes as well. Because
Scotus takes it as given that our world contains contingency, he thinks it evident that the
intellectualist view is false, and divine choice must be rooted in the will.106
Now, one may legitimately wonder whether the type of necessity at work in the
divine intellect is, for Aquinas, what Scotus makes it out to be. However, I am less
concerned here with whether Scotus’ critique of Aquinas is a fair reading as I am with
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Scotus’ solution to the problem of divine choice. Though Scotus is convinced that the
intellectualist view must be rejected on the grounds that it yields necessitarianism, Scotus
recognizes a serious problem facing voluntarism, to wit: if voluntarism means that the
will simply contradicts the intellect, then voluntarism implies that the will is evil. To
explain, according to the faculty psychology of the Medievals, intellective judgments aim
at discerning the good. If the will contradicts the intellect without reason, then the will
does evil for evil’s sake—choosing arbitrarily contrary to what the intellect tells it is
good. Moreover, in the case of God, such contrary movements would be against what is
known to be good, not what is fallibly judged good. Therefore, while Scotus feels bound
to defend voluntarism out of concern for genuine freedom, he recognizes that an adequate
defense must show that voluntarist choice cannot simply be choice that contradicts the
good without reason.107
Scotus’ solution is the very differentiation between God’s speculative knowledge
and God’s necessary knowledge discussed in §2 above. As noted in that section, Scotus
understands the truth or falsity of contingent propositions to depend on the divine will for
grounding. These contingent truths, though still known to the divine intellect via the
divine essence according to their being knowable, fall to God’s speculative knowledge
and are grounded by divine choice, which is precisely the rationale behind the distinction
between mere logical possibles and grounded real possibles explained above. Therefore,
the divine will is what grounds the content of divine knowledge judged by the intellect.108
How this addresses the problem of divine freedom is that it adds a layer to the
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relationship between intellect and will that is foreign creation, namely, that the
determinate truths which the intellect judges are first grounded by the will.
By way of analogy, let us think anthropomorphically about the intellect-will
relationship, as if the intellect were one boy (Uzi) and the will were another boy (Ari),
and let us think of the means considered by the intellect as assorted colored pencils. In
creatures, we can think of the relationship this way. Uzi and Ari sit at a table together,
and on the table are various colored pencils. Uzi selects the pencil he thinks best and
presents it to Ari. For the intellectualist, Ari is blind and must therefore trust Uzi’s
judgment. For the voluntarist, Ari may send Uzi back to the drawing board, as it were, or
merely refuse to choose any pencil. Applied to God, this analogy creates the difficulty
with which we are currently dealing, namely, that Uzi is infallible and the pencil he
chooses is not thought best but is best, and therefore, Ari is cannot send Uzi back to the
drawing board unless Ari is corrupt and opposes the good. However, Scotus’ theory of
divine knowledge demands a modification to the analogy when applied to God. Under
Scotus’ theory of divine knowledge, Uzi and Ari first sit at a table on which are no
pencils, and it is Ari that places a myriad of pencils on the table for Uzi’s consideration.
Even if we grant that Uzi is infallible in his judgment of the best, this judgment varies
depending on what is placed before him. If Ari places red, yellow, and blue before Uzi,
blue may be chosen as the best; but if Ari places red, green, and blue before Uzi, he may
choose green. Both choices would be true (let us say) to Uzi’s infallible judgment of the
best, but in both cases the judgment is different because what is present is different.
Hence, the choice is best, given what is available. In short, Scotus protects divine
freedom by placing its choice not only after but also before the judgment of the intellect.
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Is such a solution available to Leibniz? I think it is. I have already argued in Part 2
that the theory of divine knowledge Leibniz advocates is closest to Scotus.109 And the
above nuance does not change my assessment. Leibniz is quite clear that truths are
foreseen because they are determinate (G 6.124). If Leibniz does indeed hold that
contingents must be grounded by the will, then unless a proposition is made determinate
by the divine will (i.e., is grounded), then it is not foreseen by the intellect nor included in
its judgments; and we have reason to believe that Leibniz holds this view. We have seen
that he sides with the predeterminators on the point that it is not possible to “know a
contingent event in a way that is independent of knowledge of its causes” (G 6.125-6),
and this includes knowledge of the First Cause. As we saw in chapter 3, this is precisely
why Leibniz postulates two decrees by God, one in the realm of the possible that grounds
contingents and another in the realm of the actual that adds existence to a particular series
(C 23; cf. G 6.147-8); and we have seen that Leibniz continues to affirm that the divine
decrees are represented in divine reason as part of its concept of possible worlds (in signo
rationis) (G 6.147). Thus, there is reason to think Leibniz does understand the will to first
make propositions determinate so that they may be judged. Moreover, the idea that the
will is active in the determination of truth prior to any judgment would make sense of
Leibniz’s portrait of God as entering into all the details of a given possible world and
“having pondered upon everything and compared it with other possible sequences” (G
6.148).
I do see three potential objections to this theory, however, that merit attention.
The first is this. It could be objected that the contingents are part of the eternal verities
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(e.g., G 6.126); hence, the notion of a divine choice preceding these determinate truths is
impossible. However, as has already been noted in chapter 4, this is not a problem for
Scotus’ theory, since he understands the determination of truths by the will to be an
eternal decision by God.110 The prior in this instance is a logical, not temporal order.
Second, Leibniz suggests that “all conditional futurities must be comprised” in the
eternal verities (G 6.126), which one could take to mean that there is no divine choice
with reference to conditional futurities, since all conditional futurities are present. A
conceptual error is afoot in this objection, however. Returning to the analogy of Uzi and
Ari, the objection presumes that, as in the analogy, Ari has various colored pencils
beneath the table. If he presents orange, blue, and red, the reason he could have presented
green, yellow, and brown is because he has green, yellow, and brown pencils. Yet, this is
precisely where the analogy breaks down. For if we think of future contingents in this
way, we arrive at a picture in which the will has already every contingent that it could
possibly ground but only selectively makes these available to the intellect for judgment.
But this is not the case in the Scotist theory of divine knowledge. Rather, whatever the
will grounds is what is knowable and thus known by the intellect; if a contingent is not
grounded by the divine will it is not a future conditional. Analogically, it would closer to
think of Ari as producing colored pencils ex nihilo, and if he does not produce a certain
colored pencil, it is not hidden; rather, it does not exist. So, it is with conditionals
grounded by divine choice. On the Scotist theory of divine knowledge, one can truly say
that all future conditionals are present to the divine intellect because any that have not
been grounded by the will are not future conditionals. This is not to say that the will
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could not have grounded other future conditionals, but it is to say that the only future
conditionals that are, are those the will has grounded.
The third difficulty is the most serious. This objection asks why the will grounded
those future conditionals that it did in fact ground and not others. In other words, is the
first act of divine will truly arbitrary in the sense of being will void of reason? I see two
possible replies. First, this objection may well slip into the same conceptual error as the
previous objection, as if the will randomly selects a certain set of conditionals amongst
others; but this, once again, is not the concept in play. (I will not rehearse the reply of the
previous paragraph here.) This point leads to the other line of reply.
The second response is that there is a certain level of ignorance that must be
admitted here, since we have no reference point in creation to which we may appeal; for
the layer of choice added here is not part of creaturely experience. The closest
approximation at which I can arrive is the imagination. Let us say, for analogy’s sake, I
want to write a story about a fantastical creature. I will begin to produce possible
creatures in my mind for consideration. My imagination will be limited by the laws of
logic, and will take its cues from what I know of the Great Chain of Being. And those
possibilities generated will be judged relative to my aims in the story. For my part, I
cannot pinpoint precisely what governs the generation of possibilities in such an
imaginative exercise, other than my desire to create (in a literary sense) something. I am
confident it is not random, and I have a clear sense that I may direct and redirect the
process, but there is a level of inscrutability to the process itself. Granting that my mind’s
ability to direct and redirect thought is reflective of my libertarian freedom and that I am
correct that the process is not random, I can affirm that the process is free, rational, and
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could be otherwise. But I can say little beyond this. I will return to this point concerning
inscrutability in the next section. For now, let it stand.
In light of the foregoing, what can we conclude regarding Leibniz’s ability to
avoid divine determinism? Based on the foregoing, Leibniz has available to him at least
three ways forward:
(1) Even if we grant that the divine intellect may inevitably arrive at the judgment
that our world is the BPW, such that this judgment could not be otherwise, the
intellect cannot move God to action. Hence, it remains with the divine will to
choose in keeping with this judgment (volo) or to refrain from choice (non voloi).
At the very least, then, it is a matter of freedom whether God create or not create
the BPW.
(2) Though God has no liberty with regard to his governing end, nor with regard to
the association of means and subordinate ends, it could be argued that God has
freedom of ends subordinate. Because any number of subordinate ends is
compatible with divine goodness, God has freedom of contrariety regarding
which subordinate end to choose in service to the governing end of his own
goodness. Therefore, even if God necessarily chooses the best means to any given
subordinate end, it is not necessary that God choose any particular subordinate
end.
(3) Should the argument for contrariety from subordinate ends be rejected, the Scotist
theory of divine knowledge offers the solution that because contingent
propositions must be grounded by the divine will, the intellect can only judge
those possibles grounded in the speculative knowledge of God. While the divine
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intellect may necessarily incline toward one possible as best, the range of
possibles grounded and known by the intellect for judgment is ultimately
determined by divine choice. Therefore, God’s freedom of contrariety is
preserved, not because the intellect may fail to be inclined toward the best, but
because the best is a judgment of options that are first grounded by the will.
Any one of these replies in itself could preserve divine choice. Even if God has no
freedom of contrariety, as per solutions (2) and (3), the fact that God can withhold action
altogether, such that there might be no world at all, is an affirmation of freedom of
contradiction in God. This solution has clear textual support in Leibniz, so we can be
confident that Leibniz denies divine determinism in this very basic sense. As for whether
divine choice goes beyond freedom of contradiction, this falls to the second two
solutions. As noted above, solution (2) was advocated by later Leibnizians; however, I
find its viability in reference to Leibniz himself to be questionable at best. As for solution
(3), though it does show God to have freedom of contrariety after the judgment of the
intellect, it does provide a way of thinking of divine freedom of election prior to this
judgment. I think this solution is, at the very least, compatible with Leibniz’s writings,
and has the merit of explaining his more active depictions of God in reference to possible
worlds. For my part, I am inclined to think that Leibniz is able to defend divine freedom
of specification, given his theory of divine knowledge. But I suspect some readers would
be less than satisfied with the appeal to inscrutability, and this anticipation dissatisfaction
brings us to the final section of this chapter.
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4. Postcript on the Nature of Freedom
While I suspect that the foregoing is satisfactory to many libertarian readers, I
also expect thatcompatibilist readers to be less than satisfied. More specifically, I suspect
that the compatibilist would insist on invoking Leibniz’s PSR at every turn, demanding a
reason or cause for the choice made, and in so doing would attempt to reduce divine
choice to psychological determinism. With regard to God’s freedom of contradiction
(volo / non volo), I anticipate that the compatibilist would press this solution along the
following lines: Is not the choice to not create one choice among many subordinate ends
that is in competition with other subordinate ends? And does not the intellect’s judgment
of subordinate ends necessitate that the divine will be left with only one choice, namely,
the best? Regarding the freedom of subordinate ends, I anticipate that the compatibilist
would ask: Is not the subordinate end a means to the governing end? If so, does it not
follow that God, in seeing the best means with its given end, necessarily link the best
subordinate end with the governing end? The implication is again one of psychological
determinism. And, with regard to the will being the ground of God’s speculative
knowledge, I expect the compatibilist to inquire: Why did the divine will choose to
ground these possibles and not other possibles? The implication is simply that a reason
must be given, lest God’s choice proves to be irrational and arbitrary, and therefore, the
choice to ground certain possibles and not others must fall again into psychological
determinism.
In this string of objections, what becomes evident is both the fundamental
disconnect on first principles between libertarians and compatibilists and common
misunderstandings of the nature of choice in traditional faculty psychology. Beginning
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with the latter, there is a sense in which the compatibilist line of inquiry betrays a
reductionist view of the nature of will, a view that faculty psychology aims at avoiding.
By continually pressing for the reason or cause for the will choosing as it does, the
objector reduces will to intellect, making the will merely the final step in a sequence of
intellective judgments. Such is the point of the faculty psychology of the scholastics,
namely, to prevent intellective deliberations from producing action without any selfmoving faculty of choice that may freely stay the movement or initiate it. This is
precisely why Leibniz distinguishes a soul with understanding only from a soul with
understanding and will (G 6.122-3). The very point of the intellect-will distinction is to
account for the phenomenon of freedom. The intellect arrives at judgments, but these
judgments do not move the rational creature. An act of will is required. Hence, intellect
may present its judgment, but no movement occurs simply by virtue of this fact; the will
is the moving faculty, and if it does not act on the intellective judgment, that judgment
has no bearing on the choice of the being. Hence, the above lines of inquiry which press
for the cause of divine choosing, as if the cause were an intellective judgment, ultimately
aim at obliterating the intellect-will distinction by reducing will to intellect.
Along similar lines, there seems to be an reductionist view of non volo as well.
The type of objections anticipated above tend to treat not-willing as one of many means
or subordinate ends that the intellect judges, as if non volo is identical to nolo. Quite the
contrary, the freedom of the will, as espoused in older faculty psychology, includes
freedom of contrariety (will p or will ~p) and contradiction (will p or not will p).
However, not willing is not merely one of many means, as if the intellect were deciding
which end is the best end and not doing anything is one possible means. Instead, non volo
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recognizes that no intellective judgment moves the will, for the will alone can move
itself. Hence, while the intellect may offer to the will its judgments regarding any number
of given ends—just as the passions may press in upon the agent, bidding action—the will
need not act at all. Non volo is not one of the means judged, but merely a
phenomenological fact that nothing outside the will compels it to move, for not moving at
all is within the free capacity of the will. To somehow press this capacity into one of the
means judged is to again try and reduce the movements of the will to merely an
intellective judgment that necessarily moves the individual.
A third reductionist tendency in play is that there is an apparent conflation of
reasons and causes. Let us take the phenomenon of creaturely choice as expounded in the
above in chapter 4, §1.3. If Chas finds himself tempted by a seductress, he will be
assailed by inclining reasons from both his passions and his rational nature. These
competing incentives oscillate in a competition for dominance. At T1 the dominant
inclination may be Chas’ conscience, while at T2 Chas’ passions and desire for sexual
pleasure may take the upper hand. In keeping with Leibniz’s claims concerning choice, if
Chas wills, he wills in keeping with the dominant inclination. However, there is no
necessity in his choosing. The reason is that Chas need not choose at T1 or T2. If he wills
at T1 he wills in keeping with his conscience, since it is the dominant inclination. But
because inclinations incline without determining or necessitating action, Chas can refrain
from willing until T2 and thus will in keeping with his passions. Or he could refrain from
willing at all and simply not will with regard to the choice at hand.
The reason this point is important is because it highlights the distinction between
reason and cause. It is quite true that the choosing of Chas is rational and his choice is for
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a reason. Should Chas will retreat at T1, Chas’ reason is that his conscience is the
dominant inclination. Should Chas will adultery at T2, Chas’ reason is that his passions
are dominant. However, the cause of Chas’ choosing is his free spontaneity. As R.
Cranston Paull has argued, Leibniz’s PSR does not prevent free decisions from
constituting sufficient reasons: “the fact that the chooser has the specific [nature] that he
does provides a sufficient reason for the miraculous choice.”111 Aspects of Leibniz’s
writings may seem contrary to this, such as Leibniz’s mockery of the Jesuit notion that
freedom has a privileged status among creation of moving without cause (G 6.127-8).
However, it should be remembered that the context of such statements is always
Leibniz’s rejection of equipoise. The above distinction between reason and cause does
not fall prey to this criticism. If the will moves, it has inclining reasons and is thus
rational. But because the will is never necessitated to act by any inclining reason and is
ultimately an irreducible cause of its own free movements, reasons incline; they never
necessitate. Or, put otherwise, reasons incline; they never cause action, for the will is the
free and spontaneous cause of its own actions.
While all of the above qualifications are quite necessary when making plain why
the determinist use of the PSR is overly reductionistic, there is a more serious and
fundamental divide between the compatibilist and the libertarian that is in play here. The
compatibilist perpetually insists on getting behind the will in order to offer a mechanical
explanation of choice. Hence, its line of inquiry continually falls into determinism
precisely because its search for a cause is not satisfied with the inscrutable mystery of
freedom; it insists on there being a determining cause behind these voluntary causes. This
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tendency is articulated by J. R. Cresswell when he writes in reference to Scotus, “Here
we are obliged to leave the Subtle Doctor, for there is no answer to the final question:
What is the ‘reason’ for the will’s act? or, What are the conditions for the sake of which
the free decision of the will can make the object an end?”112 In the face of such a
question, we arrive at the most fundamental distinction between libertarians and
determinists. The libertarian is committed to something akin to the reply of Immanuel
Kant: the free movements of the will are inscrutable, for if a mechanistic explanation
could be offered, such as what is found among empirical cause-effect nexus, our willing
would not be free.113 This commitment to the will as an inscrutable bedrock of choice (or
a voluntary cause) is invariably the stand the libertarian must take. The will is the ground
of choice that cannot be gotten behind or forced into mechanical categories without
violating the very nature of freedom, anymore than a circle could be scrutinized if its
scrutinizers demanded that it be explained by being squared.
My invocation of Kant, here, is quite intentional. For Kant is a useful catalyst for
bringing to the fore some key distinctions between the older metaphysics (and their
corresponding espistemologies) and the newer approach of the compatibilists. First,
Kant’s argument for freedom is instructive because he acknowledges that the empirical
faculties inevitably press without ceasing for a mechanical efficient cause that moves the
will to choose. This is simply the nature of the empirical faculties: they process things in
terms of mechanical cause and effect. However, Kant is clear that our empirical faculties
do not perceive things as they are in themselves—hence God, the soul, and freedom itself
112
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are beyond our empirical intuitions. Our moral faculties give us a sense of what is
required of freedom—how it is to be defined in terms of contingency and contrary
choice—but it never gives us an empirical intuition of it. Were our empirical faculties to
try to give an empirical intuition, these faculties would invariably search again for a
mechanical cause and undermine freedom. This is precisely why Kant labels freedom
inscrutable: it cannot be thought by the empirical faculties, but it is demanded and
defined by the moral faculties.114
To be sure, my intention is not to press Kant backwards onto Leibniz. However,
Kant’s point is important because it has precedence in the Christian tradition prior to
Leibniz. The epistemological limitations expressed in Kant’s reply have precedence
among a number of Church fathers, as do their application to the mind itself. Basil of
Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzen on up through John of Damascus
understand the structures and limits of human reason to be dictated, not by the outside
world, but by the innate limitations of our faculties. I will focus here on Basil of Caesarea
as one example.115
Basil discusses the limitations of our faculties in the context of Christian
knowledge of God. His discussion hinges on the patristic distinctions between ousia,
hypostasis, and energeia. The distinction between ousia and hypostasis is likely more
familiar to readers, given its centrality to the Nicene understanding of the Trinity. Briefly
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stated, the Eastern fathers make a distinction between the particular or subject that has a
certain nature (hypostasis) and the nature (ousia) had by the subject. The pro-Nicenes
maintained the moderate realist position that multiple members of a given species share a
common nature. For example, Bob, Bill, and Bernice are not three humans (human
denoting the species or nature that subsists in the subject), but are three human (singular)
persons (plural). The distinction was at the heart of the pro-Nicene understanding of the
Trinity, according to which Christians do not profess three Gods (God here indicating the
divine nature, which is simple and one), but profess three divine (singular) persons
(plural).116 As for energeia, the term, as discussed above, identifies operations that
proceed from fully actual perfections and are non-mutative.117 The concept enabled the
Christians, with Aristotle, to affirm that God is pure actuality, and is thus void of
movements (i.e., mutations from potency to actuality), but still say that God is operative
in the world.118 Second, the concept provided a way to speak of human participation in
the divine via God’s operative power (energeia) without collapsing God and world into a
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common nature (ousia).119 By way of analogy, the operative powers of fire include
heating and lighting, but these operations can be communicated to metal without
changing the ousia of metal—the metal remains metal but is “energized” by a foreign
nature, namely, that of fire.
Employing these distinctions, Basil gives reason to think that one can be ignorant
of ousia and yet not of its energeiai nor of the hypostases in whom it subsists. For, Basil
argues that our to grasp ousia is not restricted to the divine. Rather, ousiai generally are
beyond the grasp of human faculties. Take, for example, a human person. Basil submits
that there is a distinction between the appearance of the subject, which is superficial and
based on properties manifest in matter, and the form immanent in matter that gives rise to
these properties. We perceive the former, and from these properties and the operative
powers we observe we infer what nature is immanent. However, we do not perceive the
essence directly. Basil writes:
The quibble is just as though any one were to say, Do you know Timothy? Oh, if
you know Timothy you know his nature…. Yes; but I at the same time both know
and do not know Timothy, though not in the same way and in the same degree….
I know him according to his nature and other properties; but I am ignorant of his
essence. Indeed, in this way too, I both know, and am ignorant of myself. I know
indeed who I am, but, so far as I am ignorant of my essence I do not know
myself.120
In this passage, Basil professes to know Timothy (the hypoastsis) but confesses
ignorance of Timothy’s essence (ousia). Basil’s claim is not that he is unsure whether
Timothy is human, but he is presuming a more Aristotelian epistemology, according to
which he has neither innate ideas nor direct access to Timothy’s essence. Instead, he
119
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moves from observation of the subject to an abstract idea of his nature (eidos).121 But the
inferential abstract offers a type of propositional knowledge regarding Timothy’s nature;
to apprehend the essence directly is a different matter. And the latter is plainly beyond
Basil’s faculties. Lest we read Basil as saying that these epistemic limits apply to only
objects external to him, he is clear that the same limits apply to his self-understanding:
Basil does not know his own essence.
The aim of Basil’s argument is to defend the coherence of claiming that we do not
apprehend the divine essence, but can still profess knowledge of the divine hypostases
and energeiai.122 However, for our purposes here, the nuances of Basil’s case are
informative with regard to the respective epistemologies of more traditional theological
schools and the later compatibilists. The former view, as expressed by Basil and echoed
in other patristic writers,123 indicates that they do not presume to apprehend freedom as
such. Quite the contrary, “Indeed, in this way too, I both know, and am ignorant of
myself. I know indeed who I am, but, so far as I am ignorant of my essence I do not know
myself.”124 Hence, it would not be controversial to claim with regard to the will that we
do not apprehend its nature, such that we can get behind it and dissect it. We know only
its operations and particular uses. To say this is not to admit complete ignorance of the
will. On the contrary, to grasp propositionally that its operations are contrary to
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mechanical determination and thus cannot be explained in this manner is to grasp
something quite meaningful, just as to grasp propositionally that God’s essence is infinite
and thus cannot be circumscribed by the finite intellect is to grasp something quite
meaningful.125
We can, therefore, offer some level of predication based on the operations of
freedom. However, to infer a predicate based on the operations is quite different than
apprehending its nature directly. Hence, we find propositions regarding freedom in older
literature, but these are non-reductive propositions. For example, in Gomarus we find its
the basic requirements: q is embraced in such a way that q may be rejected; q is elicited
in a way that the act may not be elicited without any change in understanding; the act is
free from necessity and coercion; the act cannot be reducible to a movement of habit;
and the act is spontaneously chosen, that is, by an inward potency to produce or not
produce the act.126 These sorts of conditions are common, but there is no claim to have
gotten behind freedom or provided a mechanism for choice. Instead, there is only an
understanding, based on experience and the demands of moral culpability, that the
operations of freedom are of such a kind that the above predicates apply.127
To be sure, the distinction between the compatibilist and the incompatibilist is not
whether one makes a bald appeal to mystery (incompatibilist) or does not (compatibilist).
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Instead, the discussion is indicative of a reductionist empiricist tendency that emerges in
the 16th and 17th centuries,128 and gives rise to compatibilism in the 17th and 18th
centuries.129 The more traditional epistemology described above is indicative of an
Aristotelian tendency in which there are non-empirical realities that press in on matter.
Our faculties do not apprehend these non-empirical realities directly; they perceive only
the operations of these realities from which they make inference to the reality that
undergirds them. Reason also perceives that there are non-empirical realities, such as
mathematics and universals, that press in on the understanding but not on the senses.130
With the rise of the mechanical philosophy, however, the anti-Aristotelian bias pushed
back against this way of thinking, demanding empirical mechanisms for the order of
things (or at least speculation regarding empirical mechanisms).131 Formal causality
(what it is) was often reduced to or conflated with material causality (of what it is made);
and with the dissolve of the distinction between formal and material cause, cause itself
was often reduced to efficient cause only—hence Robert Boyle’s fear that the mechanical
philosophy would ultimately dispose of final causality as well.132
So it was with freedom. The insistence on getting behind freedom became
reductionist because it presumed that a mechanical answer can be given with regard to
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the cause of choice. The more traditional tendency, however, tends to accept the limits of
reason. Much like Kant, the older philosophy recognizes that it faces empirical limits.
Based on moral intuition and the existential experience of freedom, basic predication is
assigned to freedom—what it includes and excludes—but there is a recognition that the
nature or essence of freedom itself is inscrutable. Hence, the older view is satisfied with
affirming that its choices are rational (as per the above distinction between causes and
reasons) and providing the conditions of choosing (contra necessitarianism), but this is
the limit of our understanding of voluntary causes.
Returning, then, to Leibniz, we face the question of where he sits on this topic—
with the new or old philosophy. PSR is often read as a reductionist tendency: Leibniz
demands a cause behind freedom. I, however, side with Paull that Leibniz’s PSR does not
require a reductionist treatment of free choice; it suffices that the will has a reason (given
its embrace of the then-dominant inclination); the cause of choice is the will itself, which
accords with Leibniz’s use of voluntary causes. As for the inscrutability of this cause, I
think it is relevant that Leibniz distinguishes explain, comprehend, prove, and uphold,
and based on his definitions, unless he offers an a priori proof for freedom, it cannot be
proven and therefore cannot be comprehended; it can only be upheld (G 6.52). In
addition, it is worth remembering that Leibniz returns to Aristotle after a youthful jaunt in
the world of the mechanical philosophy, and I have sought to highlight throughout Part 2
the degree to which Leibniz remains committed to the older philosophies. Finally, I find
that a number of Leibniz’s claim simply do not make sense apart from libertarian choice,
as I have argued here and in Part 2. In the end, therefore, I believe the libertarian reading
of Leibniz is not only viable, but may prove to be the most charitable.

CHAPTER 6
Challenges to the Best and the Contemporary Task of Theodicy

To this point, we have seen that there is good prime facie evidence for this
Augustinian reading of Leibniz’s philosophical theology, and that this rereading casts
suspicion on the respective necessitarian, deistic, and Spinozistic portraits of Leibniz of
the past three centuries. This chapter takes two final steps in completing this project. In
specific, I turn my attention to the contemporary discussion concerning the problem of
evil. First (section 1), I consider contemporary objections to the very idea of a “best”
world. As we will see, the previous chapters provide ample material for addressing these
remaining difficulties. Second (section 2), I consider the alternatives to Leibniz’s
theodicy in the current literature. I will argue that the affirmative approaches to theodicy
that presume a traditional understanding of God either reiterate some aspect of Leibniz’s
theodicy or could be affirmed as a sub-point within his theodicy. Thus, while there is
resistance to Leibniz’s theodicy among contemporary defenders of God’s justice,
Leibniz’s opponents prove unsuccessful in offering true alternatives.

1. Objections to “the Best”
Contemporary objections to Leibniz’s theodicy often center on his claims
concerning “the best.” In this section, we will consider four such objections: (1) Does the
idea of “the best possible world” make sense? (2) Even if there is not a best possible
world, it would still be rational for God to create because a world is better than no
world. (3) One cannot sin against possible agents, only against actual agents; hence God
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has no obligation to any possible worlds other than the one he chooses to actualize. (4) A
Christian worldview does not require that God create the best possible world. I will deal
with each of these objections in turn.
I. Does the idea of “the best possible world” make sense?
There are two sides to this coin. The one side, advocated by Robert Merrihew
Adams, is that there appears to be no limit to the number of possible worlds, and thus no
“maximum” perfection that could constitute a “best possible world.”1 The other side of
this coin can be found in Richard Swinburne, J. L. Mackie, Michael Banner, Joshua
Hoffman, and Gary Rosenkrantz who suggest that if it is intelligible to speak of a
maximum level of merit that a world can have, then it is likely that more than one
possible world would possess this level of merit.2 This difficulty, or set of difficulties, is
what leads a number of scholars to seek some procedure according to which God may
rationally select a world, despite the absence of a best option.3 I contend such efforts are
unnecessary, as I see at least four replies.
The first is Leibniz’s claim that if equilibrium were to occur, no choice could
follow (G 6:107). The reply is a simple modus tollens:
1. If no best can be found among possible worlds, then no world would exist.
2. Our world exists.
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3. Therefore, a best can be found among possible worlds. (1 & 2)
Leibniz’s case, as discussed above, is based on what he knows a priori of God, and we
have seen that he has patristic and medieval support for his understanding that providence
does everything in the best possible way.4 But I expect that his assumptions concerning
faculty psychology would be contested by proponents of this objection, and thus, while
the above argument is valid, many would question whether it is sound.
The second reply is directed at Adams’ version of the objection. Though Leibniz
offers the following remark in a very different context, the point is perfectly relevant
here. Leibniz states: “Even so there are asymptote figures in geometry where an infinite
length makes only a finite progress in breath” (G 6:279). The statement is found in the
context of Leibniz’s claim that the damned can perpetually mitigate their sufferings by
restraint but never achieve bliss; yet the geometric analogy could be used just as well in
the current context. Even if we grant that there are an infinite number of possible worlds,
it does not follow that there is limitless goodness to be found amongst these worlds. A
best may still be available. Coupled with the above modus tollens claim, Leibniz could
quite easily argue that the best is not only an intelligible concept, but one we have reason
to believe obtains.
The third reply calls into question the understanding of possible worlds in view. It
is evident that the proponents of this objection take possible worlds in the strictly logical
sense. Hence, there is no limit to the number of possible worlds, and every conceivable
subject-predicate combination that is void of contradiction is available to God. Yet, two
points should be kept in mind concerning the limiting of possible worlds. The first is
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Leibniz’s own point concerning compossibles. Though there may be no limit to the
number of goods we can imagine, Leibniz insists that not all possible goods are
compossible goods. Such a claim adds a layer of intelligibility to the idea that there is a
maximal concatenation of compossible goods, even if the number of possible goods is not
limited. The second point is this. Granting the metaphysical understanding of the possible
argued throughout this project, not every logically possible world obtains in the realm of
the possible. Hence, as Leibniz himself points out, we do not know what possible worlds
are available to God. In this light, demonstrating that the objection holds water becomes
much more difficult. For even if one can conceive of two worlds that are perfectly equal
in goodness, this does not demonstrate that both imagined worlds can be found in the
realm of the possible.
The fourth and final reply is that the concept of world utilized in the argument is
too limited. Let us say that there is a maximum level of goodness that a possible world
can possess (p). And let us also say that God finds in the realm of the possible multiple
worlds that possess p. For the sake of argument, we will say that 50 possible worlds
posses p. Might God be able to actualize all 50 possible worlds simultaneously in
different dimensions? If the answer is Yes, and I see no reason to answer otherwise, then
those 50 worlds would constitute the world on Leibniz’s use of the term. For Leibniz uses
world (Monde) in the broad sense of creation (e.g., G 6:107). Leibniz could therefore
reply to the objection thusly: If multiple possible worlds were found to be equal in
goodness, but all such worlds could be actualized simultaneously in parallel dimensions,
then this concatenation of compossible goods in multiple worlds would constitute the best
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possible world. In this light, it is questionable whether the version of the objection as
formulated by Swinburne, et al., is intelligible.
II. Even if there is not a best possible world, it would still be rational for God to
create because a world is better than no world.
This objection is an extension of the previous one, and takes aim specifically at
premise 1 of the above modus tollens argument. Proponents of this objection, such as
Swinburne, argue that without the best, “[God] surely has reason to use some process of
random selection or some arbitrary feature of a world to determine which to create….
[U]nlike Buridan’s ass, he may make an arbitrary selection, and that will have been the
rational thing to do.”5 The assumption is that no creation is worse than a creation that is
not the best, and therefore God would be truer to himself if he created a less-than-best
world than if he refused to create.6
This objection is another version of the point of confusion argued against in the
previous chapter. It will recalled that I suggested that some contemporary scholarship
displays sympathy for the notion that God gains something by creating. This line of
objection makes this very presumption. As argued above, however, neither Aquinas nor
any other orthodox patristic or medieval figure would grant that God’s goodness is
enhanced by creation.7 In his act of creating, God does not move his own potential into
actuality—he has no potentiality. He merely displays outwardly by his operations those
perfections that are fully actualized and already possessed from eternity. This is what

5

Swinburne, The Existence of God, 115. Cf. D. Howard-Snyder and F. Howard-Snyder, “How an
Unsurpassable Being Can Create a Surpassable World,” 260-68.
6

Adams, “Must God Create the Best?” 317-319.

7

See, e.g., chapter 2, §1.2 above.

374
Aquinas means when he suggests that God’s goodness is complete in itself and not
enhanced by any subordinate end on which he might choose to act.8
In this light, we have reason to maintain that, contra Adams, no act by God is
required for him to be true to himself. For, God’s being is perfectly actualized
independent of the creation and any exercise of will. Nonetheless, if an act is willed by
God, then it must be in keeping with his character. Framed in this light, to not create is
perfectly compatible with the idea of God. But we have very good reason to question
whether acting randomly, arbitrarily, or capriciously is true to God’s nature and
character. In this light, if God’s only options are to create randomly (contrary to his
character) or refrain from creating (in keeping with his character), then we have reason to
believe that restraint would be exercised instead of random action. Leibniz’s premise 1
can thus be argued to have theological merit over against the claims of Adams,
Swinburne, et al.
III. One cannot sin against possible agents, only against actual agents; hence
God has no obligation to any possible worlds other than the one he chooses to actualize.
This objection also comes out of Adams. He suggests that there is a significant
difference between possible beings and actual beings. God has no obligation to treat in a
certain way the former, “for they are not”; but clearly the latter deserve to be treated a
certain way, “for they are.”9 No doubt this objection has prime facie merit, as it would
seem strange for one to suggest that we are just as obliged to “beings” that lack existence
as we are to those that have existence.
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To answer this objection, we must consider how Leibniz understands divine duty.
He speaks of God’s duty to the best in two distinct ways. The first emphasizes the fact
that God, unlike a tutor or a mother, has a duty to everything in creation. That is, as God,
his duty is to the whole, and nothing is outside of his providential jurisdiction (G 6:175-7;
188). The second way in which Leibniz speaks of God’s duty to the best is in reference to
God’s own self. That is, God’s duty to perform the best is a duty to the perfections of his
very divinity, namely, his wisdom, goodness, and power (G 6:183).
In neither of the above senses of duty must Leibniz appeal to God’s obligation to
possible agents. Instead, both senses are reducible to God having an obligation to God’s
self. In the first sense of duty, Leibniz’s claim is twofold. First, God (unlike creatures)
cannot misjudge a good, rendering it too much or too little, or incline toward it in a
manner disproportionate to the goodness it possesses. Second, and as an extension of the
first, God cannot exalt the good of one particular entity or set of entities above the good
of others if in so doing he becomes disproportionately concerned with that particular
aspect of creation over the whole. Much like a parent with multiple children, he cannot
seek the good of one child in such a manner that it causes him to neglect his duty to his
other children. Or, to use Leibniz’s analogy, a guard whose duty is to keep watch over a
town cannot justly stop a fight between two men in town if doing so requires that he fail
in his obligation to the town as a whole, thereby putting more lives in danger (G 6:117).
Such a claim is not about God’s duty to possible individuals, but about his duties as God
to the whole of creation.
The second sense of duty is more closely related to the objection, since it is the
basis for Leibniz’s claim that God has a duty to the best. Yet, this second sense of duty is
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not a claim that one group of possible individuals is more entitled to existence than
another set of possible individuals. On the contrary, the claim is again that God cannot
fail in his obligation to himself. That is, it would be unworthy of divine intellect and
wisdom to judge something less than the best to be best. Likewise it would be unworthy
of the divine will, which inclines perfectly toward the good, to choose contrary to the
known good (i.e., the best) in favor of a lower good. The claim is an extension of
Leibniz’s contention that the hypothetical necessity of the best follows a priori from the
very idea of God. Hence for God to create a world that does not meet this hypothetical
necessity is for God to destroy his very divinity, since in so doing he would will
something utterly incompatible with his divine nature (G 6:183). In the end, the duty is
not to possible agents; the duty is to God’s own nature, since, as John of Damascus puts
it, “according to right reason, everything that has come about through providence has
quite necessarily come about in the best manner and that most befitting God, so that it
could not have happened in a better way.”10
IV. A Christian worldview does not require that God create the best.
This fourth objection comes out of Adams as well. Now, the claim that a Christian
worldview does not require God to create the best beckons the question: How does one
define Christian worldview? The extent to which we find antecedents of Leibniz’s
theodicy in the Christian tradition makes me wonder whether such a premise is so easily
granted. However, for the sake of argument, let it stand.
Adams argues the point by suggesting that the Judeo-Christian God has a loving
disposition, being graciously disposed toward creatures. Because grace loves without
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consideration of merit, a “Gracious Person” loves others without fretting over whether
there is someone better to love.11 Adams’ conclusion is that grace is antithetical to the
idea that God chooses the best possible world, since God does not create beings because
they are better but because he is gracious. Where Adams heads with this conclusion is
that it would be an act of grace for God to stoop down and create a world that is inferior
to the best. For, in so doing God would display his gracious character by giving existence
to a world that does not merit it.12
Four points should be noted in response. First, the irony of this objection is that
Adams has previously argued that God has no obligations to possible entities, only
toward actual entities.13 Yet, the above objection (i.e., a gracious God would create a
world that does not merit it) hangs on the opposite presupposition: Possible worlds have
merits or demerits, and God’s choices regarding possible worlds can reflect justice
(rendering what is due) or grace (granting good things that are not due). If, however, God
has no obligations toward any possible world, how can God’s choosing of possible world
1 (PW1) over PW2 constitute an act of grace toward PW1 by which he overlooks its
relative demerits?
Second, even if we grant that somehow God’s dealings with PW1 and PW2 could
display God’s gracious character, Adams’ picture of grace is a distorted one. The picture
he paints is not of grace but of capricious and unjust dealings. For, if it is possible for
God to be obligated to a possible world because of its ontological merits, then PW2 can
rightly claim that it has been treated unjustly in being passed over for PW1. Notice that in
11
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Christ’s parable of the late workers, for example, the vineyard owner pays the workers
who labored in the vineyard all day their proper wages. His generosity was shown in that
he paid the eleventh-hour workers a full day’s wages as well (Matt 20:1-16). What
Adams calls grace would be equivalent to the vineyard owner refusing to pay those who
labored all day and paying only the eleventh-hour workers. No doubt God may give
creatures goods that they have not merited (grace), but he may not forego his duty to
render to each what is due (justice). Or, as Leibniz puts it, God does not operate by a
despotic power by which he may condemn innocence (G 6:208-9).
Third, this entire line of reasoning hinges on understanding God’s duty in the
sense refuted above—that is, as duty to possible entities. If God’s duty is not to possible
entities, however, but is to himself and his perfections, as Leibniz argues, then this line of
argumentation is wrongheaded. For the question is not Which world, if chosen, would
display God’s gracious election? A world consisting of a single mineral might be the best
answer if formulated in this way. The question instead is What world is most true to
God’s wisdom, goodness, and power? God’s duty does not concern the entitlements of
PW1 or PW2, but the divine nature itself.
Fourth, one might anticipate Adams replying to the previous point by suggesting
that the Christian worldview emphasizes grace as primary in God. Thus, the attribute to
which God must fulfill his duty is not his goodness or wisdom or justice or power, but his
grace. Even granting this claim—which I think is suspect—Adams does not escape
Leibniz’s central contention. For, at the end of the day, Adams’ claim on this
reformulation is that the end for which God created the world is to show forth his grace,
and our world is the best possible means for doing so. The implication is that Adams still
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lands precisely where Leibniz begins: Ours is the best possible world, given God’s aim of
showing forth his grace. The great difference between Leibniz and Adams is that Adams
has a more specific claim concerning God’s end in creating the world. Leibniz, by
contrast, admits ignorance on this point.

2. Leibniz and the Contemporary Task of Theodicy
Throughout this project, I have made the case that Leibniz’s theodicy is not
original or innovative, but gathers together various insights from the history of Christian
theology generally and from the Augustinian tradition in particular. As we now consider
the contemporary task of theodicy, I will argue that Leibniz not only gathers into one
place the central insights of the Augustinian tradition, thereby articulating the theodicy
tacitly present throughout its history, but also anticipates the majority of defenses or
theodicies that have been forwarded in recent years.14
To illustrate the point, we will look at the problem of evil as articulated in
contemporary literature, after which we will home in on those defenses or theodicies that
have emerged in response. Under this heading, we will look at two types of approaches.
One approach looks backward to the giants of Christian theology in an effort to dust off
resources that offer a reply. As an example, I will focus on an essay by Eleonore Stump
on Aquinas. We will see that the insights Stump draws out from Aquinas articulate point
by point the claims of the Leibnizian theodicy. The second approach we will consider is
the constructive efforts of recent scholarship to develop a fresh answer to the problem of
evil. We will examine three such defenses/theodicies in the work of Alvin Plantinga,
14
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John Hick, and Marilyn McCord Adams, respectively. We will see that each of these
figures emphasizes a different aspect of the problem and thus takes a different strategy in
reply. Yet, I will argue that each of their responses can either be found explicitly in
Leibniz or assumes a line of argumentation implicitly present in his work. We will begin
with the former approach as found in Stump.15
In Stump’s essay on providence and evil, she notes that she had previously
established a trio of premises rooted in the basic Christian creation-fall-redemptionconsummation narrative: (1) man fell into sin by free choice and passed corruption to its
inheritance; (2) natural evil occurs because of the fall of man; and (3) depending on the
given man’s condition at death, he goes to heaven or hell.16 Her aim in addressing the
topic of providence seeks to build on this case in two ways, only one of which is of
concern here, namely, to show that she rejects the view that God wills evil in order to
produce the best of all possible worlds.17
Stump succinctly summarizes a number of claims that sit at the foundation of
Augustinian theology, such as the goodness of being and the identification of God and
Goodness, following from divine simplicity.18 In addition, she sets forth from Aquinas a
traditional understanding of the relationship between divine sovereignty and creaturely
freedom. That is, God has limitations when dealing with creatures but only insofar as
God chooses to create them in a certain way and to interact with them according certain
15
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rules.19 Stump argues that God’s providential dealings with creatures are an extension of
his goodness, and the ultimate telos of his creatures is union with him. Hence, God in his
goodness aims at reuniting his creatures with himself. For simplicity sake, she identifies
both the plan and its execution as providence.20
Now, Stump acknowledges that problems emerge when considering arguments
that God’s will not only directs creatures back to himself, but succeeds in doing so. One
group of arguments consist in stating that God’s will is not always accomplished, and
thus it would seem that God’s plans are frustrated by men.21 In addressing this difficulty,
she uses Aquinas to distinguish God’s antecedent will from his consequent will. She
notes that God in his antecedent will desires that all men are saved.22 The antecedent will,
notes Stump, considers the particular thing in the abstract, and thus desires nothing but its
telos for it.23 Yet, the consequent will is God’s will with reference to the particular thing
in the given circumstances. She uses the example of Jonah, suggesting that Jonah
contravenes God’s antecedent will, but not his consequent will. For, although God desires
Jonah’s obedience (antecedently), God allows Jonah to sin against him, and thus permits
evil (consequently).24
God’s permitting of evil can be understood in two ways, argues Stump. One
understanding attributes to God a good end, but not a good object (i.e., what is actually
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done).25 According to Aquinas, however, to let good ends justify evil means is to have a
good end but a bad object, which is immoral.26 Therefore, Stump argues that no one is
justified in permitting evil because they can compensate for that evil with a good
outcome. She therefore argues that evil is permissible only when it is the best and only
means available for preventing a greater evil from occurring. For, to permit a lesser evil
in order to avoid a greater evil is to actually have a good end and a good object, despite
the fact that a lesser evil is permitted in the process.27 The permissive will of God must
therefore be understood in this latter sense.
In this light, Stump is suspicious of Alvin Plantinga’s claim that God’s permitting
of evil is often “mysterious.”28 Her point is that the truth of this claim depends on the
sense in which “mysterious” is taken. If he means that we have no idea why God permits
evil, she disagrees. The distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will allows
us to say with confidence that evil is permitted because it could not be prevented without
a greater evil occurring. However, as for what that greater evil is or how this evil fits into
the whole relative to the alternatives, this remains unclear to us and is in that sense
mysterious.29
Needless to say, the parallels between Stump’s claims and Leibniz are evident.
Stump presumes the creation-fall-redemption-consummation narrative of Christianity, as
25
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well as the traditional metaphysics concerning God and providence as laid bare by
Aquinas. She invokes a free choice defense in reference to the fall and subsequent evils.
In reference to God, she argues that he in his goodness has as his object the good of all
things. But having created man in certain ways (i.e., free) and chosen to deal with man
according to certain rules, this good is not always attainable. Hence, God antecedently
wills nothing but good for each particular creature within creation and wills their
obedience and telos. Yet, God, in his consequent will, must consider each creature in
context. It is here that God permits evil. Lest one read this as good ends justify evil
means, however, the permitting of evil must be understood as a permission that prevents
still greater evils, and thus has both a good end and a good object.
The great irony of Stump’s case is that she understands her essay to be contrary to
the view that God permits evil in order to create the best possible world.30 Stump’s claim
on this point seems to be based on a misreading of Leibniz, however. That is, Leibniz’s
God wills the best as well as the evils actually done. Hence, while Leibniz’s God has a
good end, his God has a corrupt object, which makes his will immoral. Her claim that
God permits evil only to prevent greater evils aims at remedying this distortion. Yet, as
we have seen throughout Part 2, Leibniz does not understand God to will evil
affirmatively or approve of evil, nor does he advocate a good-ends-justify-evil-means
perspective. Instead, he takes the willing of evil in precisely the same way as Stump.
Thus, while Stump sees herself as having unearthed a better way of understanding God’s
permissive will, one that is contrary to the theory of the best, the end result is that she
parrots from Aquinas Leibniz’s very theodicy.
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Stump’s use of Aquinas gives only further confirmation of the ties between
Leibniz’s claims and those of the Augustinian tradition. Yet, what of the more
constructive efforts that have emerged in recent years? Do we find among these
something new? Perhaps the best place to begin is with the basic formulation of the
problem in current literature. The analytic problem of evil is a triad of premises that
appear to be incompatible, but must all be affirmed by a traditional theist (i.e., one who
affirms something like the Judeo-Christian understanding of God and his attributes):
1. God is omnipotent.
2. God is omnibenevolent.
3. Evil exists.
Contemporary proponents of the problem of evil include J. L. Mackie, H. J. McCloskey,
William L. Rowe, and J. L. Schellenberg.31 Mackie sets up the problem in a syllogistic
fashion, harkening back to Hume’s well-known paraphrase of Epicurus.32 Mackie argues
that a contradiction emerges when holding the above three premises in tandem, and the
theist must abandon one of these premises to remain consistent. Mackie takes this fact to
be reflected in the solutions ranging from Manicheism, which denies (1), to the denial of
evil as an illusion, which denies (3). In the end, the conclusion of these proponents of the
problem is that, given the reality of natural evils (e.g., earthquakes), extreme evils (e.g.,
the holocaust), and superfluous evils (e.g., the rape and beating of a child), no
31
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justification for evil can be offered by the theist, and thus it is likely, if not certain, that
God does not exist.33
Though some theists concede the point and thus seek a revised understanding of
divinity,34 a great many seek to offer constructive and innovative defenses or theodicies
amid a traditional view of God. To be sure, these theodicies are “traditional” not in the
sense that the theology presumed throughout is orthodox, but in the sense that the view of
God presumed throughout is broadly traditional. There are typically three major
components of these traditional defenses/theodicies: (i) moral evil is the product of free
moral agents; (ii) certain higher goods are not possible without risking certain evils; and
(iii) a long-term vision is essential to seeing how the permitting of evil is morally
permissible. Exactly what each of these claims looks like varies from proponent to
proponent, but each one regularly comes to the fore in traditional defenses/theodicies.35 I
will here focus on three examples coming out of Plantinga, Hick, and McCord Adams.
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Plantinga is perhaps the most well-known advocate of the “free-will defense” in
recent years, which exemplifies (i) and (ii). Plantinga labels his reply a defense rather
than a theodicy, since he takes the latter to imply a more normative claim concerning the
reasons for the existence of evil. A defense, by contrast, merely aims at showing that an
answer can be given to the analytic problem of evil, and in showing this, undermines the
analytic certainty of God’s non-existence.36
Plantinga sets his free-will defense on the backdrop of contemporary antitheodicy approaches, such as that of Mackie.37 Plantinga highlights the fact that if the
anti-theodicy argument aims at granting certainty of God’s non-existence, it must
demonstrate a formal contradiction between the attributes of God (traditionally
understood) and the existence of evil. For only if God is omnipotent, and omnibenevolent
(c) lands in a formal contradiction with evil exists (d) is the case proven.38 The free-will
defense aims at undermining the anti-theodicy case by showing that if c is conjoined with
a third proposition (e), and the conjoining of c and e entails d, then there is no formal
contradiction between c and d.39 God creates creatures with free will, it is suggested, is e
and when conjoined with c, this may well entail d.
One key objection to this line of argumentation is the logical possibility of free
creatures who do not sin. That is to ask: Is it not logically possible for God to create a
world where men always freely choose the good?40 In reply, Plantinga challenges the
36
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conflation logically possible worlds with actualizable worlds, and thus argues that not all
of the former fall within the sphere of the latter.41 In defense of this claim, he draws a
distinction between creating and actualizing. The former is unilateral—God alone does
it—but the latter may not be. For example, if one of the conditions of a person choosing
the good freely is that they do so without influence from outside agents, then the
contingency of the act falls to the free agent, not to God. God can create free agents, but
he cannot create free-agents-freely-choosing-the-good. The latter must be actualized by
the agent making this choice.42 Granting such distinctions, there are a great many
logically possible worlds that God cannot actualize, for many logically possible worlds
involve free agents choosing this or that, and God cannot do this on their behalf. This
conclusion opens the door to the possibility of transworld depravity: That is, though not
every logically possible world with free agents includes evil, every actualizable world
with free agents does.43
A second influential theodicy in recent years is that of John Hick. Hick develops
what he calls an Irenaean soul-building theodicy, which emphasizes (iii), but also brings
to bear (i) and (ii). Drawing on St. Irenaeus, Hick parts ways with the “Augustinian”
understanding of the fall in which Adam was an ideal being that dragged humanity down
from its heights into corruption. Instead, according to Hick, Adam was immature and
needed to develop virtue through a good use of free choice.44 Though Adam went astray,
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this did not drag humanity down from paradise, but was simply one of many missteps in
the long trail of the moral and spiritual development of humanity. Such development is
precisely the aim of our world. According to Hick, “The Irenaean approach, representing
in the past a minority report, hinges upon the creation of humankind through the
evolutionary process as an immature creature, living in a challenging and therefore
person-making world.”45 In Hick’s theodicy, the “challenges” of this world that help
catalyze human growth include not only natural evils, pain and suffering, and the ability
to go morally awry, but also epistemic distance between humanity and God—distance
that preserves our freedom regarding whether to love God or reject God.46
In keeping with his pluralistic convictions, Hick argues that the building of souls
must ultimately be efficacious in the life to come. That is to say, God’s aim of building
souls must succeed for every human person. Hick writes, “If Augustine is correct [that
our hearts are restless until they rest in God], then sooner or later, in our own time and in
our own way, we shall all freely come to God; and universal salvation can be affirmed,
not as a logical necessity but as the contingent but predictable outcome of the process of
the universe interpreted theistically.”47

19.4 (PL 41:269-271, 327-328, 350, 351-353, 434-435, 627-631); De Genesi ad Litteram Imperfectus 1.3
(PL 34:218-219); De Natura Boni contra Manichaeos 5, 8 (PL 42:553, 554); Enchiridion ad Laurentium de
Fide et Spe et Caritate 12-13, 23 (PL 40:236-238, 244); De Praedestione Sanctorum 17.34 (PL 44:985986).and Irenaeus, Contra Haereses 3.20.1-3.20.2, 4.37.5, 4.38.1-4.38.3, 4.39.1-4.39.2, 5.6.1 (PG 7:942a944a, 1102b-1103a, 1105a-1108c, 1109c-1110d, 1136c-1138c); Ostensio Apostolicae Praedicationis in
Démonstration de la Prédication Apostolique, ed. and trans. Adelin Rouseau (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf,
1995), c12, vol. 406 of Sources Chrétiennes.
45

Hick, “An Irenaean Theodicy,” 39.

46

See Hick, Evil and the God of Love, IV, esp. IV.xii.3; IV.xiii.7; and IV.xiv-xv.

47

Hick, “An Irenaean Theodicy,” 52. See also John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (Yale
University Press, 2005), Part IV.

389
Like Plantinga’s defense, Hick’s soul-building theodicy addresses the problem of
evil classically formulated. If God is omnipotent, and omnibenevolent (c), how is evil
exists (d) possible? Although both thinkers posit a version of the free-will defense, Hick
advances on Plantinga’s theodicy by way of anthropology. In Plantinga’s version of the
free will defense, c is conjoined with a third proposition, e (freedom), that results in d.
Hick affirms the addition of e, but he believes another proposition is still needed: Free
creatures come into being morally and spiritually unformed, and must be formed through
trials (f). Granting f, we have both an explanation of why freedom results in evil (viz., the
inevitable immaturity of newly created beings) and a purpose, beyond freedom itself, that
justifies the temporary permitting of evil (viz., the moral/spiritual formation of free
creatures). In other words, Hick does not believe that freedom in itself is a good capable
of justifying evil or even of explaining why evil exists. Freedom may be a necessary
condition for reconciling c with d, but it is not a sufficient condition. What is required is
both an explanation of why free creatures inevitably sin and a purpose beyond freedom
itself that makes their temporary follies a price worth paying. Proposition f, argues Hick,
offers both.48
A third approach to the problem of evil is the defense of Marilyn McCord
Adams.49 McCord Adams homes in on the problem of hell as the centerpiece of the
problem of evil. The basic contention is that if God exists, hell cannot.50 McCord Adams
highlights three significant difficulties that the doctrine raises. First, hell is counter to the
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overall good of the person, as it does not reform or redeem, but only promotes evil.51
Second, the problem is exacerbated if coupled with the doctrine of election—especially
in its more fatalistic formulations—for the result is a diabolic picture of God as one who
creates and destines individuals for torment without a view to their good or ultimate
redemption.52 Third, the problem faces the disproportionate difficulty, or the problem that
the punishment rendered to the individual seems grossly disproportionate to the crimes of
the damned.53
McCord Adams considers the prospect of a free choice defense. She thinks this
explanation fails in reference to hell. The primary difficulty she identifies is that humans
have trouble conceiving what they have not experienced. The rejection of God in favor of
eternal damnation is not, then, a fully informed choice.54 In addition, McCord Adams
thinks the defense is stymied by the notion of the fall, according to which a single sin in
utopia results in innumerable evils and ultimately in original sin, which makes it
impossible for men to respond to the gospel without prevenient grace.55 She therefore
sides with Hick in rejecting the Augustinian view.56 She considers several other
approaches, all of which she thinks faill: A Molinist approach in which God saves those
he knows will accept the gospel; a psychological view in which hell is locked from the
inside but the damned are hardened in rebellion; and an annihilationist view in which the
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damned are destroyed rather than tormented in perpetuity.57 In the end, McCord Adams
maintains that hell, being wholly incompatible and unreconcilable with the idea of God,
must not exist. In short, the only possible defense is universalism—all will be saved.58
With these three defenses/theodicies before us, we can see that all three of the
above responses are compatible with Leibniz’s overarching argument. Notice that
Plantinga’s distinction between a defense and a theodicy does not distance him from
Leibniz. Quite the contrary, this distinction, if granted, indicates that Leibniz’s own
project is rightly labeled a defense, not a theodicy. For, as we saw above, Leibniz does
not claim to know the reasons why God created the world or offer a definitive answer to
every problem. Quite the contrary, he insists, despite Bayle’s prodding, that he need not
account for every evil, but only show that divinity is compatible with the permitting of
evil:
[B]ut I do not undertake to give [a complete explanation]; nor am I bound to do
so…. It is sufficient for me to point out that there is nothing to prevent the
connection of a certain individual evil with what is the best on the whole. This
incomplete explanation, leaving something to be discovered in the life to come, is
sufficient for answering the objections, though not for a comprehension of the
matter. (G 6:189)
It is Bayle, not Leibniz, who insists on a complete explanation of evil. Leibniz is satisfied
to offer a defense of God’s justice, or theo dikā.
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Yet, beyond the overall strategy, the particulars of Plantinga’s approach can all be
found explicitly in Leibniz (granting the reading argued herein). Plantinga’s free-will
defense has two major features. Its central claim is that God may not be able to actualize
freedom (itself a good) without evil attaching by concomitance. As we have seen (per
chapter 3), Leibniz states explicitly that God only permits evil if it attaches by
concomitance to some greater good, and he entertains the possibility that freedom itself
may be the very good that cannot be had without evil resulting as a consequence (see
chapter 4, §2.2-3 above).
The second major feature of Plantinga’s defense is the possibility of transworld
depravity. We saw above that Plantinga distinguishes logically possible worlds from
actualizable worlds. That is to say, there is a difference between creating a world and
actualizing a state of affairs. The former God does unilaterally, but the latter, if it includes
free creatures acting freely, is brought about synergistically. Simply because a certain
state of affairs is logically possible, this does not mean it can be actualized by God
unilaterally if that state of affairs requires that free agents freely choose certain things.59
This nuances moves Plantinga much closer to the metaphysical view of possible worlds
argued for in Parts 2 and 3 of this project. According to this rereading of Leibniz, not
every logically possible world obtains in the realm of the possible, and only those worlds
that obtain in the realm of the possible can be granted existence by God.60 The push in
both Plantinga and Leibniz (again, granting this reading) is for a more nuanced
understanding of possible worlds that limits what is available to God and opens the door
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to the possibility that a sinless world may not be possible in the sense of being
unilaterally actualizable by divine decree.61
The theodicy of Hick, while not contained explicitly in Leibniz, is also perfectly
compatible with Leibniz’s central claim. Hick rejects Leibniz’s theodicy as repugnant,
arguing that Leibniz treats the smattering of good and evil as mere aesthetics.62 Yet, Hick
goes on to argue that God’s central aim in creation is to build souls, and our world is
justified because it is the best means for reaching this end. Hick’s conclusion is that this
goal, when combined with free choice and the general immaturity of creation, is
sufficient to justify the temporary existence of evil. There are significant theological
differences between Hick and Leibniz (e.g., Hick is a pluralist; Leibniz is not; Hick
denies the fall in the Augustinian sense; Leibniz does not). However, Leibniz’s defense
could quite easily affirm that Hick’s central claim may well be correct. It may well be
that the end (or one of the ends) for which God created the world is to build souls, and
that our world is the best means for reaching that end. Moreover, it may be true that the
formation of souls, as it occurs in our world, is a good that cannot be had without evil
attaching to our world by concomitance. The great difference between Leibniz and Hick
is that Hick is more dogmatic regarding the end for which God created the world.
Leibniz, by contrast, remains agnostic regarding God’s reasons.
We find a similar result in reference to McCord Adams’ defense. Because
McCord Adams finds hell to be the centerpiece of the problem of evil, she finds
universalism and only universalism to solve the problem. Leibniz would not accept her
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insistence on this being the only solution to the problem of hell—hence his manifold
barrage of possible solutions discussed in chapter 4, §3.3. However, we did see that
Leibniz includes in his list of possible solutions universalism (à la Origen, Gregory of
Nyssa, et al.) (G 6:60-1). Leibniz himself thinks a retreat to this position is unnecessary
(G 6:165), but he grants its possibility. In the end, the great difference between McCord
Adams and Leibniz is the same difference between Hick and Leibniz: McCord Adams
offers a dogmatic answer, while Leibniz thinks it suffices to catalog the various possible
solutions (in which hers is included), while remaining agnostic about which will be
shown correct in the life to come (G 6:279-80).
This result can be found to carry throughout the majority of the contemporary
literature that offers a defense or theodicy. Most authors tend to either offer a reason why
God would permit evil or forward a hypothetical that could undermine the specific evil in
view. In the former case, the reason is typically reducible to a good that cannot be had
without evil attaching as a consequence (such as freedom) or an end for which God
created our world (such as soul-building) that cannot be had without our world.63 In the
latter approach, the hypothetical offered, if having any representation in the history of
Christian orthodoxy, can typically be found to be explicitly entertained by Leibniz or to
be implied in or compatible with his work. If there is a difference between Leibniz and
63
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these contemporary authors, it more often than not centers on the cogency of “the best.”
But, as we have seen above in §1 above, it is questionable whether any successful
refutations of this concept are forthcoming. In short, I think it is fair to say that the
contemporary literature on theodicy is a footnote to Leibniz.

***
As stated in the opening of this work, the defense of Leibniz’s theodicy contained
herein is both historical and constructive. On the historical side, I have sought to show
several things. My overarching case has been that Leibniz’s philosophical theology,
rightly interpreted, represents a traditional brand of Augustinianism, and the claims
throughout his theodicy are an undefiled extension of this tradition. Hence, Leibniz’s
theodicy is not his own, but is the tacit claim of a longstanding theological tradition made
explicit and brought to bear on the problem of evil as articulated in Leibniz’s day.
As an extension of this claim, I have also argued a number of subordinate claims,
the most significant of which center on how we read Leibniz on the God-world
relationship and on free choice. Regarding the former, I have argued that Leibniz’s
understanding of possible worlds, foreknowledge, divine decree, pre-established
harmony, predetermination, premotion, and divine concourse all have precedence in and
are a recapitulation of older Augustinian, theistic views of God-world interaction. As for
free choice, I have made the case that the Augustinian tradition is not only incompatiblist,
but was recognized as such in Leibniz’s day. Hence, in adhering to this tradition, Leibniz
knowingly embraces a libertarian theology.
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As noted at the outset, however, this project is not strictly a work in the history of
ideas. Rather, this work has included in its aims an assessment and defense of the
viability of Leibniz’s theodicy for Christian theology and the task of theodicy today.
Toward this end, I have constructively engaged Leibniz’s contemporary objectors and the
current literature on the problem of evil, devoting the latter part of this project to
lingering objections and interlocution with current approaches to the problem of evil. I
have sought to demonstrate that we have sufficient evidence to think that Leibniz’s
theodicy, when read in the light of the Augustinian tradition, is theologically orthodox
and philosophical cogent and defensible.
I close this project with two notes, one related to the constructive side of this
defense and the other related to its historical side. Beginning with the latter, how one
determines what is entailed by a Christian worldview likely depends in large part on
one’s confessional commitments. For those, such as myself, who take their cues from the
ecumenical councils, the confessions of the early Church, and the norms of patristic and
early-medieval theology generally, the extent to which Leibniz’s theodicy is rooted in
historical theology is important. For my part, I do not take Christianity to be
metaphysically neutral,64 and thus am unwilling to part ways with the normative
assumptions concerning ontology, the nature of God, or even faculty psychology as found
throughout the first millennium (or so) of Christianity. And I, for one, am convinced that
Leibniz’s claims are a natural, if not inevitable, extension of these early Christian
commitments. I recognize that late-Medieval developments and the deconfessionalizing
trends of the post-Reformation era provide escape routes from Leibniz’s claims.
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However, I am unconvinced that such innovations are true to the faith once given over to
the Saints, articulated and defended in the Patristic era, and received by the early
Medievals. Therefore, I take Leibniz’s response to be not only philosophically cogent and
defensible, but to be the most viable response to the problem of evil for traditional
Christian theology—if not the inevitable response of traditional Augustinianism.
The second note, on which I close this project, concerns the constructive side of
this defense of Leibniz. Though this project falls under the rubric of the history of ideas,
the success and value of this project does not hang solely on its persuasiveness as a
rereading of Leibniz. Were one to somehow find conclusive evidence that the
interpretation of Leibniz defended herein is not true to his texts, the theodicy expounded
and defended here would not thereby disappear. For regardless of whether the theodicy
expounded and defended here is rightly attributed to Leibniz, it remains a theodicy
expounded and defended nonetheless. In this light, the question of whether this theodicy
is Leibniz’s theodicy is different from the question of whether this theodicy is viable and
defensible. One could affirm the former and deny the latter; one could deny the former
and affirm the latter; one could affirm the former and the latter; or one could deny the
former and the latter. In this project I have maintained both claims, to wit, this theodicy is
rightly ascribed to Leibniz and this theodicy is viable and defensible Christian defense of
the justice of God. But should this exposition and defense be somehow dissociated from
Leibniz, it would remain a theodicy now in the literature nonetheless.

APPENDIX
Theological Theses for Public Defense

Theses Pertaining to the Ph.D. Dissertation
1.

From the eighteenth century until today, Leibniz has often been painted as
standing outside of traditional Christian theism. This reading is suspect because it
is based on a number of interpretive assumptions that are contrary to traditional
Augustinian theology, the very theology Leibniz claims to affirm.

2.

Augustine of Hippo opposes physical determinism, theological determinism, and
psychological determinism. Over against these, he argues that the Christian view
of providence understands God’s decrees to operate synergistically, foreknowing
and upholding free choice.

3.

High medieval Augustinians, such as Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus,
recognize the danger of psychological determinism that follows from the
doctrines of divine omniscience and omnibenevolence, and show agreement that
psychological determinism must be rejected as contrary to free choice.

4.

The response to the compatibilism of Jonathan Edwards in eighteenth century
British literature indicates a general agreement among British writers in this
period that the Reformed tradition is opposed to determinism.

5.

Eighteenth and nineteenth century compatibilists display a markedly different
understanding of the theological divides between Greek and Latin Christians,
Augustinians and Pelagians, and Reformed and Arminians than earlier
incompatibilist understandings.

6.

Because Leibniz affirms the traditional understanding of divine foreknowledge,
namely that God foreknows future contingents apart from experience, Leibniz
believes we must affirm that all truths are analytic.

7.

Though God’s knowledge of individuals includes those predicates that are in the
subject, namely future contingents, Leibniz does not understand this to yield
determinism because God knows these predicates to be in the subject
contingently. Hence the predicate could be negated without contradiction.

8.

Leibniz understands God to move agents by particular concourse, but in doing so,
God is not the cause of evil. For evil is a privation; hence whatever is
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ontologically positive in the act is produced by God (the efficient cause), while
whatever is regressive belongs to the creature (the deficient cause).
9.

Though Leibniz affirms that the will always chooses in keeping with its dominant
inclination, this does not yield determinism in Leibniz since he denies that the will
is never bound to choose, and he affirms that the will is able to anticipate and
redirect chains of thought that may lead to a given inclination.

10.

Leibniz’s understanding of possible worlds reflects neither the intellectualist
model of Aquinas, the voluntarist model of Henry of Ghent, nor the middle
knowledge model of Luis de Molina. Rather, his understanding of God’s
grounding of possibles by the will and God’s knowledge of possibles by the
intellect’s knowledge of the divine essence reflects the middle way of John Duns
Scotus.

11.

Drawing on John of Damascus, Leibniz affirms that God antecedently inclines
toward, and indeed wills, every possible good proportionate to its goodness, but
because not all goods are compossible, God consequently wills the best
concatenation of compossible goods.

12.

According to Leibniz, God can only permit sin if preventing this evil would
require that God sin and the permitting of sin is the only and best way to prevent a
still greater evil.

13.

Leibniz argues that it may not be possible for God to prevent free creatures from
misusing their freedom by perpetual miracle while fulfilling his duty to the whole
of creation.

14.

The fall of creatures, says Leibniz, must be ascribed to the free choice of these
creatures. For God provided all that was necessary for them to refrain from
sinning, though they did not make a right use of it.

15.

Leibniz’s view of election and reprobation denies both infralapsarianism and
supralapsarianism on the basis that God decrees an entire world in total. Thus
there is only one decree of God that entails all the particular decrees in the given
world.

16.

Leibniz’s understanding of prevenient grace is broadly Arminian. For he sides
with those who affirm that God has given grace sufficient for salvation to all, if
only they would make a right use of it.

17.

Leibniz denies that hell is eternal because the transgressions committed by the
damned merit infinite punishment. On the contrary, the damned continue to sin in
hell, and thus their finite punishments continue in perpetuity.
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18.

Because the punishment of the damned is proportionate to their sin, Leibniz
argues that the damned may restrain themselves and lessen their torments, though
in doing so the damned cannot attain blessedness.

19.

Leibniz’s solution to the problem of original sin, namely whether it has its source
of perpetuation in God, combines the solution of the pre-existent soul with
traducianism. On this solution, all souls are present in creation at its inception.
The human souls in Adam are thus corrupted in the fall, but the properties of
consciousness and personhood are not added to the soul by God until they become
the subject of a procreative act around which other monads organize.

20.

Leibniz does not understand the contingency of a given act to reside in transworld
identity, according to which an individual exists in multiple worlds, engaging in
different acts, but to reside in the nature of the free act itself. That is, the predicate
is in the subject in such a way that it can be negated without contradiction, and
thus was chosen in a way that reflects the free capacity of the will and its power
of contrary choice.

21.

God is not bound to create since he is pure actuality. As such, his goodness is
complete in itself and does not increase in his act of creation; creation only
displays outwardly that which is already possessed fully inwardly. Hence God
may choose to create or choose to refrain from creating, as both are compatible
with divine goodness.

22.

Because God need not create, it is within the purview of divine goodness, reason,
and freedom to refrain from creating. The world is therefore modally contingent
because it does not follow necessarily from the idea of God, only from the
hypothetical necessity that if God creates, then he creates the best.

23.

Even if there are an infinite number of possible worlds, this does not mean that
there is no maximally good world. For there are geometric lines that are infinite
but make only finite progress, and the range of possible worlds is limited by the
notion of compossibility.

24.

Even if there are multiple worlds of equal good, this does not mean that there is
no best possible world. For so long as several worlds can be actualized
simultaneously, in different dimensions, for example, this collection of equally
good worlds would constitute the best “world” in Leibniz’s sense of the word,
namely, as creation.

25.

It is not an act of grace for God to create a world that is less than the best, for God
has no obligation to any possible world. Therefore his choice of world can only
do justice or injustice to his own goodness, not to any possible worlds that are
passed over or decreed.
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26.

Leibniz’s theodicy naturally unfolds from premises central to the Augustinian
tradition, such as evil as privation, the intellect judging the good, the will
inclining toward the good, divine omniscience, divine omnipotence, and so on.
Thus, a traditional Augustinian cannot deny Leibniz’s theodicy without
abandoning some standard aspect of this tradition.

27.

The affirmative contemporary replies to the problem of evil in figures such as
Alvin Plantinga, John Hick, Marilyn McCord Adams, et al. are compatible with
Leibniz’s theodicy and thus could be appropriated into his theodicy.

Theses Pertaining to Ph.D. Coursework
28.

The epistemology of the Cappadocian Church fathers points away from a Platonic
reading. For these fathers consistently deny that humans have, or can have,
knowledge of essence. Rather, human knowledge infers essence by its encounter
with the operative powers of an essence.

29.

John Calvin’s view of perseverance affirms the hypothetical necessity that if one
falls away from the faith, they will be damned, and he thus reads warning
passages concerning the conditional nature of salvation as affirming this
hypothetical necessity. His view of perseverance is rooted in confidence in God’s
providential care for the elect, not in the impossibility of apostasy by believers.

30.

Karl Barth’s reply to Lessing’s ditch identifies the problem as one of both
subjective epistemology and temporal distance from historical events. Barth’s
reply to this problem emphasizes the objective reality of God for man in Christ,
independent of epistemic certainty, and the presence of Christ here and now in the
gospel, as opposed to there and then in history.

31.

John Hare’s divine command theory drives a wedge between natural goods and
moral goods, but appeals to the fitting nature of moral goods for their rationale.
This view must lapse into either natural law, per its emphasis on the fitting nature
of the commands, or into repugnance by granting that God may command that
which strikes the faculties as necessarily immoral, such as the torture of infants,
per the rift between natural and moral goods.

32.

Though John Nevin admits to having been influenced by German philosophy in
his early years, Nevin’s later emphasis on Christ as the point of union between
God and humanity and Nevin’s emphasis on the organic spread of the salvation to
the world is indicative, not of Schleiermacher or Hegel, but of the influence of the
Cappadocian fathers.

33.

Contra the claim of Philip Clayton, panentheism does not naturally accommodate
the current scientific picture of organic development as bottom-up, for
panentheism conceives of creation moving from being toward non-being, or top-
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down. The contemporary understanding of organic development is better
accommodated by the Augustinian picture of creation ex nihilo in which creatures
move from non-being toward being.
34.

Augustine distinguishes the gift of prevenient grace from the gift of perseverance.
As a result, he affirms that not all who receive prevenient grace persevere to the
end. But because predestination refers to one’s ultimate destination, he does
affirm that only those who are predestined to be saved receive the gift of
perseverance.

35.

Gregory Palamas’ distinction between ousia and energeia and his related
understanding of epistemology, namely that the Christian comes to know God via
the transfiguration of the faculties by participation in the divine energeia, is true
to the view of the Greek fathers, especially the Cappadocians.

36.

The case made by the Eunomians that the unbegotten Father is ontologically
superior to the Only-Begotten Son and the Spirated Holy Spirit falls into the
category error of confusing efficient causality with formal causality. These
distinctions of unbegotten, begotten, and spirated identify a distinction in efficient
causality (how they have the divine nature) not a distinction in formal causality
(what they are by nature).

Theses of Personal Interest
37.

Kant’s rational religion, as articulated in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere
Reason, reflects a Kabbalist influence, evidenced in his advocacy of
monopsychism in Book 1 and his NeoPlatnonic Christology in Book 2, which
mirrors the Kabbalist concept of Adam Kadmon.

38.

The Greek Church fathers show consistent commitment to the view that God is
the creator of bodies that include both essence and accidents. Thus they argue that
all created entities, including spirits, are hylomorphic.

39.

The Cappadocian fathers and Immanuel Kant show very similar commitments to
the limits of human knowledge, which give rise to the problem of religious
epistemology in Kant’s philosophy. The respective solutions to this problem,
however, shows that Kant is committed to the immutability of the faculties of
reason, while the Cappadocians believe that the human person can be transfigured
by participation in the operative power of God, thereby enabling them to
participate in an otherwise foreign knowledge, namely, God’s own.

40.

Artwork is an outward manifestation of inward perfections acquired by the artist,
and because it has this ontological grounding, value judgments concerning
artwork have a definite truth-value based on the judgment’s correspondence to the
perfections manifest in the work itself.
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